National Mall
Steps Identified by Stakeholders Facilitate Design and Approval of Security Enhancements Gao ID: GAO-05-518 June 14, 2005The National Mall in Washington, D.C., encompasses some of our country's most treasured icons and serves as a public gathering place for millions of visitors each year. The National Air and Space Museum, for example, was the most visited museum worldwide in 2003, hosting 9.4 million visitors. Federal agencies with facilities on the National Mall have begun implementing physical security enhancements to protect their facilities and the visiting public. This report responds to Congressional interest in the efforts and expenditures pertaining to these security enhancements and discusses (1) the physical security enhancements that have been implemented on the National Mall since September 11, 2001, the additional enhancements planned, and the costs of these enhancements; (2) the considerations given to incorporating access and aesthetics into the design and approval of these security enhancements, and how issues of access and aesthetics are perceived by visitors in relation to these enhancements; and (3) examples of how federal agencies are using key practices to implement the enhancements, and any challenges the agencies are experiencing in using these key practices. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Smithsonian Institution, Department of the Interior, Department of Agriculture, and National Gallery of Art provided clarifying and technical comments, which were incorporated into this report where appropriate.
Since September 11, 2001, federal agencies on the National Mall have obligated about $132 million for physical security enhancements, with the National Park Service and the Smithsonian accounting for about 75 percent of the total obligations. Security enhancements include additional security personnel, facility upgrades, and equipment and technology. Planned enhancements include the installation of permanent security barriers to protect against vehicle bombs. Public access and aesthetic considerations are integral to the design and approval of security enhancements on the National Mall. Federal agencies must coordinate with reviewing organizations, such as the National Capital Planning Commission, and consider aesthetics, historic preservation, urban design, urban planning, and environmental effects when implementing security enhancements. Although federal agencies reported that the review process can be time-consuming, review organizations noted that early and frequent consultation with them helps to ensure a smoother, more efficient, and expeditious review process. GAO's survey of about 300 visitors to the National Mall, and reports from federal agencies, indicate that visitors value access to and the appearance of the National Mall and generally find the current level of security enhancements acceptable. GAO's survey results also suggest that visitors regard access and aesthetics as important priorities when adding security enhancements to the National Mall. Federal agencies on the National Mall reported using five of the six key practices identified by GAO--allocating resources using risk management, leveraging technology, information-sharing and coordination, performance management and testing, and strategic management of human capital--in implementing physical security enhancements. However, none of the federal agencies on the National Mall reported using the key practice of aligning assets to mission in implementing security measures because they believe they do not have excess or underutilized facilities or consider the practice applicable to property under their jurisdiction. Agencies identified balancing ongoing mission priorities with the need for security as a common challenge in using key practices to implement physical security enhancements.
GAO-05-518, National Mall: Steps Identified by Stakeholders Facilitate Design and Approval of Security Enhancements
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Report to the Chairman, Committee on Government Reform, House of
Representatives:
June 2005:
National Mall:
Steps Identified by Stakeholders Facilitate Design and Approval of
Security Enhancements:
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-518]:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-518, a report to the Chairman, Committee on
Government Reform, House of Representatives:
Why GAO Did This Study:
The National Mall in Washington, D.C., encompasses some of our
country‘s most treasured icons and serves as a public gathering place
for millions of visitors each year. The National Air and Space Museum,
for example, was the most visited museum worldwide in 2003, hosting 9.4
million visitors. Federal agencies with facilities on the National Mall
have begun implementing physical security enhancements to protect their
facilities and the visiting public.
This report responds to your interest in the efforts and expenditures
pertaining to these security enhancements and discusses (1) the
physical security enhancements that have been implemented on the
National Mall since September 11, 2001, the additional enhancements
planned, and the costs of these enhancements; (2) the considerations
given to incorporating access and aesthetics into the design and
approval of these security enhancements, and how issues of access and
aesthetics are perceived by visitors in relation to these enhancements;
and (3) examples of how federal agencies are using key practices to
implement the enhancements, and any challenges the agencies are
experiencing in using these key practices.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Smithsonian Institution,
Department of the Interior, Department of Agriculture, and National
Gallery of Art provided clarifying and technical comments, which were
incorporated into this report where appropriate.
What GAO Found:
Since September 11, 2001, federal agencies on the National Mall have
obligated about $132 million for physical security enhancements, with
the National Park Service and the Smithsonian accounting for about 75
percent of the total obligations. Security enhancements include
additional security personnel, facility upgrades, and equipment and
technology. Planned enhancements include the installation of permanent
security barriers to protect against vehicle bombs.
Public access and aesthetic considerations are integral to the design
and approval of security enhancements on the National Mall. Federal
agencies must coordinate with reviewing organizations, such as the
National Capital Planning Commission, and consider aesthetics, historic
preservation, urban design, urban planning, and environmental effects
when implementing security enhancements. Although federal agencies
reported that the review process can be time-consuming, review
organizations noted that early and frequent consultation with them
helps to ensure a smoother, more efficient, and expeditious review
process. GAO‘s survey of about 300 visitors to the National Mall, and
reports from federal agencies, indicate that visitors value access to
and the appearance of the National Mall and generally find the current
level of security enhancements acceptable. GAO‘s survey results also
suggest that visitors regard access and aesthetics as important
priorities when adding security enhancements to the National Mall.
Federal agencies on the National Mall reported using five of the six
key practices identified by GAO”allocating resources using risk
management, leveraging technology, information-sharing and
coordination, performance management and testing, and strategic
management of human capital”in implementing physical security
enhancements. However, none of the federal agencies on the National
Mall reported using the key practice of aligning assets to mission in
implementing security measures because they believe they do not have
excess or underutilized facilities or consider the practice applicable
to property under their jurisdiction. Agencies identified balancing
ongoing mission priorities with the need for security as a common
challenge in using key practices to implement physical security
enhancements.
Current and Proposed Security Enhancements at the National Museum of
Natural History:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-518.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Mark L. Goldstein at
(202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Federal Agencies Have Obligated about $132 Million for Physical
Security Enhancements on the National Mall since September 11, and
Additional Measures Are Planned:
Security Enhancements Have Incorporated Considerations of Public Access
and Aesthetics and Have Been Generally Accepted by Visitors:
Federal Agencies Report Using Most Key Practices, but Balancing Mission
Priorities with the Need for Physical Security Enhancements Poses
Common Challenge:
Concluding Observations:
Agency Comments:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Results of National Mall Visitor Survey:
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Staff Acknowledgments:
Bibliography:
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation:
Department of the Interior:
National Capital Planning Commission:
National Coalition to Save Our Mall:
Tables:
Table 1: Total Obligations for Physical Security Enhancements on the
National Mall, Fiscal Years 2002 through 2004:
Figures:
Figure 1: The National Mall in Washington, D.C.:
Figure 2: Key Practices in Facility Protection:
Figure 3: Phased Implementation of USDA Physical Security Enhancements:
Figure 4: Incorporation of Physical Security Enhancements in the
National Museum of the American Indian:
Figure 5: Modifications to Physical Security Enhancements of the
Washington Monument:
Figure 6: Current and Proposed Security Enhancements at the National
Museum of Natural History:
Figure 7: Visitor Survey Results on Access to and Appearance of the
National Mall:
Abbreviations:
ACHP: Advisory Council on Historic Preservation:
CFA: U.S. Commission of Fine Arts:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
EOC: Emergency Operations Center:
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
HVAC: heating, ventilating, and air-conditioning:
NCPC: National Capital Planning Commission:
NEPA: National Environmental Policy Act:
NHPA: National Historic Preservation Act:
NM&I: National Monuments and Icons Assessment Methodology:
SHPO: State Historic Preservation Officer:
USBG: U.S. Botanic Garden:
USDA: U.S. Department of Agriculture:
Letter June 14, 2005:
The Honorable Tom Davis:
Chairman, Committee on Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, increased attention
has been given to protecting our nation's key assets, whose destruction
could result not only in the loss of life, but in the loss of
irreplaceable items from American history and of structures that have
come to symbolize America worldwide. The National Mall in Washington,
D.C., encompasses some of our country's most treasured icons and serves
as a public gathering place for millions of visitors each year. The
National Air and Space Museum, for example, was the world's most
frequently visited museum in 2003, with 9.4 million visitors. As such,
federal agencies and entities[Footnote 1] with facilities on the
National Mall[Footnote 2]--the National Park Service, Smithsonian
Institution, National Gallery of Art, Department of Agriculture, and
U.S. Botanic Garden--have implemented and are continuing to implement
physical security enhancements to protect their facilities, employees,
and the visiting public. To assist in financing the anticipated costs
of designing and implementing new security enhancements, Congress
provided supplemental appropriations to most of these federal agencies
in fiscal year 2002.[Footnote 3] In addition, the agencies have funded
security enhancements from their annual appropriations acts.
We have issued several reports on the physical security of federal
facilities. For example, in November 2004, we identified a set of key
practices that can provide a framework for guiding federal agencies'
facility protection efforts.[Footnote 4] To assist the Committee in its
oversight role, this report discusses (1) the physical security
enhancements that have been implemented on the National Mall since
September 11, the additional enhancements planned, and the costs of
these enhancements; (2) the considerations given to incorporating
access and aesthetics in designing and approving physical security
enhancements on the National Mall, and how issues of access and
aesthetics are perceived by visitors in relation to these enhancements;
and (3) examples of how federal agencies are using key practices to
implement physical security enhancements on the National Mall, and any
challenges the agencies are experiencing in using these key practices.
To accomplish all of these objectives, we reviewed historical plans for
the design, expansion, and maintenance of the National Mall;
appropriations acts and accompanying legislative material; statutory
and regulatory provisions related to security enhancements of the
National Mall grounds; and federal agency proposals for implementing
physical security enhancements on the National Mall. We also received
information about obligations and costs associated with physical
security enhancements on the National Mall since the terrorist attacks
of September 11. We interviewed officials of the National Park Service,
U.S. Park Police, Smithsonian Institution, National Gallery of Art,
Department of Agriculture, U.S. Botanic Garden, U.S. Capitol Police,
National Capital Planning Commission, U.S. Commission of Fine Arts,
Advisory Council for Historic Preservation, District of Columbia's
Historic Preservation Office, Department of Homeland Security, and
National Coalition to Save Our Mall. Furthermore, we surveyed about 300
visitors to the National Mall on 5 days in October and November 2004 to
obtain reactions about security enhancements. We performed our work
from August 2004 through May 2005 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. (See app. I for a more detailed
discussion of the report's scope and methodology; also see app. II for
the results of our National Mall Visitor Survey.)
Results in Brief:
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, federal agencies on the
National Mall have obligated about $132 million for physical security
enhancements, with two agencies accounting for about three-quarters of
the obligations incurred. Specifically, the National Park Service
accounted for about $57 million, or 43 percent of the total
obligations, and the Smithsonian Institution accounted for an
additional 32 percent of the total obligations. Security enhancements
implemented by these federal agencies include additional security
personnel, facility upgrades, and equipment and technology. Additional
security enhancements planned by these federal agencies include the
installation of permanent perimeter security barriers to protect
against vehicle bombs and of technological upgrades to improve
surveillance and monitor access into facilities. However, the
implementation of physical security enhancements on the National Mall
is shaped, in part, by the availability of funds and the costs of
enhancements. Federal agencies typically adjust their security plans on
the basis of available funding.
Public access and aesthetic considerations are integral to the design
and approval of security enhancements on the National Mall. Federal
agencies are required to coordinate with review organizations, such as
the National Capital Planning Commission, and consider aesthetics,
historic preservation, urban design, urban planning, and environmental
impacts when implementing physical security enhancements. Although
federal agencies told us the review process can be time-consuming,
review organizations noted that early and frequent consultation with
review organizations helps to ensure a smoother, more efficient, and
expeditious review process. These officials also noted that informal
consultations should occur during the project's preliminary design
phase and continue throughout the design of the security project. For
example, the Smithsonian Institution consulted with all of the review
organizations before developing a concept design for its perimeter
security projects and, as a result, received favorable reviews from all
stakeholders on its preliminary design. Finally, our survey results and
reports from federal agencies indicate that visitors value access to
and the appearance of the National Mall, and that they generally find
the current level of security enhancements acceptable. Our survey
results further suggest that visitors regard access and aesthetics as
important priorities when adding security enhancements to the National
Mall.
In past work, we identified six key practices that have emerged from
the increased attention to facilities protection that, collectively,
could provide a framework for guiding federal agencies' ongoing
facility protection efforts. These key practices are allocating
resources using risk management, leveraging security technology,
information-sharing and coordination, performance management and
testing, strategic management of human capital, and aligning assets to
mission. Federal agencies on the National Mall reported using five of
these six key practices in implementing physical security enhancements.
For example, agencies told us they use risk assessments to efficiently
allocate resources to mitigate areas of greatest risk first. In
addition, agencies reported integrating new technologies to extend the
capabilities of security staff and to improve their facilities' overall
operating efficiencies. Agencies also reported sharing information
through periodic meetings, including performance measures in their
strategic plans, and providing new training programs for security
personnel. However, none of the federal agencies on the National Mall
reported using the key practice of aligning assets to mission, which
involves the reduction of underutilized or excess facilities in order
to reduce vulnerabilities, in implementing security measures on the
National Mall. Agencies reported that they do not believe that they
have any excess or underutilized facilities on the National Mall or
elsewhere or do not consider this practice applicable to property under
their jurisdiction. For example, one agency reported that all of its
facilities are needed to execute its mission of increasing and
diffusing knowledge, and that the closure of any of its facilities
would therefore be inconsistent with its mission. Federal agencies
identified balancing ongoing mission priorities with security needs as
a common challenge in using key practices to implement physical
security enhancements.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Smithsonian Institution,
Department of the Interior, Department of Agriculture, and National
Gallery of Art provided clarifying and technical comments, which we
incorporated into this report where appropriate.
Background:
The National Mall in Washington, D.C., traces its history in part to
plans developed by Pierre Charles L'Enfant and the U.S. Senate's Park
Commission of the District of Columbia--commonly known as the McMillan
Commission. The L'Enfant Plan of 1791 envisioned the National Mall as a
grand avenue beginning at the U.S. Capitol and extending west to the
current site of the Washington Monument. The McMillan Commission Plan
of 1901-1902 extended the National Mall further west and south to the
future sites of the Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials. Multiple
geographic definitions of the National Mall exist. For example, the
narrowest definition of the National Mall encompasses the area between
1ST and 14TH Streets and Constitution and Independence Avenues. Broader
definitions of the National Mall extend its boundaries to include the
grounds of the Washington Monument and the grounds of the Lincoln and
Jefferson Memorials, while other definitions also include the U.S.
Capitol, the White House, the Ellipse, and West Potomac Park. For the
purposes of our report, we defined the National Mall as the area
extending from the foot of the U.S. Capitol grounds west to the
Washington Monument and proceeding further west and southeast to
include the Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials. It also includes the area
between Constitution and Independence Avenues between 1ST and 14TH
Streets (see fig. 1).[Footnote 5]
Figure 1: The National Mall in Washington, D.C.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The open spaces of the National Mall, along with the Washington
Monument, the Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials, and other
memorials,[Footnote 6] are (1) administered and maintained by the
National Capital Parks unit of the National Park Service (Park
Service), which is within the Department of the Interior (Interior),
and (2) patrolled by the U.S. Park Police. In addition, other federal
agencies control and maintain various facilities located on the
National Mall, as described below:
* Smithsonian Institution (Smithsonian): Created as a trust
instrumentality of the United States by an act of Congress in
1846,[Footnote 7] the Smithsonian is considered the world's largest
museum and research complex, featuring 11 facilities on the National
Mall--that is, the Smithsonian Castle, Arts and Industries Building,
Freer Gallery of Art, Hirshhorn Museum and Sculpture Garden, National
Air and Space Museum, National Museum of African Art, National Museum
of American History, National Museum of the American Indian, National
Museum of Natural History, Arthur M. Sackler Gallery, and S. Dillon
Ripley Center.
* National Gallery of Art (National Gallery): With the gift of Andrew
W. Mellon's collection of paintings and works of sculptures, the
National Gallery was created by a joint resolution of Congress in 1937.
Located at the northeast corner of the National Mall, the National
Gallery today maintains two buildings--the West and East Buildings,
opened in 1941 and 1978, respectively--and an outdoor Sculpture Garden,
opened to the public in 1999.
* Department of Agriculture (USDA): The only cabinet-level agency
building located on the National Mall is the USDA's Whitten
Building.[Footnote 8] In 1995, this building was named for former U.S.
Representative Jamie L. Whitten.
* U.S. Botanic Garden (USBG): Tracing its origins as far back as 1816,
USBG is managed under the direction of the Joint Committee on the
Library, with the Architect of the Capitol responsible for the garden's
operations and maintenance. USBG's Conservatory and the adjacent
outdoor National Garden (currently under construction) are situated on
the southeast corner of the National Mall. Security for USBG is
provided by the U.S. Capitol Police.
Along with the federal agencies that manage facilities on the National
Mall, several governmental and other entities have an oversight,
advisory, or advocacy role related to the construction, renovation, or
modification of facilities, including the implementation of security
enhancements, on the National Mall and throughout Washington, D.C.
These entities include the following:
* National Capital Planning Commission (NCPC): NCPC, which is the
federal government's central planning agency for the National Capital
Region, provides planning guidance for the development of federal land
and buildings in the city. NCPC and federal agencies must comply with
both the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the National
Historic Preservation Act (NHPA). These laws require that federal
agencies consider the effects of their undertakings on environmental
quality and historic properties, respectively, and allow for public
participation and comment. NCPC's policies and procedures are meant to
ensure compliance with these laws during its review process. NCPC also
reviews the design of federal construction projects, oversees long-
range planning for development, and monitors capital investment by
federal agencies.
* Commission of Fine Arts (CFA): CFA provides advice to federal and
D.C. government agencies on matters of art and architecture that affect
the appearance of the capital city.
* D.C. State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO) and Advisory Council
on Historic Preservation (ACHP): Federal agencies that undertake the
construction or renovation of properties in Washington, D.C., are
required by law to assess whether there may be effects to designated
historic properties, engage in consultation with the SHPO[Footnote 9]
on effects to historic properties, and provide ACHP with an opportunity
to comment. ACHP promotes the preservation, enhancement, and productive
use of the nation's historic resources and reviews federal programs and
policies to promote effectiveness, coordination, and consistency with
national preservation policies.
* National Coalition to Save Our Mall: Founded in 2000, the coalition
is made up of professional and civic organizations and concerned
artists, historians, and citizens to provide a national constituency
dedicated to the protection and preservation of the National Mall in
Washington, D.C. The coalition's mission is to "defend our national
gathering place and symbol of Constitutional principles against threats
posed by recent and ongoing proposals--for new memorials, security
barriers, service buildings and roads--that would encroach on the
Mall's historical and cultural integrity, its open spaces and sweeping
vistas, and its significance in American public life."
The physical security of federal facilities, including those on the
National Mall, has been a more urgent governmentwide concern since the
1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma. The vulnerability of our nation's infrastructure was further
highlighted after the terrorist attacks of September 11. Since the
September 11 attacks, actions have been taken to better protect our
critical infrastructure and key assets from future attacks of
terrorism. In 2002, the Administration's Office of Homeland Security
issued The National Strategy for Homeland Security, which recognized
the potential for attacks on national monuments and icons and
identified Interior as the lead federal agency with jurisdiction over
these key assets.[Footnote 10] The Administration outlined actions that
Interior should take to protect national icons and monuments in The
National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical
Infrastructures and Key Assets in 2003.[Footnote 11] Furthermore, the
Administration issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 in
December 2003, establishing a national policy for federal agencies to
identify and prioritize U.S. critical infrastructure and key resources
and to protect them from terrorist attacks.[Footnote 12]
In response to the effects of what were viewed as makeshift security
measures that affected the historic design and streetscape of
Washington, D.C., NCPC's Interagency Task Force issued a report in
October 2001--Designing for Security in the Nation's Capital--
identifying design strategies to improve mobility and aesthetic
conditions throughout Washington, D.C.[Footnote 13] The following year,
NCPC released a design framework and implementation strategy for
Washington's "monumental core" and downtown area, National Capital
Urban Design and Security Plan, which provided a summary of building
perimeter security considerations; streetscape design concepts that
incorporate security components; and an implementation strategy for the
design, construction, funding, maintenance, and operations of security
installations in Washington, D.C.[Footnote 14] (See the bibliography
for additional reports related to this topic.)
Likewise, improving the physical security of federal facilities has
been the subject of several GAO reports, including our November 2004
report.[Footnote 15] In that report, we assessed the actions of the
federal government's Interagency Security Committee in coordinating
federal facility protection efforts and delineated a set of six key
practices emerging from the collective practices of federal agencies to
provide a framework for guiding agencies' facility protection efforts
(see fig. 2). As previously mentioned, these key practices are
allocating resources using risk management, leveraging technology,
information-sharing and coordination, performance measurement and
testing, aligning assets to mission, and strategic management of human
capital.
Figure 2: Key Practices in Facility Protection:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Federal Agencies Have Obligated about $132 Million for Physical
Security Enhancements on the National Mall since September 11, and
Additional Measures Are Planned:
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, about $132 million has
been obligated for physical security enhancements by federal agencies
for facilities on the National Mall. Overall, the Park Service and the
Smithsonian have incurred higher levels of obligations for physical
security enhancements than other agencies because they manage most of
the facilities on the National Mall (see table 1). Federal agencies
obligated funds for physical security enhancements from funds made
available through annual and supplemental appropriations.
Table 1: Total Obligations for Physical Security Enhancements on the
National Mall, Fiscal Years 2002 through 2004:
Dollars in millions:
Fiscal year: 2002;
Park Service: $19.0;
Smithsonian: $17.1[A];
National Gallery: $1.4;
USDA: $8.5;
USBG: $0.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Park Service: $14.4;
Smithsonian: $17.3;
National Gallery: $2.1;
USDA: $9.5;
USBG: $0.6.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Park Service: $24.0;
Smithsonian: $7.2;
National Gallery: $3.7;
USDA: $7.1;
USBG: $0.
Fiscal year: Total;
Park Service: $57.4[B];
Smithsonian: $41.6[C];
National Gallery: $7.2[D];
USDA: $25.1[E];
USBG: $0.6[F].
Sources: Department of the Interior's National Park Service,
Smithsonian Institution, National Gallery of Art, Department of
Agriculture, and U.S. Botanic Garden.
[A] Obligation includes $2.25 million for temporary security barriers.
[B] Park Service obligations include $24.5 million for Park Police
security personnel, including some overtime, and equipment.
[C] Security personnel costs are included in the obligation totals for
each fiscal year.
[D] Obligations for security personnel are not included because no
additional security personnel were hired after September 11.
[E] Some obligations made for the entire headquarters complex of USDA
are included.
[F] Obligations at USBG have been made by the U.S. Capitol Police since
2003. The U.S. Capitol Police did not incur any obligations for
physical security enhancements at USBG in fiscal year 2004. No
obligations were incurred in fiscal year 2002.
[End of table]
The implementation of physical security enhancements on the National
Mall is shaped, in part, by the availability of funds and the costs of
enhancements. Federal agencies often adjust their security plans on the
basis of available funding. The remaining text in this section
describes the physical security enhancements for which these agencies
told us they have obligated funds, as well as some of the costs
associated with implementing these enhancements. Additional planned
physical security enhancements for each of the agencies are also
discussed.
National Park Service and U.S. Park Police:
The Park Service and the Park Police told us they obligated over $57
million for physical security enhancements, including security
personnel, on the National Mall during fiscal years 2002 through 2004,
primarily at the Washington Monument and the Lincoln and Jefferson
Memorials.[Footnote 16] For each of these monuments and memorials, the
Park Service incurred such obligations to conduct site surveys; develop
security proposals; comply with environmental, historical, and design
guidelines; hire construction managers; and replace temporary security
measures with permanent security enhancements. Perimeter security
construction was under way at both the Washington Monument and the
Lincoln Memorial during our review, while designs for perimeter
security at the Jefferson Memorial have not been finalized. The
following text provides some examples of perimeter security
enhancements implemented and planned at each of these national icons.
* The Washington Monument: After September 11, the Park Service
installed closed-circuit television cameras, in addition to temporary
security measures, such as a ring of jersey barriers and a visitor
screening facility at the Washington Monument. During our review, the
Monument was closed to the public because of construction to replace
these temporary security features with permanent security enhancements.
The Monument reopened in April 2005, and the grounds are expected to
reopen in early summer. The grounds will be regraded, and 30-inch
retaining walls, serving as both vehicle barriers and visitor seating,
will surround the Monument. In addition, pedestrian pathways, upgraded
lighting, and seating benches are expected to be installed on the
Monument grounds. The total cost of constructing these permanent
physical security enhancements is estimated at $12.2 million. The Park
Service also told us it is considering the installation of a remote
visitor screening facility; however, implementation of this security
enhancement had not been approved or scheduled.[Footnote 17]
* The Lincoln Memorial: After September 11, concrete jersey barriers
and planters were installed around the Lincoln Memorial ring and the
circular drive east of the memorial was closed to all traffic.
Construction is expected to be completed in spring 2006, at which time
a 35-inch retaining wall will serve as a perimeter vehicle barrier
around the north, west, and south sides of the memorial.[Footnote 18]
In addition, bollards (short posts) will be installed on the east side
of the circle to complete the vehicle barrier system. Construction
costs for the vehicle barrier system are estimated at $5.1 million.
* The Jefferson Memorial: Since the September 11 terrorist attacks,
temporary concrete jersey barriers have been in place around the
Jefferson Memorial, and the U-shaped drive on the south side of the
memorial has been closed to traffic. In addition, the parking lot
adjacent to the memorial has been closed to the public. The
construction of a permanent vehicle barrier system, still in the design
stage, is expected to begin in the winter of 2005 and to be completed
in the winter of 2006 at an estimated cost of $4.1 million.
In addition to funds specifically obligated at these national icons,
the Park Service obligated funds in fiscal year 2002 for closed-circuit
television cameras at various memorials located within the National
Mall. Furthermore, the Park Police obligated funds during this time for
security personnel and equipment support, such as X-ray machines, body
armor, and vehicles. The Park Service told us the completion of
permanent vehicle barriers and the installation of equipment and
technology upgrades, such as permanent security cameras at each
monument and memorial, were the only additional physical security
enhancements planned on the National Mall at the time of our review.
Smithsonian Institution:
In fiscal years 2002 through 2004, the Smithsonian obligated
approximately $42 million for numerous physical security enhancements,
such as additional security personnel, periodic risk assessments,
perimeter vehicle barriers, blast mitigation film, closed-circuit
television cameras, emergency voice systems, and electronic screening
of the public and mail at its National Mall facilities. Some of these
security enhancements were already completed at the time of our review.
In other cases, enhancements already existed in a facility or are
planned to be implemented during future renovations. Smithsonian
officials noted that they have established priorities for the
implementation of physical security enhancements, identifying as their
top priorities the installation of perimeter security barriers and of
blast protection film on their facilities' windows. The Smithsonian
plans to obligate an additional $72 million to implement these and
other security enhancements between fiscal years 2006 through
2012.[Footnote 19]
* Perimeter vehicle barriers: Permanent barriers around the exterior of
each of the Smithsonian's National Mall facilities will replace
existing temporary barriers to provide protection from vehicle bombs.
According to the Smithsonian, this security measure, which is to be
implemented in three phases, is one of its highest priorities. The
first phase, the construction of a perimeter barrier around the
National Air and Space Museum, has already begun and is expected to be
completed in February 2006.[Footnote 20] The second phase, the
construction of perimeter barriers around the Smithsonian's National
Museum of American History and National Museum of Natural History is
expected to begin in July 2006 and to be completed in June 2008. The
final phase, addressing perimeter security for the remaining
Smithsonian facilities on the National Mall, will be implemented
between April 2008 and April 2010. Smithsonian officials told us that
$11 million was obligated for this project in fiscal years 2002 and
2003, and that an additional $24.7 million is planned for obligation
through fiscal year 2008.
* Blast-resistant window system enhancement: For this enhancement,
which is designed to prevent or reduce the number of deaths or injuries
from flying glass, the Smithsonian obligated a total of $1.8 million in
fiscal years 2003 and 2004 and plans to obligate an additional $44.9
million through fiscal year 2012 to implement this measure.
* Perimeter closed-circuit television cameras: Providing surveillance
of the grounds adjacent to the Smithsonian's National Mall facilities
to detect suspicious activities, this enhancement has been implemented
by the Smithsonian at 3 of its facilities on the National
Mall,[Footnote 21] resulting in obligations totaling $660,000 in fiscal
year 2002. The Smithsonian canceled the implementation of this security
enhancement at some of its other National Mall facilities but plans to
implement the measure during future security upgrades or capital
renovation projects.
* Emergency voice systems: This enhancement, intended to enable
emergency response staff to broadcast disaster-or emergency-related
information to affected Smithsonian staff and visitors, was in place at
three museums on the National Mall prior to September 11. To implement
this enhancement at the remainder of its facilities, the Smithsonian
obligated $2.9 million in fiscal year 2002.
* Electronic screening of the public and mail: According to the
Smithsonian, this enhancement is designed to prevent a terrorist from
carrying an explosive device or firearm into a Smithsonian facility, or
to mitigate the effects of such a weapon's use. The enhancement also is
designed to detect explosives or biological agents delivered through
the mail system. Although lack of space for screening equipment will
limit the use of this security enhancement at its National Mall
facilities, the Smithsonian does plan to implement this measure at some
of its facilities. However, in some cases, renovations are required to
install an adequate number of screening stations. The Smithsonian has
deferred renovations to fully implement this measure until it can
address higher priority security enhancements. In the meantime, several
facilities have received full magnetometer screening and bag searches
to limit the potential for explosive devices or firearms to enter a
Smithsonian facility. The Smithsonian obligated $2.2 million in fiscal
year 2002 for this enhancement.
Besides funding the enhancements previously identified, the Smithsonian
obligated about $20 million for additional security personnel and $1
million for risk assessments for its facilities during fiscal years
2002 through 2004. Furthermore, the Smithsonian has requested $700,000
for electronic access control measures and $2 million to deter, detect,
or prevent the introduction of chemical, biological, or radiological
agents into air intakes at its National Mall facilities.
National Gallery of Art:
Officials from the National Gallery told us it has obligated over $7
million to implement physical security enhancements at its East and
West Buildings and Sculpture Garden since September 11. Funds have been
obligated at both the East and West Buildings and for equipment and
technology, such as magnetometers, X-ray machines, closed-circuit
television cameras, and body armor. In addition, the National Gallery
installed streetscape and landscape barriers, such as trees and
boulders, along the exterior of the East Building; constructed a
security guardhouse and modified the service entrance at the West
Building; and deployed temporary barricades to be used during
heightened security alerts. Finally, the National Gallery has obligated
funds for an Integrated Security Management System, the review of its
disaster management plan, and the review of vulnerability assessments
for security against explosive devices. Although implementation of
future security enhancements is subject to available funding, the
following text describes some examples of security enhancements planned
by the National Gallery:
* The National Gallery plans to conduct additional studies to evaluate
its camera system and the need for an Emergency Operations Center
(EOC). By determining the number and location of cameras currently in
use throughout the National Gallery, this study will provide the
gallery with the most comprehensive surveillance system possible. The
EOC study will determine the National Gallery's need for an off-site
space to conduct security operations in the event of a large-scale
emergency affecting the National Mall. The estimated cost of the
studies is $350,000.
* The National Gallery plans to upgrade perimeter security through
additional protections against explosions and hazardous agents. These
measures include erecting bollards and retractable steel plates around
the perimeter of the East and West Buildings and Sculpture Garden to
protect against unauthorized vehicles, adding window film to windows in
the entire East Building and part of the West Building, and installing
air intake protection sensors in the West Building to protect against
biological agents or other materials. The estimated cost of
implementing these enhancements is $1.4 million.
* The National Gallery plans to install additional equipment and
technology, such as improved access controls and biometrics, perimeter
cameras, and screening devices. For example, new employee
identification badges (smart cards) will be authenticated and
electronically tracked through the National Gallery's Integrated
Security Management System to protect against fraud. In addition, the
National Gallery intends to improve security and access controls
through the use of biometric systems. Additional external cameras will
improve surveillance of the East and West Buildings and Sculpture
Garden. Finally, X-ray machines and magnetometers that are already in
use at some public entrances will be added at closed entrances at the
West Building to improve visitor access during heightened security. The
estimated cost of implementing these enhancements is $580,000.
Department of Agriculture:
USDA has obligated about $25 million for physical security enhancements
for its facilities on or adjacent to the National Mall since September
11.[Footnote 22] USDA conducted blast assessment studies, hired
additional security personnel, and began installing window protection
measures and a public address system at each of its Washington, D.C.,
facilities, in addition to developing a perimeter streetscape security
master plan for the four-building headquarters complex. USDA also
obligated funds for a situation room and a heating, ventilating, and
air-conditioning (HVAC) air intake study at the Whitten Building
located on the National Mall.
USDA plans to continue installing blast resistant windows for the South
Building under its overall modernization project and safety drapes in
additional locations in the four-building headquarters complex; it also
plans to undertake major HVAC improvements against bioterrorism.
However, the implementation of these measures is dependent on available
funding and the priority given to these measures by USDA. In some
cases, the security enhancements will be coordinated with major
renovations of its facilities. Beginning in fiscal year 2006, USDA also
plans to improve security around its facilities by implementing
perimeter security barriers that it developed for the Whitten Building
and adjacent facilities. USDA plans to implement this project in four
phases based on funding availability and USDA's assessment of each
building's location, vulnerability, and other factors (see fig. 3).
Each phase can be subdivided and adjusted according to funding
availability. The proposed security elements include a combination of
bollards, fences, planters, tree well enclosures, and retaining and
freestanding walls located primarily at the buildings' roadways, curbs,
and driveways. Specifically, at the Whitten Building facing the
National Mall, USDA plans to install a combination of bollards and
planters to create a 50-foot stand-off distance from the facility. The
overall estimated cost of implementing these perimeter security
enhancements is between $13 million and $14 million.
Figure 3: Phased Implementation of USDA Physical Security Enhancements:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
U.S. Botanic Garden:
The U.S. Capitol Police is responsible for security at USBG. The
physical security enhancements implemented at USBG include a visitor
screening facility at the entrance of the Conservatory to detect
weapons and explosives, security cameras, card readers throughout the
Conservatory, an alarm system, and the addition of four security
officers when the Conservatory is open to the public. The U.S. Capitol
Police obligated $600,000 in fiscal year 2003 to implement these
enhancements. U.S. Capitol Police officials told us they do not
anticipate a need for additional funding for security enhancements at
USBG.
Security Enhancements Have Incorporated Considerations of Public Access
and Aesthetics and Have Been Generally Accepted by Visitors:
Public access and aesthetics are vital to the design and approval of
physical security enhancements to sites on the National Mall. Agencies
are required to coordinate with reviewing organizations and consider
aesthetics, historic preservation, urban design, urban planning, and
environmental impacts when implementing physical security enhancements.
Reports from federal agencies, along with responses to our own survey
of National Mall visitors, indicate that visitors have found the
current level of public access and the aesthetics of temporary and
permanent physical security enhancements acceptable. The majority of
survey respondents also indicated that aesthetics and public access
should be given high priorities when adding security enhancements to
the National Mall.
Access and Aesthetics Are Critical to the Design and Approval of
Physical Security Enhancements on the National Mall:
Agency officials told us that they consider public access and
aesthetics in developing and designing physical security enhancements
for their facilities on the National Mall. These officials noted that
maintaining the cultural and historic character of their facilities is
important, and that providing visitors with access to their facilities
is fundamental to their educational and commemorative missions. For
example, officials of the Smithsonian and National Gallery stated the
importance of ensuring the public's access to their collections and
exhibits when implementing security enhancements. Park Service
officials noted that they want visitors to be able to access the
monuments and memorials as they did before security enhancements were
implemented. Similarly, in terms of aesthetics, officials of the
Smithsonian and National Gallery told us that in designing smaller
security projects, they use exhibit and design specialists to ensure
that the security projects are implemented according to consistent
standards throughout their facilities. For larger security projects,
they also work with security consultants, design specialists, and
architecture and engineering firms to ensure that aesthetics are
incorporated into their security designs. USBG works with the U.S.
Capitol Police to incorporate aesthetics into security
enhancements.[Footnote 23] For example, additional surveillance cameras
were reinstalled in less visible sites, while maintaining their overall
security function.
In the case of a facility that is under construction, such as the
Smithsonian's National Museum of the American Indian,[Footnote 24]
security features can be integrated directly into the design of the
structure without the need for the subsequent installation of
potentially more conspicuous and obtrusive features (see fig. 4). After
September 11, the Smithsonian altered the landscaping plan for the
National Museum of the American Indian to integrate additional security
enhancements into the design of the facility. Specifically, four
substantial "grandfather rocks"[Footnote 25] were repositioned to
locations where they could serve as a vehicle barrier, while
maintaining the cultural and aesthetic significance of these objects.
Figure 4: Incorporation of Physical Security Enhancements in the
National Museum of the American Indian:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In most cases, however, agencies have had to develop and design
physical security enhancements for facilities already in place on the
National Mall. Still, officials of these agencies told us that public
access and aesthetics are critical elements in the design of security
enhancements. For example, officials of the Smithsonian noted that the
perimeter vehicle barriers that will be constructed around each of its
museums on the National Mall have been designed with an eye toward
integrating the architectural design and characteristics of the museums
into the barriers. In addition, they noted that the height of the
barriers will be adjusted in certain locations to achieve a better
appearance and scale, improve pedestrian movement and accessibility,
and provide space for visitors to sit on the barriers themselves.
Similarly, the physical security enhancements to the Washington
Monument that were under construction during our review were designed
to ensure consistency in the historical landscaping of the grounds and
in the spaces for visitors' recreation. Although the Park Service
developed alternative design proposals, including the one depicted in
the figure below (right), the selected design includes a regrading of
the Monument grounds and the construction of retaining walls that are
intended to disappear into the landscape (see fig. 5).
Figure 5: Modifications to Physical Security Enhancements of the
Washington Monument:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Multiple Organizations Work with National Mall Agencies to Design and
Review Security Enhancements:
Several organizations work with the agencies that have facilities on
the National Mall to ensure that security enhancements reflect access
and aesthetic concerns. Specifically, the SHPO and ACHP, as well as
NCPC and CFA, coordinate with the agencies that have facilities on the
National Mall. Such coordination is designed to ensure that
architecture, urban design, urban planning, aesthetics, historic
preservation, and environmental impacts are considered when
implementing physical security enhancements.
For example, federal agencies[Footnote 26] must prepare an
environmental assessment to determine the effects of proposed security
enhancements on the human environment as part of the NEPA
process.[Footnote 27] In addition, because security enhancements may
affect the historic character of properties on the National Mall,
federal agencies are required to follow the NHPA's Section 106 review
process. This process has federal agencies consider the effects of
their actions on historic property and address "adverse effects" that
could diminish the integrity of the property. Federal agencies are
responsible for initiating the review process and for consulting with
the SHPO on measures to deal with any adverse effects. In addition,
ACHP is given a reasonable opportunity to comment as part of the NHPA
process. Federal agencies are also required to solicit public input as
part of both the NEPA and NHPA review processes.
Finally, agencies must submit those designs that fall under the NCPC
and CFA statutory authorities to these review organizations before
security enhancements can be implemented. NCPC officials told us that
they examine security projects comprehensively from a broad design and
urban planning perspective to ensure the project's consistency with the
commission's comprehensive urban design and planning documents, such as
the Comprehensive Plan for the National Capital and the Urban Design
and Security Plan. NCPC must give approval before a security
enhancement project can be implemented. CFA officials told us they
focus on visual appearance and on how security enhancements can be
physically integrated into the urban environment. Although agencies
must submit security designs to CFA, the commission plays an advisory
role in reviewing security projects and cannot enforce agencies to
implement its recommendations. Projects are generally submitted to NCPC
and CFA after the completion of most, if not all, of the NEPA and NHPA
processes. These processes must be completed before NCPC approves the
final design.
National Mall Agencies and Review Organizations Identified Challenges
in Designing and Approving Security Enhancements:
Although aesthetic and public access considerations are seen as
critical elements in the design and approval of physical security
enhancements to facilities on the National Mall, agency officials also
told us that the process applicable to all construction and renovation
projects in Washington, D.C.--requiring consultation, review, and
approval with multiple review organizations--adds to project costs and
can be both time-consuming and inefficient. Of particular concern,
officials of these agencies noted the seeming overlap in consultations
and reviews of projects required among the review organizations. For
example, Park Service officials told us that in submitting a security
proposal, one review organization might request a particular change to
the design, and another organization might request an entirely
different change. Sometimes, consensus on the design of a security
project had been reached at the staff level within a review
organization, but the commissioners within that organization then had
different ideas about the project's design. For example, designs for
security enhancements for the eastern portion of the Lincoln Memorial
have gone before the CFA's commissioners several times for their
review.[Footnote 28] Furthermore, some agency officials noted that the
commissioners from CFA and NCPC might disagree on a particular security
design. According to officials from the Park Service, there is
currently no guidance available to assist agencies in moving forward on
proposals that receive contradictory direction. These officials
suggested that in such cases, commissioners, rather than staff, from
both review organizations should consult with one another to resolve
their differences and provide guidance to the agency on moving forward.
While CFA officials acknowledged that there is no formal process for
resolving disagreements between commissions, they noted several options
for reconciling such differences. For example, in some cases, agencies
may be able to circulate revised drawings to the commissions in between
formal meetings, or the commissions might delegate approval authority
to the staff level, pending modifications. Finally, the public can
comment on security proposals affecting the National Mall. As a result
of competing stakeholder interests, it can take months or even years to
go through the review process.
The perimeter security designs for the Washington Monument illustrate
the effects multiple stakeholders can have on a proposed security
project's design and schedule. Officials from the Park Service told us
that a preliminary design for the Washington Monument was selected in
December 2001. The design consisted primarily of landscape barriers
that would provide perimeter security and an underground visitor
screening facility. The Park Service submitted its design to CFA at
this time, and, according to both parties, CFA approved the vehicular
barrier portion of the design with only minor changes.[Footnote 29] In
addition, Park Service officials told us that they submitted the
security design to NCPC in January 2002 and received final approval for
the perimeter security portion of the design in June 2003. Park Service
officials noted the approval process for the Washington Monument design
was relatively quick. However, the design for the underground screening
facility did not receive final approval from CFA and received only
preliminary approval from NCPC before the underground screening
facility project was canceled. According to CFA officials, the
screening facility as planned would have drastically changed how
visitors accessed the Monument, and it was not an effective security
proposal. CFA officials told us they proposed a number of alternatives
for this portion of the project, but the Park Service rejected them.
According to CFA officials, they have not recently discussed this
project with the Park Service. Park Service officials told us that the
concept for the underground screening facility was abandoned because of
significant resistance from a number of stakeholders and because
Congress never approved funding for the measure. Park Service officials
told us the temporary screening facility that was in place before the
Washington Monument was under construction will be put back until a
permanent screening facility is designed.
Review organizations also identified challenges in the review process
for implementing security enhancements on the National Mall. Review
organizations said they have concerns about their budgets and staff
resources. Officials from these organizations told us that the number
of security projects submitted for their review has greatly increased
since the September 11 terrorist attacks. However, officials noted that
they have not received additional funding or staff to respond to the
increase in proposals. In addition, officials from CFA and NCPC noted
that some agencies do not always justify the need for a particular
security enhancement or identify the threat that the agency is trying
to protect against. Officials from CFA noted that this type of
information is helpful in developing a design that meets the needs of
both the agency and the review organization. Furthermore, officials
from CFA also noted that when applicants come to them after a project
already has been designed, the applicant is often reluctant to make any
changes or consider alternative approaches because of the time and
money already invested. Finally, both federal agencies and the review
organizations noted that the limited number of security designs
available to secure facilities in an urban environment presents a
challenge in implementing security enhancements. Park Service officials
noted that the technology available for perimeter security consists
primarily of vehicle barrier systems (e.g., bollards, walls, and
strengthened street furniture). However, these officials noted that the
review organizations often do not approve security designs that
exclusively consist of bollards.
National Mall Agencies and Review Organizations Identified Steps That
Can Make the Review Process More Efficient:
Several agency officials, along with the review organizations, stated
that early and frequent consultation helps to ensure a smoother, more
efficient review process. Both the agencies and the review
organizations noted that informal consultations between all parties
should continue throughout the design of the security project. Informal
consultations can begin before "putting pen to paper" and should occur
during the project's preliminary design phase. According to these
officials, security proposals, in particular, benefit from these early
consultations because of their importance and sensitivity. Both the
review organizations and the federal agencies identified the following
additional actions that could lead to a more efficient review process:
* Consult early and frequently with all relevant stakeholders:
Consulting with all of the review organizations that play a role in the
design and approval of security enhancements at the same time not only
facilitates a more efficient review process, but doing so can also
improve relations between agencies and review organizations over time.
In addition, consulting with all stakeholders allows for the expression
of everyone's views and concerns up front. Moreover, consultation with
the staff and, in some cases with the commissioners of the review
organizations, allows them to react informally to a proposed design,
thereby giving agencies the opportunity to incorporate their opinions
into the proposal. Officials from NCPC told us that their commissioners
and CFA's commissioners might disagree on a design proposal because
they are providing a first reaction to a design that was not previously
discussed during informal consultations. In such cases, agencies may
have to go back through the review process to meet everyone's needs,
which can take several additional months or even years, in addition to
costing the agency financial and staff resources. However, officials
from the review organizations noted that disagreements between the two
commissions occur infrequently, perhaps once a year. According to the
Park Service, disagreements between the two commissions seem to occur
more often with security projects that include some of our nation's
memorials. For example, Park Service officials noted that they have
received different direction from the two commissions on the Washington
Monument, Lincoln Memorial, and Jefferson Memorial security projects.
In considering a design for its perimeter security projects, the
Smithsonian consulted with all of the review organizations before
developing a concept design. The parties discussed different design
options, and the Smithsonian was able to incorporate the review
organizations' comments and suggestions into its proposal. According to
CFA, the Smithsonian also selected a designer that considered the needs
of the agency and the balance between security and access and urban
design. Smithsonian officials believe that the success of their efforts
hinged on bringing to the table experts from their offices of
Protection Services; Historic Preservation; and Engineering, Design,
and Construction who were willing to engage in dialogue and answer
questions from the review organizations. As a result, the Smithsonian
received favorable reviews of their preliminary design for security
enhancements from all of the stakeholders. According to Smithsonian
officials, the Smithsonian continues to consult with the SHPO, NCPC,
and CFA during the ongoing development of its final perimeter security
designs.
* Be flexible and open to the review process and possible changes:
Officials from some of the agencies and the review organizations
discussed the importance of being open and flexible to alternatives
throughout the design process for security enhancements. In particular,
some officials stressed the importance of taking time to develop a
security solution built on the opinions and consensus of all
stakeholders. According to these officials, this approach will
ultimately result in stronger working relationships and a design
solution that takes both security and urban design issues into
consideration.
Officials from CFA told us that the Departments of Energy and Education
developed successful security designs because they consulted early and
were open to considering alternative proposals. For example, according
to CFA, Energy's ideas for security designs at one of its Washington,
D.C., facilities were not appropriate for an urban environment.
However, through consultations with the review organizations, Energy
was able to design a better security project that will be less costly
than the one it originally designed. Similarly, Education developed a
proposal for renovating its plaza but did not incorporate any security
enhancements into the design. However, because Education consulted with
the review organizations before going too far in the design process, it
was able to incorporate security features into the design. As a result,
Education avoided later costly revisions to the project.
* Consult urban planning documents such as NCPC's submission guidelines
and Urban Design and Security Plan: Agencies submitting project
proposals to NCPC for review and approval are required to follow NCPC's
submission guidelines. The guidelines include NCPC's requirements for
various phases of project proposals as well as NCPC's environmental and
historic preservation procedures. The submission guidelines also
outline suggestions for coordinating stages of the review process. For
example, agencies can initiate the NEPA and NHPA review processes
simultaneously and plan their public participation, analysis, and
review so as to meet the purposes and requirements of both statutes in
a timely and efficient manner. The Security Plan provides a framework
for planning, designing, and implementing security enhancements and
focuses exclusively on incorporating perimeter security measures into
existing streetscape or landscape features. The Security Plan also
identifies security design solutions that are appropriate to the
character of areas within the Monumental Core,[Footnote 30] including
the National Mall and the Washington Monument and Lincoln and Jefferson
Memorials.
Several of the agencies on the National Mall told us they actively
participated in the development of the Security Plan, and they are
using the plan to help them balance perimeter security issues with
considerations of aesthetics and access to the National Mall. For
example, Park Service officials told us they used the plan to develop
concept designs for the Washington Monument as well as the Lincoln and
Jefferson Memorials.[Footnote 31] Similarly, the Smithsonian developed
plans to replace planter pots, industrial-looking vehicle barriers, and
other temporary security measures with custom-designed elements,
including benches, light poles, urns, and bollards, that complement the
historic surroundings of the National Mall (see fig. 6). Smithsonian
officials noted that the Security Plan provides constructive ideas for
what NCPC does and does not look for in designs for security
enhancements. As a result, NCPC has praised the Smithsonian on its
efforts to balance necessary security enhancements with public access
and aesthetics.
Figure 6: Current and Proposed Security Enhancements at the National
Museum of Natural History:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Furthermore, according to USDA, its proposed security project was
designed to address both minimum USDA perimeter security requirements
and the goals of the NCPC plan. Proposed security enhancements for the
Whitten Building include landscape bollards that sit well within the
generous "front lawn" of the building, and that are designed to respect
the significant and historic open character of the National Mall.
Effects of Enhancements on Access and Appearance Are Generally
Acceptable to Visitors:
Visitors value access to and the appearance of the National Mall and
generally find security enhancements acceptable. A number of agencies
on the National Mall told us that they have received very few
complaints about difficulty in accessing sites on the National Mall.
Officials from the Smithsonian further told us that a survey they
conducted of visitors to their museums in fiscal year 2002 suggests
that visitors do not consider the time standing in line to pass
security checkpoints at museum entrances problematic, provided the wait
is less than 15 minutes. Moreover, some agencies we interviewed also
reported very few complaints about the appearance of sites that are
being or have been modified to accommodate physical security
enhancements.
Our survey of about 300 visitors to the National Mall found that these
visitors did not view the security enhancements on the National Mall,
which included both temporary and permanent enhancements, as having
unacceptable effects on access or appearance.[Footnote 32] Seventy-
eight percent of respondents indicated that security enhancements had
no effect on public access to sites on the National Mall, or made
access easier. In addition, 64 percent of those surveyed said the
security enhancements had no effect or a positive effect on the
appearance of the National Mall (see fig. 7).
Figure 7: Visitor Survey Results on Access to and Appearance of the
National Mall:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The majority of survey respondents also said the security enhancements
they encountered would have no effect on whether they will return for a
visit. However, results differed between residents of the Washington,
D.C., metropolitan area and those who reside in other areas.
Washington, D.C., metropolitan-area residents were almost twice as
likely as U.S. residents from outside the Washington, D.C.,
metropolitan area to report that security measures have had a negative
effect on access to and appearance of sites on the National Mall.
Furthermore, although visitors reported that current levels of public
access and appearance are satisfactory, the survey results also suggest
that visitors regard access and aesthetics as important priorities when
adding security measures to the National Mall. The majority of
respondents (85 percent) said both access and aesthetics should be
considered a medium to high priority when implementing additional
security enhancements. Overall, these results suggest that in terms of
public access and aesthetics, visitors to the National Mall find the
existing temporary and permanent security enhancements acceptable.
Federal Agencies Report Using Most Key Practices, but Balancing Mission
Priorities with the Need for Physical Security Enhancements Poses
Common Challenge:
Agencies Report Using Most Key Practices to Implement Physical Security
Enhancements:
In our November 2004 report,[Footnote 33] we identified six key
practices that have emerged from the increased attention to facilities
protection given by federal agencies in recent years. We noted that,
collectively, these key practices could provide a framework for guiding
federal agencies' ongoing facility protection efforts. These practices
are allocating resources using risk management; leveraging security
technology; sharing information and coordinating protection efforts
with other stakeholders; measuring program performance and testing
security initiatives; implementing strategic human capital management
to ensure that agencies are well-equipped to recruit and retain high-
performing security professionals; and aligning assets to mission,
thereby reducing vulnerabilities.
Throughout our review, agencies with facilities on the National Mall
reported using all but one of these key practices when implementing
security enhancements. For example, the Smithsonian told us it
leverages technology by using closed-circuit television cameras to
extend the capabilities of its security staff. Closed-circuit
television cameras enable security staff to quickly identify and
respond to a security incident for investigative purposes. In addition,
the Smithsonian told us it conducts periodic risk assessments of all
its properties to determine how to allocate resources to mitigate the
greatest risks first. The Park Service told us that it is including
performance measures in its draft strategic plan, and that it conducts
regular security inspections of national icons. The Park Service also
told us that it is providing new training programs for security
personnel, including in-service training for officers of the Park
Police. To attract a more qualified pool of applicants for security
positions, the National Gallery reported strengthening its recruitment
process and reported a new emphasis on antiterrorism training for its
security personnel. The National Gallery also told us it has
implemented, or plans to implement, a number of advanced security
technologies to provide a more comprehensive security assessment of its
facilities. Finally, federal agencies also reported meeting
periodically to discuss upcoming events, intelligence information, and
criminal activities. However, none of the federal agencies reported
using one key practice--aligning assets to mission--to implement
physical security enhancements because they do not believe that they
have excess or underutilized facilities on the National Mall or
elsewhere or consider the practice applicable to properties under their
jurisdiction.[Footnote 34]
Allocating Resources Using Risk Management:
Allocating resources using risk management entails the systematic and
analytical process of considering the likelihood that a threat will
endanger an asset--that is, a structure, individual, or function--and
identifying actions that can reduce the risk and mitigate the
consequences. As part of its Disaster Management Program, the
Smithsonian performs risk assessments of all its properties every 3 to
5 years to determine the need for security enhancements. Smithsonian
officials told us that their last risk assessment was performed in
fiscal year 2002, but another multihazard risk assessment--addressing
both man-made and natural disasters--was occurring during our review.
According to Smithsonian officials, the current effort will update the
last risk assessment and provide a ranked listing of risks, with
proposed mitigation actions and costs, across the entire portfolio of
the Smithsonian's facilities. In accordance with the intent of this key
practice, Smithsonian officials said the updated risk assessment will
allow the institution to use resources more efficiently to mitigate the
greatest risks first.
Park Service officials also told us that risk management is a key
practice used to determine the need for physical security enhancements
to their facilities on the National Mall. They noted that risk
assessments were completed in the late 1990s by three outside entities,
and internal reviews were performed by Park Police and Park Service
officials. After September 11, the Park Service worked with a private
security firm to assess the risk of terrorist attacks at monuments on
the National Mall. This assessment examined potential threats--
including the distance from which explosives could potentially destroy
any of the National Mall's structures--and alternative methods of both
prevention and protection. Additionally, the Park Service identified
specific protection criteria and designated key areas with the highest
vulnerability as priorities, including areas of the National Mall. The
Park Service told us it has used the security firm's report findings to
determine where to allocate appropriated funds and implement security
upgrades for high-risk structures. Park Service officials also told us
that they rely on risk assessments as well as intelligence assessments,
reviews of latest terror trends, visitor needs, and reviews of criminal
and service incidents to allocate resources to respond to identified
risks.
Since June 2004, Interior has applied its National Monuments and Icons
Assessment Methodology (NM&I Methodology) to assets that fall under the
purview of the Park Service. The NM&I Methodology provides a uniform
risk assessment and ranking methodology and was developed in response
to the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7's requirement that
Interior formulate a plan for identifying, assessing, prioritizing, and
developing protective programs for critical assets within the national
icons and monuments sector. According to information from Interior, the
NM&I Methodology is specifically designed to quantify risk, identify
needed security enhancements, and measure risk-reduction benefits at
icon and monument assets.[Footnote 35]
National Gallery officials told us that it assesses potential risks to
the physical security of its facilities through the use of technical
consultants with specialized experience in security areas, such as
blast analysis. The National Gallery uses the results of such studies
to form a basis for developing specific projects or operational
policies to mitigate the identified risks. For example, National
Gallery officials told us that targeted risk assessments, such as the
blast analysis on the exterior wall of the East Building, identified
the need for window security film and various types of physical
barriers.
Leveraging Security Technology:
By efficiently using technology to supplement and reinforce other
security measures, agencies can more effectively apply the appropriate
countermeasures to vulnerabilities identified through the risk
management process. Our previous work reported that prior to a
significant investment in a project, a detailed analysis should be
conducted to determine whether the benefits of a technology outweigh
its costs. In addition, we reported that agencies should decide how a
technology will be used and whether to use a technology at all to
address vulnerabilities before implementation. The implementation costs
of technologies in facilities protection can be high, particularly if
infrastructure modifications are necessary. Therefore, in some cases, a
lesser technological solution may be more effective and less costly
than more advanced technologies.
Several of the agency officials we spoke with identified steps they
have taken to make efficient use of technology to supplement and
reinforce other security enhancements. For example, the Smithsonian
uses closed-circuit television cameras in several of its museums on the
National Mall. These cameras are low-cost security technologies that
extend the capabilities of the Smithsonian's security staff by
providing an immediate assessment of information for investigative
purposes. The Smithsonian also identified the need for electronic
screening facilities at some of its facilities on the National Mall.
However, because the museums would need to undergo costly renovations
to make enough space for the screening equipment, these museums are
using magnetometer screening and bag searches until other, higher
priority security enhancements have been implemented.
The National Gallery has also implemented, and plans to implement, a
number of security technologies at its facilities on the National Mall.
Currently, the National Gallery uses magnetometers, X-ray machines, and
closed-circuit television cameras to improve its perimeter protection.
The National Gallery plans to undertake a risk analysis of its security
camera configuration to determine whether the number of cameras
currently in use provides the most comprehensive surveillance system
possible. In addition, the National Gallery plans to improve its access
control through new employee identification badges that can be rapidly
authenticated and tracked electronically through an Integrated Security
Management System. According to the National Gallery, comprehensively
integrating a number of new technologies provides more complete
security for its facilities and improves its operating efficiencies.
Finally, Park Service officials stated that closed-circuit television
cameras are in extensive use at the national icons on the National Mall
and are a critical component to the security of the area. Park Service
officials also noted that they are constantly reviewing developing
security technologies to determine the most cost-effective methods for
upgrades.
Information-Sharing and Coordination:
All agencies said they obtain and share information on potential
threats to facilities to better understand risks and more effectively
determine preventive measures. Among the agencies with facilities on
the National Mall, meetings are held quarterly to discuss upcoming
events, intelligence information, and criminal activities. Numerous
other forums of information-sharing and coordination also occur:
* Park Service officials told us that Park Police officers are assigned
to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Joint Task Force and
participate in meetings with the U.S. Attorneys, the D.C. Metropolitan
Police Department, and their own intelligence unit. In addition, we
were told that the Park Service relies on information gathered from
officers and rangers assigned to the National Mall area, who relay such
information to other entities as appropriate; and that coordination
routinely occurs between the Park Police and the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS).
* Smithsonian officials said that they meet with the Park Police twice
per month to discuss security issues, and again monthly to receive
crime and terrorism intelligence from the Park Police, and on a daily
basis to coordinate police activities on the National Mall. In
addition, Smithsonian security officials meet and coordinate with the
FBI and receive daily general information on terrorist and other
disaster-related activity from DHS.
* According to officials of the National Gallery, they attend meetings
and briefings with the FBI, the Mayor's Special Events Task Group, and
the U.S. Park Police. Further, National Gallery officials said they
coordinate regularly with these entities, as well as the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), D.C. Metropolitan Police
Department, DHS, U.S. Attorneys Office, U.S. Secret Service,
Smithsonian, Library of Congress, National Archives, Federal Trade
Commission, Federal Protective Service, and the John F. Kennedy Center
for the Performing Arts.
* USDA officials noted they share information and coordinate with the
Smithsonian, their immediate neighbor on the National Mall. USDA
officials also told us they coordinate with the Federal Protective
Service and the Park Police for general physical security and law
enforcement activities. In addition, USDA officials noted they
coordinate matters pertaining to national security, threats and
emergency response directly with DHS, FEMA, the FBI, and the U.S.
Secret Service, as applicable. Dignitary protection and the security of
high-risk personnel are coordinated with the U.S. Secret Service and
the Department of State. Finally, USDA officials told us they
participate on the Southeast Area Security Chiefs Council and other
forums to exchange and develop information pertaining to security and
law enforcement.
As previously noted, another source of coordination on physical
security enhancements occurred through the NCPC Interagency Security
Task Force. Made up of representatives of 75 stakeholder agencies, the
task force's efforts resulted in two reports that have guided agencies
throughout the city in devising and implementing physical security
enhancements. Both the Smithsonian and USDA's perimeter security
projects relied heavily on the task force's National Capital Urban
Design and Security Plan.
Performance Measurement and Testing:
This key practice encompasses two components to ensure the
effectiveness of physical security enhancements implemented by
agencies: linking security goals to broader agency mission goals, and
inspecting and assessing physical security enhancements. Park Service
officials indicated that they use both parts of this key practice
because they (1) include performance measures in the U.S. Park Police's
draft strategic plan and (2) conduct regular and frequent inspections
of the national icons by the Park Police and routinely update and
discuss security issues with Park Police officials. Smithsonian
officials also told us they use both parts of this key practice in
performing risk assessments of their facilities; implementing risk
assessment recommendations for facility upgrades, adding staff, adding
equipment, and using operational procedures as performance metrics; and
including physical security measures in the Smithsonian's broader
performance measurements. USDA also said it uses both parts of this key
practice by linking security goals to the broader agency goal of
providing a safe and functional workplace to support staff in carrying
out their public service missions and through an established program to
inspect and periodically reassess the physical security stature of all
USDA properties, including the properties near the National Mall, and
to effect corrective actions as appropriate.
Strategic Human Capital Management:
Strategic management of human capital involves implementing strategies
to help individuals maximize their full potential, having the
capability to recruit and retain high-performing security and law
enforcement professionals, and ensuring that personnel are well
exercised and exhibit good judgment in following security procedures.
We found that most of the agencies on the National Mall are
implementing this key practice primarily by offering new training
programs for security personnel. Specifically, Park Service officials
told us that they have sponsored training for employees of all affected
parks as well as in-service training for officers of the Park Police.
Similarly, the Smithsonian has instituted training courses on terrorism
awareness, emergency procedure, and shelter-in-place procedures, among
others, for its security staff. The National Gallery has also focused
its efforts on training, with particular emphasis on antiterrorism
training, such as shelter-in-place and evacuation drills. In addition,
to attract a more qualified pool of applicants for security positions,
the National Gallery reported strengthening its recruitment process.
USDA constructed an emergency operations center, which is staffed 24
hours a day, 7 days a week, to monitor and respond to emergencies.
Aligning Assets to Mission:
Aligning assets to mission involves the reduction of underutilized or
excess property at federal agencies in order to better reflect
agencies' missions and reduce vulnerabilities by decreasing the number
of assets that need to be protected. Our previous work reported that to
the extent that agencies are expending resources to maintain and
protect facilities that are not needed, funds available to protect
critical assets may be lessened. In addition, we noted that funds no
longer spent securing and maintaining excess property could be put to
other uses, such as enhancing protection at critical assets that are
tied to agencies' missions. For example, we reported in January 2003
that the Department of Defense estimates it is spending $3 billion to
$4 billion each year maintaining facilities that are not needed. In
another example, costs associated with excess Energy facilities,
primarily for security and maintenance, were estimated by Energy's
Office of the Inspector General in April 2002 to exceed $70 million
annually.[Footnote 36] One building that illustrates this problem is
the former Chicago main post office. In October 2003, we testified that
this building, a massive 2.5 million square foot structure located near
the Sears Tower, is vacant and costing USPS $2 million annually in
holding costs.[Footnote 37] It is likely that agencies that continue to
hold excess or underutilized property are also incurring significant
holdings costs for services, including security and maintenance.
Finally, we recently recommended that the Chair of the Interagency
Security Committee consider our work as a starting point for
establishing a framework of key practices that could guide agencies'
efforts in the facility protection area.[Footnote 38]
None of the federal agencies reported using this key practice to
implement physical security enhancements on the National Mall because
they do not believe that they have excess or underutilized facilities
or consider this practice applicable to property under their
jurisdiction. For example, Smithsonian officials told us that they do
not have any excess property on the National Mall or elsewhere.
Officials stated that all of the Smithsonian's facilities, including
its gardens, are needed for research, education, and exhibition
purposes to execute its mission of increasing and diffusing knowledge.
The Smithsonian believes that any closures of its facilities would
therefore be inconsistent with its mission. Similarly, according to the
Park Service, land reserved or dedicated for national park purposes,
including land under its jurisdiction, by law is not considered excess
or underutilized property.[Footnote 39]
Balancing Mission Priorities with the Need for Physical Security
Enhancements Poses Common Challenge:
Although we found that agencies on the National Mall are using most of
the key practices we identified for the protection of facilities,
officials from most of these agencies identified a common challenge in
using these practices and, in fact, in implementing all types of
physical security enhancements. That common challenge is balancing
their ongoing mission priorities with the emergent need to implement
physical security enhancements. Some officials described the challenge
as inadequate funding for security enhancements, or as competition for
limited resources between any new requirements for security
enhancements and more traditional functions and operations. Officials
described the challenge as a more subtle need to ensure that physical
security enhancements are not inconsistent with the agencies' mission.
For example, one official told us that planning for security
enhancements necessitates the involvement of key facilities personnel
to ensure that part of the agency's mission--public access--is
maintained. Another official we spoke with noted that careful planning
and coordination for implementing physical security enhancements is
essential to avoid compromising both programs and public access.
Similarly, some officials suggested that the multiple levels of
consultation and review required for projects that involve construction
or renovation on federal property could be an obstacle to the use of
key practices. Finally, officials from one agency noted that a lack of
reliable, quantitative risk assessment data and little consistency in
interpreting information and intelligence obtained from various sources
create a challenge in using key practices to implement security
measures.
Concluding Observations:
The security of our nation's critical infrastructure remains a
heightened concern in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist
attacks. On the National Mall, federal agencies are in the early stages
of designing and implementing permanent perimeter security barriers to
protect their facilities and the visiting public. In doing so, agencies
have coordinated with a number of review organizations that consider
the impact of proposed security designs on the urban environment and
the symbolic nature of the National Mall, its icons, and its museums.
Multiple stakeholder viewpoints on the design of security enhancements
present a challenge for an efficient review process. In some cases,
agencies involved stakeholders after investing time and resources in a
particular security design. As a result, these agencies sometimes had
to go through multiple iterations of the review process, which can
strain the already limited financial and staff resources of all
stakeholders.
As agencies continue developing security proposals for their facilities
on the National Mall, several steps, such as early and frequent
consultation with all stakeholders, can result in a more efficient
review process. Specifically, consultation in the preliminary design
phase allows for the consideration of multiple viewpoints and
alternative design solutions, thereby mitigating the potential for
later costly and time-consuming revisions. Such early consultation
could also expedite the implementation of security enhancements to
protect facilities and visitors on the National Mall.
Key practices, such as allocating resources using risk management,
coordinating protection efforts with other stakeholders, and aligning
assets to mission, have clear implications for the facility protection
area. As we have recently recommended, it is important that agencies
give attention to these practices and consider them collectively as a
framework for guiding their ongoing efforts in implementing security
measures on the National Mall and in their overall facility protection
areas.
Agency Comments:
We provided draft copies of this report to the Smithsonian, Interior,
USDA, and National Gallery for their review and comment. USDA officials
generally agreed with the report's findings and concluding observations
and provided clarifying comments. Officials from the other agencies
also provided clarifying and technical comments, which we incorporated
into this report where appropriate.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to other interested congressional committees; the Secretaries of
Agriculture, the Interior, and Smithsonian; and the Director of the
National Gallery. We will also make copies available to others upon
request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the
GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact me on
(202) 512-2834 or at [Hyperlink, goldsteinm@gao.gov] or Susan Fleming,
Assistant Director, on (202) 512-4431 or at [Hyperlink,
flemings@gao.gov].
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Mark L. Goldstein:
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Our objectives were to assess (1) physical security enhancements that
have been implemented on the National Mall since September 11, 2001,
the additional enhancements planned, and the costs of these
enhancements; (2) the considerations given to incorporating access and
aesthetics in designing and approving physical security enhancements on
the National Mall, and how issues of access and aesthetics are
perceived by visitors in relation to these enhancements; and (3)
examples of how federal agencies are using key practices to implement
physical security enhancements on the National Mall, and any challenges
the agencies are experiencing in using these key practices.
For all of these objectives, we researched historical plans for the
design, expansion, and maintenance of the National Mall; appropriations
acts and accompanying legislative material; statutory and regulatory
provisions related to security enhancements of the National Mall
grounds; and proposals for implementing physical security enhancements
on the National Mall. We also interviewed officials of the National
Park Service (Park Service), U.S. Park Police, Smithsonian Institution
(Smithsonian), National Gallery of Art (National Gallery), Department
of Agriculture (USDA), U.S. Botanic Garden (USBG), U.S. Capitol Police,
National Capital Planning Commission, U.S. Commission of Fine Arts,
Advisory Council for Historic Preservation, District of Columbia's
Historic Preservation Office, Department of Homeland Security, and
National Coalition to Save Our Mall.
While multiple geographic definitions of the National Mall exist, we
defined the area of the National Mall, for purposes of our report, as
extending from the foot of the U.S. Capitol grounds west to the
Washington Monument and proceeding farther west and southeast to
include the Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials. It also includes the area
between Constitution and Independence Avenues between 1ST and 14TH
Streets. We did not include the White House or the U.S. Capitol
Building because security enhancements for these buildings fall under
the jurisdiction of the U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. Capitol
Police, respectively.
In addition, for our first objective, we reviewed federal
appropriations law and accompanying legislative materials, budget
reports, and federal agencies' and entities' budget submissions related
to physical security enhancements on the National Mall; we also
received information about obligations and costs associated with
physical security enhancements on the National Mall since the terrorist
attacks of September 11. Agencies on the National Mall provided us with
obligation data only for their facilities located on the National Mall,
where possible. In some cases, obligations incurred for facilities on
the National Mall could not be separated from obligations incurred for
an agency's facilities located adjacent to the National Mall. To assess
the reliability of the obligation and cost data received by these
agencies, we developed a template for agencies on the National Mall to
obtain consistency in the data provided by each of the agencies;
interviewed knowledgeable agency officials to clarify any questions;
provided the agencies with a spreadsheet we developed that organized
obligations for security enhancements by fiscal year to make sure that
we accurately used the data provided and asked agencies to identify the
source of the obligations incurred; and further clarified any
discrepancies in these data. From this assessment, we determined that
these data are sufficiently reliable for purposes of this report.
For our second objective, we also reviewed the law, planning and review
criteria, reports, and documentation related to specific proposals for
physical security enhancements on the National Mall. In addition, we
conducted a 3-minute intercept survey of visitors to the National Mall
to determine (1) the extent to which visitors to the National Mall feel
that security measures on the National Mall affect access to sites on
the National Mall and the appearance of the National Mall; (2) the
extent to which visitors to the National Mall feel that additional
security measures are needed; (3) the priority that National Mall
visitors would assign access to the National Mall and the appearance of
the National Mall, in the event that additional security measures are
added; and (4) whether security measures affect the likelihood that
National Mall visitors will return.
To develop the questions for the 3-minute survey, we identified the key
information necessary to gain a general understanding of (1) how
visitors to the National Mall assess the effects of security measures
on access to and the appearance of the National Mall and (2) the
priority that visitors assign to the National Mall's accessibility and
appearance. After initially developing, reviewing, and modifying the
survey questions, we conducted a total of nine pretests--four cognitive
pretests with GAO employees who were not associated with this review
and five with visitors to the National Mall.
We provided GAO employee pretest participants (internal participants)
with an overview of the engagement and the intercept survey methodology
to be utilized. Subsequently, we showed internal participants the map
of the National Mall and then asked them to respond to the survey
questions. Upon completion of the survey, we asked for specific
comments on each question and encouraged participants to share their
thoughts and ideas regarding the structure of the survey and the extent
to which the questions seemed clear and easy to answer.
The five external pretests were conducted by GAO team members on the
National Mall, near the Smithsonian Metro Station. Following the
intercept survey protocol, our interviewers approached respondents
asking if they would like to answer a short survey on physical security
measures on the National Mall area. Five out of 15 potential
respondents approached participated in the survey. Nonrespondents
consisted of those unwilling to participate, those who had not yet seen
anything on the National Mall because they had just arrived, and those
unable to speak the English language. Respondents were first shown the
map of the National Mall and then were asked to respond to the survey
questions. Interviewers noted questions, comments, and any lack of
clarity to the questions on the part of external pretest respondents.
The final changes to the survey were made on the basis of the combined
observations from the pretests with GAO employees and pretests with
visitors to the National Mall.
The population for the survey was National Mall visitors. We chose
survey sites to cover the geographic range of the National Mall and
conducted interviews between 1:30 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. on Monday, October
18; Monday, October 25; Tuesday, October 26; Friday, November 5; and
Sunday, November 7, 2004. We chose to interview National Mall visitors
during these hours for two reasons: (1) to make it more likely that
visitors stopped for the survey had been on the National Mall long
enough to visit one or more sites on the National Mall and (2) to
reduce the chances of surveying government employees on the National
Mall during their lunch break.
We identified 300 as the target size for our sample, on the basis of
balancing the advantages and costs associated with a larger sample
size, considering that a sample of this size allows for some analysis
of subgroups but is small enough to limit survey costs. We stratified
the sample by choosing survey sites to cover the geographic range of
the National Mall. To avoid any bias by gender, ethnicity, or other
individual differences, we systematically approached the fifth person
who passed by a particular landmark (e.g., a park bench, tree, or light
pole); first, from the time interviewing commenced and, thereafter,
immediately following the completion of an interview.
In counting potential respondents, we excluded several types of
individuals as out of scope. Specifically, we excluded persons who did
not speak English, who appeared to be younger than 18 years old, who
were exercising on the National Mall, who were talking on a cell phone,
who were leading a group of people on the National Mall, or who had
just arrived on the National Mall and had not yet visited any sites. Of
667 National Mall visitors approached and asked to complete the survey,
537 were found to be in scope. Of these 537 visitors, 229 declined to
complete the survey, yielding a 57 percent response rate.
Although we took measures to avoid sample bias, our survey sample is a
nonprobability sample. Results from nonprobability samples cannot be
used to make inferences about a population because in a nonprobability
sample, some elements of the population being studied have no chance or
an unknown chance of being selected as part of the sample.
GAO employees conducted the interviews. A GAO employee showed
respondents a map of the National Mall, asked the survey questions, and
marked responses on the survey. The survey first asked respondents to
specify which sites and what types of security measures they had seen
in their visit to the National Mall. To help with site identification,
the map that the respondents received clearly labeled the museums and
monuments. The survey then posed a series of questions about the
effects of the security measures on access to National Mall sites and
the appearance of the National Mall, the extent to which additional
security is needed on the National Mall, and the priority respondents
would assign to the accessibility and appearance of National Mall
sites, in the event that further security measures are added. The
survey concluded by asking whether the security measures affect
respondents' likelihood of returning to visit the National Mall.
For our third objective, we also reviewed and analyzed GAO and other
governmental reports on the protection of federal facilities and
homeland security. We also developed a structured interview guide with
questions about the key practices for implementing security
enhancements and sent the guide to the Smithsonian, Park Service, USDA,
and National Gallery. We then incorporated their responses into the
report without independent verification.
We conducted our review from August 2004 through May 2005 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Federal agency
officials provided much of the data and other information used in this
report. Overall, we found no discrepancies with these data and,
therefore, determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the
purpose of this report. We requested official comments on this report
from the Smithsonian, the Department of the Interior, USDA, and the
National Gallery.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Results of National Mall Visitor Survey:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Mark L. Goldstein, (202) 512-2834;
Susan A. Fleming, (202) 512-4431:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to those named above, Dennis J. Amari, Virginia Chanley,
Sandra J. DePaulis, Robert V. Dolson, Colin Fallon, Denise M. Fantone,
H. Brandon Haller, Anne Izod, Jason Kelly, Nancy J. Lueke, David
Sausville, and Susan Michal-Smith made key contributions to this
report.
[End of section]
Bibliography:
[End of section]
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation:
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation. Protecting Historic
Properties: A Citizen's Guide to Section 106 Review. Washington, D.C.:
2002.
Department of the Interior:
Department of the Interior, Office of the Inspector General. Homeland
Security: Protection of Critical Infrastructure Systems - Assessment 2:
Critical Infrastructure Systems (2002-I-0053). Washington, D.C.:
September 2002.
Department of the Interior, Office of the Inspector General. Homeland
Security: Protection of Critical Infrastructure Facilities and National
Icons--Assessment 1: Supplemental Funding - Plans and Progress (2002-I-
0039). Washington, D.C.: June 2002.
Department of the Interior, Office of the Inspector General. Progress
Report: Secretary's Directives for Implementing Law Enforcement Reform
in Department of the Interior (2003-I-0062). Washington, D.C.: August
28, 2003.
Department of the Interior, Office of the Inspector General. Review of
National Icon Park Security (2003-I-0063). Washington, D.C.: August
2003.
National Capital Planning Commission:
National Capital Planning Commission. Comprehensive Plan for the
National Capital: Federal Elements. Washington, D.C.: August 2004.
Interagency Task Force of the National Capital Planning Commission.
Designing for Security in the Nation's Capital. Washington, D.C.:
October 2001.
National Capital Planning Commission. National Capital Urban Design and
Security Plan. Washington, D.C.: July 2002.
National Capital Planning Commission. Memorials and Museums Master
Plan. Washington, D.C.: September 2001.
National Coalition to Save Our Mall:
National Coalition to Save Our Mall. First Annual State of the Mall
Report: The Current Condition of the National Mall. Rockville, MD:
October 2002.
(543107):
FOOTNOTES
[1] For the purposes of this report, we are using the term "agency" to
refer to all five federal entities noted.
[2] For the purposes of this report, the National Mall has been
designated as the area extending from the foot of the U.S. Capitol
grounds west to the Washington Monument, proceeding west to the Lincoln
Memorial, and continuing southeast to the Jefferson Memorial. It also
includes the area between Constitution and Independence Avenues between
1ST and 14TH Streets.
[3] P.L. 107-117, 115 Stat. 2230 (2002).
[4] GAO, Homeland Security: Further Actions Needed to Coordinate
Federal Agencies' Facility Protection Efforts and Promote Key
Practices, GAO-05-49 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 30, 2004).
[5] We did not include the White House or U.S. Capitol Building because
security enhancements for these buildings fall under the jurisdiction
of the U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. Capitol Police, respectively.
[6] The Franklin Delano Roosevelt Memorial, Korean War Veterans
Memorial, Vietnam Veterans Memorial, and World War II Memorial are also
located on the National Mall.
[7] The Smithsonian Institution was created in accordance with the
terms of a bequest made by James Smithson of England to form "an
establishment for the increase and diffusion of knowledge among men."
In total, the Smithsonian consists of 18 museums and galleries, the
National Zoological Park, and 10 science centers.
[8] The headquarters complex of the Department of Agriculture also
includes the South and Yates Buildings and the Cotton Annex; however,
these buildings are not located directly on the National Mall.
[9] The State Historic Preservation Officer is appointed by the Mayor
of Washington, D.C.
[10] Office of Homeland Security, The National Strategy for Homeland
Security, July 2002.
[11] Office of Homeland Security, The National Strategy for the
Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets,
February 2003. The National Strategy directs Interior to take the lead
on the following initiatives to protect national icons and monuments:
define critical criteria for national monuments, icons, and symbols;
conduct threat and vulnerability assessments; retain a quality security
force; conduct security-focused public outreach and awareness programs;
collaborate with state and local governments and private foundations to
ensure the protection of symbols and icons outside the federal domain;
evaluate innovative technologies; and make provisions for extra
security during high-profile events.
[12] Homeland Security Presidential Directive Number 7, Critical
Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection, December
17, 2003.
[13] NCPC, Designing for Security in the Nation's Capital, October
2001. The Interagency Task Force included representatives from the
Departments of the Interior, State, the Treasury, Defense, and Justice;
the General Services Administration, Central Intelligence Agency,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Secret Service, National Park
Service, Federal Highway Administration, Architect of the Capitol, and
U.S. Capitol Police; the House Committee on Government Reform and
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs; various D.C. government
agencies; and other interested parties.
[14] NCPC, National Capital Urban Design and Security Plan, October
2002.
[15] GAO-05-49.
[16] The Park Service has not obligated funds at any of its other
memorials on the National Mall, such as the World War II Memorial, for
vehicle barrier systems. Funds have been obligated for closed-circuit
television systems at various locations on the National Mall.
[17] The Park Service initially had plans for an underground visitor
screening facility.
[18] The Park Service has not yet completed security designs for the
east side of the Lincoln Memorial.
[19] The Smithsonian's planned obligations do not include security
personnel.
[20] Due to delays in obtaining the required stone, this project has
been delayed from its original completion date of October 2005.
[21] The Smithsonian installed closed-circuit television cameras at the
National Museum of American History, National Museum of Natural
History, and National Air and Space Museum.
[22] USDA's Whitten Building is located on the National Mall, whereas
the South and Yates Buildings and the Cotton Annex are located adjacent
to the National Mall.
[23] The U.S. Capitol Police coordinates with the Architect of the
Capitol on the design and implementation of security enhancements for
the Capitol Complex.
[24] The National Museum of the American Indian was under construction
during our review and opened to the public in September 2004.
[25] The "grandfather rocks" serve as reminders of the longevity of
Native peoples' relationships to the environment and carry the message
and cultural memory of past generations to future generations.
[26] For purposes of certain laws, such as NEPA and NHPA, the
Smithsonian is treated as a federal agency.
[27] 42 U.S.C. § 4332.
[28] According to Park Service officials, they are continuing to work
with both NCPC and CFA to develop a solution for the eastern portion of
the Lincoln Memorial.
[29] In a letter dated March 5, 2002, CFA stated "the Commission—have
concluded with their unanimous approval, that Mr. Olin's preliminary
scheme, as presented, is an appropriate design solution to improve the
Monument's physical perimeter security."
[30] The Monumental Core includes the Capitol Grounds, the Mall and
Mall Complex, the Southwest Federal Center, the Federal Triangle, the
White House and President's Park, the Northwest Rectangle, Arlington
Cemetery, the Pentagon, Fort Meyer, and Henderson Hall.
[31] According to Park Service officials, following the Security Plan
can sometimes lead to delay in the approval process for security
projects. Park Service officials stated that their submission for a
security project for the Lincoln Memorial, which followed the Security
Plan recommendation, was rejected by NCPC in favor of an alternative
plan that was designed by NCPC staff.
[32] A total of 308 surveys were conducted on 5 days in late October
and early November 2004 at various locations on the National Mall.
Although we took measures to avoid sample bias, our survey sample is a
nonprobability sample. Results from nonprobability samples cannot be
used to make inferences about a population because in a nonprobability
sample, some elements of the population being studied have no chance or
an unknown chance of being selected as part of the sample.
[33] GAO-05-49.
[34] The key practice of aligning assets to mission encourages agencies
to release excess or underutilized property, so that they no longer
incur costs to maintain and secure such property.
[35] The NM&I Methodology has two phases, a consequence assessment
phase and a risk assessment phase. During the consequence phase, each
asset's iconic significance is subjectively determined and specific
attack scenarios are used to evaluate security at each asset. The risk
assessment phase is used to determine the effectiveness of existing
security systems for preventing or mitigating the specified attack
scenarios.
[36] Department of Energy, Office of the Inspector General, Disposition
of the Department's Excess Facilities, DOE/IG-0550 (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 3, 2002).
[37] GAO, Federal Real Property: Actions Needed to Address Long-
standing and Complex Problems, GAO-04-119T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1,
2003).
[38] GAO-05-49.
[39] The general practice of disposing of "excess or underutilized
property" does not apply to Park Service property that is reserved or
dedicated for national park purposes because the Federal Property and
Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended, specifically excludes
this. 40 U.S.C. § 102(9)(A)(ii).
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