Plum Island Animal Disease Center
DHS Has Made Significant Progress Implementing Security Recommendations, but Several Recommendations Remain Open Gao ID: GAO-08-306R December 17, 2007For many years, the Department of Agriculture (USDA) owned and operated the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, located on an island in the Long Island Sound off the coast of New York. Scientists at Plum Island, often with the assistance of scientists from other countries, diagnose the pathogens that cause foreign animal diseases and then conduct research to, among other things, develop vaccines to protect against them. Some of the pathogens maintained at Plum Island, such as foot-and-mouth disease, are highly contagious to livestock and could cause catastrophic economic losses in the agricultural sector if they are released outside the facility. Other pathogens known to have been maintained at Plum Island could also cause illness and death in humans. For these reasons, USDA conducts its work on Plum Island within a sealed biocontainment area that has special safety features designed to contain the pathogens. After the terrorist attacks on the United States, new laws and regulations required officials at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center to further restrict access to the pathogens in order to protect animal health and, thereby, also help reduce the possibility of bioterrorism. In addition, Plum Island and its assets and liabilities were transferred from USDA to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Today, USDA continues to conduct its diagnostic and research work on Plum Island, but it now does so in coordination with DHS as part of a broader joint strategy to protect against the intentional or accidental introduction of foreign animal diseases. In 2005, we reported that, as part of that strategy, DHS had started to develop plans to replace the Plum Island Animal Disease Center with a new, modernized facility. Since then, DHS has selected six possible sites for this new facility, including Plum Island. This planned higher-level biosecurity facility will enable the department to expand the research currently conducted on the island to include work on higher-consequence biological threats posed by zoonotic (i.e., transmittable from animals to humans) and foreign animal diseases.
As a part of our routine audit work, we have been tracking the status of the 2003 Plum Island security recommendations. In addition, in May 2007, we received a request from Senator Charles Schumer to report on this matter. On September 28, 2007, we briefed interested congressional staff on the extent to which DHS had implemented the recommendations at that time. Because of broad-based congressional interest, under the Comptroller General's statutory authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative, we are issuing this report, which summarizes that briefing. To evaluate DHS's efforts to implement the Plum Island security recommendations, we reviewed pertinent DHS and USDA documents; interviewed DHS, USDA, and other personnel responsible for Plum Island's security; and, during a visit to Plum Island in 2005, observed improvements in physical security and the procedures securing the biocontainment area as well as the facility's infrastructure. However, we did not conduct a comprehensive audit of all decisions that DHS and USDA have made to improve Plum Island security. We provided DHS and USDA an opportunity to verify facts of this report. Officials from both agencies provided us with additional information, which has been incorporated into this report. We performed our work from February 2004 through December 2007. In summary, DHS has made significant progress and has implemented 18 of the 24 recommendations. However, implementation of the 6 remaining recommendations is still under way. In 2003, physical security at Plum Island was deficient in several ways. For example, alarms and door sensors for detecting intruders were not fully operational; controls to account for the keys to the island's facilities were deficient; and USDA was not providing sufficient physical security for certain assets, including those critical to the continued operation of the facility. These vulnerabilities were particularly troubling because a strike was under way, and sabotage of the island's infrastructure had already occurred. DHS has since taken many actions in response to our recommendations. For example, alarms and door sensors are now in use, and DHS has implemented procedures to better control access to keys to facilities. In addition, the department has better secured certain features of the physical infrastructure that supports the continued operation of the Plum Island Animal Disease Center. DHS has also improved the security of North America's only foot-and-mouth disease vaccine bank. This bank represents years of cooperative research performed by Canada, Mexico, and the United States, and the material it contains is considered a critical asset for controlling a large outbreak.
GAO-08-306R, Plum Island Animal Disease Center: DHS Has Made Significant Progress Implementing Security Recommendations, but Several Recommendations Remain Open
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GAO-08-306R:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
December 17, 2007:
Congressional Addressees:
Subject: Plum Island Animal Disease Center: DHS Has Made Significant
Progress Implementing Security Recommendations, but Several
Recommendations Remain Open:
For many years, the Department of Agriculture (USDA) owned and operated
the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, located on an island in the Long
Island Sound off the coast of New York. Scientists at Plum Island,
often with the assistance of scientists from other countries, diagnose
the pathogens that cause foreign animal diseases and then conduct
research to, among other things, develop vaccines to protect against
them. Some of the pathogens maintained at Plum Island, such as foot-
and-mouth disease, are highly contagious to livestock and could cause
catastrophic economic losses in the agricultural sector if they are
released outside the facility. Other pathogens known to have been
maintained at Plum Island could also cause illness and death in humans.
For these reasons, USDA conducts its work on Plum Island within a
sealed biocontainment area that has special safety features designed to
contain the pathogens.
After the terrorist attacks on the United States, new laws and
regulations required officials at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center
to further restrict access to the pathogens in order to protect animal
health and, thereby, also help reduce the possibility of bioterrorism.
In addition, Plum Island and its assets and liabilities were
transferred from USDA to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
[Footnote 1] Today, USDA continues to conduct its diagnostic and
research work on Plum Island, but it now does so in coordination with
DHS as part of a broader joint strategy to protect against the
intentional or accidental introduction of foreign animal diseases. In
2005, we reported that, as part of that strategy, DHS had started to
develop plans to replace the Plum Island Animal Disease Center with a
new, modernized facility.[Footnote 2] Since then, DHS has selected six
possible sites for this new facility, including Plum Island. This
planned higher-level biosecurity facility will enable the department to
expand the research currently conducted on the island to include work
on higher-consequence biological threats posed by zoonotic (i.e.,
transmittable from animals to humans) and foreign animal diseases.
[Footnote 3]
Prior to Plum Island's transfer from USDA to DHS, 71 employees of the
contractor USDA had hired to operate and maintain the facility went on
strike. This strike, accompanied by sabotage of the island's
infrastructure, heightened already existing concerns that someone might
try to steal certain pathogens from the facility to conduct terrorist
activities. In this context, the Congress asked us to review, among
other things, the adequacy of security at Plum Island. In 2003, we
reported that although security at Plum Island had improved since the
terrorist attacks, the facility was vulnerable to security breaches
because physical security arrangements were incomplete and limited,
officials had been assuming unnecessary risks by not adequately
controlling access to areas where pathogens were located, incident
response capability was limited, and the full array of risks and
threats to Plum Island were not sufficiently considered.[Footnote 4] We
made 24 recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland Security to help
the department overcome these limitations. DHS agreed with the report
and its recommendations.
As a part of our routine audit work, we have been tracking the status
of the 2003 Plum Island security recommendations. In addition, in May
2007, we received a request from Senator Charles Schumer to report on
this matter. On September 28, 2007, we briefed interested congressional
staff on the extent to which DHS had implemented the recommendations at
that time. Because of broad-based congressional interest, under the
Comptroller General's statutory authority to conduct evaluations on his
own initiative, we are issuing this report, which summarizes that
briefing. (A list of addressees receiving this report appears on the
last page of this letter). To evaluate DHS's efforts to implement the
Plum Island security recommendations, we reviewed pertinent DHS and
USDA documents; interviewed DHS, USDA, and other personnel responsible
for Plum Island's security; and, during a visit to Plum Island in 2005,
observed improvements in physical security and the procedures securing
the biocontainment area as well as the facility's infrastructure.
However, we did not conduct a comprehensive audit of all decisions that
DHS and USDA have made to improve Plum Island security. We provided DHS
and USDA an opportunity to verify facts of this report. Officials from
both agencies provided us with additional information, which has been
incorporated into this report. We performed our work from February 2004
through December 2007.
In summary, DHS has made significant progress and has implemented 18 of
the 24 recommendations. However, implementation of the 6 remaining
recommendations is still under way. The following highlights DHS
actions to address our recommendations and discusses those that remain
in progress. Enclosure I lists all 24 recommendations and their status.
Addressing Physical Security Deficiencies:
In 2003, physical security at Plum Island was deficient in several
ways. For example, alarms and door sensors for detecting intruders were
not fully operational; controls to account for the keys to the island's
facilities were deficient; and USDA was not providing sufficient
physical security for certain assets, including those critical to the
continued operation of the facility. These vulnerabilities were
particularly troubling because a strike was under way, and sabotage of
the island's infrastructure had already occurred. DHS has since taken
many actions in response to our recommendations. For example, alarms
and door sensors are now in use, and DHS has implemented procedures to
better control access to keys to facilities. In addition, the
department has better secured certain features of the physical
infrastructure that supports the continued operation of the Plum Island
Animal Disease Center. DHS has also improved the security of North
America's only foot-and-mouth disease vaccine bank. This bank
represents years of cooperative research performed by Canada, Mexico,
and the United States, and the material it contains is considered a
critical asset for controlling a large outbreak.
The implementation of two of our recommendations to enhance physical
security remains in progress.
* First, we had reported that the island's contracted security force
reported to the administrative contract officer rather than to the
security director--a situation that could have impeded prompt
resolution of security-related issues. DHS agreed that this was
problematic and told us the department was initiating changes to the
security contract that would allow the security force to report
directly to the security director. DHS also told us that changing the
contract was dependent on resolution of a contract bid protest of the
contract award submitted to GAO. Since our briefing, GAO's General
Counsel has issued a decision leaving DHS free to make the necessary
contract changes.[Footnote 5] Subsequently, on November 1, 2007, DHS
entered into a new security contract. DHS officials told us that the
contract provides for the security force to report directly to the
security director effective January 1, 2008.
* Second, we also reported that USDA had no procedure for ensuring that
contractors and visitors entering the biocontainment area did not have
criminal backgrounds. We recommended that DHS check the backgrounds of
these individuals before granting them access, using, for example, the
National Crime Information Center (NCIC).[Footnote 6] According to DHS
officials, the department is developing a memorandum of agreement with
the Federal Protective Service (FPS)[Footnote 7] that will provide full-
time FPS presence on the island with the capability to verify
contractors' and visitors' backgrounds using NCIC before these
individuals enter the biocontainment area. However, this agreement has
not yet been finalized because DHS has not determined how it will pay
for maintaining FPS on the island 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The
expense of this arrangement was not planned for or included in DHS'
current budget.
Limiting Access to Pathogens:
In 2003, we reported that USDA was not adequately controlling access to
the pathogens. For example, we found that 12 Plum Island employees,
some with access to pathogens, had not had their background checks
updated in more than 10 years, even though USDA had told us that
background checks were updated every 5 years. Also, we found that as
many as five cleaning, maintenance, and repair staff--who are not
required to have background checks but are required to be escorted by
an approved individual--were working in the biocontainment area without
escorts. DHS has taken several actions in response to our
recommendations. For example, DHS has developed a process to update
background checks on a regular basis and has developed a line-of-sight
escort policy that requires all cleaning, maintenance, and repair staff
entering the biocontainment area to be continually monitored by
individuals with completed background checks. According to DHS
officials, if an escort is not available, unapproved individuals are
not permitted access to the area.
However, DHS has not fully implemented our recommendation that the
department ensure that individuals involved in laboratory activities in
the biocontainment area--including students and regardless of
citizenship--be approved in accordance with the law. Specifically, in
2003, we reported that USDA did not require background checks on
students attending its foreign animal disease diagnostic classes that
were regularly held in the biocontainment area. We stated that this
practice might not have been consistent with the regulations
implementing the Agricultural Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of
2002.[Footnote 8] According to the regulations, individuals with access
to pathogens should undergo background investigations. However, these
regulations also allow the Administrator of USDA's Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service to exempt individuals from background
investigations if the Administrator determines there is good cause and
if doing so is consistent with protecting animal health or animal
products.
USDA officials recently told us that it has provided such an exemption
for the students attending its foreign animal disease diagnostic
classes. USDA's position is that background investigations are not
required because the risk of a student removing a pathogen is
exceedingly low, largely due to what USDA calls "unique and
extraordinary security measures" it has taken for students. According
to USDA, these measures include denying students access to areas where
pathogens are stored or equipment necessary to extract the pathogen
from the tissue of the infected animal; not allowing students to
inoculate animals with the pathogens or to analyze animal tissue or to
isolate the disease from tissues; requiring students to be escorted at
all times by approved individuals while in the biocontainment area; and
requiring students to shower twice and completely change clothing
between showers while being continuously escorted. Any remaining risk
is acceptable, according to USDA, given the catastrophic risks
associated with not having adequately trained professionals who can
accurately diagnose and treat foreign animal diseases.
While we recognize the importance of maintaining a cadre of trained
animal disease professionals, we continue to find it troubling that
students are not subject to any type of background check before
handling animals infected with diseases that have been determined to
pose a severe threat to animal health and the economy. DHS officials
recently told us that they are conducting background checks on
international visitors, including those attending the foreign animal
disease diagnostic classes. DHS officials also plan to do background
checks on all individuals entering the biocontainment area using NCIC,
once FPS is on the island full time. However, DHS does not yet have a
firm timetable for when this will take place. Until this occurs, DHS
continues to follow USDA policy permitting U.S. students to attend the
classes without background checks.
Enhancing Incident Response Capability:
In 2003, we also found the island's incident response capability to be
limited. For example, although the small guard force carried firearms,
it was not authorized to do so; and no policy was put in place defining
if, when, and how guards should use their weapons. In addition, because
no formal arrangements with local law enforcement existed in 2003, Plum
Island officials were unable to predict the extent to which surrounding
localities would provide backup assistance during an incident. DHS has
since taken actions to overcome these response limitations. For
example, the guard force on the island is now authorized to carry
weapons, in accordance with New York state law, and policies and
procedures are in place detailing how guards should deal with
intruders. DHS also recently established a memorandum of agreement with
the town of Southold, NY, to provide law enforcement backup assistance
when necessary. As a result, even though the guards do not yet have
arrest authority, they can detain an individual on the island until
Southold police arrive and make arrests, if necessary. The agreement
with Southold also defines response times according to the type of
assistance required--such as marine and canine patrol support--and
provides for additional support from the Suffolk County Police
Department--such as helicopters, explosive ordinance disposal
capability, and other incident response assets--when warranted.
The implementation of two of our recommendations to enhance incident
response capability remains in progress.
* First, we recommended that DHS develop an incident response plan that
included precise detail about what to do if an incident occurred that
exceeded the capability of the security system, such as a terrorist
attack. In 2003, the island's incident response plan contained certain
elements required under USDA regulation, such as how to respond to a
bomb threat, but the plan did not clearly lay out the actions to be
taken for incidents exceeding Plum Island's security capabilities. This
was critical because at that time, according to DHS officials, the
nation faced a significant risk of a terrorist attack. Although, in
January 2007, DHS entered into a memorandum of agreement to obtain
backup assistance from the town of Southold, DHS has not yet updated
its incident response plan reflecting these new capabilities, but told
us it intends to do so.
* Second, we recommended that DHS conduct exercises with local law
enforcement to test the efficiency and effectiveness of Plum Island's
response capability. DHS agreed that it would be important to conduct
such exercises once arrangements with local law enforcement were made.
DHS conducted one exercise with the U.S. Coast Guard in 2006 to test
response to a simulation involving a suspicious boat approaching the
island. In addition, DHS recently informed us that, in November 2007,
it conducted a security exercise with more than 40 law enforcement
officials. While these exercises are positive developments, further
steps are needed, including testing the effectiveness of the response
plan once it reflects lessons learned from these exercises and the new
arrangements with local law enforcement.
Reevaluating Risks and Threats:
Finally, in 2003, USDA had not sufficiently reevaluated the extent of
the risks and threats to the security of Plum Island. For example, USDA
had identified a list of threats that applied to all of its
laboratories, but it had not reviewed these threats with the
intelligence community and local law enforcement officials to ensure
that threats particular to Plum Island and its vicinity were taken into
consideration. The FBI, Suffolk County officials, and others told us at
the time that they considered this step to be very important. DHS has
since taken actions to respond to our recommendations to reconsider
risks and threats to the security of Plum Island. For example, DHS
officials told us they consult regularly with appropriate local law
enforcement and intelligence agencies--including the U.S. Coast Guard,
the FBI, FPS, and the Southold Police Department--to reconsider and
update threats specific to Plum Island.
Implementation of one of our recommendations to reevaluate the risks
and threats to Plum Island remains in progress. Specifically, we
recommended that DHS revise, as necessary, security and incident
response plans to reflect any redefined risks, threats, and assets.
Although we have asked DHS officials to provide us with an updated
security plan, we have not seen evidence that the security plan has
been reviewed since 2004.
Concluding Observations:
DHS has made significant progress in the years since 2003, implementing
most of our recommendations. Whether Plum Island continues to operate
in its current capacity:
or as a higher level biosecurity facility, it is important that DHS
fully implement the remaining recommendations to reduce the risk of
pathogen theft and to enhance response capabilities at Plum Island.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees, the Secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland Security, and
other interested parties. We will also make copies available to others
upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report or need
additional information, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or
shamesl@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
report. Key contributors to this report are listed in enclosure II.
Signed by:
Lisa Shames:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
Enclosures:
[End of section]
List of Congressional Addresses:
The Honorable Tom Harkin:
Chairman:
The Honorable Saxby Chambliss:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Joseph Lieberman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Collin C. Peterson:
Chairman:
The Honorable Bob Goodlatte:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Agriculture:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John D. Dingell, Jr.
Chairman:
The Honorable Joe Barton:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Energy and Commerce:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Chairman:
The Honorable Peter T. King:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Tom Davis:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Herb Kohl:
Chairman:
The Honorable Robert Bennett:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug
Administration, and Related Agencies:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Robert C. Byrd:
Chairman:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Homeland Security:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Rosa L. DeLauro:
Chairman:
The Honorable Jack Kingston:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development, FDA and Related
Agencies:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Jim Langevin:
Chairman:
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and
Technology:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Bart Stupak:
Chairman:
The Honorable John M. Shimkus:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations:
Committee on Energy and Commerce:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Harold Rogers:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Homeland Security:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton:
The Honorable Charles E. Schumer:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Tim Bishop:
The Honorable Steve Israel:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Enclosure I:
Status of GAO Recommendations on Plum Island Physical Security as of
December 2007:
Recommendation: Addressing physical security deficiencies;
1. Fully implement the physical security measures;
Status: Implemented.
Recommendation: Addressing physical security deficiencies; Address the
specific security shortcomings identified by our Office of Special
Investigations;
2. The security force reports directly to the Administrative Contract
Officer and not to the Security Director--it is important for the
security force to report directly to the Security Director of Plum
Island to ensure that security-related issues are handled promptly;
Status: In progress.
Recommendation: Addressing physical security deficiencies; Address the
specific security shortcomings identified by our Office of Special
Investigations;
3. There are no name or record checks given to contractors and visitors
going into the biocontainment area. Contractors and visitors entering
the biocontainment area could be checked for criminal charges (through
the National Crime Information Center) before they are granted access;
Status: In progress.
Recommendation: Addressing physical security deficiencies; Address the
specific security shortcomings identified by our Office of Special
Investigations;
4. The area outside of the biocontainment and administrative building
is surveilled by stationary closed-circuit television cameras, which
are insufficient. Installing pan, tilt, and zoom closed-circuit
television cameras in certain areas would enhance surveillance
capabilities;
Status: Implemented.
Recommendation: Addressing physical security deficiencies; Address the
specific security shortcomings identified by our Office of Special
Investigations;
5. The island is easily accessible to the general public by boat, and
there are limited "no trespassing" signs present on the island to
advise the public that it is a government facility--more "no
trespassing" signs in those areas of the island that are easily
accessible to the public by boat would address this condition;
Status: Implemented.
Recommendation: Addressing physical security deficiencies; Address the
specific security shortcomings identified by our Office of Special
Investigations;
6. In the event of a fire, Plum Island is not always able to respond
appropriately because the fire brigade has limited hours of operation.
The security force could be cross-trained for fire rescues and
therefore provide 24-hour coverage;
Status: Implemented.
Recommendation: Addressing physical security deficiencies; Address the
specific security shortcomings identified by our Office of Special
Investigations;
7. The building used for overnight accommodations lacks panic alarms
for emergency response. Panic alarms could be installed in the building
and, when visitors are present, security guards could drive by on a
regular basis;
Status: Implemented.
Recommendation: Addressing physical security deficiencies; Address the
specific security shortcomings identified by our Office of Special
Investigations;
8. Control for keys and master keys of the facility are deficient. The
security department could be assigned the responsibility for all keys
and master keys. A key log could be created to better track possession
of keys;
Status: Implemented.
Recommendation: Addressing physical security deficiencies;
9. Better secure certain features of the physical infrastructure that
supports the continued operation of the Plum Island Animal Disease
Center; Status: Implemented.
Recommendation: Addressing physical security deficiencies;
10. Better secure the foot-and-mouth disease vaccine bank;
Status: Implemented.
Recommendation: Limiting access to pathogens;
11. Ensure that all individuals involved in laboratory activities in
the biocontainment area--including students and regardless of
citizenship--have been approved in accordance with the law;
Status: In progress.
Recommendation: Limiting access to pathogens;
12. Ensure that background checks of individuals involved in laboratory
activities in biocontainment are updated regularly;
Status: Implemented.
Recommendation: Limiting access to pathogens;
13. Ensure that cleaning, maintenance, and repair staff entering the
biocontainment area are escorted at all times by individuals with
completed background checks;
Status: Implemented.
Recommendation: Limiting access to pathogens;
14. Consult with other laboratories to identify ways to mitigate the
inherent difficulty of securing pathogens;
Status: Implemented.
Recommendation: Enhancing incident response capability;
15. Resolve the issue of the guards' authority to carry firearms and
make arrests;
Status: Implemented.
Recommendation: Enhancing incident response capability;
16. Develop and implement a policy on how guards should deal with
intruders and use weapons;
Status: Implemented.
Recommendation: Enhancing incident response capability;
17. Increase the size of the guard force;
Status: Implemented.
Recommendation: Enhancing incident response capability;
18. Complete an agreement with local law enforcement agencies to ensure
backup assistance when needed;
Status: Implemented.
Recommendation: Enhancing incident response capability;
19. Define an adequate response time for law enforcement to respond to
incidents;
Status: Implemented.
Recommendation: Enhancing incident response capability;
20. Develop an incident response plan that includes precise detail
about what to do in the event an incident occurs that exceeds the
capability of the security system, such as a terrorist attack;
Status: In progress.
Recommendation: Enhancing incident response capability;
21. Conduct exercises with local law enforcement to test the efficiency
and effectiveness of Plum Island's response capability;
Status: In progress.
Recommendation: Reevaluating risks and threats;
22. Reconsider the security risks at Plum Island, taking into account
recent acts of disgruntled employees;
Status: Implemented.
Recommendation: Reevaluating risks and threats;
23. Consult with appropriate state and local law enforcement and
intelligence agencies to revisit the threats specific to the Plum
Island Animal Disease Center;
Status: Implemented.
Recommendation: Reevaluating risks and threats;
24. Revise, as necessary, security and incident response plans to
reflect any redefined risks, threats, and assets;
Status: In progress.
Source: GAO.
Note: The recommendations listed in this table were made in GAO-03-847.
[End of table]
[End of enclosure]
Enclosure II:
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Lisa Shames, (202) 512-3841, or shamesl@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Charles Adams, Assistant
Director, and Mary Denigan-Macauley made key contributions to this
report. Kevin Bray, Nancy Crothers, Jennifer Gregory, Barbara
Patterson, and Raymond Rodriguez also made important contributions.
[End of enclosure]
Footnotes:
[1] The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-296, §310, 116
Stat. 2135, 2174).
[2] See GAO, Plum Island Animal Disease Center: DHS and USDA Are
Successfully Coordinating Current Work, but Long-Term Plans Are Being
Assessed, GAO-06-132 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 19, 2005).
[3] For more information on higher-level biosecurity facilities see
GAO, High-Containment Biosafety Laboratories: Preliminary Observations
on the Oversight of the Proliferation of BSL-3 and BSL-4 Laboratories
in the United States, GAO-08-108T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 4, 2007).
[4] GAO, Combating Bioterrorism: Actions Needed to Improve Security at
Plum Island Animal Disease Center, GAO-03-847 (Washington, D.C.: Sept.
19, 2003).
[5] See M&M Investigations, Inc., B-299369.2, B-299369.3, Oct. 24,
2007, 2007 CPD.
[6] NCIC is operated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and
provides federal, state, and local law enforcement and other criminal
justice agencies with, among other things, information on criminal
history records.
[7] FPS transferred from the General Services Administration to DHS in
March 2003 and has responsibility for protecting federal facilities.
[8] See Pub. L. No. 107-188, Tit. II, § 212, 116 Stat. 647.
[End of section]
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