The Democratic Republic of the Congo
Major Challenges Impede Efforts to Achieve U.S. Policy Objectives; Systematic Assessment of Progress Is Needed Gao ID: GAO-08-562T March 6, 2008During the last decade, conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)--one of the world's poorest countries--led directly or indirectly to the deaths of an estimated 5.4 million Congolese. A U.S.-supported peace process began in 2001, and the country's first democratically elected president in 40 years was inaugurated in 2006. However, conflict in the country has continued. In enacting the Democratic Republic of the Congo Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act of 2006 (the Act), Congress established 15 U.S. policy objectives that address humanitarian, social development, economic and natural resource management, governance, and security concerns in the DRC. The Act mandated that GAO review U.S. programs in the DRC that support these policy objectives. In this testimony, based on its December 2007 report, GAO identifies (1) U.S. programs and activities that support the Act's objectives, (2) major challenges hindering the accomplishment of the objectives. For its report, GAO obtained and analyzed program documents for seven U.S. agencies--the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Defense (DOD), Health and Human Services (HHS), Labor (DOL), State, and the Treasury and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). GAO also met with officials of these agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) active in the DRC.
In fiscal years 2006 and 2007, respectively, seven agencies allocated a total of about $217.9 million and $181.5 million for the DRC. About 70 percent of these funds supported the Act's humanitarian and social development objectives and about 30 percent supported its economic and natural resource management, governance, and security objectives. Agencies' programs and activities included, for example, USAID's provision of emergency supplies, food, and water and sanitation improvements to vulnerable populations; Treasury's provision of interim debt relief; and State's provision of training and other assistance for professionalizing members of the DRC's military. Several major, interrelated challenges--an unstable security environment, weak governance, mismanagement of natural resources, and lack of basic infrastructure--have impeded efforts to achieve the Act's policy objectives. For instance, weak and abusive DRC security forces have worsened humanitarian and social problems, forcing U.S. and NGO staff to curtail some efforts. At the same time, corruption and other governance problems have impeded efforts to reform the security sector and hold human rights violators accountable. Meanwhile, mismanagement of natural resources has fueled continued conflict and corruption, and a lack of basic infrastructure has hindered progress in humanitarian, developmental, and governance programs. The U.S. government has not established a process to assess overall progress toward the Act's policy objectives. As a result, it cannot be assured that it has allocated U.S. resources in the most effective manner. In its December 2007 report, GAO recommended that the Secretary of State work with the heads of the other agencies implementing programs in the DRC to develop a plan for systematically assessing the U.S. government's overall progress in achieving the Act's policy objectives. State agreed with GAO's recommendation.
GAO-08-562T, The Democratic Republic of the Congo: Major Challenges Impede Efforts to Achieve U.S. Policy Objectives; Systematic Assessment of Progress Is Needed
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Testimony:
Before the Congressional Human Rights Caucus:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 1:00 p.m. EST:
Thursday, March 6, 2008:
The Democratic Republic Of The Congo:
Major Challenges Impede Efforts to Achieve U.S. Policy Objectives;
Systematic Assessment of Progress Is Needed:
Statement of David Gootnick, Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
GAO-08-562T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-562T, testimony before the Congressional Human
Rights Caucus.
Why GAO Did This Study:
During the last decade, conflict in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC)”one of the world‘s poorest countries”led directly or
indirectly to the deaths of an estimated 5.4 million Congolese. A U.S.-
supported peace process began in 2001, and the country‘s first
democratically elected president in 40 years was inaugurated in 2006.
However, conflict in the country has continued.
In enacting the Democratic Republic of the Congo Relief, Security, and
Democracy Promotion Act of 2006 (the Act), Congress established 15 U.S.
policy objectives that address humanitarian, social development,
economic and natural resource management, governance, and security
concerns in the DRC. The Act mandated that GAO review U.S. programs in
the DRC that support these policy objectives. In this testimony, based
on its December 2007 report, GAO identifies (1) U.S. programs and
activities that support the Act‘s objectives, (2) major challenges
hindering the accomplishment of the objectives. For its report, GAO
obtained and analyzed program documents for seven U.S. agencies”the
Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Defense (DOD), Health and Human
Services (HHS), Labor (DOL), State, and the Treasury and the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID). GAO also met with
officials of these agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGO)
active in the DRC.
What GAO Found:
In fiscal years 2006 and 2007, respectively, seven agencies allocated a
total of about $217.9 million and $181.5 million for the DRC. About 70
percent of these funds supported the Act‘s humanitarian and social
development objectives and about 30 percent supported its economic and
natural resource management, governance, and security objectives.
Agencies‘ programs and activities included, for example, USAID‘s
provision of emergency supplies, food, and water and sanitation
improvements to vulnerable populations; Treasury‘s provision of interim
debt relief; and State‘s provision of training and other assistance for
professionalizing members of the DRC‘s military.
Several major, interrelated challenges”an unstable security
environment, weak governance, mismanagement of natural resources, and
lack of basic infrastructure”have impeded efforts to achieve the Act‘s
policy objectives. For instance, weak and abusive DRC security forces
have worsened humanitarian and social problems, forcing U.S. and NGO
staff to curtail some efforts. At the same time, corruption and other
governance problems have impeded efforts to reform the security sector
and hold human rights violators accountable. Meanwhile, mismanagement
of natural resources has fueled continued conflict and corruption, and
a lack of basic infrastructure has hindered progress in humanitarian,
developmental, and governance programs.
The U.S. government has not established a process to assess overall
progress toward the Act‘s policy objectives. As a result, it cannot be
assured that it has allocated U.S. resources in the most effective
manner. In its December 2007 report, GAO recommended that the Secretary
of State work with the heads of the other agencies implementing
programs in the DRC to develop a plan for systematically assessing the
U.S. government‘s overall progress in achieving the Act‘s policy
objectives. State agreed with GAO‘s recommendation.
Figure: U.S. Funding Allocations for the DRC, Fiscal Years 2006-2007:
[See PDF for image]
This figure contains two pie-charts depicting the following data:
Funding allocations by agency:
State/USAID emergency assistance: 44% ($173.7 million);
State/USAID nonemergency: 36% ($142 million);
Treasury: 11% ($44.6 million);
HHS: 6% ($23.6 million);
USDA: 2% ($9.6 million);
DOL: 1% ($5.5 million);
DOD: less than 1% ($0.4 million).
Source: GAO analysis of executive agencies' data.
Funding allocations by category:
Humanitarian assistance: 43%;
Social development: 27%;
Economic/natural resource management: 19%;
Governance: 6%;
Security: 5%.
Source: GAO analysis of executive branch data.
[End of figure]
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-562T].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact David Gootnick at (202)
512-3194 or gootnickd@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Members of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus:
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work on U.S. assistance in
the Democratic of the Congo (DRC). Because of its large size, central
location in sub-Saharan Africa, and abundant natural resources, the DRC
is important to the stability of central Africa and the interests of
the United States. However, since achieving independence in 1960, the
DRC--one of the world's poorest countries--has suffered from despotic
rule, underdevelopment, and economic problems. Further, during the last
decade, conflict in the DRC resulted directly or indirectly in the
deaths of an estimated 5.4 million Congolese.
According to the Department of State, Western aid to the DRC fell in
the early 1990s because of concerns about human rights abuses and the
need for internal reforms, but the United States began to increase its
support in 2001 after the initiation of U.S.-supported peace talks. A
transitional DRC government was installed in 2003, and the country's
first democratically elected president in 40 years was inaugurated in
December 2006. However, conflict in the country has continued. In
December 2006, Congress enacted the DRC Relief, Security, and Democracy
Promotion Act of 2006 (the Act),[Footnote 1] establishing 15 policy
objectives related to humanitarian, social development, economic and
natural resource, governance, and security concerns in the DRC. The Act
mandated that GAO review U.S. programs in the DRC that support these
policy objectives.
My statement today is based on our December 2007 report[Footnote 2]
that identified (1) U.S. programs and activities that support the Act's
objectives, [Footnote 3] (2) major impediments hindering accomplishment
of these objectives, and (3) U.S. efforts to assess progress toward
accomplishing the objectives.[Footnote 4] (See app. I for a description
of our methodology.)
Summary:
U.S. agencies have implemented a number of programs and activities that
support the Act's policy objectives. In fiscal years 2006 and 2007,
respectively, USDA, DOD, HHS, DOL, State, Treasury, and USAID allocated
a total of about $217.9 million and $181.5 million for the DRC. About
70 percent of the funds supported the Act's humanitarian and social
development objectives and about 30 percent of the funds supported the
Act's economic and natural resources, governance, and security
objectives. The agencies' programs and activities have included, for
example, USAID's provision of emergency supplies, food, and water and
sanitation improvements to vulnerable populations; Treasury's
provision of interim debt relief; and State's provision of training and
other assistance aimed at professionalizing members of the DRC's
military.
Several major challenges impede U.S. efforts to achieve the Act's
policy objectives, according to U.S., nongovernmental organization
(NGO), and other officials and experts: (1) unstable security
environment, (2) weak governance and widespread corruption, (3)
mismanagement of natural resources, and (4) lack of basic
infrastructure. These challenges are interrelated and have hindered
progress in multiple areas. For instance, weak and abusive DRC security
forces have worsened humanitarian and social problems, forcing U.S. and
NGO staff to curtail some efforts; the lack of security has also
discouraged investment, negatively affecting the country's economic
potential. At the same time, corruption and other governance problems
have impeded efforts to reform the security sector and hold human
rights violators accountable and have discouraged private-sector
investment, thus hindering economic growth. Meanwhile, mismanagement of
the DRC's natural resources has fueled continued conflict and
corruption, and a lack of basic infrastructure, such as buildings,
equipment, and roads, has hindered progress in humanitarian,
developmental, and governance programs.
The U.S. government has not established a process to assess overall
progress toward achieving the Act's policy objectives in the DRC.
Although State and the National Security Council (NSC) have developed
mechanisms to coordinate executive branch agencies' activities in the
DRC, neither of these mechanisms systematically assesses overall
progress. As a result, the U.S. government cannot be fully assured that
it has allocated its resources in the DRC in the most effective manner.
To ensure a basis for informed decisions regarding U.S. allocations for
assistance in the DRC as well as any needed bilateral or multilateral
actions, we recommended in our 2007 report that the Secretary of State
work with the heads of the other U.S. agencies implementing programs in
the DRC to develop a plan for systematically assessing the extent to
which the U.S. government as a whole is making progress in achieving
the Act's policy objectives. State agreed with our recommendation.
Background:
The DRC's size, location, and wealth of natural resources contribute to
its importance to U.S. interests in the region. With an area of more
than 900,000 square miles, the DRC is roughly the size of the United
States east of the Mississippi River. Located in the center of Africa,
the DRC borders nine nations. Its abundant natural resources, which
constitute its primary export products, include 34 percent of the
world's cobalt reserves, 10 percent of the world's copper reserves, and
64 percent of the world's coltan reserves, as well as diamonds, gold,
cassiterite, and other minerals. Moreover, the DRC's rain forests
provide 8 percent of the world's carbon.[Footnote 5]
The DRC has had a turbulent history. In 1965, fewer than 5 years after
the nation achieved independence from Belgium, a military regime seized
control of the DRC and ruled, often brutally, for more than 3 decades.
It was toppled in 1997 by a coalition of internal groups and
neighboring countries to the east, including Rwanda and Uganda, after
dissident Rwandan groups began operating in the DRC. Subsequent efforts
by a new DRC government to secure the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan
troops prompted a second war in 1998 that eventually drew the armies of
three more African nations into the DRC. Beginning in 1999, a United
Nations (UN) peacekeeping force was deployed to the DRC. After a series
of U.S.-supported peace talks that began in 2001, the other nations
withdrew all or most of their troops and an interim government was
established. Elections held in 2006 with logistical support provided by
UN peacekeepers culminated in the December 6, 2006, inauguration of the
DRC's first democratically elected president in more than 40 years.
However, conflict in the DRC has continued. According to the
International Rescue Committee, from 1998 through 2007, 5.4 million
Congolese died as the direct or indirect consequence of conflict in the
country, with an estimated 2.1 million of those deaths since 2002.
The DRC suffers from a wide range of problems, including acute poverty
and limited economic prospects. It is one of the poorest and least
developed countries in the world:[Footnote 6] the current life
expectancy is 43 years, in part because the DRC suffers from high rates
of tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, and malaria. USAID reports that 2 of every
10 children born in the DRC die before their fifth birthday and that
the maternal death rate is the world's highest. An international group
of donor nations recently concluded that the DRC's educational system
is failing and that most rural children do not attend school. In
addition, wars and turmoil have reduced its economy to dependence on
subsistence agriculture and informal activities. The DRC's prospects
are also encumbered by an external debt load of around $8
billion,[Footnote 7] which is three times greater than the level of
debt that the World Bank and the IMF consider sustainable. Moreover,
the DRC has not fully qualified for debt relief under the enhanced
Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative.[Footnote 8]
The DRC receives assistance from a number of donor nations and
organizations. During 2004 and 2005, the 10 largest donors to the DRC
were the World Bank's International Development Association, the
European Commission, Japan, Belgium, the United Kingdom, the United
States, France, Germany, the IMF, and the Netherlands. The United
States' goal for its assistance to the DRC, as characterized by State,
is to strengthen the process of internal reconciliation and
democratization to promote a stable, developing, and democratic
DRC.[Footnote 9] As described by the Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs, U.S. policy is to support, but not lead, the efforts
of the DRC to address its problems.
Table 1 shows the Act's 15 U.S. policy objectives for the DRC, linked
to the five categories of assistance--humanitarian, social development,
economic and natural resource management, governance, and security.
Table 1: Policy Objectives in the DRC Relief, Security, and Democracy
Promotion Act of 2006, by Category:
Policy objective: Help promote, reinvigorate, and support the political
process in the DRC to press all parties in the Transitional National
Government and the succeeding government to implement fully and to
institutionalize mechanisms--including national and international
election observers, fair and transparent voter registration procedures,
and a significant civic awareness and public education campaign created
for the July 30, 2006--elections and future elections in the DRC to
ensure that elections are carried out in a fair and democratic manner;
Category: Governance.
Policy objective: Urge the DRC government to recognize and act upon its
responsibilities to immediately bring discipline to its security
forces; hold those individuals responsible for atrocities and other
human rights violations, particularly the rape of women and girls as an
act of war, accountable and bring such individuals to justice;
Category: Governance, security.
Policy objective: Help ensure that, once a stable national government
is established in the DRC, it is committed to multiparty democracy,
open and transparent governance, respect for human rights and religious
freedom, ending the violence throughout the country, promoting peace
and stability with its neighbors, rehabilitating the national judicial
system and enhancing the rule of law, combating corruption, instituting
economic reforms to promote development, and creating an environment to
promote private investment;
Category: Governance, economic and natural resource management.
Policy objective: Assist the DRC government as it seeks to meet the
basic needs of its citizens, including security, safety, and access to
health care, education, food, shelter, and clean drinking water;
Category: Humanitarian, social development, and security.
Policy objective: Support security sector reform by assisting the DRC
government to establish a viable and professional national army and
police force that respects human rights and the rule of law, is under
effective civilian control, and possesses a viable presence throughout
the entire country, provided the DRC meets all requirements for U.S.
military assistance under existing law;
Category: Security.
Policy objective: Help expedite planning and implementation of programs
associated with the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation,
reintegration, and rehabilitation process in the DRC;
Category: Security.
Policy objective: Support efforts of the DRC government, the UN
peacekeeping force, and other entities, as appropriate, to disarm,
demobilize, and repatriate the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of
Rwanda and other illegally armed groups;
Category: Security.
Policy objective: Make all efforts to ensure that the DRC government
(a) is committed to responsible and transparent management of natural
resources across the country; and (b) takes active measures to (i)
promote economic development; (ii) hold accountable individuals who
illegally exploit the country's natural resources; and (iii) implement
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative by enacting laws
requiring disclosure and independent auditing of company payments and
government receipts for natural resource extraction;
Category: Economic and natural resource management.
Policy objective: Promote a viable civil society and to enhance
nongovernmental organizations and institutions, including religious
organizations, the media, political parties, trade unions, and trade
and business associations, that can act as a stabilizing force and
effective check on the government;
Category: Governance.
Policy objective: Help rebuild and enhance infrastructure,
communications, and other mechanisms that will increase the ability of
the central government to manage internal affairs, encourage economic
development, and facilitate relief efforts of humanitarian
organizations;
Category: Humanitarian, social development.
Policy objective: Help halt the high prevalence of sexual abuse and
violence perpetrated against women and children in the DRC and mitigate
the detrimental effects from acts of this type of violence by
undertaking health, education, and psycho-social support programs;
Category: Social development.
Policy objective: Work aggressively on a bilateral basis to urge
governments of countries contributing troops to MONUC to enact and
enforce laws on trafficking in persons and sexual abuse that meet
international standards, promote codes of conduct for troops serving as
part of UN peacekeeping missions, and immediately investigate and
punish citizens who are responsible for abuses in the DRC;
Category: Security.
Policy objective: Assist the DRC as it undertakes steps to (a) protect
internally displaced persons and refugees in the DRC and border regions
from all forms of violence, including gender-based violence and other
human rights abuses; (b) address other basic needs of vulnerable
populations with the goal of allowing these conflict-affected
individuals to ultimately return to their homes; and (c) assess the
magnitude of the problem of orphans from conflict and HIV/AIDS in the
DRC and work to establish a program of national support;
Category: Security, social development, humanitarian.
Policy objective: Engage with governments working to promote peace and
security throughout the DRC and hold accountable individuals, entities,
and countries working to destabilize the country;
Category: Security.
Policy objective: Promote appropriate use of the forests of the DRC in
a manner that benefits the rural populations in that country who depend
on the forests for their livelihoods and protects national and
environmental interests;
Category: Economic and natural resource management.
Source: GAO analysis of Section 102 of the DRC Relief, Security, and
Democracy Promotion Act of 2006.
[End of table]
U.S. Programs and Activities That Support the Act's Policy Objectives:
U.S. agencies have implemented a number of programs and activities that
support the Act's policy objectives. In fiscal years 2006 and 2007,
about 70 percent of U.S. funding for the DRC was allocated for programs
that would support the Act's emergency humanitarian and social
development objectives and about 30 percent was allocated for programs
and activities that would support the Act's economic, governance, and
security objectives (see fig. 1).
Figure 1: Allocation of U.S. Funding for the DRC by Category, Fiscal
Years 2006-2007:
[See PDF for image]
This figure contains both a pie-chart and a table. The following
information is presented:
Funding allocations by category:
Humanitarian assistance: 43%;
Social development: 27%;
Economic/natural resource management: 19%;
Governance: 6%;
Security: 5%.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Humanitarian: $85.3 million;
Social development: $51.9 million;
Economic: $66.4[A] million;
Governance: $7.5 million;
Security: $6.9 million;
Total: $217.9 million.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Humanitarian: $88.4 million;
Social development: $58.2 million;
Economic: $9.6 million;
Governance: $14.5 million;
Security: $10.8 million;
Total: $181.5 million.
Fiscal year: Total;
Humanitarian: $1733.7 million;
Social development: $110.1 million;
Economic: $76.0 million;
Governance: $22.1 million;
Security: $17.7 million;
Total: $399.4 million.
Source: GAO analysis of executive branch data.
Notes: Because of rounding, figures in rows and columns may not sum to
totals shown.
[A] Includes $44.6 million allocated by the Treasury to help address
costs of DRC debt relief. The DRC has received interim debt relief but
must meet additional criteria before its debt is fully reduced.
[End of figure]
Seven U.S. agencies--USDA, DOD, HHS, DOL, State, Treasury, and USAID--
allocated about $217.9 million and $181.5 million for aid to the DRC in
fiscal years 2006 and 2007, respectively, with State and USAID
providing the majority of these funds (see fig. 2).[Footnote 10]
Figure 2: Allocation of U.S. Funding for the DRC by Agency, Fiscal
Years 2006-2007:
[See PDF for image]
This figure contains a pie-chart depicting the following data:
Funding allocations by agency:
State/USAID emergency assistance: 44% ($173.7 million);
State/USAID nonemergency: 36% ($142 million);
Treasury: 11% ($44.6 million);
HHS: 6% ($23.6 million);
USDA: 2% ($9.6 million);
DOL: 1% ($5.5 million);
DOD: less than 1% ($0.4 million).
Source: GAO analysis of executive agencies' data.
Note: According to HHS, its Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) obligates funds for projects that are part of research that can
be conducted in different countries, rather than allocating funds by
country. Our summary figures incorporate total CDC funding for the DRC
for the 2 years depicted. For fiscal year 2008, State and USAID
estimate that they will allocate a total of $105.6 million for the DRC,
and for fiscal year 2009, they are requesting a total of $95.1 million.
The Treasury requested $178.3 million for fiscal year 2008 in the event
that the DRC qualifies for debt relief. OPIC has approved $400 million
in financing and insurance for a U.S. company to invest in the DRC's
mining sector and will seek fiscal year 2008 funding to support this
project.
[End of figure]
Examples of U.S. agencies' programs and activities in each category
include the following (see app. II for more information).
Humanitarian. USAID and State have provided humanitarian assistance to
help the DRC meet its citizens' and vulnerable populations' basic
needs.
* USAID has provided emergency assistance to vulnerable populations in
the DRC. Working primarily through the UN World Food Program and an
NGO, USAID has supported distribution of food to internally displaced
persons; people infected with, and orphans affected by, HIV/AIDS; and
victims of sexual abuse by soldiers. Working primarily through NGOs,
USAID has provided emergency supplies, health care, nutrition programs,
water and sanitation improvements, food, and agricultural assistance to
other vulnerable populations, such as malnourished children and war-
affected populations.
* USAID has provided emergency assistance to support road
rehabilitation and bridge reconstruction projects; schools; and the
socioeconomic reintegration of ex-child soldiers, adult combatants, and
their families.
* State has provided humanitarian assistance to help repatriate,
integrate, and resettle refugees in the DRC. In fiscal year 2007, this
assistance was implemented primarily by the UN High Commissioner on
Refugees, other international organizations, and NGOs.
Social development. USAID, HHS, and DOL have provided assistance to
support the Act's social development and rehabilitation objectives.
* USAID has worked through NGOs to improve education, health care, and
family planning. For instance, USAID has funded efforts to reduce
abandonment of children; provide psychosocial support, medical
assistance, and reintegration support to survivors of sexual and
gender-based violence in the eastern DRC; train teachers; and increase
access to education for vulnerable children.
* USAID has funded efforts to train medical staff and nurses in the
management of primary health care, distribute bed nets to prevent the
spread of malaria and polio, provide family planning services, and
support voluntary counseling and testing centers for HIV/AIDS.
* HHS has allocated funds for immunization against, and the
surveillance and control of, infectious diseases such as polio,
measles, and HIV/AIDS.
* DOL has allocated funds to address children's involvement in mining
and related services, small-scale commerce, child soldiering, and other
forms of child labor in the DRC.
Economic and natural resource management. Treasury, USAID, State, and
USDA have provided support for the Act's economic objectives.
* Treasury has worked with the World Bank and the IMF to relieve the
DRC of some of its foreign debt. The United States provided the DRC
interim debt relief (primarily through reduced interest payments) in
fiscal years 2005 through 2007, following the DRC's admittance into the
HIPC debt relief program. Once the DRC qualifies for the completion of
its HIPC debt relief, Treasury plans to pay the budgetary costs of
fully relieving the DRC's $1.3 billion debt to the United
States.[Footnote 11]
* USAID has allocated funds to support sustainable natural resource
management, forest protection, and biodiversity in the DRC through the
Central African Regional Program for the Environment.
* State has supported efforts to promote transparency in the DRC's
natural resource sector by serving as the U.S. representative to the
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, which deals with rough diamond
trade,[Footnote 12] and to the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative (EITI).[Footnote 13]
* USDA has allocated funds to improve agricultural productivity,
increase rural market development, provide credit for agribusiness and
rural infrastructure, and increase access to potable water and water
for irrigation in the DRC.
Governance. USAID and State have allocated funds for programs that
support the Act's governance objectives.
* USAID has allocated funds to organize itinerant court sessions
intended to bring justice institutions closer to citizens, facilitate
greater access to justice for vulnerable people, and provide quality
legal assistance to the population in relatively inaccessible parts of
the DRC.
* USAID has supported an NGO's establishment of democracy resource
centers to assist political party leaders, civic activists, elected
local and national officials, and government institutions in promoting
good governance and democracy.
* USAID, to promote judicial independence, supported an NGO's efforts
by fostering improvements to the DRC's legal framework, such as laws on
sexual violence and the rights of women, and providing legal assistance
activities for victims of sexual and gender-based violence.
* State allocated funds in 2006 for more than 30 programs by the
National Endowment for Democracy, including programs aimed at informing
women of their rights, addressing issues of abuse and corruption, and
promoting political participation.
Security. State, USAID, and DOD have provided security-related
assistance in the DRC.
* State has facilitated a multinational forum, the Tripartite Plus
Commission, for the DRC and nations on its troubled eastern border--
Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi--to discuss regional security issues,
including militias operating illegally in the eastern DRC.
* USAID has launched programs to promote the reintegration of some
former fighters into Congolese society.
* State is refurbishing the DRC's military officer training school and
training multiple levels of the military, including brigade-and
battalion-staff level officers, on military justice reform, civil-
military relations, and other issues of concern.
Major Challenges Hindering Achievement of the Act's Policy Objectives
in the DRC:
U.S., NGO, and other officials and experts identified several major
challenges that are impeding U.S. efforts to achieve the Act's policy
objectives. These challenges include (1) an unstable security
environment, (2) weak governance and widespread corruption, (3)
mismanagement of natural resources, and (4) lack of basic
infrastructure.[Footnote 14] Because these challenges are
interrelated, they negatively impact progress in multiple areas.
* Unstable security environment. The DRC's weak and abusive security
forces have been unable to quell continuing militia activities in the
DRC's eastern regions, where security worsened during 2007. For
example, the UN reported that the DRC army is responsible for 40
percent of recently reported human rights violations--including rapes,
mass killings of civilians, and summary executions--and DRC police and
other security forces have killed and tortured civilians with total
impunity.[Footnote 15] State reported that government and other armed
forces in the DRC have committed a wide range of human rights abuses,
including forcing children into the security forces.[Footnote 16]
Further, the DRC's unstable security situation has worsened the DRC's
humanitarian and social problems and impeded efforts to address these
problems. For instance, U.S. agency officials reported that the
conflict has forced them to curtail some emergency assistance programs,
and NGOs implementing development and humanitarian assistance
activities in the DRC reported that the lack of security has resulted
in attacks on their staff or led them to suspend site visits and cancel
and reschedule work. In addition, the DRC's unstable security situation
has negatively affected the country's economic potential by
discouraging investment, which in turn could worsen security through
renewed conflict.[Footnote 17]
* Weak governance and corruption. By many accounts, corruption in the
DRC is widespread. For example, Transparency International's 2007
Corruption Perceptions Index identifies the DRC as one of the 10th most
corrupt countries in the world.[Footnote 18] Further, weak governance
and corruption in the DRC have hindered efforts to reform the security
sector and hold human rights violators accountable. For instance,
according to U.S. officials, the DRC lacks a government office with
clear authority on security issues, and efforts to reform the DRC's
police may be impeded by lack of support from corrupt DRC institutions.
According to NGO representatives, the lack of an effective judiciary
impedes efforts to hold human rights violators accountable for their
actions, which in turn promotes a "culture of impunity." Moreover,
governance problems have hindered efforts to implement economic reforms
required for debt relief and promote economic growth. For example,
according to Treasury officials and IMF documents, the government's
lack of commitment to meet certain requirements has jeopardized the
DRC's ability to receive some interim debt relief, qualify for full
debt relief, and improve the country's overall economic prospects.
[Footnote 19] Finally, the judiciary's ineffective enforcement of
commercial contracts in the DRC has likely discouraged private sector
investment and hence economic growth. The World Bank rated the DRC's
enforcement of contracts as among the weakest in the world, such that a
company might need to expend roughly 150 percent of a typical
contract's value to ensure enforcement through court proceedings.
* Mismanagement of natural resources. Governance and capacity
challenges in the DRC have limited the ability of international donors,
NGOs, and the DRC government to improve natural resource management.
For example, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme has criticized
the DRC for weak internal controls, customs capacity, and ability to
track diamonds extracted by large number of self-employed
miners.[Footnote 20] According to U.S. and NGO officials, the DRC also
conducted a national mining contract review without publishing its
terms of reference or all of the contracts or clearly defining the role
of civil society representatives. Further, mismanagement of the DRC's
natural resources has fueled continued conflict and corruption.
According to U.S. officials, international donors, and NGOs, the DRC's
abundant natural resources fuel conflict between neighboring countries'
militias and armed domestic factions and foster corruption among
government officials.
* Lack of basic infrastructure. The DRC lacks many key elements of
basic infrastructure, such as buildings, equipment, and transportation.
For example, according to a recent study by 17 donor nations, no roads
link 9 of the DRC's 10 provincial capitals to the national capital and
no roads link the DRC's northern and southern regions or its eastern
and western regions. International observers have reported that the
DRC's educational and penal infrastructures are dilapidated, and an
international group of donor nations stated that the DRC's
electrification, communications, and supplies of clean water have major
deficiencies. Moreover, the DRC's lack of basic infrastructure has
hindered progress in humanitarian, developmental, and governance
programs. According to U.S. officials, the lack of an adequate in-
country transportation system increases the time required to get
supplies to those in need and, according to U.S. and NGO officials,
increases the expense or difficulty associated with their programs.
International donors and organizations said that the lack of
infrastructure has made economic development impossible in many areas
and may stifle the potential for economic growth and private sector
activity in most DRC provinces.
U.S. Efforts to Assess Overall Progress toward Achieving the Act's
Policy Objectives:
Although U.S. agencies monitor their efforts in the DRC, the U.S.
government has not established a process to assess overall progress
toward achieving the Act's policy objectives in the DRC. Further,
although State and NSC have developed mechanisms to coordinate some of
the agencies' activities in the DRC, neither mechanism systematically
assesses overall progress.
Some of the key agencies involved in the DRC monitor their respective
programs. For example, USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
(OFDA) has two program officers in the DRC who regularly visit project
sites and publish quarterly reports on OFDA activities. Their partner
organizations, or implementers, also provide reports and updates on
their projects.[Footnote 21]
However, the executive branch has not established a governmentwide
process to use such information for an assessment of overall U.S.
progress in the DRC. Although State and NSC have developed mechanisms
aimed at providing some degree of coordination among executive branch
agencies active in the DRC, neither mechanism currently provides for
the systematic assessment of overall U.S. progress toward its goals.
* In 2006, to ensure that foreign assistance, including assistance
provided to the DRC, is used as effectively as possible to meet broad
foreign policy objectives, the Secretary of State appointed a Director
of Foreign Assistance (DFA), who also serves as the Administrator of
USAID.[Footnote 22] Under DFA's guidance, State and USAID have begun to
develop a joint planning and budgeting process that, according to State
officials, may eventually assess all U.S. foreign assistance. However,
as of February 2008, the Office of the DFA had not completed its DRC
operations plan for fiscal year 2007, which ended on September 30,
2007.
* To focus attention on issues affecting the Great Lakes region of
central Africa, which encompasses the DRC, the National Security
Council established an interagency working group, comprising officials
from DOD, State, and USAID. The group's mission is to establish a
coordinated approach, policies, and actions to address issues, such as
security, in the DRC and other countries in the region. However,
according to NSC and State officials, the group has not developed
systematic tools for assessing the impact of all U.S. agencies' efforts
to achieve the Act's objectives. Also, the group does not include
several agencies providing assistance to the DRC, such as DOL, HHS, and
USDA.
The lack of a governmentwide process for assessing its overall progress
in the DRC limits the U.S. government's ability to ensure that it has
allocated its resources in the most effective manner. At the same time,
given the DRC's significance to Africa's stability, the scope,
complexity, and urgency of the challenges to achieving U.S. policy
objectives in the DRC warrant a governmentwide response. To ensure a
basis for informed decisions regarding U.S. allocations for assistance
in the DRC as well as any needed bilateral or multilateral actions, we
recommended in December 2007 that the Secretary of State, through the
Director of Foreign Assistance, work with the heads of the other U.S.
agencies implementing programs and activities in the DRC to develop a
plan for systematically assessing the extent to which the U.S.
government as a whole is making progress in achieving the Act's policy
objectives. Commenting on a draft of our 2007 report, State endorsed
our recommendation, noting that it would likely be met as DFA's joint
planning and budgeting processes are extended to include all U.S.
agencies engaged in the DRC.[Footnote 23]
This completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to
any questions that Members of the Caucus may have at this time.
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
For our December 2007 report, we identified (1) U.S. programs and
activities that support the objectives of the DRC Relief, Security, and
Democracy Promotion Act of 2006 (the Act),[Footnote 24] (2) major
challenges hindering accomplishment of these objectives, and (3) U.S.
efforts to assess progress toward accomplishing these objectives.
To identify U.S. programs and activities that support the Act's
objectives, we analyzed policy, planning, budget, and programming
documents describing U.S. policies and programs in the DRC provided by
key U.S. agencies--the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Defense
(DOD), Labor (DOL), Health and Human Services (HHS), State, and the
Treasury; the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC); and the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). We identified the
amount of funding each agency allocated for its DRC programs in fiscal
years 2006 and 2007; we did not determine the extent to which each
agency obligated or expended its allocated funds. We also met with
representatives from each of these agencies, the National Security
Council (NSC), nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and other
organizations with expertise on DRC-related issues.
To identify key impediments hindering accomplishment of the Act's
policy objectives, we analyzed relevant policy and program documents;
interviewed U.S. agency officials; conducted a round-table session with
a nonprobability sample of 11 NGOs with a broad range of experience and
expertise implementing programs and projects in the DRC; and
interviewed representatives from other organizations with experience in
the DRC.
To identify U.S. efforts to assess progress toward accomplishing the
Act's policy objectives, we reviewed U.S. agency assessments and
implementation documents. Although we did not travel to the DRC, we
conducted several telephone interviews with U.S. embassy and USAID
mission staff in the DRC.
We conducted this performance audit from May 2007 to December 2007, in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements:
GAO Contact:
David Gootnick, (202) 512-3149 or gootnickd@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgements:
In addition to the contact named above, Zina Merritt (Assistant
Director), Pierre Toureille, Kristy Kennedy, Kendall Schaefer, Martin
De Alteriis, Michael Hoffman, Reid Lowe, and Farhanaz Kermalli made key
contributions to this report. Grace Lui provided technical assistance.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Pub. L. No. 109-456, 120 Stat. 3384.
[2] GAO, Democratic Republic of the Congo: Systematic Assessment Is
Needed to Determine Agencies' Progress toward U.S. Policy Objectives,
GAO-08-188 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2007).
[3] We grouped the Act's 15 objectives in five categories:
humanitarian, social development, economic and natural resource
management, governance, and security.
[4] Because the Act directed us to review actions taken by U.S.
agencies to achieve its objectives, we focused on the fiscal year in
which the Act was enacted and, for context, the fiscal year before its
enactment.
[5] Coltan and cassiterite are metals used in the electronics industry.
[6] The DRC was ranked 167th of 177 nations surveyed by the UN
Development Program in terms of life expectancy, education, and
standard of living, and its ranking on these measures has declined by
more than 10 percent over the past decade. The Fund for Peace ranked
the DRC second, after Sudan, in its Failed States Index.
[7] We state external debt in present value terms, which take into
account the sum of all future debt-service obligations (interest and
principal) on existing debt, discounted at the market interest rate.
[8] The DRC qualified for partial debt relief in 2003 through HIPC, a
joint bilateral and multilateral effort to relieve poor countries of
debt to promote long-term economic growth and debt sustainability. In
qualifying for HIPC, the DRC has been able to receive interim debt
relief, primarily in terms of lower debt-service payments. The DRC must
meet certain additional criteria before its debt is fully reduced
through HIPC.
[9] State has also reported that the United States is seeking to ensure
that the DRC professionalizes its security forces and is at peace;
develops democratic institutions; supports private-sector economic
growth and achieves macroeconomic stability; meets the basic needs of
its people; and, with its international partners, provides relief in
humanitarian crises.
[10] We did not determine the extent to which the agencies had
obligated and expended the funds they allocated. In addition to
providing the funding shown, the United States also contributed funds
to international organizations that conducted activities in the DRC
during 2006 and 2007. For example, it contributed about $236 million
and $300 million in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, respectively, for the
support of UN peacekeeping activities in the DRC. As one of the largest
donors to the DRC, the World Bank has funded a wide range of programs-
-including macroeconomic management, infrastructure, and disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration of militia fighters--that have
totaled around $366 million in fiscal year 2006 and $180 million in
fiscal year 2007. The United States provides around 14 percent of donor
funds to the World Bank for such operations. It is also the largest
contributor to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria,
which is active in the DRC.
[11] Treasury estimates that the budgetary cost of reducing the $1.3
billion of DRC bilateral debt owed to the United States is about $300
million, based on the Office of Management and Budget's Circular Number
A-11. According to Treasury officials, Treasury intends to use $44.6
million allocated in fiscal year 2006, about $80 million in previously
appropriated funds, and about $178 million in fiscal year 2008 funds.
[12] The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme aims to control the
international rough diamond trade and assure customers that diamonds
purchased have not helped to finance violent conflicts.
[13] Under EITI, countries publish and verify payments and government
revenues in the natural resource sector.
[14] In addition to the challenges in the DRC that we describe, the NGO
representatives who participated in our round-table session identified
challenges outside the DRC relating to the level of U.S. engagement and
commitment in the DRC as well as to the prioritization of U.S.
resources and the lack of demonstrated results.
[15] Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, MONUC Human
Rights Division, The Human Rights Situation in the Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC) during the period of July to December 2006 (Feb. 8,
2007).
[16] State Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor,
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Washington, D.C., March 6,
2007).
[17] The DRC country assistance framework document notes that an
additional 2 percent of economic growth sustained over 10 years could
reduce the risk of renewed civil war by about one-third. See also Paul
Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," Oxford
Economic Papers, vol. 56 (2004). Other researchers have estimated that
a democratic nation is roughly 10 times more likely to be overthrown if
its economy experiences negative growth 2 years in a row; see Adam
Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando
Limongi, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-
Being in the World, 1950-1990 (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge
University Press, 2000).
[18] The DRC, with three other countries, has a score of 1.9 on the
corruption index's 10-point scale, in which a score of zero would be
given for a highly corrupt state and 10 would be given for a "clean"
state. The index includes 179 nations (see [hyperlink,
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007)].
[19] To receive the estimated $6.3 billion in debt relief for which it
may qualify under HIPC, the DRC must meet various conditions that
include satisfactory macroeconomic performance under an IMF-supported
program, improved public sector management, and implementation of
structural reforms. Although donors had expected the DRC to qualify for
full debt relief in 2006, the government instead fell into arrears and
failed to implement needed policies; as a result, the IMF has suspended
its program assistance to the DRC in 2007. Having determined that the
DRC cannot sustain its current debt levels, the IMF is consulting with
the DRC regarding a new debt-relief program, according to Treasury
officials. However, the DRC will not qualify for full debt relief until
at least 2009.
[20] These challenges are common to many developing country members.
For further discussion of such challenges, see GAO, International
Trade: Critical Issues Remain in Deterring Conflict Diamond Trade,
GAO-02-678 (Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2002).
[21] For example, in one report, OFDA noted that work conditions are
extremely difficult because many health centers are accessible only by
foot and that the local population is often too fearful of attacks by
armed groups operating in the area to make full use of the centers
[22] DFA is charged with developing a coordinated U.S. government
foreign assistance strategy; creating and directing consolidated
policy, planning, budget, and implementation mechanisms and staff
functions required to provide umbrella leadership to foreign
assistance; and providing guidance to foreign assistance delivered
through other agencies and entities of the U.S. government, including
the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the Office of the Global AIDS
Coordinator.
[23] See GAO-08-188, appendix III, for State's comments regarding a
draft of our report.
[24] Pub. L. No. 109-456, 120 Stat. 3384.
[End of section]
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