Humane Methods of Handling and Slaughter
Public Reporting on Violations Can Identify Enforcement Challenges and Enhance Transparency Gao ID: GAO-08-686T April 17, 2008In fiscal year 2007, more than 150 million cattle, sheep, and other animals destined for human consumption were slaughtered in the United States. The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Food Safety and Inspection Service is responsible for enforcing the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act (HMSA), which mandates that animals are handled and slaughtered humanely. GAO reported on USDA's efforts to enforce HMSA in 2004 (Humane Methods of Slaughter Act: USDA Has Addressed Some Problems but Still Faces Enforcement Challenges, GAO-04-247). More broadly, GAO has also issued many reports that address federal oversight of the U.S. food safety system. This testimony focuses on (1) GAO's 2004 report on the frequency and scope of reported HMSA violations and enforcement actions by USDA, (2) information on trends in staffing and funding for USDA food inspections, and (3) information on overall federal oversight of food safety. To provide this new information, GAO analyzed personnel and funding data from USDA and the Office of Management and Budget, and interviewed USDA food safety inspection officials.
In January 2004, GAO reported that incomplete and inconsistent inspection records made it difficult to determine the frequency and scope of HMSA violations, inspectors did not always document violations of the act, and they did not consistently document the scope and severity of each incident. GAO also reported that enforcement actions to address noncompliance with the act were inconsistent, and that USDA was not using consistent criteria to determine when to suspend plant operations in cases of serious or repeated violations. The Congress has urged USDA to report annually on trends in compliance with humane slaughter methods. Such public reporting can enhance transparency, but USDA's most recent report was in March 2003 and relied on incomplete data. For example, that report said very few infractions were for inhumane treatment, but GAO found that at least one-fourth of the infractions were for ineffective stunning which fails to meet humane standards. USDA has taken actions to address the recommendations GAO made in 2004 about oversight of HMSA. However, GAO has not evaluated the effectiveness of these actions. USDA faces resource challenges that may make it difficult for it to enforce HMSA and ensure the safety of the food supply. Although USDA's budget for food safety-related activities has increased since 1988, staffing for these activities has declined from its highest level in 1995. Agency officials noted the overall decline is due, in part, to consolidation in the meat industry, resulting in fewer facilities. In 2004, GAO found that USDA lacked detailed information on how much time its inspectors spend on humane handling and slaughter activities, making it difficult to determine if the number of inspectors is adequate. USDA has taken actions to address most of GAO's recommendations for assessing its resource needs for HMSA, but GAO has not evaluated these actions. Although not directly related to HMSA activities, the quantity of meat and poultry inspected and passed by USDA has grown, and the quantity of meat and poultry recalled has increased. USDA has oversight responsibility for ensuring the safety of meat, poultry, and processed eggs. For example, federal regulations prohibit companies from processing and selling meat from disabled cows--which have a higher probability of being infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy--without explicit USDA inspector approval. However, USDA is only 1 of 15 agencies that collectively administer at least 30 laws related to food safety. This fragmentation is the key reason GAO added the federal oversight of food safety to its High-Risk Series in 2007 and called for a governmentwide reexamination of the food safety system. GAO has reported on problems with this system--including inconsistent oversight, ineffective coordination, and inefficient use of resources. Going forward, as GAO has recommended, a governmentwide, results-oriented performance plan and a reconvened President's Council on Food Safety could build a sustained focus on the safety of the nation's food supply.
GAO-08-686T, Humane Methods of Handling and Slaughter: Public Reporting on Violations Can Identify Enforcement Challenges and Enhance Transparency
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-08-686T
entitled 'Humane Methods of Handling and Slaughter: Public Reporting on
Violations Can Identify Enforcement Challenges and Enhance
Transparency' which was released on April 18, 2008.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Domestic Policy, Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 1:00 p.m. EDT:
Thursday, April 17, 2008:
Humane Methods of Handling and Slaughter:
Public Reporting on Violations Can Identify Enforcement Challenges and
Enhance Transparency:
Statement of Lisa Shames, Director Natural Resources and Environment:
GAO-08-686T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-686T, testimony before the Subcommittee on
Domestic Policy, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of
Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
In fiscal year 2007, more than 150 million cattle, sheep, and other
animals destined for human consumption were slaughtered in the United
States. The U.S. Department of Agriculture‘s (USDA) Food Safety and
Inspection Service is responsible for enforcing the Humane Methods of
Slaughter Act (HMSA), which mandates that animals are handled and
slaughtered humanely. GAO reported on USDA‘s efforts to enforce HMSA in
2004 (Humane Methods of Slaughter Act: USDA Has Addressed Some Problems
but Still Faces Enforcement Challenges, GAO-04-247). More broadly, GAO
has also issued many reports that address federal oversight of the U.S.
food safety system.
This testimony focuses on (1) GAO‘s 2004 report on the frequency and
scope of reported HMSA violations and enforcement actions by USDA, (2)
information on trends in staffing and funding for USDA food
inspections, and (3) information on overall federal oversight of food
safety. To provide this new information, GAO analyzed personnel and
funding data from USDA and the Office of Management and Budget, and
interviewed USDA food safety inspection officials.
What GAO Found:
In January 2004, GAO reported that incomplete and inconsistent
inspection records made it difficult to determine the frequency and
scope of HMSA violations, inspectors did not always document violations
of the act, and they did not consistently document the scope and
severity of each incident. GAO also reported that enforcement actions
to address noncompliance with the act were inconsistent, and that USDA
was not using consistent criteria to determine when to suspend plant
operations in cases of serious or repeated violations. The Congress has
urged USDA to report annually on trends in compliance with humane
slaughter methods. Such public reporting can enhance transparency, but
USDA‘s most recent report was in March 2003 and relied on incomplete
data. For example, that report said very few infractions were for
inhumane treatment, but GAO found that at least one-fourth of the
infractions were for ineffective stunning which fails to meet humane
standards. USDA has taken actions to address the recommendations GAO
made in 2004 about oversight of HMSA. However, GAO has not evaluated
the effectiveness of these actions.
USDA faces resource challenges that may make it difficult for it to
enforce HMSA and ensure the safety of the food supply. Although USDA‘s
budget for food safety-related activities has increased since 1988,
staffing for these activities has declined from its highest level in
1995. Agency officials noted the overall decline is due, in part, to
consolidation in the meat industry, resulting in fewer facilities. In
2004, GAO found that USDA lacked detailed information on how much time
its inspectors spend on humane handling and slaughter activities,
making it difficult to determine if the number of inspectors is
adequate. USDA has taken actions to address most of GAO‘s
recommendations for assessing its resource needs for HMSA, but GAO has
not evaluated these actions. Although not directly related to HMSA
activities, the quantity of meat and poultry inspected and passed by
USDA has grown, and the quantity of meat and poultry recalled has
increased.
USDA has oversight responsibility for ensuring the safety of meat,
poultry, and processed eggs. For example, federal regulations prohibit
companies from processing and selling meat from disabled cows”which
have a higher probability of being infected with bovine spongiform
encephalopathy”without explicit USDA inspector approval. However, USDA
is only 1 of 15 agencies that collectively administer at least 30 laws
related to food safety. This fragmentation is the key reason GAO added
the federal oversight of food safety to its High-Risk Series in 2007
and called for a governmentwide reexamination of the food safety
system. GAO has reported on problems with this system”including
inconsistent oversight, ineffective coordination, and inefficient use
of resources. Going forward, as GAO has recommended, a governmentwide,
results-oriented performance plan and a reconvened President‘s Council
on Food Safety could build a sustained focus on the safety of the
nation‘s food supply.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-686T]. For more information,
contact Lisa Shames at (202) 512-3841 or shamesl@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the U. S. Department of
Agriculture's (USDA) implementation of its program to ensure that
animals destined for human consumption are handled and slaughtered
humanely. More than 150 million cattle, sheep, hogs, and other animals
ultimately destined to provide meat for human consumption were
slaughtered in fiscal year 2007, at some 700 federally inspected
slaughter facilities throughout the United States. The Food Safety and
Inspection Service (FSIS), within USDA, is responsible for enforcing
the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act (HMSA), which prohibits the
slaughtering of animals, or the handling of animals in connection with
slaughtering, unless it is humane. However, the recently documented
inhumane treatment of disabled cows slaughtered at the Westland/
Hallmark plant in California and the entry of their meat into the
market calls into question FSIS's enforcement of the act. In
particular, federal regulations prohibit companies from processing and
selling meat from disabled (nonambulatory) cows without explicit FSIS
inspector approval. Nonambulatory cows raise particular concerns
because they have a higher probability of being infected with bovine
spongiform encephalopathy, commonly known as mad cow disease.
In 2004, we reported that FSIS was not adequately recording instances
of noncompliance with HMSA, and thus could not assure the Congress that
it was fully enforcing the act at federally inspected slaughter
facilities.[Footnote 1] Specifically, we found the following:
* Incomplete and inconsistent inspection records made it difficult to
determine the frequency and scope of humane handling and slaughter
violations. Those inspection records showed that inspectors did not
always document violations of HMSA and that when they did, the
inspectors did not consistently document the scope and severity of each
incident. Enforcement actions to address noncompliance with the act and
regulations were also inconsistent.
* FSIS officials were not using consistent criteria to suspend plant
operations. As a result, plants in different FSIS districts were not
subject to comparable enforcement actions.
* FSIS lacked detailed information on how much time its inspectors
spent on humane handling and slaughter activities, making it difficult
to determine if the number of inspectors is adequate. In general, FSIS
officials believed that, with the introduction of a District Veterinary
Medical Specialist (DVMS) in 2002 at each of the agency's field
offices, the number of personnel devoted to humane handling and
slaughter compliance was adequate.
Our 2004 report did not specifically assess FSIS's effectiveness in
enforcing the humane handling and slaughtering provisions of HMSA, such
as those related to the Westland/Hallmark incident.
In this context, my testimony today focuses on (1) GAO's 2004 report on
the frequency and scope of reported HMSA violations and enforcement
actions by USDA, (2) trends in staffing and funding for USDA food
inspections, and (3) GAO's designation of federal oversight of food
safety to its High-Risk Series.
In summary, I would like to make three observations. First, FSIS has
taken actions to address the recommendations we made in our 2004 report
to improve its reporting of humane handling and slaughter methods at
federally inspected facilities. These recommendations principally dealt
with weaknesses in FSIS's internal reporting of the frequency and scope
of HMSA violations. However, without further evaluation and public
reporting to enhance transparency and accountability, we do not know
the effectiveness of these actions.
Second, although the FSIS budget has increased since 1988, staffing
levels have declined since 1995, and some districts have experienced
high vacancy rates among inspectors, possibly impairing enforcement of
HMSA and food safety regulations generally. Meanwhile, the volume of
meat and poultry inspected and passed by FSIS has grown, along with the
number of pounds of recalled meat and poultry. Staff levels are
expected to rise slightly in 2008 as FSIS fills vacant positions.
Third, USDA's FSIS is only 1 of 15 agencies that collectively
administer at least 30 laws related to food safety. This fragmentation
is the key reason GAO added the federal oversight of food safety to its
High-Risk Series in 2007 and called for a governmentwide reexamination
of the food safety system.[Footnote 2] The fragmentation results in
federal resources for food safety being directed to multiple agencies.
For example, the majority of federal expenditures for food safety
inspection were directed toward USDA's programs for ensuring the safety
of meat, poultry, and egg products, even though USDA is responsible for
regulating only about 20 percent of the food supply.
This testimony is based on new and previously issued work. To analyze
trends in FSIS resources, we examined personnel and funding data from
FSIS and the Office of Management and Budget for the past 20 years and
determined they were sufficiently reliable for our analyses. To provide
updated information on our previously issued reports, we interviewed
FSIS officials and gathered information on the status of our
recommendations. We conducted our work from April 2 through April 14,
2008, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. These standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
The Congress passed the Humane Slaughter Act in 1958 following intense
and broad-based public concerns about cruelty and abuse of livestock in
meat-packing plants. At that time, the Congress determined that using
humane methods of slaughter prevented the needless suffering of
livestock, resulted in safer and better working conditions for
employees, and brought about improvements in products and economies of
slaughter operations, among other benefits. However, the act was
limited to federal government agencies, which were required to contract
for or procure meat products only from producers and processors that
employed humane slaughtering methods in all of their plants. In 1978,
the Congress passed HMSA, which required that all federally inspected
slaughter establishments adopt humane handling and slaughter methods.
FSIS has issued regulations and directives to enforce the act.
Important requirements of these regulations and guidance include the
following:
* Animals stunned before slaughter must be rapidly and effectively
rendered insensible before they are slaughtered. Stunning is effective
when the animal feels no pain, is rendered instantly unconscious, and
remains unconscious until slaughtered.
* Dragging of disabled and other animals unable to move while conscious
is prohibited.
* All holding pens and driveways and ramps must be designed, built, and
maintained to prevent injury to livestock.
* Livestock should be provided with access to water in holding pens,
and food if held for more than 24 hours.
* The use of electrical prods and other devices to move livestock must
not be excessive.
FSIS is responsible for ensuring compliance with HMSA. FSIS is also
responsible for ensuring the safety of most meat, poultry, and
processed egg products at federally inspected facilities. Currently,
FSIS employs in-plant about 7,800 inspectors--that is, public health
veterinarians, food inspectors, and consumer safety inspectors. These
inspectors work collaboratively, and are responsible for inspecting
animals prior to slaughter, as well as the carcasses after slaughter,
in order to ensure the food is safe for human consumption. According to
FSIS officials, as inspectors carry out their food safety and other
activities, they are responsible for monitoring compliance with humane
handling and slaughter requirements at plants that are covered by HMSA.
According to FSIS, while HMSA requires inspectors to observe the entire
handling and slaughter process, inspectors do not have to observe all
animals all the time for HMSA compliance.
When inspectors observe a violation of HMSA or its implementing
regulations, they are required to notify plant management and document
the violation.
In response to HMSA noncompliance, FSIS can take a number of
enforcement actions, which impose restrictions on a facility's ability
to operate, including the following:
* For less serious violations of HMSA, inspectors at a facility can
issue a "reject tag" to quickly respond to violations that are limited
in scope. Inspectors place these reject tags on a piece of equipment or
an area of the plant, prohibiting use until the violation is corrected.
* For more serious violations, the district manager can suspend
inspection until violations are addressed. This usually results in
suspended operations at the facility (or part of the facility) because
without federal inspections the facility's products are prevented from
entering interstate and foreign commerce.
In the rare cases where a plant fails to respond to FSIS concerns about
repeated or serious violations, the administrator of FSIS can withdraw
inspection. This removes the grant of inspection from a facility,
preventing its products from entering interstate and foreign commerce.
The facility must reapply for and be awarded a grant of inspection
before federal inspections may resume.
FSIS Has Taken Actions Intended to Improve Its Records on Humane
Slaughter Violations, but Public Reporting Can Enhance Transparency:
In 2004, we identified weaknesses in FSIS's regulations and guidance
for recording compliance with HMSA in key areas: (1) the frequency and
scope of humane handling and slaughter violations, and (2) actions to
enforce compliance with humane handling and slaughter provisions. FSIS
has taken steps to improve its reporting of humane handling and
slaughter violations. However, although the Congress has urged USDA to
report annually on violations and trends in compliance, USDA has not
issued such a report since March 2003. Such public reporting can
enhance transparency.
In 2004, we reported that incomplete and inconsistent FSIS inspection
records made it difficult to determine the frequency and scope of
humane handling and slaughter violations. Available FSIS records showed
that during the 28 months between January 2001 and March 2003,
inspectors wrote 553 noncompliance records to document violations of
HMSA and the implementing regulations at 272 facilities across the
United States. According to these inspection records, ineffective
stunning, which does not quickly render animals insensible to pain, and
in many cases results in a conscious animal reaching slaughter, was the
most prevalent type of noncompliance. To a lesser extent, the records
showed incidents of, in declining order of prevalence: poor facility
conditions, failure to provide water to animals awaiting slaughter,
excessive force, and excessive use of electric prods. However, in
conducting this analysis, we found internal control problems that call
into question the reliability of FSIS records regarding compliance with
the act. First, because the agency had not stored its noncompliance
records in electronic form, it could not provide us with at least 44 of
the 553 records from January 2001 through March 2003. Second, almost
half of the DVMSs we interviewed at the time of our review reported
that inspectors did not always document noncompliance when they should
have because they were unsure about regulatory requirements. Third, the
noncompliance records did not consistently document the scope and
severity of violations. For example, some noncompliance records
mentioned that ineffective stunning occurred, but did not provide the
cause of the violation or the number of animals affected.
We also reported FSIS took inconsistent enforcement actions to address
noncompliance with HMSA. Inspectors stationed in slaughter plants had
not consistently issued reject tags, which temporarily halt operations
in all or part of a plant. Several of the DVMSs we interviewed
attributed the inconsistent enforcement actions to inspectors'
inexperience, lack of clarity regarding their authority, or the
misperception that certain violations were minor. We found similar
inconsistencies at the district management level. District managers can
decide to take the more serious enforcement action of withdrawing
inspectors from the plant, most likely suspending a plant's operations,
when they are notified of serious violations. However, they lacked
clear criteria on when to do so, which can lead to inconsistent
enforcement. We found, for example, one case in which a district
manager did not suspend inspections after inspectors had issued 16
noncompliance records to a slaughter facility documenting the plant's
failure to properly stun animals. In contrast, another facility's
failure to provide access to water and to maintain acceptable pen
conditions led to a suspension of operations. As a result, FSIS could
not ensure that humane slaughter requirements are consistently enforced
across districts, a fact that undermines FSIS efforts to enforce the
act.
To provide more useful information and to help strengthen oversight of
HMSA, we recommended in 2004 that the Secretary of Agriculture direct
FSIS to (1) include in noncompliance records specific information on
the type and cause of violations, (2) establish additional criteria for
when districts are to take enforcement actions in cases of repetitive
violations, and (3) require that district offices and inspectors
clearly document the basis for enforcement actions that they take in
response to repetitive violations, among others. In response to these
recommendations FSIS took steps intended to strengthen its oversight of
humane handling and slaughter methods at federally inspected
facilities. In particular, it has issued additional guidance to its
district offices and inspectors to assist them in determining when to
take enforcement actions for repeated violations. The guidance
includes, among other things:
* categories for the types and causes of humane handling and slaughter
violations to be reported on noncompliance records;
* questions inspection personnel should use to assist them in
determining when a noncompliance trend exists; and:
* examples of noncompliance activities affecting an animal's safety or
constituting inhumane treatment of an egregious nature that would
warrant immediate enforcement by inspection personnel.
Although the agency's actions were responsive to our recommendations,
without further evaluation, we do not know the effectiveness of these
actions.
Finally, FSIS has not reported annually on trends in compliance with
humane slaughter methods, as urged by the Congress, and its most recent
data on violations were incomplete. Public reporting is the means
through which the federal government communicates the results of its
work to the Congress and the American people. Such reporting is in the
public interest and promotes transparency in government operations. In
2002, the Congress urged the Secretary of Agriculture to fully enforce
the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act and report annually to the Congress
on the number of violations and trends recorded by FSIS
inspectors.[Footnote 3] According to FSIS officials, in response to the
Congress and as part of its annual appropriations process, USDA has
provided the House and Senate appropriations committees information on
the number of suspensions as well as general information on HMSA
activities. However, in recent years, USDA has not reported to the
Congress on the number of violations and trends recorded by its
inspectors. In its most recent report, in March 2003, USDA indicated to
the Congress that during fiscal year 2002, "very few infractions were
for actual inhumane treatment of the animals." However, we identified
shortcomings in the data used to make this finding. At the time of our
review, officials told us that the statement was based on a sample of
approximately half of the noncompliance records available. In contrast,
our analysis of all of the noncompliance records FSIS provided for
fiscal year 2002 showed that one-fourth of the 366 noncompliance
incidents documented by inspectors were for incidents of ineffective
stunning which fails to meet humane standards in USDA regulations. Lack
of complete and consistent data can make it difficult for FSIS to
accurately assess compliance with the act, and prevents transparency in
the reporting of violations.
FSIS's Budget Has Increased as Staffing Has Declined:
Unlike the budgets of other federal agencies responsible for food
safety, the budget for FSIS has seen a marked increase since 1988. As
shown in figure 1, the agency's budget authority increased from $392
million in fiscal year 1988 to $930 million in fiscal year 2008, or 137
percent. When adjusted for inflation, the increase is about 47 percent.
Figure 1: FSIS Budget Authority, Fiscal Years 1988 through 2008:
This figure is a combination line graph showing FSIS budget authority,
fiscal years 1988 through 2008. The X drive represents fiscal year, and
the Y axis represents dollars in millions.
Fiscal year: "1988";
Constant dollars: 633.4;
Nominal dollars: 392.
Fiscal year: "1989";
Constant dollars: 629.8;
Nominal dollars: 405.
Fiscal year: "1990";
Constant dollars: 631.8;
Nominal dollars: 421.3.
Fiscal year: "1991";
Constant dollars: 648.8;
Nominal dollars: 448.9.
Fiscal year: "1992";
Constant dollars: 667.5;
Nominal dollars: 473.4.
Fiscal year: "1993";
Constant dollars: 680.5;
Nominal dollars: 493.7
Fiscal year: "1994";
Constant dollars: 699.5;
Nominal dollars: 518.3.
Fiscal year: "1995";
Constant dollars: 701.9;
Nominal dollars: 531.
Fiscal year: "1996";
Constant dollars: 706.8;
Nominal dollars: 545.
Fiscal year: "1997";
Constant dollars: 731.6;
Nominal dollars: 574.
Fiscal year: "1998";
Constant dollars: 741.8;
Nominal dollars: 589.
Fiscal year: "1999";
Constant dollars: 767;
Nominal dollars: 617.
Fiscal year: "2000";
Constant dollars: 790;
Nominal dollars: 649.
Fiscal year: "2001";
Constant dollars: 827.3;
Nominal dollars: 695.
Fiscal year: "2002";
Constant dollars: 852.6;
Nominal dollars: 730.
Fiscal year: "2003";
Constant dollars: 863.2;
Nominal dollars: 754.
Fiscal year: "2004";
Constant dollars: 863.6;
Nominal dollars: 774.
Fiscal year: "2005";
Constant dollars: 883.3;
Nominal dollars: 817.
Fiscal year: "2006";
Constant dollars: 868.6;
Nominal dollars: 830.
Fiscal year: "2007";
Constant dollars: 906.9;
Nominal dollars: 890.
Fiscal year: "2008";
Constant dollars: 930;
Nominal dollars: 930.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of Budget of the U.S. government data.
[End of figure]
The Administration's proposed fiscal year 2009 budget calls for an
increase in FSIS's funding to $952 million. When adjusted for
inflation, the proposed increase is about $4 million, or 0.5 percent.
While FSIS's budget authority has significantly increased since the
late 1980s, the number of FSIS employees has declined. As shown in
figure 2, from fiscal year 1995 to fiscal year 2007, the number of full-
time employees at FSIS fell from about 9,600 to about 9,200, or 4
percent. Vacancy rates across FSIS have declined to about 7 percent,
and for its inspector positions vacancies have declined to about 4
percent. However, 2 of the agency's 15 districts--Boulder and Des
Moines--reported vacancy rates among their inspector positions of about
22 percent and 11 percent, respectively. As the figure also shows,
staff levels are expected to rise slightly in 2008 as FSIS fills vacant
positions. Agency officials noted the overall decline is due, in part,
to consolidation in the meat industry, resulting in fewer facilities,
and the introduction of the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point
system, which is a risk-based effort to reduce food contamination.
Figure 2: FSIS Staff Levels, Fiscal Years 1988 through 2008:
This figure is a line graph showing the FSIS staff levels, fiscal years
1988 through 2008. The X graphh represents the fiscal year, and the Y
axis represents the number of full-time employees.
Fiscal year: "1988";
Number of full time employees: 9176.
Fiscal year: "1989";
Number of full time employees: 9121.
Fiscal year: "1990";
Number of full time employees: 9206.
Fiscal year: "1991";
Number of full time employees: 9286.
Fiscal year: "1992";
Number of full time employees: 9386.
Fiscal year: "1993";
Number of full time employees: 9524.
Fiscal year: "1994";
Number of full time employees: 9613.
Fiscal year: "1995";
Number of full time employees: 9614.
Fiscal year: "1996";
Number of full time employees: 9470.
Fiscal year: "1997";
Number of full time employees: 9432.
Fiscal year: "1998";
Number of full time employees: 9403.
Fiscal year: "1999";
Number of full time employees: 9325.
Fiscal year: "2000";
Number of full time employees: 9439.
Fiscal year: "2001";
Number of full time employees: 9321.
Fiscal year: "2002";
Number of full time employees: 9259.
Fiscal year: "2003";
Number of full time employees: 9208.
Fiscal year: "2004";
Number of full time employees: 9237.
Fiscal year: "2005";
Number of full time employees: 9373.
Fiscal year: "2006";
Number of full time employees: 9339.
Fiscal year: "2007";
Number of full time employees: 9184.
Fiscal year: "2008";
Number of full time employees: 9425.
[See PDF for image]
Source: Budget of the U.S. Government.
Note: Data for 2008 are estimated.
[End of figure]
Furthermore, in 2004 we reported FSIS did not have data on the number
of inspectors devoted to compliance with HMSA or on the amount of time
that inspectors spend on humane handling and slaughter requirements.
Without such information, FSIS could not determine the appropriate
number of inspectors for different-sized plants or the number of
inspectors needed overall to effectively enforce the act.
We recommended that FSIS (1) develop a mechanism for determining the
level of resources that the agency devotes to humane handling and
slaughter activities, (2) develop criteria for determining the
appropriate level of inspection resources, and (3) periodically assess
whether that level is sufficient to effectively enforce the act. In
response to these recommendations, FSIS took steps intended to improve
its monitoring of resources needed to ensure compliance with HMSA.
Specifically, FSIS:
* implemented a system that tracks inspectors' time spent verifying
that humane handling and slaughter requirements are met,
* developed policy that instructs FSIS managers to use data on the
amount of time devoted to humane handling and slaughter activities to
assist in inspection resource planning, and:
* established performance measures and targets to compare against time
spent on daily activities to enforce compliance with HMSA.
Again, these actions were responsive to our recommendations, but
without further evaluation, we do not know the effectiveness of these
actions.
Although not directly pertaining to FSIS's enforcement of HMSA, the
quantity of meat and poultry inspected by the agency, as well as the
quantity of meat and poultry recalled, identifies some of the current
challenges the agency faces. Meat and poultry consumption in the United
States has increased sharply. As shown in figure 3, the quantity of
meat and poultry inspected and approved by the agency has increased
from about 65 billion pounds in 1988 to more than 100 billion pounds in
2007. Much of the increase is due to the expanding U.S. poultry market.
Figure 3: Meat and Poultry Inspected and Passed by FSIS, Fiscal Years
1988 through 2008:
This figure is a combination bar graph of the meat and poultry
inspected and passed by FSIS, fiscal years 1988 through 2008. The X
axis represents the fiscal years, and the Y axis represents the pounds
in millions.
Fiscal year: "1988";
Poultry: 37;
Meat: 28.
Fiscal year: "1989";
Poultry: 35;
Meat: 30.
Fiscal year: "1990";
Poultry: 38;
Meat: 32.
Fiscal year: "1991";
Poultry: 36;
Meat: 34.
Fiscal year: "1992";
Poultry: 39;
Meat: 36.
Fiscal year: "1993";
Poultry: 41;
Meat: 37.
Fiscal year: "1994";
Poultry: 41;
Meat: 40.
Fiscal year: "1995";
Poultry: 44;
Meat: 41.
Fiscal year: "1996";
Poultry: 45;
Meat: 44.
Fiscal year: "1997";
Poultry: 41;
Meat: 44.
Fiscal year: "1998";
Poultry: 41;
Meat: 43.
Fiscal year: "1999";
Poultry: 53;
Meat: 47.
Fiscal year: "2000";
Poultry: 45;
Meat: 48.
Fiscal year: "2001";
Poultry: 47;
Meat: 47.
Fiscal year: "2002";
Poultry: 42;
Meat: 50.
Fiscal year: "2003";
Poultry: 44;
Meat: 49.
Fiscal year: "2004";
Poultry: 44;
Meat: 53.
Fiscal year: "2005";
Poultry: 46;
Meat: 55.
Fiscal year: "2006";
Poultry: 47;
Meat: 57.
Fiscal year: "2007";
Poultry: 48;
Meat: 57.
Fiscal year: "2008";
Poultry: 48;
58.
[See PDF for image]
Source: Budget of the U.S. Government.
Note: Data for 2008 are estimated.
[End of figure]
Although the number of recalls has declined in recent years, the
quantity of meat and poultry recalled has increased sharply. Meat and
poultry product recalls declined from 125 in 2002 to 58 in 2007.
However, 2 of the 6 biggest meat recalls in U.S. history have occurred
in the past 6 months. In October 2007, Topps Meat Company LLC announced
the recall of 22 million pounds of ground beef used for frozen
hamburgers due to E. coli contamination. At the time, the Topps recall
was the fifth largest in U.S. history. The E. coli-contaminated meat
sickened at least 32 people in eight states. On February 17, 2008,
Westland/Hallmark Meat Company announced the recall of more than 143
million pounds of beef, the largest recall in U.S. history. The
quantity of meat and poultry recalled has increased from 5 million
pounds in 1994, the first year for which data were readily available,
to 145 million in just the first quarter of March 2008.
Federal Oversight of Food Safety Is a High-Risk Area that Needs
Governmentwide Reexamination:
While today's hearing focuses specifically on FSIS's responsibilities
for the oversight of food safety, it is important to note that FSIS is
1 of 15 federal agencies that collectively administer at least 30 laws
related to food safety. This fragmentation is a key reason we
designated federal oversight of food safety as a high-risk area.
Primary responsibility for food safety lies with USDA--which has
oversight responsibility for meat, poultry, and processed egg products-
-and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)--which is responsible for
the safety of virtually all other foods. In addition, among other
agencies, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) in the
Department of Commerce conducts voluntary, fee-for-service inspections
of seafood safety and quality; the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) regulates the use of pesticides and maximum allowable residue
levels on food commodities and animal feed; and the Department of
Homeland Security is responsible for coordinating agencies' food
security activities. This federal regulatory system for food safety,
like many other federal programs and policies, evolved piecemeal,
typically in response to particular health threats or economic crises.
In 2007, we added the federal oversight of food safety to our High-Risk
Series,[Footnote 4] which is intended to raise the priority and
visibility of government programs that are in need of broad-based
transformation to achieve greater economy, efficiency, effectiveness,
accountability, and sustainability. Over the past 30 years, we have
reported on issues--for example, the need to transform the federal
oversight framework to reduce risks to public health as well as the
economy--that suggest that the federal oversight of food safety could
be designated as a high-risk area. The fragmented nature of the federal
food oversight system suggests the government could plan more
strategically to inspect food production processes, identify and react
more quickly to outbreaks of foodborne illnesses, and focus on
promoting the safety and integrity of the nation's food supply.
While we have reported on problems with the federal food safety system-
-including inconsistent oversight, ineffective coordination, and
inefficient use of resources--most noteworthy for today's hearing is
that federal expenditures for the oversight of food safety have not
kept pace with the volume of foods regulated by the agencies or
consumed by the public. We have reported that four agencies--USDA, FDA,
EPA, and NMFS--spent a total of $1.7 billion on food safety-related
activities in fiscal year 2003.[Footnote 5] USDA and FDA were
responsible for nearly 90 percent of those federal expenditures.
However, the majority of federal expenditures for food safety
inspection were directed toward USDA's programs for meat, poultry, and
egg products even though those programs cover only about 20 percent of
the food supply. In contrast, FDA accounted for only 24 percent of
expenditures even though it is responsible for regulating about 80
percent of the food supply.
Others have called for fundamental changes to the federal food safety
system overall. In 1998, the National Academy of Sciences' National
Institute of Medicine concluded that the system is not well equipped to
meet emerging challenges.[Footnote 6] In response to the academy's
report, the President established a Council on Food Safety, which
released a Food Safety Strategic Plan in January 2001. The plan
recognized the need for a comprehensive food safety statute and
concluded, "the current organizational structure makes it more
difficult to achieve future improvements in efficiency, efficacy, and
allocation of resources based on risk."
Taken as a whole, our work indicates that the Congress and the
executive branch can and should create the environment needed to look
across the activities of individual programs within specific agencies,
including USDA, and toward the goals that the federal government is
trying to achieve. To that end, we have recommended, among other
things, that the Congress enact comprehensive, uniform, and risk-based
food safety legislation and commission the National Academy of Sciences
or a blue-ribbon panel to conduct a detailed analysis of alternative
organizational food safety structures. We have also recommended that
the executive branch reconvene the President's Council on Food Safety
to facilitate interagency coordination on food safety regulation and
programs. According to documents on the council's Web site, the current
administration has not reconvened the council.
These actions can begin to address the fragmentation in the federal
oversight of food safety. Going forward, to build a sustained focus on
the safety and integrity of the nation's food supply, the Congress and
the executive branch can develop expectations for food safety and
follow up with congressional oversight and strategic planning by
agencies, including USDA. We have previously reported that a
governmentwide performance plan that is mission based and results
oriented would help ensure agency goals are complementary and mutually
reinforcing. Furthermore, this plan would help decision makers balance
trade-offs and compare performance when making resource allocations and
restructuring decisions.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions that you or Members of the subcommittee may
have.
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this testimony. For further
information about this testimony, please contact Lisa Shames, Director,
Natural Resources and Environment (202) 512-3841 or shamesl@gao.gov.
Key contributors to this testimony were Thomas Cook, Assistant
Director; Kevin Bray; Mary Denigan-Macauley; Leslie Mahagan; Ben
Shouse; Carol Herrnstadt Shulman; and Tyra Thompson.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, Humane Methods of Slaughter Act: USDA Has Addressed Some
Problems but Still Faces Enforcement Challenges, GAO-04-247
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2004).
[2] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.:
Jan. 31, 2007).
[3] Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107- 171,
Section 10305 116 Stat. 134, 493.
[4] GAO-07-310.
[5] GAO, Overseeing the U.S. Food Supply: Steps Should be Taken to
Reduce Overlapping Inspections and Related Activities, GAO-05-549T
(Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2005).
[6] National Academy of Sciences, Institute of Medicine, Ensuring Safe
Food from Production to Consumption (Washington, D.C.: 1998).
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
and select "E-mail Updates."
Order by Mail or Phone:
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent.
Orders should be sent to:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room LM:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
To order by Phone:
Voice: (202) 512-6000:
TDD: (202) 512-2537:
Fax: (202) 512-6061:
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
