Wildland Fire Management
Federal Agencies Have Taken Important Steps Forward, but Additional, Strategic Action is Needed to Capitalize on Those Steps Gao ID: GAO-09-877 September 9, 2009The nation's wildland fire problems have worsened dramatically over the past decade, with more than a doubling of average annual acreage burned and federal appropriations for wildland fire management. The deteriorating fire situation has led the agencies responsible for managing wildland fires on federal lands--the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture and four agencies in the Department of the Interior--to reassess how they respond to wildland fire and to take steps to improve their fire management programs. GAO reviewed (1) progress the agencies have made in managing wildland fire and (2) key actions GAO previously recommended and believes are still necessary to improve wildland fire management. GAO reviewed previous GAO reports and agency documents and interviewed agency officials. GAO prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative.
The Forest Service and the Interior agencies have improved their understanding of wildland fire's ecological role on the landscape and have taken important steps toward enhancing their ability to cost-effectively protect communities and resources by seeking to (1) make communities and resources less susceptible to being damaged by wildland fire and (2) respond to fire so as to protect communities and important resources at risk but to also consider both the cost and long-term effects of that response. To help them do so, the agencies in recent years have reduced hazardous fuels, in an effort to keep wildland fires from spreading into the wildland-urban interface and to help protect important resources by lessening a fire's intensity; sponsored efforts to educate homeowners about steps they can take to protect their homes from wildland fire; and provided grants to help homeowners carry out these steps. The agencies have also made improvements that lay important groundwork for enhancing their response to wildland fire, including adopting new guidance on how managers in the field are to select firefighting strategies, improving the analytical tools that assist managers in selecting a strategy, and improving how they acquire and use expensive firefighting assets. Despite the agencies' efforts, much work remains. GAO has recommended several key actions--including development of an overarching fire management strategy--that, if completed, would substantially improve the agencies' management of wildland fire. Nonetheless, the agencies have yet to: (1) Develop a cohesive strategy laying out various potential approaches for addressing the growing wildland fire threat, estimated costs associated with each approach, and the trade-offs involved. Such information would help the agencies and Congress make fundamental decisions about an effective and affordable approach to responding to fires. (2) Establish a cost-containment strategy that clarifies the importance of containing costs relative to other, often-competing objectives. Without such clarification, GAO believes managers in the field lack a clear understanding of the relative importance that the agencies' leadership places on containing costs and are therefore likely to continue to select firefighting strategies without duly considering the costs of suppression. (3) Clarify financial responsibilities for fires that cross federal, state, and local jurisdictions. Unless the financial responsibilities for multijurisdictional fires are clarified, concerns that the existing framework insulates nonfederal entities from the cost of protecting the wildland-urban interface--and that the federal government would therefore continue to bear more than its share of the cost--are unlikely to be addressed. (4) Take action to mitigate the effects of rising fire costs on other agency programs. The sharply rising costs of managing wildland fires have led the agencies to transfer funds from other programs to help pay for fire suppression, disrupting or delaying activities in these other programs. Better methods of predicting needed suppression funding could reduce the need to transfer funds from other programs.
GAO-09-877, Wildland Fire Management: Federal Agencies Have Taken Important Steps Forward, but Additional, Strategic Action is Needed to Capitalize on Those Steps
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Report to Congressional Addressees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
September 2009:
Wildland Fire Management:
Federal Agencies Have Taken Important Steps Forward, but Additional,
Strategic Action Is Needed to Capitalize on Those Steps:
GAO-09-877:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-877, a report to congressional addressees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The nation‘s wildland fire problems have worsened dramatically over the
past decade, with more than a doubling of average annual acreage burned
and federal appropriations for wildland fire management. The
deteriorating fire situation has led the agencies responsible for
managing wildland fires on federal lands”the Forest Service in the
Department of Agriculture and four agencies in the Department of the
Interior”to reassess how they respond to wildland fire and to take
steps to improve their fire management programs. GAO reviewed (1)
progress the agencies have made in managing wildland fire and (2) key
actions GAO previously recommended and believes are still necessary to
improve wildland fire management. GAO reviewed previous GAO reports and
agency documents and interviewed agency officials. GAO prepared this
report under the Comptroller General‘s authority to conduct evaluations
on his own initiative.
What GAO Found:
The Forest Service and the Interior agencies have improved their
understanding of wildland fire‘s ecological role on the landscape and
have taken important steps toward enhancing their ability to cost-
effectively protect communities and resources by seeking to (1) make
communities and resources less susceptible to being damaged by wildland
fire and (2) respond to fire so as to protect communities and important
resources at risk but to also consider both the cost and long-term
effects of that response. To help them do so, the agencies in recent
years have reduced hazardous fuels, in an effort to keep wildland fires
from spreading into the wildland-urban interface and to help protect
important resources by lessening a fire‘s intensity; sponsored efforts
to educate homeowners about steps they can take to protect their homes
from wildland fire; and provided grants to help homeowners carry out
these steps. The agencies have also made improvements that lay
important groundwork for enhancing their response to wildland fire,
including adopting new guidance on how managers in the field are to
select firefighting strategies, improving the analytical tools that
assist managers in selecting a strategy, and improving how they acquire
and use expensive firefighting assets.
Despite the agencies‘ efforts, much work remains. GAO has recommended
several key actions”including development of an overarching fire
management strategy”that, if completed, would substantially improve the
agencies‘ management of wildland fire. Nonetheless, the agencies have
yet to:
* Develop a cohesive strategy laying out various potential approaches
for addressing the growing wildland fire threat, estimated costs
associated with each approach, and the trade-offs involved. Such
information would help the agencies and Congress make fundamental
decisions about an effective and affordable approach to responding to
fires.
* Establish a cost-containment strategy that clarifies the importance
of containing costs relative to other, often-competing objectives.
Without such clarification, GAO believes managers in the field lack a
clear understanding of the relative importance that the agencies‘
leadership places on containing costs and are therefore likely to
continue to select firefighting strategies without duly considering the
costs of suppression.
* Clarify financial responsibilities for fires that cross federal,
state, and local jurisdictions. Unless the financial responsibilities
for multijurisdictional fires are clarified, concerns that the existing
framework insulates nonfederal entities from the cost of protecting the
wildland-urban interface”and that the federal government would
therefore continue to bear more than its share of the cost”are unlikely
to be addressed.
* Take action to mitigate the effects of rising fire costs on other
agency programs. The sharply rising costs of managing wildland fires
have led the agencies to transfer funds from other programs to help pay
for fire suppression, disrupting or delaying activities in these other
programs. Better methods of predicting needed suppression funding could
reduce the need to transfer funds from other programs.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is making no new recommendations at this time. The agencies have
generally agreed with GAO‘s previous recommendations but have yet to
implement several key recommendations GAO believes could, if
implemented, substantially assist them in capitalizing on the important
progress they have made to date. In commenting on a draft of this
report, both the Forest Service and the Department of the Interior
generally agreed with its findings.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-877] or key
components. For more information, contact Robin Nazzaro at (202) 512-
3841 or nazzaror@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
Agencies' Efforts to Implement a New Approach to Managing Wildland Fire
Have Better Positioned Them to Respond to Fire Effectively:
Agencies Have Yet to Take Certain Key Actions That Would Substantially
Improve Their Management of Wildland Fire:
Concluding Observations:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Agriculture, Forest
Service:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of the Interior:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Table:
Table 1: Forest Service and Interior Wildland Fire Appropriations,
Fiscal Years 1996 through 2007:
Figures:
Figure 1: Distribution of Total Land Managed by the Five Agencies
Responsible for Wildland Fire Management:
Figure 2: Ways Wildland Fire Can Threaten a Structure:
Figure 3: Home with Defensible Space:
Figure 4: Burning Home Surrounded by Unburned Vegetation:
Abbreviation:
FPA: fire program analysis:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 9, 2009:
Congressional Addressees:
The nation's wildland fire problems have worsened dramatically over the
past decade, threatening communities as well as important natural and
cultural resources. Both the average acreage burned annually and
federal appropriations for wildland fire management activities have
more than doubled, with appropriations reaching more than $2.9 billion
annually, on average, during fiscal years 2001 through 2007. State and
local governments have likewise spent hundreds of millions of dollars
to suppress fires during severe fire years. A number of factors have
contributed to these increases. Uncharacteristically dense, continuous
accumulations of vegetation, due in part to past fire suppression
policies and land management practices, and severe regional weather and
drought have led to higher-intensity fires and longer fire seasons. At
the same time, continued development in and near wildlands, an area
often called the wildland-urban interface, has placed more homes at
risk. Five federal agencies--the Forest Service within the Department
of Agriculture and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Land
Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Park Service within
the Department of the Interior--are responsible for managing wildland
fires on federal lands. State forestry agencies and other entities--
including tribal, county, city, and rural fire departments--have
primary responsibility for managing wildland fires on nonfederal lands
and share responsibility for protecting homes and other private
structures.
A series of damaging wildland fires in the 1990s led the Forest Service
and the Interior agencies to reassess their approach to managing fire.
It also prompted a sustained effort, known as the National Fire Plan,
[Footnote 1] on the part of the federal agencies and Congress to
improve fire suppression capabilities, reduce potentially hazardous
vegetation that can fuel wildland fires, restore fire-adapted
ecosystems, and help communities better withstand wildland fire.
Growing recognition of the long-term fiscal challenges facing the
nation has also led Congress, the agencies, and others to focus on
ensuring that federal wildland fire activities are appropriate and
carried out in a cost-effective manner. Over the last decade, this
focus led federal agencies (including the Forest Service, Interior, the
Department of Agriculture's Office of Inspector General, and us) and
other organizations (including the National Association of State
Foresters and the National Academy of Public Administration) to conduct
numerous reviews of federal wildland fire programs. For example, we
have reported or testified more than 50 times since 1999 on issues
related to wildland fire management, recommending more than 50 actions
the Forest Service and the Interior agencies could take to improve the
programs. The agencies have taken--and continue to take--steps to
address the shortcomings the reviews identified and to otherwise
improve their fire management programs, but concerns persist over the
agencies' response to the deteriorating fire situation.
In this context, and to provide the administration and the 111th
Congress with an overview of the agencies' efforts to address the
wildland fire problem, this report provides information on (1) the
progress the Forest Service and the Interior agencies have made in
managing wildland fire and (2) key actions we previously recommended
and believe are still necessary to improve the agencies' management of
wildland fire. We prepared this report under the Comptroller General's
authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative.
To address our first objective, we reviewed agency documents to
identify the agencies' overall approach to managing wildland fire, the
key steps the agencies have taken to address the growing wildland fire
problem, and any improvement resulting from those steps. To further our
understanding of these issues, we interviewed various agency officials,
including officials in Washington, D.C., and at the National
Interagency Fire Center in Boise, Idaho. To address our second
objective, we reviewed our prior reports and testimonies to identify
steps we previously recommended that the agencies take to improve their
wildland fire programs and reviewed relevant agency documents and
interviewed agency officials to determine the status of the agencies'
implementation of those recommendations. Appendix I describes our scope
and methodology in more detail. We conducted this performance audit
from January 2009 to September 2009, in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we
plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence
to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on
our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives.
Background:
Wildland fires triggered by lightning are both natural and inevitable
and play an important ecological role on the nation's landscapes. These
fires shape the composition of forests and grasslands, periodically
reduce vegetation densities, and stimulate seedling regeneration and
growth in some species. Over the past century, however, various land
use and management practices--including fire suppression, grazing, and
timber harvesting--have reduced the normal frequency of fires in many
forest and rangeland ecosystems and contributed to abnormally dense,
continuous accumulations of vegetation. Such accumulations not only can
fuel uncharacteristically large or severe wildland fires but also--with
more homes and communities built in or near areas at risk from wildland
fire--threaten human lives, health, property, and infrastructure.
Moreover, the introduction and spread of invasive nonnative species
(such as cheatgrass), along with the expanded range of certain
flammable native species (such as western juniper) have also altered
natural fire regimes, contributing to wildland fires' burning in some
areas with uncharacteristic frequency or intensity.
The Forest Service, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Land
Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Park Service are
responsible for wildland fire management. These five agencies manage
about 700 million acres of land in the United States, including
national forests, national grasslands, Indian reservations, national
parks, and national wildlife refuges. The Forest Service and the Bureau
of Land Management manage the majority of these lands. The Forest
Service manages about 190 million acres; the Bureau of Land Management
manages about 260 million acres; and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Fish
and Wildlife Service, and National Park Service each manage less than
100 million acres. Figure 1 shows the distribution of land among the
five agencies. Each agency has from 7 to 12 regional or state offices
that oversee field units.
Figure 1: Distribution of Total Land Managed by the Five Agencies
Responsible for Wildland Fire Management:
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart]
Bureau of Indian Affairs (Interior agency): 9%;
National Park Service (Interior agency): 12%;
Fish and Wildlife Service (Interior agency): 14%;
Bureau of Land Management (Interior agency): 37%;
Forest Service: 28%.
Sources: GAO analysis of Forest Service and Interior data.
[End of figure]
The federal wildland fire management program has three major
components: preparedness, suppression, and fuel reduction.[Footnote 2]
To prepare for a wildland fire season, the agencies acquire
firefighting assets--including firefighters, fire engines, aircraft,
and other equipment--and station them either at individual federal land
management units (such as national forests or national parks) or at
centralized dispatch locations. The primary purpose of these assets is
to respond to fires before they become large--a response referred to as
initial attack--thus forestalling threats to communities and natural
and cultural resources. The agencies fund the assets used for initial
attack primarily from their wildland fire preparedness accounts.
When a fire starts, current federal policy directs the agencies to
consider land management objectives--identified in land and fire
management plans developed by each land management unit--and the
structures and resources at risk when determining whether or how to
suppress the fire. A wide spectrum of strategies is available to choose
from, and the land manager at the affected local unit is responsible
for determining which strategy to use. In the relatively rare instances
when fires escape initial attack and grow large, the agencies respond
using an interagency system that mobilizes additional firefighting
assets from federal, state, and local agencies, as well as private
contractors, regardless of which agency or agencies have jurisdiction
over the burning lands. Federal agencies typically fund the costs of
these activities from their wildland fire suppression accounts.
In addition to preparing for and suppressing fires, the agencies
attempt to reduce the potential for severe wildland fires, lessen the
damage caused by fires, limit the spread of flammable invasive species,
and restore and maintain healthy ecosystems by reducing potentially
hazardous vegetation that can fuel fires. Approaches used for managing
vegetation include setting fires under controlled conditions
(prescribed burns), mechanical thinning, herbicides, certain grazing
methods, or combinations of these and other approaches. The agencies
fund these activities from their fuel reduction accounts.
Congress, the Office of Management and Budget, federal agency
officials, and others have expressed concern about mounting federal
wildland fire expenditures. Federal appropriations to the Forest
Service and the Interior agencies to prepare for and respond to
wildland fires, including appropriations for reducing fuels, have more
than doubled, from an average of $1.2 billion from fiscal years 1996
through 2000 to an average of $2.9 billion from fiscal years 2001
through 2007. Adjusting for inflation, the average annual
appropriations to the agencies for these periods increased from $1.5
billion to $3.1 billion (in 2007 dollars). The Forest Service received
about 70 percent, and Interior about 30 percent, of the appropriated
funds; table 1 shows the agencies' combined fire appropriations for
fiscal years 1996 through 2007.
Table 1: Forest Service and Interior Wildland Fire Appropriations,
Fiscal Years 1996 through 2007 (Dollars in millions):
Fiscal year: 1996;
Total appropriations: Nominal: $772.4;
Total appropriations: Inflation-adjusted[A]: $984.2.
Fiscal year: 1997;
Total appropriations: Nominal: $1,432.1;
Total appropriations: Inflation-adjusted[A]: $1,793.3.
Fiscal year: 1998;
Total appropriations: Nominal: $1,116.7;
Total appropriations: Inflation-adjusted[A]: $1,381.7.
Fiscal year: 1999;
Total appropriations: Nominal: $1,159.3;
Total appropriations: Inflation-adjusted[A]: $1,415.9.
Fiscal year: 2000;
Total appropriations: Nominal: $1,598.9;
Total appropriations: Inflation-adjusted[A]: $1,914.2.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Total appropriations: Nominal: $2,859.9;
Total appropriations: Inflation-adjusted[A]: $3,344.7.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Total appropriations: Nominal: $2,238.8;
Total appropriations: Inflation-adjusted[A]: $2,569.0.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Total appropriations: Nominal: $3,165.1;
Total appropriations: Inflation-adjusted[A]: $3,560.2.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Total appropriations: Nominal: $3,230.6;
Total appropriations: Inflation-adjusted[A]: $3,541.6.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Total appropriations: Nominal: $2,929.8;
Total appropriations: Inflation-adjusted[A]: $3,144.0.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Total appropriations: Nominal: $2,701.4;
Total appropriations: Inflation-adjusted[A]: $2,775.4.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Total appropriations: Nominal: $3,047.0;
Total appropriations: Inflation-adjusted[A]: $3,047.0.
Source: GAO analysis of Congressional Research Service data.
[A] We adjusted the appropriations amounts for inflation, using the
chain-weighted gross domestic product price index with fiscal year 2007
as the base year.
[End of table]
Analysis of structures damaged during past fires and experimental
research have identified a number of relatively simple steps that can
reduce the risk of damage to structures from wildland fire. Minimizing
or preventing damage requires understanding the different types of
wildland fire and how they can ignite structures. Surface fires--which
burn vegetation or other fuels, such as shrubs, fallen leaves, small
branches, and roots, near the surface of the ground--can ignite a home
or other building by burning nearby vegetation and eventually igniting
flammable portions of the building, including exterior walls or siding;
attached structures, such as a fence or deck; or other nearby flammable
materials, such as firewood or patio furniture. Crown fires--which burn
the tops, or crowns, of trees--place homes at risk because they create
intense heat, which can ignite portions of structures even without
direct contact from flames. Embers, or "firebrands"--which can be
carried on the wind a mile or more from a fire--can ignite a structure
by landing on the roof or by entering a vent or other opening. Figure 2
illustrates how each type of fire can take advantage of a structure's
vulnerabilities and those of its immediate surroundings.
Figure 2: Ways Wildland Fire Can Threaten a Structure:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Wildland fires can ignite homes and structures in different ways.
Surface fires (A) can ignite a home by burning nearby vegetation.
Crown fires (B) create intense heat, which can ignite portions of
structures, without direct contact from flames.
Firebrands (C), or embers, can ignite a home by landing on the roof or
entering a roof vent or other opening.
A, B, and C are depicted on the illustration.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Agencies' Efforts to Implement a New Approach to Managing Wildland Fire
Have Better Positioned Them to Respond to Fire Effectively:
As the Forest Service and the Interior agencies have improved their
understanding of wildland fire's role on the landscape, their approach
to managing fire has evolved. Under the new approach, the agencies seek
to make the landscape less susceptible to damage by wildland fire and
to respond to fires in ways that protect communities and important
resources while also considering the cost and long-term effects of that
response.
Agencies' Approach to Managing Wildland Fire Has Evolved:
Historically, the Forest Service and the Interior agencies generally
viewed fire as a damaging force that they attempted to suppress
quickly--as exemplified by the "10 a.m. policy," in which the goal was
to contain every fire by 10:00 the morning after it was reported. For
decades, the agencies were often successful in this approach. This
emphasis on suppression led to a substantial decline in the average
number of acres burned annually from the 1930s through the 1970s. A
number of damaging fires in the 1990s, however, led the agencies to
fundamentally reassess their understanding of wildland fire's role on
the landscape. Their view of fire's ecological role began to expand,
from seeing benefits in a few ecosystems, like certain grasslands and
forest types, to realizing that in many locations--particularly the
arid West--fire was inevitable. In addition, they recognized that by
allowing brush, small trees, and other vegetation to accumulate, their
past success in suppressing fires was in part responsible for making
recent fires more severe.
The agencies' increased awareness of fire's benefits, as well as of the
unintended negative consequences of suppression, led them in 1995 to
develop the Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy, a policy they
reaffirmed and updated in 2001.[Footnote 3] Under the policy, the
agencies abandoned their attempt to put out every wildland fire,
seeking instead to (1) make communities and resources less susceptible
to being damaged by wildland fire and (2) respond to fires so as to
protect communities and important resources at risk but also to
consider both the cost and long-term effects of that response. As a
result, the agencies have increasingly emphasized firefighting
strategies that focus on land management objectives, which may lead
them to use less aggressive firefighting strategies that can not only
reduce costs in some cases but also be safer for firefighters by
reducing their exposure to unnecessary risks, according to agency fire
officials.
Agencies Have Laid Important Groundwork through Their Efforts to Reduce
Damage to Communities and Resources and to Improve Their Responses to
Wildland Fire:
In recent years, the Forest Service and the Interior agencies have
taken steps to help them better achieve the Federal Wildland Fire
Management Policy's vision. In an effort to make the landscape less
susceptible to damage from wildland fire, for example, they have
reduced hazardous fuels and fostered fire-resistant communities. They
have also improved their ability to respond efficiently and effectively
to wildland fires that occur, including taking steps to (1) implement
the federal wildland fire management policy, (2) improve decisions
regarding fire management strategies, and (3) improve how they acquire
and use firefighting assets.
Agencies Have Taken Steps Intended to Reduce Wildland Fire Damage to
Communities and Resources:
In an effort to reduce damage to communities and resources from
wildland fire, the agencies have continued to reduce fuels and foster
fire-resistant communities, but the extent to which these efforts have
reduced risk is unknown.
Reducing hazardous fuels. Reducing hazardous fuels--to keep wildland
fires from spreading into the wildland-urban interface and to help
protect important resources by lessening a fire's intensity--is one of
the primary objectives of the National Fire Plan. The agencies reported
reducing fuels on more than 29 million acres from 2001 through 2008.
The agencies have also improved the data they use to help identify
lands where fuels need to be reduced and have taken steps to improve
their processes for allocating fuel reduction funds and setting
priorities for fuels projects. The agencies have nearly completed their
geospatial data and modeling system, LANDFIRE, as we recommended in
2003.[Footnote 4] LANDFIRE is intended to produce consistent and
comprehensive maps and data describing vegetation, wildland fuels, and
fire regimes across the United States.[Footnote 5] Such data are
critical to helping the agencies (1) identify the extent, severity, and
location of wildland fire threats to the nation's communities and
resources; (2) predict fire intensity and rate of spread under
particular weather conditions; and (3) evaluate the effect that
reducing fuels may have on future fire behavior. LANDFIRE data are
already complete for the contiguous United States, and the agencies
have reported they expect to complete the data for Alaska and Hawaii in
2009. Because vegetative conditions change over time for a variety of
reasons, including landscape-altering events such as hurricanes,
disease, or wildland fires themselves, the agencies also plan several
processes for updating the data, including selective updates every 2
years to reflect changes due to fires, fuel treatments, and other
disturbances and a comprehensive update every 10 years.
In addition, the agencies have begun to improve their processes for
allocating fuel reduction funds to different areas of the country and
for selecting fuel reduction projects, as we recommended in 2007.
[Footnote 6] The agencies have started moving away from "allocation by
tradition" toward a more consistent, systematic allocation process.
That is, rather than relying on historical funding patterns and
professional judgment, the agencies are developing a process that also
considers risk, effectiveness of fuel reduction treatments, and other
factors. The Forest Service uses this process to allocate funds to its
nine regions and has directed the regions to use it to allocate funds
to their respective national forests. Interior uses a similar process
to allocate funds to its four agencies, and the agencies in turn use it
to allocate funds to their respective state or regional offices. The
agencies have been increasing their use of this process, in fiscal year
2009 applying the results to help them determine how to allocate their
fuel reduction dollars. Interior, however, kept its agencies and
regions from gaining or losing more than 10 percent in funds relative
to fiscal year 2008. Agency officials told us they expect to continue
to improve their processes and to increasingly rely on them to allocate
fuel reduction funds.
Despite these improvements, further action is needed to ensure that the
agencies' efforts to reduce hazardous fuels are directed to areas at
highest risk. The agencies, for example, still lack a measure of the
effectiveness of fuel reduction treatments and therefore lack
information needed to ensure that fuel reduction funds are directed to
the areas where they can best minimize risk to communities and natural
and cultural resources. Forest Service and Interior officials told us
that they recognize this shortcoming and that efforts are under way to
address it. The Joint Fire Science Program, for example, has funded
almost 50 studies examining the effectiveness of fuel reduction
treatments in different locations and has begun a comprehensive effort
to evaluate the effectiveness of different types of fuel treatments, as
well as the longevity of those treatments and their effects on
ecosystems and natural resources.[Footnote 7] Efforts like these are
likely to be long term, involving considerable research investment, and
have the potential to improve the agencies' ability to assess and
compare the cost-effectiveness of potential treatments in deciding how
to optimally allocate scarce funds.
Fostering fire-resistant communities. Protecting the nation's
communities is both one of the key goals of wildland fire management
and one of the leading factors contributing to rising fire costs.
Increasing the use of protective measures to mitigate the risk to
structures from wildland fire is a key goal of the National Fire Plan--
a goal which also may help contain the cost of managing fires in the
long term. This plan, developed by federal wildland fire agencies and
state governors, encourages, but does not mandate, state and local
governments to adopt laws requiring homeowners and homebuilders to take
measures to help protect structures from wildland fires. Because these
measures rely on the actions of individual homeowners and homebuilders
or on laws and land-use planning affecting private lands, achieving
this goal is primarily a state and local government responsibility.
Nonetheless, the Forest Service and the Interior agencies have helped
sponsor the Firewise Communities program, which works with community
leaders and homeowners to increase the use of fire-resistant
landscaping and building materials in areas of high risk.[Footnote 8]
Federal and state agencies also provide grants to help homeowners pay
for creating defensible space around private homes.
A few relatively simple steps can reduce the risk of damage to
structures from wildland fire. Experts from a symposium convened for us
in 2004 by the National Academy of Sciences emphasized that the two
most critical measures for protecting structures from wildland fires
are (1) reducing vegetation and flammable objects within an area of 30
to 100 feet around a structure, often called creating defensible space
(see fig. 3), and (2) using fire-resistant roofing materials and
covering attic vents with mesh screens.[Footnote 9] Analysis of
structures damaged during past fires and experimental research have
shown these two steps to be key determinants of whether or not a
structure is damaged by wildland fire.
Figure 3: Home with Defensible Space:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Defensible space: Reducing vegetation and other flammable materials
within 30 to 100 feet of a structure (the area shaded in yellow) creates
defensible space that substantially reduces the likelihood that a
wildland fire will damage or destroy the structure. Creating defensible
space around a structure does not require that all trees and plants be
eliminated, but plants or trees adjacent to structures should be
carefully spaced and be pruned to remove the lower branches that hang
over the roof.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Nevertheless, use of protective measures is inconsistent. We reported
in 2005 that many homeowners in the wildland-urban interface have not
used such measures to mitigate fire risk because of the time or expense
involved. State and local fire officials estimated that the price of
creating defensible space, for example, can range from a negligible
amount, if homeowners can do the work themselves, to $2,000 or more.
Competing concerns also influence the use of protective measures. For
example, although modifying landscaping to create defensible space has
proved to be key in protecting structures from wildland fire, officials
and researchers have reported that homeowners are more concerned about
the effect of landscaping on their property's appearance, privacy, or
habitat for wildlife. Defensible space can, however, be created so as
to alleviate many of these concerns. Leaving thicker vegetation away
from a structure and pruning plants close by it, for instance, can help
protect the structure and still be attractive, private, and wildlife-
friendly. Misconceptions about fire behavior and the effectiveness of
protective measures can also influence what people do to protect
structures from wildland fires. For example, homeowners may not know
that homes can be more flammable than the surrounding trees, shrubs, or
other vegetation and therefore do not recognize the need to reduce the
flammability of the structure itself (see fig. 4). Fire officials told
us that few people realize that reducing tree density close to a
structure can return a wildland fire to the ground, where it is much
easier to keep away from structures, or that fire-resistant roofs and
screened attic vents can reduce the risk of ignition from firebrands.
Finally, homeowners may not use protective measures because they
believe that firefighters are responsible for protecting their homes
and do not recognize that they share this responsibility.
Figure 4: Burning Home Surrounded by Unburned Vegetation:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: Forest Service.
[End of figure]
Agencies' Improvements Have Laid Important Groundwork for Enhancing
Their Response to Wildland Fire:
Implementing the Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy. The Federal
Wildland Fire Management Policy directs each agency to develop a fire
management plan for all areas they manage with burnable vegetation.
Without such plans, agency policy does not allow use of the whole
spectrum of wildland fire response strategies, including less
aggressive strategies--meaning that, for areas without such plans, the
agencies must attempt to suppress fires regardless of any benefits that
might come from allowing them to burn. We reported in 2006 that about
95 percent of the agencies' 1,460 individual land management units had
completed the required plans. We also reported, however, that the
agencies may not always find it easy to update these plans; a Forest
Service official told us, for example, that, if the introduction of new
data into a fire management plan results in the development of new fire
management objectives, the agency might need to conduct a new
environmental analysis of that plan, requiring additional time and
resources.[Footnote 10] Moreover, in examining 17 fire management
plans, a May 2007 independent review of large wildland fires managed by
the Forest Service in 2006 identified several shortcomings in the
plans, including that most of them examined did not contain current
information on fuel conditions and that many did not provide sufficient
guidance on selecting firefighting strategies.[Footnote 11] If fire
management plans are not updated to reflect the most current
information on the extent and distribution of fire risks and the most
promising methods for dealing with these risks, the plans will be of
limited use to the agencies in managing wildland fire.
The Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy also states that the
agencies' responses to wildland fires are to be based on the
circumstances of each fire and the likely consequences to human safety
and to natural and cultural resources. Interagency guidance on
implementing the policy, adopted in 2009, clarifies that the full range
of fire management strategies and tactics are to be considered when
responding to every wildland fire and that a single fire may be
simultaneously managed for different objectives. Previous guidance
required each fire to be managed either for suppression objectives--
that is, to put out the fire as quickly as possible--or to achieve
resource benefits--that is, to allow the fire to burn to gain certain
benefits such as reducing fuels or seed regeneration. Both the
Department of Agriculture's Inspector General and we criticized the
previous guidance, in part because it did not allow the agencies the
flexibility to switch between these strategies as fire conditions
changed or to manage parts of a single fire differently.[Footnote 12]
By allowing this flexibility, the new guidance should help the agencies
achieve management objectives on more acres and help contain the long-
term costs of fire management.
Improving decisions about fire management strategies. The agencies have
recently undertaken several efforts to improve decisions about
firefighting strategies. In 2007 we reported that previous studies had
found that officials may not always consider the full range of
available strategies and may not select the most appropriate strategy,
which would account for the cost of suppression; the value of
structures and other resources threatened by the fire; and, where
appropriate, any potential benefits to natural resources.[Footnote 13]
Managers of the agencies' individual land management units--typically
known as line officers and including national forest supervisors, BLM
district managers, and others--are responsible for making strategic
decisions about how to manage a fire. A 2000 review by the National
Association of State Foresters, however, concluded that many line
officers have little wildland fire experience and may select fire
management strategies that lead to unnecessarily high suppression
costs. Fire officials told us such strategies may also have a low
likelihood of success, unnecessarily exposing firefighters to risk of
injury. The Forest Service initiated a program in 2007 designed to add
to line officers' knowledge and experience through a series of
certifications at three competency levels, certifying the officer to
manage a fire of low, medium, or high complexity. If a fire exceeds the
line officer's certification level, a more experienced officer is
assigned to coach the less experienced officer; final decisions on
strategies, however, remain the responsibility of the line officer of
the unit where the fire is burning.
To help line officers and fire managers[Footnote 14] in making on-the-
ground decisions about how to manage a particular fire, the agencies in
2009 began to use a new analytical tool, known as the wildland fire
decision support system. This new tool helps line officers and fire
managers analyze various factors--such as the fire's current location,
adjacent fuel conditions, nearby structures and other highly valued
resources, and weather forecasts--in determining the strategies and
tactics to adopt. For example, the tool generates a map illustrating
(1) the probability that a particular wildland fire, barring any
suppression actions, will burn a certain area within a specified time
and (2) the structures or other resources that may therefore be
threatened. Having such information can help line officers and fire
managers understand the resources at risk and identify the most
appropriate response--for example, whether to devote substantial
resources to attempt full and immediate suppression or instead to take
a less intensive approach, which may reduce risks to firefighters and
be less costly.
The agencies have also established four teams, known as national
incident management organization teams, staffed with some of the most
experienced fire managers.[Footnote 15] These teams have several
purposes, including managing some of the most complex and costly fires;
identifying and disseminating best management practices throughout the
agencies; and, during periods of low fire activity, working with staff
at the national forests where large fires are particularly likely to
occur, to better prepare staff to respond. Fire officials said that
over time they expect these teams will improve decisions about
firefighting strategies, both for fires the teams manage directly and
those where they worked with staff ahead of time.
In addition, the agencies, following congressional committee direction,
[Footnote 16] require an independent review of all fires whose costs
exceed $10 million, including an examination of the strategic decisions
affecting suppression costs.[Footnote 17] Although these reviews may
identify instances where the agencies could have used more cost-
efficient firefighting strategies, and may provide long-term benefits
by helping the agencies identify and disseminate best practices, the
reviews are typically conducted after the fires have been suppressed
and therefore are not intended to help fire managers change strategies
while fires are still burning, before managers have taken ineffective
or unnecessary suppression actions.
To influence strategic firefighting decisions while fires are still
burning, the Forest Service (which, among the responsible federal
agencies, most often manages the most expensive fires) has experimented
in recent years with several approaches for identifying ongoing fires
where suppression actions are unlikely to be effective and for
influencing strategic decisions made during those fires that might help
contain costs and reduce risk to firefighters. A senior Forest Service
official told us that these efforts have helped raise awareness of the
importance of basing strategic decisions on (1) the resources at risk
of damage and (2) the likelihood that suppression actions will be
effective, but that the agency was still working to improve its ability
to quickly identify strategic firefighting decisions likely to be
ineffective. This official told us that the concept of reviewing
strategic decisions while a fire is still burning is new, as is the
concept of considering the probability of success, and not just the
resources at risk, in making those decisions; he added that he believed
the agency was making strides in implementing this approach but that it
would be a long process dependent on managers in the field gaining a
better understanding of the benefits of the new approach.
According to this official, the agency's approach in 2009 is to
identify ongoing fires for which the cost of suppression--estimated
using information from the wildland fire decision support system--is
expected to be higher than the cost predicted by a measure known as the
stratified cost index, based on the costs of previous fires with
similar characteristics.[Footnote 18] On those fires for which
suppression costs are expected to be substantially higher than costs
for similar fires in the past, Forest Service officials will consult
with local line officers and fire management officials to ensure that
the most appropriate firefighting strategies are being implemented. The
basis for this comparison--the stratified cost index of previous fires-
-is not entirely reliable, however; our 2007 report identified several
shortcomings with it, including the lack of data from many fires where
less costly firefighting strategies were used (because the agencies
have only recently emphasized the importance of using less aggressive
suppression strategies).[Footnote 19] As a result, using the index as
the basis for comparison may not allow the Forest Service to accurately
identify fires where more, or more-expensive, resources than needed are
being used.
Although these efforts are new and we have not fully evaluated them, we
believe they have the potential to help the agencies strengthen how
firefighting strategies are selected. The efforts, however, do not
address certain critical shortcomings. We reported in 2007, for
example, that officials in the field have few incentives to consider
cost containment in making critical decisions affecting suppression
costs, and that previous studies had found that the lack of a clear
measure to evaluate the benefits and costs of alternative firefighting
strategies fundamentally hindered the agencies' abilities to provide
effective oversight.[Footnote 20] Although the agencies have made
progress in other areas, they still lack such a measure.
Acquiring and using firefighting assets effectively. In 2007 we
reported that (1) federal agencies lacked a shared or integrated system
for effectively determining the appropriate type and quantity of
firefighting assets needed for a fire season; (2) the agencies'
processes and systems for acquiring firefighting assets lacked controls
to ensure that the agencies were procuring assets cost-effectively; and
(3) the agencies sometimes used firefighting assets ineffectively or
inefficiently, often in response to political or social pressures.
[Footnote 21] Despite continued improvement, further action to address
these shortcomings is needed.
First, to address congressional committee direction[Footnote 22] that
they improve their system for determining needed firefighting assets,
the agencies in 2009 began deploying an interagency budget-planning
system known as fire program analysis (FPA). FPA was intended to help
the agencies develop their wildland fire budget requests and allocate
funds by, among other objectives, (1) providing a common budget
framework to analyze firefighting assets without regard for agency
jurisdictions; (2) examining the full scope of fire management
activities, including preparing for fires by acquiring and positioning
firefighting assets for the fire season, mobilizing assets to suppress
fires, and reducing potentially hazardous fuels; (3) modeling the
effects over time of differing strategies for responding to wildland
fires and treating lands to reduce hazardous fuels; and (4) using this
information to identify the most cost-effective mix and location of
federal wildland fire management assets. In 2008, we reported that FPA
showed promise in achieving some of the key objectives originally
established for it but that the approach the agencies have taken
hampers FPA from meeting other key objectives, including the ability to
project the effects of different levels of fuel reduction and
firefighting strategies over time.[Footnote 23] We therefore concluded
that agency officials lack information that would help them analyze the
extent to which increasing or decreasing funding for fuel reduction and
responding more or less aggressively to fires in the short term could
affect the expected cost of responding to wildland fires over the long
term. Senior agency officials told us in 2008 that they were
considering making changes to FPA that may improve its ability to
examine the effects over time of different funding strategies. The
exact nature of these changes, or how to fund them, has yet to be
determined. Officials also told us the agencies are currently working
to evaluate the model's performance, identify and implement needed
corrections, and improve data quality and consistency. The agencies
intend to consider the early results of FPA in developing their budget
requests for fiscal year 2011, although officials told us they will not
rely substantially on FPA's results until needed improvements are made.
As we noted in 2008, the approach the agencies took in developing FPA
provides considerable discretion to agency decision makers and,
although providing the flexibility to consider various options is
important, doing so makes it essential that the agencies ensure their
processes are fully transparent.
Second, we also reported in 2007 that the agencies were planning
improvements to their acquisition processes to ensure they were
procuring assets cost-effectively. The agencies rely on private
contractors to provide many firefighting assets and have begun
implementing a new system for determining which contractors to use.
This system considers the capabilities of the equipment or personnel,
as well as the cost, and is intended to help the agencies identify the
"best value" and not just the lowest cost or closest asset. A Forest
Service official said that the agencies are also evaluating how the
equipment and personnel from each contractor perform in the field and,
once they have gathered enough data, plan to apply that information in
selecting contractors. The agencies are already using this system to
select contractors for many kinds of frequently used equipment,
including firefighting crews, fire engines, aircraft, and water trucks,
and plan to expand the system to include other equipment in future
years.
Third, the agencies have taken several steps to improve their
efficiency in using firefighting assets. As we reported in 2007, for
example, the agencies implemented a computer-based dispatching system
called the resource ordering and status system.[Footnote 24] The
agencies had been using a manual, paper-based system for requesting and
assigning firefighting assets, and the new system was meant to allow
them to more effectively and efficiently monitor firefighting assets
during a fire or other incident. We reported that although the system's
benefits had not been quantified, it had likely reduced suppression
costs by making it easier to use local firefighting assets--which could
hasten response and thus perhaps reduce fire size--and by reducing the
personnel needed to dispatch resources. The agencies can also use the
system to identify individuals qualified and available to serve in
various firefighting positions, which may help increase the agencies'
use of local incident commanders and reduce the need to mobilize more-
costly incident management teams.
We also reported in 2007 that the agencies required that an "incident
business advisor" be assigned to fires expected to cost more than $5
million and recommended that an advisor be assigned to fires expected
to cost more than $1 million. An incident business advisor represents
the line officer's interest in containing costs by observing
firefighting operations and working with the incident management team
to identify ways those operations could be more cost-effective. For
example, an incident business advisor may observe the types and
quantity of firefighting personnel and equipment assigned to a fire and
how they are used; observe how equipment and supplies are procured;
and, as a fire comes under control, ensure that the most expensive
personnel and equipment are released first.
In 2008, the agencies also changed how they determined where to send
certain firefighting assets to ensure that assets perform the highest-
priority work. Agency officials told us they instituted a new practice
to increase the likelihood that firefighting assets perform the highest-
priority actions. Under this practice, certain assets that are often in
high demand (including some of the most experienced firefighting crews)
are assigned to perform only the highest-priority actions on a
particular fire or set of adjacent fires and are then reassigned to
perform high-priority actions on other fires,[Footnote 25] rather than
being assigned for several weeks to a single fire, as has been typical.
This practice should help the agencies address a shortcoming previous
studies have identified--that firefighting assets may sit idle at a
fire rather than be released for use elsewhere because managers are
concerned that they will be unable to recall an asset if they need it
later, a practice that unnecessarily increases a fire's cost and
prevents those assets from helping to protect communities and resources
from fires burning elsewhere. In addition, the officials said it can be
important to ensure that assets are sufficiently flexible to respond to
new fires, even if many fires are already burning. Responding quickly
can substantially increase the likelihood that firefighters will be
able to contain fires before they become large, which is particularly
important when fires start in weather and fuel conditions that can
cause them to burn intensely and spread rapidly. Agency officials also
said they have improved their ability to predict when an unusually high
number of fires might start and have emphasized the need to keep some
firefighting assets in reserve to respond to new fires quickly.
Previous studies also found that agencies sometimes use more, or more-
costly, firefighting assets than necessary, often in response to
political or social pressures to demonstrate they are taking all
possible action to protect communities and resources. Consistent with
these findings, fire officials told us they were pressured in 2008 to
assign more firefighting assets than could be effectively used to fight
fires in California. More generally, previous studies have found that
air tankers may drop flame retardants when on-the-ground conditions may
not warrant such drops. Aviation activities are expensive, accounting
for about one-third of all firefighting costs on a large fire.
Providing clarity about when different types of firefighting assets can
be used effectively could help the agencies resist political and social
pressure to call up more assets than they need.
Agencies Have Yet to Take Certain Key Actions That Would Substantially
Improve Their Management of Wildland Fire:
Despite the important steps the agencies have taken, much work remains.
We have previously recommended several key actions--including
development of an overarching investment strategy for addressing the
wildland fire problem--that, if completed, would improve the agencies'
management of wildland fire. In addition to completing the overarching
strategy (which we have termed a cohesive strategy), we have
recommended that the agencies clarify the importance of containing
costs relative to other, often-competing objectives and clarify
financial responsibilities for fires that cross federal, state, and
local jurisdictions. Finally, we have identified several steps the
agencies should take, and Congress could consider, that could mitigate
the effects on the agencies' other programs of rising fire management
costs.
Develop a Cohesive Strategy:
If the agencies and Congress are to make informed decisions about an
effective and affordable long-term approach for addressing wildland
fire problems that have been decades in the making, the agencies need a
cohesive strategy that identifies the options and associated funding
for reducing excess vegetation and responding to fires. By laying out
various potential approaches for addressing the growing wildland fire
threat, the estimated costs associated with each approach, and the
trade-offs involved, a cohesive strategy would help Congress and the
agencies make informed decisions about how to invest scarce funds.
We first recommended a cohesive strategy for addressing excess
vegetation in 1999.[Footnote 26] Subsequently, after evaluating a
number of related wildland fire management issues, we reiterated the
need for a cohesive strategy in 2005 and 2006 and broadened our
recommendation to better address the interrelated nature of fuel
reduction efforts and wildland fire response.[Footnote 27] The agencies
have concurred with our recommendations to develop a cohesive strategy
but have yet to develop a strategy that clearly formulates different
approaches and associated costs.[Footnote 28] In July 2009, agency
officials told us they had begun planning how to develop a cohesive
strategy but were not far enough along to provide further information.
We were therefore unable to determine the extent to which it might
provide the information the agencies and Congress need to make
fundamental decisions about the best way for the nation to respond to
the growing wildland fire problem. Because of the critical importance
of this step in improving the agencies' overall management of wildland
fire, we continue to believe that the agencies should complete a
strategy, and begin implementing it, as quickly as possible. The
Federal Land Assistance, Management, and Enhancement Act, introduced in
2009, would require the agencies to produce, within 1 year of its
enactment, a cohesive strategy consistent with our previous
recommendations.[Footnote 29]
A document that included the critical elements of a cohesive strategy
was created in 2002: an analysis by a team of Forest Service and
Interior experts estimated the funds needed to implement each of eight
different fuel reduction options for protecting communities and
ecosystems across the nation over the next century.[Footnote 30] The
team determined that reducing the risks to communities and ecosystems
across the nation could require an approximate tripling of funding for
fuel reduction, to about $1.4 billion annually, for an initial period
of several years. These initially higher costs for fuel reduction would
decline after fuels had been sufficiently reduced to make it possible
to use less expensive prescribed burning methods in many areas. More
important, the team estimated that the reduction in fuels would allow
the agencies to suppress more fires at lower cost and would reduce
total wildland fire management costs and risk after 15 years.
Alternatively, the team concluded, maintaining the then-current level
of investment in fuel reduction would increase costs, as well as risks
to communities and ecosystems in the long term.
The Office of Management and Budget raised concerns about the accuracy
of the long-term funding estimates used by the strategy document,
however, and Office of Management and Budget officials told us in 2006
that the agencies needed to have sufficiently reliable data before they
could publish a strategy with long-term funding estimates. Since that
time, the agencies have continued to improve their data by nearly
completing their LANDFIRE and FPA projects, laying important groundwork
for future progress. Our 2008 review of FPA,[Footnote 31] however,
recognized that although FPA represented a significant step forward and
showed promise in meeting several of its objectives, it had limited
ability to examine the long-term effects of differing funding
allocation strategies--a shortcoming that could limit FPA's ability to
contribute to the agencies' development of a cohesive strategy.
[Footnote 32] In addition, the agencies' abilities to develop effective
long-term options for reducing fuels will improve if they succeed in
their current efforts to measure the effectiveness and durability of
different fuel reduction treatments.
Establish a Cost-Containment Strategy:
We reported in 2007 that although the Forest Service and the Interior
agencies had taken several steps intended to help contain wildland fire
costs, they had not clearly defined their cost-containment goals or
developed a strategy for achieving those goals--steps that are
fundamental to sound program management.[Footnote 33] Since our 2007
review, the agencies have continued to implement individual cost-
containment steps, including the wildland fire decision support system
and updated guidance for implementing the federal wildland fire
management policy, but they have yet to develop clear cost-containment
goals or a strategy for achieving them, as we recommended in our 2007
report. Without such goals and a strategy, we believe the agencies will
have difficulty determining whether they are taking the most important
steps first, as well as the extent to which the steps they are taking
will help contain costs.
The Forest Service and Interior generally disagreed with the
characterization of many of our 2007 findings. In particular, they
identified several agency documents--including the 2001 Review and
Update of the 1995 Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy and their 10-
year strategy to implement the National Fire Plan--that they argued
clearly define goals and objectives and that make up their strategy to
contain costs. Although the documents cited by the agencies provide
overarching goals and objectives, they lack the clarity and specificity
needed by land management and firefighting officials in the field to
help manage and contain wildland fire costs. Interagency policy, for
example, established an overarching goal of suppressing wildland fires
at minimum cost, considering firefighter and public safety and the
importance of resources being protected, but the agencies have
established neither clear criteria by which to weigh the relative
importance of the often-competing elements of this broad goal, nor
measurable objectives by which to determine if the agencies are meeting
the goal. As a result, despite improvements the agencies continue to
make to policy, decision-support tools, and oversight, we believe that
managers in the field lack a clear understanding of the relative
importance that the agencies' leadership places on containing costs
and--as we concluded in our 2007 report--are therefore likely to
continue to select firefighting strategies without due consideration of
the costs of suppression. Forest Service officials told us in July 2009
that although they are concerned about fire management costs, they are
emphasizing the need to select firefighting strategies on the basis of
land management objectives and reducing unnecessary risks to
firefighters, an emphasis that, in the long run, may also help contain
costs. Nonetheless, we continue to believe that our recommendations, if
effectively implemented, would help the agencies better manage their
cost-containment efforts and improve their ability to contain wildland
fire costs.
Clearly Define Financial Responsibilities for Fires That Cross
Jurisdictions:
In 2006, we reported that federal and nonfederal officials had concerns
about how costs for suppressing fires that burn across federal, state,
and local jurisdictions were shared among federal and nonfederal
entities and that these concerns may reflect a more fundamental issue--
that those entities had not clearly defined their financial
responsibilities for wildland fire suppression, particularly those for
the often costly efforts to protect the wildland-urban interface.
[Footnote 34] Nonfederal entities--including state forestry entities
and tribal, county, city, and rural fire departments--play an important
role in protecting communities and resources and responding to fires.
We reported in 2006, however, that federal officials were concerned
that the existing framework for sharing suppression costs among federal
and nonfederal entities, coupled with the availability of federal
emergency assistance,[Footnote 35] insulated state and local
governments from the cost of providing wildland fire protection in the
wildland-urban interface.[Footnote 36] As a result, state and local
governments had less incentive to adopt laws (such as building codes
requiring fire-resistant building materials in areas at high risk of
wildland fire) that, in the long run, could help reduce the cost of
suppressing wildland fires. We therefore recommended that the federal
agencies work with relevant state entities to develop more-specific
guidance as to when particular cost-sharing methods should be used and
to clarify their respective financial responsibility for fires that
burn, or threaten to burn, across multiple jurisdictions. The agencies
have updated their guidance on when particular cost-sharing methods
should be used, although we have not evaluated the effect of this
guidance. Still, the agencies have yet to clarify the financial
responsibility for fires that threaten multiple jurisdictions.
Our 2006 report identified two primary ambiguities regarding financial
responsibilities for fire suppression.
* Federal wildland fire management policy states that protecting
structures is the responsibility of state, tribal, and local entities
but it also states that, under a formal fire protection agreement
specifying the financial responsibilities of each entity, federal
agencies can assist nonfederal entities to protect the exterior of
structures threatened by wildland fire.[Footnote 37] Forest Service
guidance defines actions to protect the exterior of structures to
include removing fuels in the vicinity of structures and spraying water
or retardant on structures or surrounding vegetation. Federal and
nonfederal officials agreed that federal agencies can assist with such
actions, but they did not agree on which entities are responsible for
bearing the costs. Federal officials told us that the purpose of this
policy is to allow federal agencies to use their personnel and
equipment to help protect homes but not to bear the financial
responsibility of providing that protection. Nonfederal officials,
however, said that these actions are intended to keep a wildland fire
from reaching structures, and financial responsibility should therefore
be shared between both federal and nonfederal entities. The Forest
Service developed new "structure protection principles" in 2009, but
these principles do not clarify the financial responsibilities for
suppression actions intended to protect structures.
* The presence of structures adjacent to federal lands can
substantially alter fire suppression strategies and raise costs. A
previous report and agency officials have questioned which entities are
financially responsible for suppression actions taken on federal lands
but intended primarily or exclusively to protect adjacent wildland-
urban interface areas. Fire managers typically use existing roads and
geographic features, such as rivers and ridgelines, as firebreaks to
help contain wildland fires. If, however, homes and other structures
are located between a fire and such natural firebreaks, firefighters
may have to construct other firebreaks and rely more than they would
otherwise on aircraft to drop fire retardant to protect the structures,
thereby increasing suppression costs. Nonfederal officials in several
states questioned the appropriateness of assigning to nonfederal
entities the costs for suppression actions taken on federal lands. They
said that an accumulation of fuels on federal lands is resulting in
more-severe wildland fires and contributing to the increased cost of
fire suppression. They also said that federal agencies are responsible
for keeping wildland fires from burning off federal land and should
therefore bear the costs of doing so. Federal officials recognized this
responsibility, but some also said that with the growing awareness that
wildland fires are inevitable in many parts of the country, policy
should recognize that wildland fires will occur and are likely to burn
across jurisdictional boundaries. In their view, those who own property
in areas at risk of wildland fires share a portion of the financial
responsibility for protecting it. Previous federal agency reports have
also recognized this issue and called for clarifying financial
responsibility for such actions.[Footnote 38]
Agency officials, in conjunction with officials from nonfederal
entities, including the National Association of State Foresters, have
initiated an effort intended to help clarify federal and nonfederal
financial responsibilities, although it is too early to determine if
the effort will succeed. Yet the continuing expansion of the wildland-
urban interface and the rising costs for protecting these areas make
resolving these issues ever more urgent. Unless the financial
responsibilities for multijurisdictional fires are clarified, the
concerns that the existing framework insulates nonfederal entities from
the cost of protecting the wildland-urban interface from fire--and that
the federal government therefore continues to bear more than its share
of that cost--are unlikely to be addressed.
Mitigate Effects of Rising Fire Costs on Other Agency Programs:
Rising wildland fire costs have led the Forest Service and the Interior
agencies to transfer funds from other programs to help pay for fire
suppression. The year-to-year variability in the number, location, and
severity of fires makes it difficult to estimate needed suppression
funds accurately, and when appropriated funds are insufficient to cover
actual suppression expenditures, the agencies are authorized to use
funds from their other programs to pay for emergency firefighting
activities. We reported in 2004 that from 1999 through 2003, the
agencies transferred more than $2.7 billion from these other programs.
[Footnote 39] The Forest Service transferred funds from numerous
programs, including construction and maintenance; the national forest
system; and state and private forestry programs that provide grants to
states, tribes, communities, and private landowners for fire and insect
management, among other purposes. Interior transferred funds primarily
from its construction and land acquisition programs. We have not
examined this issue in detail since our 2004 report, but in 2009 we
testified that funding transfers continued, with the agencies
transferring funds in fiscal years 2006, 2007, and 2008.[Footnote 40]
Although the agencies received additional appropriations to cover, on
average, about 80 percent of the funds transferred, we found that the
transfers caused the agencies to cancel or delay some projects and fail
to fulfill certain commitments to their nonfederal partners. We
reported, for example, that funding transfers delayed planned
construction and land acquisition projects, which in some cases led to
higher project costs due to revised budget and construction plans or
higher supply and land acquisition costs. In one instance, the Forest
Service delayed purchasing a 65-acre property in Arizona that it had
planned to acquire for approximately $3.2 million in 2002; it was able
to purchase the property about a year later, but the cost of the
property had increased by $195,000. Also, although funds were
transferred to help the agencies suppress wildland fires, among the
delayed projects were ones to reduce fuels to lower the fire risk to
communities, construct new firefighting facilities, and provide
firefighting training courses.
To help the agencies address the impacts of funding transfers on other
agency programs, we recommended in 2004 that they take a number of
steps, including improving their methods for estimating annual
suppression costs. Typically, the agencies base their estimates of
needed suppression funding on the 10-year rolling average of fire costs
[Footnote 41]--a method with known problems. Although we noted in our
2004 report that better estimates of the costs of suppressing fires in
a given year would reduce the likelihood that the agencies would need
to transfer funds from other accounts, the agencies continue to use the
10-year rolling average as the foundation of their budget requests.
Interior stated at the time that it believed that the 10-year average
was a "reasonable and durable basis for suppression budgeting." The
Forest Service, however, concurred with our recommendation.
Nevertheless, a Forest Service official told us in 2008 that the agency
had analyzed alternative methods for estimating needed suppression
funds but determined that no better method was available. While we
recognize that the accuracy of the 10-year average is likely to improve
as recent years with higher suppression costs are included in that
average, the need to transfer funds in each of the last 3 years
suggests that the agencies should continue to seek a more accurate
method for estimating needed suppression costs.
In addition to the actions we believe the agencies need to take, we
have also suggested that Congress consider legislating alternative
approaches to funding wildland fire suppression that could help reduce
the need for the agencies to transfer funds. As we reported in 2004,
for example, Congress could consider alternative funding approaches for
wildland fire suppression, including establishing a reserve account
that the agencies could access when their suppression accounts are
depleted.[Footnote 42] Such an account could provide either a specified
amount (a definite appropriation) or as much funding as the agencies
need to fund emergency suppression (an indefinite appropriation).
Each approach has advantages and disadvantages. Establishing a reserve
account with a definite appropriation would provide the agencies with
incentives to contain suppression costs within the amount in the
reserve account, but depending on the size of the appropriation and the
severity of a fire season, suppression costs could still exceed the
funds reserved, and the agencies might still need to transfer funds
from other programs. An account with an indefinite appropriation, in
contrast, would eliminate the need for transferring funds from other
programs but would offer no inherent incentives for the agencies to
contain suppression costs. Furthermore, both definite and indefinite
appropriations could raise the overall federal budget deficit,
depending on whether funding levels for other agency or government
programs are reduced. The Federal Land Assistance, Management, and
Enhancement bill would establish a wildland fire reserve account; the
administration's budget for fiscal year 2010 also proposes a $282
million reserve account for the Forest Service and a $75 million
reserve account for Interior to provide funding for firefighting when
the appropriated 10-year average is exhausted.[Footnote 43]
Concluding Observations:
The agencies responsible for managing wildland fires on federal lands
have unquestionably improved their understanding of the nation's
wildland fire problem and have positioned themselves to respond to fire
more effectively. Noteworthy advances include more flexible
firefighting strategies, better information and decision-making tools,
and a more coordinated approach. Yet it is not clear how much ground
the agencies have gained through these improvements, because at the
same time the agencies have been working to improve, the conditions
contributing to the nation's fire problem have worsened--with
increasing development in the wildland-urban interface, a continued
excess of accumulated fuels, and growing evidence of the effects of
climate change. The agencies have recognized that additional, strategic
action is needed if they are to get ahead of the fire problem rather
than simply react to it, but they have yet to take the bold steps we
believe are necessary to implement such a strategic approach. Such
steps--including implementation of a cohesive strategy and efforts to
better predict, contain, and share firefighting costs--could, over
time, allow the agencies to better prepare for, and respond to, the
severe wildland fire seasons to come. Without such steps, the agencies
risk failing to capitalize on the important, but incomplete,
improvements they have made--and risk losing ground in their fight to
manage the wildland fire problem.
We are making no new recommendations at this time. As noted, however,
we believe that our previous recommendations--which the agencies have
generally agreed with--could, if implemented, substantially assist the
agencies in capitalizing on the important progress they have made to
date.
Agency Comments:
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Agriculture
and the Interior for comment. Both the Forest Service and the
Department of the Interior agreed with the findings in the report. The
Forest Service's and Interior's written comments are reproduced in
appendixes II and III, respectively.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees; the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior; the Chief
of the Forest Service; the Directors of the Bureau of Indian Affairs,
Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Park
Service; and other interested parties. The report also is available at
no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staffs have questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-3841 or nazzaror@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Robin M. Nazzaro:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
List of Congressional Addressees:
The Honorable Tom Harkin:
Chairman:
The Honorable Saxby Chambliss:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Jeff Bingaman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Lisa Murkowski:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Collin C. Peterson:
Chairman:
The Honorable Frank D. Lucas:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Agriculture:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Nick J. Rahall II:
Chairman:
Committee on Natural Resources:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Dianne Feinstein:
Chairman:
The Honorable Lamar Alexander:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Joe Baca Chairman:
The Honorable Jeff Fortenberry:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Department Operations, Oversight, Nutrition, and
Forestry:
Committee on Agriculture:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks:
Chairman:
The Honorable Michael K. Simpson:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Raul M. Grijalva:
Chairman:
The Honorable Rob Bishop:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests, and Public Lands:
Committee on Natural Resources:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine progress the Forest Service and Department of the Interior
agencies have made in managing wildland fire, we reviewed pertinent
agency documents and our previous reports and testimonies. To identify
the agencies' overall approach to managing wildland fires and any
changes they have made to that approach, we reviewed key agency
documents, including the 1995 and 2001 federal wildland fire management
policies and the key documents making up the National Fire Plan. To
identify key steps the agencies have taken to address the growing
wildland fire problem and any improvement resulting from these steps,
we reviewed agency documents and previous GAO reports and testimonies
related to wildland fire. To further our understanding of the changes
in the agencies' approach to managing wildland fire and the steps they
have taken to address the problem--and to identify any additional
agency efforts to improve their wildland fire programs--we interviewed
various agency officials, including officials in Washington, D.C., and
at the National Interagency Fire Center in Boise, Idaho.
To determine the key actions we previously recommended and believe are
still needed to improve the agencies' management of wildland fire, we
reviewed our previous reports and testimonies and identified steps we
had previously recommended the agencies take to improve their wildland
fire programs. In many cases, our earlier recommendations were based on
our review of agency documents and of independent analysis of the
agencies' programs (including reviews by the National Academy of Public
Administration and the National Association of State Foresters). To
determine the status of the agencies' implementation of our
recommendations, we reviewed relevant agency documents and interviewed
agency officials.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2009 to September
2009, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Agriculture, Forest
Service:
USDA:
Caring for the Land and Serving People:
United States Department of Agriculture:
Forest Service:
Washington Office:
1400 Independence Avenue, SW:
Washington, DC 20250:
File Code: 1430:
September 2, 2009:
Robin M. Nazarro:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Nazarro:
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) draft report, GAO-09-877, "Wildland Fire
Management: Federal Agencies Have Taken Important Steps Forward, but
Additional Strategic Action is Needed to Capitalize on Those Steps."
The Forest Service generally agrees with GAO's findings and confirms
the validity of this draft report, which contained no recommendations
for further actions. The Forest Service appreciates that GAO has
recognized the substantial efforts that the Forest Service and its
partners in the wildland fire community have undertaken to improve
wildland fire management in recent years. Many of the key actions GAO
points to as remaining to be completed are multijurisdictional in
nature. They require collaboration among Federal and State wildland
fire partners, and we will continue to work with these partners to make
wildland fire management more effective.
Fundamentally, we believe engaging in a robust use of risk management
protocols in wildland fire management, which includes assessing risk to
life and property, will link to governance that results in informed,
strategic choices on each incident.
Any issues or concerns we had were raised during our briefing meeting
and have been adequately addressed. We acknowledge the substantial
effort on the part of GAO in conducting this report and look forward to
working with GAO in the future.
If you have further questions, please contact Sandy T. Coleman, Forest
Service Assistant Director for GAO/OIG Audit Liaison Staff, at 703-605-
4699.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Thomas L. Tidwell:
Chief:
cc: Jaelith H Rivera, Erica Kim:
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of the Interior:
United States Department of the Interior:
Office Of The Secretary:
Washington, DC 20240:
August 28, 2009:
Ms. Robin M. Nazzaro:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
United States Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Ms. Nazzaro:
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the Government
Accountability Office draft report entitled "Wildland Fire Management:
Federal Agencies Have Taken Important Steps Forward, but Additional
Strategic Action is Needed to Capitalize on Those Steps," (GAO-09-877).
The Department of the Interior generally agrees with the findings in
this draft report and believes GAO accurately portrayed the substantial
progress the Department has made in recent years - together with our
partners - to better manage wildland fire. The draft report contains no
new recommendations for further action. We appreciate GAO's summary of
previous reviews and recommendations contained in this draft report.
The Department is committed to continuing this progress.
Any issues or concerns we had with your review were raised during our
meeting and have been adequately addressed. We acknowledge the
substantial effort on the part of GAO in conducting this draft report,
and look forward to working with them again in the future.
Please contact Mr. Kirk Rowdabaugh, Director, Office of Wildland Fire
Coordination, at 202-606-3447 with any questions.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Pamela Haze, for:
Rhea Suh:
Assistant Secretary:
Policy, Management and Budget:
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Robin M. Nazzaro, (202) 512-3841, or nazzaror@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Steve Gaty, Assistant
Director; David P. Bixler; Ellen W. Chu; Jonathan Dent; Richard P.
Johnson; and Kim Raheb made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Wildland Fire Management: Actions by Federal Agencies and Congress
Could Mitigate Rising Fire Costs and Their Effects on Other Agency
Programs. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-444T].
Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2009.
Forest Service: Emerging Issues Highlight the Need to Address
Persistent Management Challenges. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-443T]. Washington, D.C.: March 11,
2009.
Wildland Fire Management: Interagency Budget Tool Needs Further
Development to Fully Meet Key Objectives. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-68]. Washington, D.C.: November 24,
2008.
Wildland Fire Management: Federal Agencies Lack Key Long-and Short-Term
Management Strategies for Using Program Funds Effectively. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-433T]. Washington, D.C.: February
12, 2008.
Forest Service: Better Planning, Guidance, and Data Are Needed to
Improve Management of the Competitive Sourcing Program. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-195]. Washington, D.C.: January 22,
2008.
Wildland Fire Management: Better Information and a Systematic Process
Could Improve Agencies' Approach to Allocating Fuel Reduction Funds and
Selecting Projects. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1168]. Washington, D.C.: September
28, 2007.
Natural Hazard Mitigation: Various Mitigation Efforts Exist, but
Federal Efforts Do Not Provide a Comprehensive Strategic
Framework.[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-403].
Washington, D.C.: August 22, 2007.
Wildland Fire: Management Improvements Could Enhance Federal Agencies'
Efforts to Contain the Costs of Fighting Fires. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-922T]. Washington, D.C.: June 26,
2007.
Wildland Fire Management: A Cohesive Strategy and Clear Cost-
Containment Goals Are Needed for Federal Agencies to Manage Wildland
Fire Activities Effectively. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1017T]. Washington, D.C.: June 19,
2007.
Wildland Fire Management: Lack of Clear Goals or a Strategy Hinders
Federal Agencies' Efforts to Contain the Costs of Fighting Fires.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-655]. Washington, D.C.:
June 1, 2007.
Department of the Interior: Major Management Challenges. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-502T]. Washington, D.C.: February
16, 2007.
Wildland Fire Management: Lack of a Cohesive Strategy Hinders Agencies'
Cost-Containment Efforts. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-427T]. Washington, D.C.: January 30,
2007.
Biscuit Fire Recovery Project: Analysis of Project Development, Salvage
Sales, and Other Activities. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-967]. Washington, D.C.: September
18, 2006.
Wildland Fire Rehabilitation and Restoration: Forest Service and BLM
Could Benefit from Improved Information on Status of Needed Work.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-670]. Washington, D.C.:
June 30, 2006.
Wildland Fire Suppression: Better Guidance Needed to Clarify Sharing of
Costs between Federal and Nonfederal Entities. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-896T]. Washington, D.C.: June 21,
2006.
Wildland Fire Suppression: Lack of Clear Guidance Raises Concerns about
Cost Sharing between Federal and Nonfederal Entities. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-570]. Washington, D.C.: May 30,
2006.
Wildland Fire Management: Update on Federal Agency Efforts to Develop a
Cohesive Strategy to Address Wildland Fire Threats. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-671R]. Washington, D.C.: May 1,
2006.
Natural Resources: Woody Biomass Users' Experiences Provide Insights
for Ongoing Government Efforts to Promote Its Use. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-694T]. Washington, D.C.: April 27,
2006.
Natural Resources: Woody Biomass Users' Experiences Offer Insights for
Government Efforts Aimed at Promoting Its Use. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-336]. Washington, D.C.: March 22,
2006.
Wildland Fire Management: Timely Identification of Long-Term Options
and Funding Needs Is Critical. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-923T]. Washington, D.C.: July 14,
2005.
Natural Resources: Federal Agencies Are Engaged in Numerous Woody
Biomass Utilization Activities, but Significant Obstacles May Impede
Their Efforts. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-741T].
Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2005.
Natural Resources: Federal Agencies Are Engaged in Various Efforts to
Promote the Utilization of Woody Biomass, but Significant Obstacles to
Its Use Remain. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-373].
Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2005.
Technology Assessment: Protecting Structures and Improving
Communications during Wildland Fires. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-380]. Washington, D.C.: April 26,
2005.
Wildland Fire Management: Progress and Future Challenges, Protecting
Structures, and Improving Communications. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-627T]. Washington, D.C.: April 26,
2005.
Wildland Fire Management: Forest Service and Interior Need to Specify
Steps and a Schedule for Identifying Long-Term Options and Their Costs.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-353T]. Washington, D.C.:
February 17, 2005.
Wildland Fire Management: Important Progress Has Been Made, but
Challenges Remain to Completing a Cohesive Strategy. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-147]. Washington, D.C.: January 14,
2005.
Wildland Fires: Forest Service and BLM Need Better Information and a
Systematic Approach for Assessing the Risks of Environmental Effects.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-705]. Washington, D.C.:
June 24, 2004.
Federal Land Management: Additional Guidance on Community Involvement
Could Enhance Effectiveness of Stewardship Contracting. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-652]. Washington, D.C.: June 14,
2004.
Wildfire Suppression: Funding Transfers Cause Project Cancellations and
Delays, Strained Relationships, and Management Disruptions. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-612]. Washington, D.C.: June 2,
2004.
Biscuit Fire: Analysis of Fire Response, Resource Availability, and
Personnel Certification Standards. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-426]. Washington, D.C.: April 12,
2004.
Forest Service: Information on Appeals and Litigation Involving Fuel
Reduction Activities. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-52]. Washington, D.C.: October 24,
2003.
Geospatial Information: Technologies Hold Promise for Wildland Fire
Management, but Challenges Remain. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-1047]. Washington, D.C.: September
23, 2003.
Geospatial Information: Technologies Hold Promise for Wildland Fire
Management, but Challenges Remain. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-1114T]. Washington, D.C.: August 28,
2003.
Wildland Fire Management: Additional Actions Required to Better
Identify and Prioritize Lands Needing Fuels Reduction. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-805]. Washington, D.C.: August 15,
2003.
Wildland Fires: Forest Service's Removal of Timber Burned by Wildland
Fires. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-808R].
Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2003.
Forest Service: Information on Decisions Involving Fuels Reduction
Activities. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-689R].
Washington, D.C.: May 14, 2003.
Wildland Fires: Better Information Needed on Effectiveness of Emergency
Stabilization and Rehabilitation Treatments. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-430]. Washington, D.C.: April 4,
2003.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of the
Interior. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-104].
Washington, D.C.: January 1, 2003.
Results-Oriented Management: Agency Crosscutting Actions and Plans in
Border Control, Flood Mitigation and Insurance, Wetlands, and Wildland
Fire Management. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-321].
Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002.
Wildland Fire Management: Reducing the Threat of Wildland Fires
Requires Sustained and Coordinated Effort. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-843T]. Washington, D.C: June 13,
2002.
Wildland Fire Management: Improved Planning Will Help Agencies Better
Identify Fire-Fighting Preparedness Needs. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-158]. Washington, D.C.: March 29,
2002.
Severe Wildland Fires: Leadership and Accountability Needed to Reduce
Risks to Communities and Resources. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-259]. Washington, D.C.: January 31,
2002.
Forest Service: Appeals and Litigation of Fuel Reduction Projects.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-1114R]. Washington,
D.C.: August 31, 2001.
The National Fire Plan: Federal Agencies Are Not Organized to
Effectively and Efficiently Implement the Plan. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-1022T]. Washington, D.C.: July 31,
2001.
Reducing Wildfire Threats: Funds Should be Targeted to the Highest Risk
Areas. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-RCED-00-296].
Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2000.
Fire Management: Lessons Learned From the Cerro Grande (Los Alamos)
Fire. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-RCED-00-257].
Washington, D.C.: August 14, 2000.
Fire Management: Lessons Learned From the Cerro Grande (Los Alamos)
Fire and Actions Needed to Reduce Fire Risks. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-RCED-00-273]. Washington, D.C.:
August 14, 2000.
Federal Wildfire Activities: Issues Needing Future Attention.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-RCED-99-282]. Washington,
D.C.: September 14, 1999.
Federal Wildfire Activities: Current Strategy and Issues Needing
Attention. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-99-233].
Washington, D.C.: August 13, 1999.
Western National Forests: Status of Forest Service's Efforts to Reduce
Catastrophic Wildfire Threats. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-RCED-99-241]. Washington, D.C.: June
29, 1999.
Western National Forests: A Cohesive Strategy Is Needed to Address
Catastrophic Wildfire Threats. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-99-65]. Washington, D.C.: April 2,
1999.
Western National Forests: Nearby Communities Are Increasingly
Threatened By Catastrophic Wildfires. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-RCED-99-79]. Washington, D.C.:
February 9, 1999.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] The National Fire Plan is a joint interagency effort to respond to
wildland fires. Its core comprises several strategic documents,
including (1) a September 2000 report from the Secretaries of
Agriculture and the Interior to the President in response to the
wildland fires of 2000; (2) congressional direction accompanying
substantial new appropriations for fire management for fiscal year
2001; and (3) several strategies and plans to implement all or parts of
the plan. See GAO, The National Fire Plan: Federal Agencies Are Not
Organized to Effectively and Efficiently Implement the Plan,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-1022T] (Washington,
D.C.: July 31, 2001).
[2] Other fire program components include prevention; science,
research, and development; and assistance to nonfederal entities.
[3] U.S. Department of Agriculture and U.S. Department of the Interior,
Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy and Program Review (Washington,
D.C.: December 1995); Department of the Interior, Department of
Agriculture, Department of Energy, Department of Defense, Department of
Commerce, Environmental Protection Agency, Federal Emergency Management
Agency, and National Association of State Foresters, Review and Update
of the 1995 Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy (Washington, D.C.:
January 2001).
[4] GAO, Wildland Fire Management: Additional Actions Required to
Better Identify and Prioritize Lands Needing Fuels Reduction,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-805] (Washington, D.C.:
Aug. 15, 2003).
[5] A fire regime generally classifies the role that wildland fire
plays in a particular ecosystem on the basis of certain
characteristics, such as the average number of years between fires and
the typical severity of fire under historic conditions.
[6] GAO, Wildland Fire Management: Better Information and a Systematic
Process Could Improve Agencies' Approach to Allocating Fuel Reduction
Funds and Selecting Projects, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1168] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28,
2007).
[7] Other Joint Fire Science Program efforts may also help the agencies
improve their fuel reduction efforts, including efforts to synthesize
and disseminate the current scientific knowledge related to reducing
fuels in different forests and grassland types and to develop a system
that would allow field managers to better use a variety of sources of
fuels data.
[8] The Firewise Communities program is the primary national effort to
educate homeowners about wildland fire risks. The program is jointly
sponsored by the International Association of Fire Chiefs, National
Emergency Management Association, National Association of State Fire
Marshals, National Association of State Foresters, National Fire
Protection Association, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Fire
Administration, Forest Service, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of
Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, and the National Park
Service. Numerous state and local fire and forestry officials also
participate in the program. See [hyperlink, http://www.firewise.org/]
for more information.
[9] Other measures, including using fire-resistant windows and building
materials, also help protect buildings from damage from wildland fire;
see GAO, Technology Assessment: Protecting Structures and Improving
Communications during Wildland Fires, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-380] (Washington, D.C: Apr. 26,
2005).
[10] Under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, agencies
evaluate the likely environmental effects of their activities using an
environmental assessment or, if the activity likely would significantly
affect the environment, a more detailed environmental impact statement.
[11] Independent Large Wildfire Cost Panel, chartered by the U.S.
Secretary of Agriculture, Towards a Collaborative Cost Management
Strategy: 2006 U.S. Forest Service Large Wildfire Cost Review
Recommendations (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2007).
[12] GAO, Wildland Fire Management: Lack of Clear Goals or a Strategy
Hinders Federal Agencies' Efforts to Contain the Costs of Fighting
Fires, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-655] (Washington,
D.C.: June 1, 2007).
[13] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-655].
[14] Fire managers known as incident commanders are responsible for
implementing the suppression strategies selected by line officers.
[15] Based in the Forest Service, the teams are available to work with
all wildland fire agencies.
[16] See H.R. Rep. No. 111-180 at 82 (2009).
[17] In addition to these independent reviews, the Forest Service
requires an internal review of fires whose costs exceed $5 million.
[18] Characteristics affecting suppression costs include fire size;
fuel types; fire intensity; physical terrain; proximity to the nearest
community; total value of structures close to the fire; and special
management considerations, such as whether the fire was burning in a
wilderness or other designated area.
[19] The utility of the index should improve over time as data from
recent fires, including those where less aggressive firefighting
strategies were used, are incorporated; see [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-655].
[20] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-655].
[21] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-655].
[22] See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 107-234 at 68 (2001).
[23] GAO, Wildland Fire Management: Interagency Budget Tool Needs
Further Development to Fully Meet Key Objectives, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-68] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 24,
2008).
[24] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-655].
[25] As we reported in 2007, the agencies already used a similar
practice to determine where many aircraft, including air tankers and
helicopters, were assigned; see [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-655].
[26] GAO, Western National Forests: A Cohesive Strategy Is Needed to
Address Catastrophic Wildfire Threats, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-99-65] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2,
1999).
[27] GAO, Wildland Fire Management: Important Progress Has Been Made,
but Challenges Remain to Completing a Cohesive Strategy, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-147] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 14,
2005); Wildland Fire Management: Update on Federal Agency Efforts to
Develop a Cohesive Strategy to Address Wildland Fire Threats,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-671R] (Washington, D.C.:
May 1, 2006).
[28] Although the agencies issued a document titled Protecting People
and Natural Resources: A Cohesive Fuels Treatment Strategy in 2006,
this document did not identify long-term options or associated funding
for reducing fuels and responding to wildland fires, elements we
believe are critical to a cohesive strategy.
[29] S. 561 (2009); H.R. 1404 (2009).
[30] Wendell Hann, et al., "A Cohesive Strategy for Protecting People
and Sustaining Natural Resources: Predicting Outcomes for Program
Options" (a paper presented at the Fire, Fuel Treatments, and
Ecological Restoration Conference, a meeting on national wildland fire
experts convened by the Forest Service's Rocky Mountain Research
Station, Fort Collins, Colo., April 2002).
[31] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-68].
[32] As previously discussed, senior agency officials told us in 2008
that they are considering making changes to FPA that may improve its
ability to examine the effects over time of different funding
strategies, although they have yet to determine the exact nature of the
changes or how to fund them.
[33] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-655].
[34] GAO, Wildland Fire Suppression: Lack of Clear Guidance Raises
Concerns about Cost Sharing between Federal and Nonfederal Entities,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-570] (Washington, D.C.:
May 30, 2006).
[35] The Federal Emergency Management Agency can reimburse nonfederal
entities for up to 75 percent of allowable fire suppression costs for
eligible fires. In 2007 and 2008, two bills were introduced that would
have allowed the reimbursement rate to increase to 90 percent, provided
the area at risk had adopted building codes and other measures designed
to protect communities from wildland fire. S. 2390 (2007); H.R. 5218
(2008).
[36] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-570].
[37] Department of the Interior, Department of Agriculture, Department
of Energy, Department of Defense, Department of Commerce, Environmental
Protection Agency, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the
National Association of State Foresters, Review and Update of the 1995
Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy (Washington, D.C.: January
2001).
[38] See Department of Agriculture, Secretary of Agriculture
Independent Cost-Control Review Panel, FY 2004 Large Cost Wildfires
Report (Washington, D.C.: March 2005), and Department of Agriculture
and Department of the Interior, Consolidation of the 2003 National and
Regional Large Incident Strategic Assessment and Oversight Review Key
Findings (Washington, D.C.: September 2003).
[39] GAO, Wildfire Suppression: Funding Transfers Cause Project
Cancellations and Delays, Strained Relationships, and Management
Disruptions, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-612]
(Washington, D.C.: June 2, 2004).
[40] GAO, Wildland Fire Management: Actions by Federal Agencies and
Congress Could Mitigate Rising Fire Costs and Their Effects on Other
Agency Programs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-444T]
(Washington, D.C: Apr. 1, 2009).
[41] The agencies calculate a simple rolling or moving average by
computing average annual expenditures over a 10-year period and
updating the average each year, using expenditures from the most recent
10 years. Each year's value receives equal weight in the average. The
moving average is generally considered to be a lagging indicator of
current costs.
[42] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-612].
[44] The FLAME bill would establish in the Treasury a fund known as the
Federal Land Assistance, Management, and Enhancement Fund. The fund
would include amounts appropriated to it in annual appropriations acts
as well as amounts transferred from any fire suppression remaining
unobligated at the end of the fiscal year. Money in the fund would be
available on a permanent indefinite basis to pay the costs of certain
catastrophic emergency wildland fire suppression activities.
[End of section]
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