Border Security
Additional Actions Needed to Better Ensure a Coordinated Federal Response to Illegal Activity on Federal Lands Gao ID: GAO-11-177 November 18, 2010Federal and tribal lands on the U.S. borders with Canada and Mexico are vulnerable to illegal cross-border activity. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)--through its U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Office of Border Patrol (Border Patrol)--is responsible for securing these lands, while the Departments of the Interior (DOI) and Agriculture (USDA) manage natural resources and protect the public. GAO was asked to examine the extent that (1) border security threats have changed on federal lands; (2) federal agencies operating on these lands have shared threat information and communications; and (3) federal agencies have coordinated budgets, resources, and strategies. GAO reviewed interagency agreements and threat assessments; analyzed enforcement data from 2007 through 2009; and interviewed officials at headquarters and two Border Patrol sectors selected due to high volume of illegal cross-border activity (Tucson) and limited ability to detect this activity (Spokane). GAO's observations cannot be generalized to all sectors but provide insights. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in October 2010. Information that DHS deemed sensitive has been redacted.
Illegal cross-border activity remains a significant threat to federal lands. On the southwest border, the Tucson sector is the primary entry point for marijuana smugglers and illegal aliens, and over the last 3 years apprehensions on federal lands have not kept pace with Border Patrol estimates of the number of illegal entries, indicating that the threat to federal lands may be increasing. On the northern border, the Spokane sector is a primary entry point for air smugglers of high-potency marijuana, but technical challenges preclude fully assessing threats to these borderlands. In the Tucson sector, federal land managers said they would like additional guidance to determine when illegal cross-border activity poses a sufficient public safety risk for them to restrict or close access to federal lands. DOI and USDA efforts to determine whether additional guidance is needed--consistent with internal control standards for the federal government and in line with DHS contingency plans for southwest border violence--could help federal land managers more easily balance public safety and access to federal borderlands. Information sharing and communication among DHS, DOI, and USDA have increased in recent years, but critical gaps remain in implementing interagency agreements. Agencies established forums and liaisons to exchange information; however, in the Tucson sector, agencies did not coordinate to ensure that federal land law enforcement officials maintained access to threat information and compatible secure radio communications for daily operations. Coordination in these areas could better ensure officer safety and an efficient law enforcement response to illegal activity. There has been little interagency coordination to share intelligence assessments of border security threats to federal lands and develop budget requests, strategies, and joint operations to address these threats. Interagency efforts to implement provisions of existing agreements in these areas could better leverage law enforcement partner resources and knowledge for more effective border security operations on federal lands. GAO is recommending that DOI and USDA determine if more guidance is needed for federal land closures, and that DHS, DOI, and USDA further implement interagency agreements. DHS, DOI, and USDA concurred with the recommendations.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Richard M. Stana Team: Government Accountability Office: Homeland Security and Justice Phone: (202) 512-8816GAO-11-177, Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Ensure a Coordinated Federal Response to Illegal Activity on Federal Lands
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
November 2010:
Border Security:
Additional Actions Needed to Better Ensure a Coordinated Federal
Response to Illegal Activity on Federal Lands:
GAO-11-177:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-177, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Federal and tribal lands on the U.S. borders with Canada and Mexico
are vulnerable to illegal cross-border activity. The Department of
Homeland Security (DHS)”through its U.S. Customs and Border Protection‘
s Office of Border Patrol (Border Patrol)”is responsible for securing
these lands, while the Departments of the Interior (DOI) and
Agriculture (USDA) manage natural resources and protect the public.
GAO was asked to examine the extent that (1) border security threats
have changed on federal lands; (2) federal agencies operating on these
lands have shared threat information and communications; and (3)
federal agencies have coordinated budgets, resources, and strategies.
GAO reviewed interagency agreements and threat assessments; analyzed
enforcement data from 2007 through 2009; and interviewed officials at
headquarters and two Border Patrol sectors selected due to high volume
of illegal cross-border activity (Tucson) and limited ability to
detect this activity (Spokane). GAO‘s observations cannot be
generalized to all sectors but provide insights. This is a public
version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in October 2010.
Information that DHS deemed sensitive has been redacted.
What GAO Found:
Illegal cross-border activity remains a significant threat to federal
lands. On the southwest border, the Tucson sector is the primary entry
point for marijuana smugglers and illegal aliens, and over the last 3
years apprehensions on federal lands have not kept pace with Border
Patrol estimates of the number of illegal entries, indicating that the
threat to federal lands may be increasing. On the northern border, the
Spokane sector is a primary entry point for air smugglers of high-
potency marijuana, but technical challenges preclude fully assessing
threats to these borderlands. In the Tucson sector, federal land
managers said they would like additional guidance to determine when
illegal cross-border activity poses a sufficient public safety risk
for them to restrict or close access to federal lands. DOI and USDA
efforts to determine whether additional guidance is needed”consistent
with internal control standards for the federal government and in line
with DHS contingency plans for southwest border violence”could help
federal land managers more easily balance public safety and access to
federal borderlands.
Information sharing and communication among DHS, DOI, and USDA have
increased in recent years, but critical gaps remain in implementing
interagency agreements. Agencies established forums and liaisons to
exchange information; however, in the Tucson sector, agencies did not
coordinate to ensure that federal land law enforcement officials
maintained access to threat information and compatible secure radio
communications for daily operations. Coordination in these areas could
better ensure officer safety and an efficient law enforcement response
to illegal activity.
There has been little interagency coordination to share intelligence
assessments of border security threats to federal lands and develop
budget requests, strategies, and joint operations to address these
threats. Interagency efforts to implement provisions of existing
agreements in these areas could better leverage law enforcement
partner resources and knowledge for more effective border security
operations on federal lands.
Figure: Percentage of Border Patrol–Estimated Illegal Entries on
Federal Lands in the Tucson Sector, Fiscal Year 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart]
Department of Agriculture Land: 48%;
Department of the Interior Land: 25%;
Tribal Land: 27%.
Source: GAO analysis of Border Patrol data.
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending that DOI and USDA determine if more guidance is
needed for federal land closures, and that DHS, DOI, and USDA further
implement interagency agreements. DHS, DOI, and USDA concurred with
the recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-177] or key
components. For more information, contact Richard Stana at (202) 512-
8777 or stanar@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
Cross-Border Illegal Activity Remains a Significant Threat to Federal
Borderlands, and Guidance Could Help Balance Public Access and Safety:
Federal Agencies Reported That Information Sharing and Communication
Had Improved, but Additional Coordination Is Needed to Close Critical
Gaps:
Additional Interagency Coordination of Threat Assessments and Budgets
for Federal Lands, and Joint Operations, Could Enhance Border Security
Efforts:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of the Interior:
Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S. Department of Agriculture:
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Figures:
Figure 1: Federal and Tribal Lands along the Canadian and Mexican
Borders, by Administering Agency:
Figure 2: Selected Federal Lands in Border Patrol's Spokane Sector:
Figure 3: Selected Federal and Tribal Lands in Border Patrol's Tucson
Sector:
Figure 4: Percentage of Border Patrol-Estimated Illegal Entries on
Federal Lands in the Tucson Sector, Fiscal Year 2009:
Figure 5: A Warning Sign about Illegal Cross-Border Activity on the
Coronado National Memorial:
Figure 6: A Warning Sign about Illegal Activity on the Sonoran Desert
National Monument:
Abbreviations:
ACTT: Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats:
BMTF: Borderlands Management Task Force:
CBP: U.S. Customs and Border Protection:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOI: Department of the Interior:
HIDTA: High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area:
IBET: Integrated Border Enforcement Area:
MOU: memorandum of understanding:
ORBBP: Operational Requirements Based Budgeting Process:
PLLA: Public Lands Liaison Agent:
QHSR: Quadrennial Homeland Security Review:
SBI: Secure Border Initiative:
SBInet: Secure Border Initiative Network:
USDA: U.S. Department of Agriculture:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
November 18, 2010:
Congressional Requesters:
National forests and parks and other federal lands on the U.S. borders
with Mexico and Canada have historically been vulnerable to illegal
cross-border activity because of remote or rugged terrain and limited
law enforcement presence. Addressing these vulnerabilities requires
interagency coordination to leverage law enforcement resources for
securing federal land borders covering over 800 miles of the southwest
border with Mexico and over 1,000 miles of the northern border with
Canada. Federal agencies with law enforcement presence on federal
lands include the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of
Border Patrol (Border Patrol), a component of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), which is primarily responsible for enforcing border
security between official ports of entry[Footnote 1] to the United
States, and the Departments of the Interior (DOI) and Agriculture
(USDA), which have jurisdiction for law enforcement on federal
borderlands administered by their component agencies. These component
agencies--including DOI's National Park Service, Fish and Wildlife
Service, and Bureau of Land Management and USDA's Forest Service--are
responsible for the protection of natural and cultural resources,
agency personnel, and the public on the lands they administer. Law
enforcement personnel from sovereign Indian nations located on the
international borders also conduct law enforcement operations related
to border security. In addition, DOI's Bureau of Indian Affairs may
enforce federal laws on Indian lands, with the consent of tribes and
in accordance with tribal laws.
In a 2004 report, we reviewed DHS, DOI, and USDA coordination of their
law enforcement programs on federal lands; reported that the component
agencies were not sharing information about local security threats,
plans for infrastructure and technology enhancements, or staff
deployment; and recommended that they establish agreements to
coordinate strategies and the use of limited resources.[Footnote 2]
These agencies concurred with our recommendation and have since
established interagency agreements intended to facilitate coordination
in these areas. DHS has also significantly increased the deployment of
personnel, technology, and infrastructure along the borders, raising
new coordination challenges. This report responds to your request that
we assess the information available about border security threats on
federal lands and progress agencies have made in sharing threat
information and achieving a coordinated interagency response.
Specifically, we reviewed the extent to which:
* border security threats have changed from fiscal year 2007 to the
present in Border Patrol sectors on the northern and southwest borders
with large concentrations of federal borderlands;
* DHS, DOI, and USDA units operating in these areas share threat
information and communications; and:
* DHS, DOI, and USDA coordinate budget requests, resource deployment,
and joint strategies to address border security threats on federal
lands.
This report is a public version of the prior sensitive report that we
provided to you in October 2010. DHS deemed some of the information in
the prior report as law enforcement sensitive information, which must
be protected from public disclosure. Therefore, this report omits
certain sensitive information about cross-border illegal activity.
Although the information provided in this report is more limited in
scope, it addresses the same questions as the sensitive report. Also,
the methodology used for both reports is the same.
In conducting our work, we analyzed DHS, DOI, and USDA documentation
and conducted site visits to selected international border locations.
On the southwest border, we visited the Border Patrol's Tucson sector
in Arizona because it comprises a mix of tribal and federal lands and
has experienced the highest volume of illegal cross-border activity,
as indicated by marijuana seizures and illegal alien apprehensions,
among southwest border sectors. We conducted semistructured interviews
with officials at federal land units within the sector, interviewed
tribal police officials, and conducted semistructured interviews with
officials at Border Patrol stations in this sector. On the northern
border, we conducted fieldwork in the Border Patrol's Spokane sector
because most of it comprises federal lands and has low levels of
Border Patrol personnel and resources and limited ability to detect
cross-border illegal activity relative to other northern Border Patrol
sectors. We conducted semistructured interviews with officials at
federal land units within the sector, as well as with officials at
Border Patrol stations. While we cannot generalize our work from these
visits to all locations along the northern and southwest borders, we
chose these locations to provide examples of the way the Border Patrol
and federal land management agencies coordinate their efforts.
To address the first objective, we reviewed Border Patrol annual
threat assessments from fiscal years 2007 through fiscal year 2009 for
the Spokane and Tucson sectors, and operational assessments. We also
reviewed apprehension data, as well as Border Patrol estimates of
total illegal entries for federal borderlands in the Tucson sector for
fiscal years 2007 through fiscal year 2009. We assessed the
reliability of these data by interviewing Border Patrol officials
responsible for overseeing quality control procedures for these data
and determined that these data were sufficiently reliable to be used
in this report. We did not use entry data for the Spokane sector
because operational assessments indicate that the sector does not have
the capability to reliably estimate illegal cross-border entries. We
reviewed Border Patrol fiscal year 2009 operational assessments for
the Tucson and Yuma sectors and the 2010 assessment for the Spokane
sector that were included in each sector's Operational Requirements
Based Budget Process (ORBBP) document to identify resources needed to
address threats and any existing operational challenges to achieving
control of the border.[Footnote 3] We also analyzed DOI and USDA
regulations related to federal land restrictions and closures and
compared these regulations with our Standards for Internal Control in
the Federal Government.[Footnote 4]
To address the second objective, we reviewed Border Patrol policies
and guidance that address information sharing and communication. We
also identified various memorandums of understanding and agreements
made and entered into by DHS, DOI, and USDA; reviewed provisions
related to information sharing; and examined the extent to which DHS,
DOI, and USDA were implementing these provisions. We also identified
and reviewed strategies outlining DHS requirements for sharing
information with other federal agencies and examined the extent to
which DHS, DOI, and USDA were implementing these requirements.
To address the third objective, we analyzed Tucson sector and Spokane
sector ORBBP documents to determine Border Patrol resource needs for
these sectors in the areas of personnel, technology, and
infrastructure. As part of our semistructured interviews with
officials in the Tucson and Spokane sectors, we also examined the
extent to which DHS, DOI, and USDA were coordinating the deployment of
personnel, technology, and infrastructure as outlined in memorandums
of understanding, interagency agreements, and departmental strategies.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2009 through
November 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. Additional details on our scope and methodology are
contained in appendix I.
Background:
Agencies Responsible for Administering and Securing Federal Lands:
USDA and DOI agencies administer nearly 2,000 miles of federally owned
or managed land adjacent to the international borders with Canada and
Mexico. The majority of these lands are administered by four agencies--
USDA's Forest Service and DOI's National Park Service, Bureau of Land
Management, and Fish and Wildlife Service. In addition, DOI's Bureau
of Indian Affairs is responsible for assisting in the administration
or management of tribal lands. For this report, we refer to these five
agencies as federal land management agencies.
On the United States--Canada border, federal lands comprise about
1,016 miles, or approximately 25 percent, of the nearly 4,000 northern
border miles (excluding the Alaska-Canada border), and are primarily:
administered by the National Park Service and Forest Service. On the
United States-Mexico border, federal lands comprise about 820 miles,
or approximately 43 percent, of the nearly 2,000 total border miles.
(See figure 1 for northern and southwest border miles and
administering agencies.)
Figure 1: Federal and Tribal Lands along the Canadian and Mexican
Borders, by Administering Agency:
[Refer to PDF for image: U.S. map with associated pie-charts]
Canadian border:
Total = nearly 4,000 miles.
Private or state owned: 75%;
Total federal and tribal lands: 25%;
Breakdown of federal and tribal lands (25%):
* Fish and Wildlife Service: less than 1%;
* Bureau of Land Management: 2%;
* Bureau of Indian Affairs: 4%;
* National Park Service: 9%;
* Forest Service: 10%.
Mexican border:
Total = nearly 2,000 miles.
Private or state owned: 57%;
Total federal and tribal lands: 43%;
Breakdown of federal and tribal lands (43%):
* Forest Service: 3%;
* Bureau of Indian Affairs: 4%;
* Fish and Wildlife Service: 8%;
* Bureau of Land Management: 9%;
* National Park Service: 19%.
Source: GAO analysis of Department of the Interior and Forest Service
data (data); Art Explosion (map).
[End of figure]
USDA and DOI employ resource managers who administer federal lands, as
well as law enforcement officers and criminal investigative agents who
operate within federal land boundaries to apprehend and investigate
persons conducting illegal activities posing a threat to the visiting
public, agency personnel, and the respective agency's mission. Agency
missions include the conservation, preservation, and protection of
natural, historic, and cultural resources. For the purposes of this
report, we refer to resource managers from all agencies as federal
land managers, and refer to law enforcement officers and criminal
investigative agents as federal land law enforcement officials.
CBP's Border Patrol agents operate on federal lands and other areas as
the primary federal law enforcement agency responsible for border
security between the ports of entry. Along these border areas, the
Border Patrol's mission is to prevent terrorists and their weapons of
terrorism from entering the United States and also to detect,
interdict, and apprehend those who attempt to illegally enter or
smuggle any person or contraband across the nation's border. The
Border Patrol is organized into 20 different sectors--with 8 sectors
on the northern border, 9 sectors on the southwest border, and 3
sectors on coastal areas along the Gulf of Mexico and in Puerto Rico.
Each sector has a headquarters with management personnel and various
numbers of stations with agents responsible for patrolling within
defined geographic areas. Depending on size and location, individual
federal borderlands may fall within one or more stations' area of
patrol responsibility and across one or two sectors.
On the northern border, a number of federal lands are located in the
Border Patrol's Spokane sector, which comprises eastern Washington,
Idaho, and western Montana. Border Patrol stations have responsibility
for border security on these lands, which include five national
forests, wilderness areas,[Footnote 5] and a national park, as shown
in figure 2.
Figure 2: Selected Federal Lands in Border Patrol's Spokane Sector:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map]
The map depicts the following entities:
Border Patrol Sector division line.
Bureau of Indian Affairs:
Makah Indian Reservation.
Forest Service:
Olympic National Park;
North Cascades National Park;
Glacier National Park.
National Park Service:
Olympic National Forest;
Mount Baker-Snoqualmie National Forest;
Pasayten Wilderness;
Okanogan-Wenatchee National Forest;
Idaho Panhandle National Forest;
Kootenai National Forest;
Flathead National Forest.
Source: GAO analysis of Department of the Interior and Forest Service
information.
[End of figure]
The Border Patrol Tucson sector has the highest concentration and
diversity of federal borderlands of all sectors on the southwest
border. Border Patrol stations in the Tucson sector are responsible
for providing border security on these lands, which include three
national wildlife refuges, two national parks, a national forest, and
other federal lands. The Tucson sector also includes the Tohono
O'odham Nation Indian Reservation. (See figure 3 for federal and
tribal lands in the Tucson sector.)
Figure 3: Selected Federal and Tribal Lands in Border Patrol's Tucson
Sector:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map]
The map depicts the following entities:
Border Patrol Sector division line.
Bureau of Indian Affairs:
Tohono O'odham Indian Reservation.
Bureau of Land Management:
Sonoran Desert National Monument;
San Pedro Riparian National Conservation Area;
Coronado National Memorial;
Ironwood Forest National Monument.
Forest Service:
Coronado National Forest.
Fish and Wildlife Service:
Cabeza Prieta National Wildlife Reuge;
San Bernardino National Wildlife Refuge
Buenos Aires National Wildlife Refuge.
National Park Service:
Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument.
Source: GAO analysis of Department of the Interior and Forest Service
information.
[End of figure]
The Border Patrol's operational strategies create an overlap in
operational and mission boundaries with DOI and USDA agencies that
provide law enforcement in the same geographic areas. Border Patrol's
National Strategy includes a "defense in depth" approach to border
security operations that provides for several layers of agents who
operate not only at the border but also on federal lands and other
areas up to 100 miles from the border. The Border Patrol's operational
strategy also prioritizes border enforcement in urban and more
populated areas that has resulted in diverting larger concentrations
of illegal cross-border activity to more remote areas, including
federal lands, where there may be more time for detection and
apprehension. This illegal cross-border activity can cause damage to
natural, historic, and cultural resources on federal lands, and put
agency personnel and the visiting public at risk. As a result, federal
land law enforcement officials and Border Patrol agents may patrol the
same area of responsibility and pursue the same persons who violate
laws underpinning each agency's respective mission. Coordination
between these agencies can help leverage resources across missions and
minimize further damage to federal lands in responding to illegal
activity.
DHS, DOI, and USDA Coordination Efforts Following Our Last Review:
Federal agencies have taken several actions aimed at coordinating
their efforts since our previous findings reported in June 2004.
[Footnote 6] We reported that the Border Patrol and federal land
management agencies had not coordinated their law enforcement efforts
on federal borderlands, and recommended that these agencies coordinate
their strategies and the use of their respective law enforcement
resources. Subsequently, DHS, DOI, and USDA acted to establish
interagency agreements and liaisons to address our recommendation for
improved coordination. In 2006, these agencies signed a joint
memorandum of understanding (MOU) that affirmed agency commitment to
coordinate efforts in a number of key areas, including:
* sharing information regarding border security threats on federal
lands;
* sharing budget requests, deployment plans, and maintenance plans for
infrastructure and technology that will be used on federal lands;
* sharing operational plans, including deployment of staff and
resources, changes in staffing levels, and patrol methods that best
align with federal laws to protect the environment and endangered
species; and:
* Border Patrol access to federal lands and waterways for the purposes
of conducting border security operations, such as tracking and
interdicting individuals, and installing remote detection systems,
consistent with applicable federal laws.[Footnote 7]
DHS, DOI, and USDA also established a 2008 MOU on secure radio
communications, which provided agreement for radio interoperability
between Border Patrol agents and federal land law enforcement
officials operating in the same geographic area of responsibility.
[Footnote 8]
The Border Patrol and DOI also established interagency liaisons, who
have responsibility for facilitating coordination between agencies,
including implementation of provisions in established agreements.
Border Patrol's Public Lands Liaison Agent (PLLA) program requires
each Border Patrol sector to staff an agent dedicated to interaction
with DOI, USDA, or other governmental or nongovernmental organizations
involved in land management issues to foster better communication;
increase interagency understanding of respective missions, objectives,
and priorities; and serve as a central point of contact to facilitate
resolution of issues and concerns. Key responsibilities of the PLLA
include engaging in the implementation of the 2006 MOU requirements
and subsequent related agreements and monitoring any enforcement
operations, issues, or activities related to federal land use or
resource management. DOI also established a Northern Border
Coordinator, colocated at the Border Patrol Spokane sector, and a
Southwest Border Coordinator, colocated at the Border Patrol Tucson
sector, to coordinate federal land management issues between and among
DOI component agencies and the Border Patrol. USDA's Forest Service
established a dedicated liaison position in the Tucson sector in June
2010 to coordinate with the Border Patrol, according to Forest Service
officials. The Forest Service has also established a Northern Border
Coordinator, who is based in the Spokane sector.
DHS Strategies and Vision for Agency Coordination and Initiatives to
Secure the Border:
DHS has also issued strategies and a vision for improved coordination
among agencies. DHS reiterated its commitment to sharing information
across agencies in its 2008 Information Sharing Strategy, which
provides full recognition and integration of federal agencies, tribal
nations, and others in the DHS information-sharing environment and in
development of relevant technology.[Footnote 9] More recently, DHS
codified its vision for effective coordination among agencies in the
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), issued in February 2010.
[Footnote 10] The QHSR emphasizes that homeland security is a
collective effort and shared responsibility of federal, state, local,
tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private-sector partners--as
well as individuals, families, and communities--and is the first step
in DHS plans to implement a strategic framework to guide the
activities of these homeland security partners toward a common end. In
achieving an end state for border security, the QHSR states that this
goal can only be achieved by cooperative efforts among federal
departments and others to share information and conduct coordinated
and integrated operations.
DHS continues implementation of the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a
multiyear, multibillion-dollar program to secure the U.S. borders that
focuses on increases in personnel, infrastructure, and technology,
particularly along the southwest border. Border Patrol agents staffed
along the U.S. borders have increased from 11,264 in 2005 to 20,161 as
of June 2010, with 2,139 agents staffed on the northern border and
17,089 agents staffed on the southwest border.[Footnote 11] In regard
to infrastructure, CBP's SBI office reported that as of April 2010, it
had completed 646 of the 652 miles of border fencing--including
pedestrian fencing and permanent vehicle barriers--that it committed
to deploy along the southwest border. As of May 2010, CBP had not
assessed the effect of this fencing on border security as we
recommended in September 2009,[Footnote 12] but had contracted with
the Homeland Security Institute to conduct this analysis.[Footnote 13]
Deployment of this infrastructure also raised concerns about the
negative effects on certain environments and wildlife that are
protected under federal law. These concerns have resulted in
consultation and mitigation efforts between DHS and DOI. In regard to
technology, CBP's SBI office deployed a Secure Border Initiative
Network (SBInet) prototype in the Tucson sector in February 2008, with
plans to fully deploy SBInet in two Tucson sector locations at the end
of calendar year 2010. SBInet is the technological component of SBI
and includes towers, cameras, radar, and other technology to detect
illegal activity along the border and attendant maintenance roads. The
planned deployment of SBInet on federal lands with sensitive
environmental areas and animal habitats also resulted in consultation
between DHS and DOI to mitigate effects on these federally protected
resources. In May 2010, we reported that SBInet has suffered from
repeated delays and cost overruns.[Footnote 14] DHS suspended future
funding for the SBInet program in March 2010 pending a comprehensive
internal review.
Cross-Border Illegal Activity Remains a Significant Threat to Federal
Borderlands, and Guidance Could Help Balance Public Access and Safety:
Cross-border illegal activity remains a significant threat on
southwest and northern federal borderlands, according to Border Patrol
assessments and data from 2009. Specifically, Border Patrol threat
assessments showed that tribal lands, a national forest, wildlife
refuges, a conservation area, and national parks in the Tucson sector
continue to be high-risk areas for cross-border threats related to
marijuana smuggling and illegal migration, and Border Patrol data show
that the number of apprehensions of illegal entrants has not kept pace
with the number of estimated illegal entries. In the Spokane sector,
Border Patrol threat and operational assessments showed that the
extent of illegal cross-border activity remains largely unknown, and
the use of borrowed technology has shown that cross-border use of low-
flying aircraft to smuggle drugs has been much higher than indicated
by the number of drug seizures. Some federal land managers in the
Tucson sector expressed concern about public endangerment on federal
lands, but lacked additional guidance to determine when public access
to federal lands should be restricted.
Border Patrol Faces Challenges in Responding to Cross-Border Threats
on Tucson Sector Federal Borderlands:
The Tucson sector is the primary entry point for marijuana smugglers
and illegal aliens on the southwest border, according to Border Patrol
assessments,[Footnote 15] and Border Patrol apprehensions have not
kept pace with the estimated number of illegal entries, indicating
that threats to these areas may be increasing. Our analysis of Border
Patrol data from fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2009 showed that
while the number of apprehensions decreased by 42 percent on Tucson
sector federal lands, the estimated number of illegal entries
decreased by 14 percent. Specifically, these data for 2009 show that
while Border Patrol agents apprehended over 91,000 illegal aliens on
federal lands, the Border Patrol estimated close to three times as
many more illegal entries on federal lands.[Footnote 16] In addition,
these data show that most of the illegal entries were estimated to
have occurred on federal lands administered by the Forest Service and
the Tohono O'odham Nation. In fiscal year 2009, for example, the
Border Patrol reported that nearly half of these estimated illegal
entries occurred on Forest Service lands, and over one-fourth occurred
on tribal lands (see figure 4).
Figure 4: Percentage of Border Patrol-Estimated Illegal Entries on
Federal Lands in the Tucson Sector, Fiscal Year 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart]
Forest Service: 48%;
Tribal Land: 27%;
Fish and Wildlife Service: 12%;
National Park Service: 11%;
Bureau of Land Management: 1%.
Source: GAO analysis of Border Patrol data.
Note: Percentages do not add to 100 percent due to rounding.
[End of figure]
According to Border Patrol operational and threat assessments, agents
face many logistical and operational challenges in responding to the
threat of illegal entries on these federal lands while ensuring that
the Border Patrol's strategy and mission are carried out effectively
and efficiently. Challenges cited by Border Patrol assessments
included insufficient resources, distance of resources from the
border, and operational gaps between stations and sectors.
* Insufficient resources. The operational assessments for all five
stations we visited with responsibility for patrolling federal lands
indicated an insufficient number of staff or amount of technology or
other resources to detect and respond to illegal activity in their
area of responsibility.
* Distance from the border. The operational assessments for all five
stations we visited indicated that distances from the station to some
border areas they patrol made enforcement difficult in these areas.
[Footnote 17] For example, Border Patrol agents from stations
responsible for patrolling parts of the Organ Pipe Cactus National
Monument, the Coronado National Memorial, and the Coronado National
Forest confirmed that the long distances between the station and
border areas hindered timely response to and apprehension of illegal
entrants. To address these vulnerabilities, the Border Patrol was
working with federal land managers from these federal lands to
establish or expand forward operating bases that allow Border Patrol
agents to maintain a constant presence.
* Operational gaps. According to Border Patrol operational and threat
assessments and station officials, some federal lands crossed station
and sector boundaries, and these boundaries were sometimes
underpatrolled, resulting in higher levels of illegal activity and
lower levels of apprehension. To address these vulnerabilities on the
Coronado National Memorial, the Border Patrol was working with land
managers to establish forward operating bases on boundary lines that
could be used by agents from different stations.
Operational and threat assessments indicated that patrolling
environmentally sensitive areas was challenging, but access to these
areas was not a primary factor to achieving operational control of the
border.[Footnote 18] In addition, Border Patrol agents that we
interviewed from the station patrolling these lands confirmed that
environmental restrictions were not a primary barrier to achieving
operational control of the border and that they are able to work with
these federal land managers to meet Border Patrol operational
requirements.
Limited Capability to Detect Illegal Activity in the Spokane Sector
Creates Challenges to Assessing Cross-Border Threats on These Northern
Borderlands:
The Spokane sector is a primary entry point for illegal cross-border
transport of high-potency marijuana from Canada via low-flying
aircraft, according to Border Patrol threat assessments, and much of
this activity occurs on federal borderlands that comprise about 77
percent of the Spokane sector border. Border Patrol Spokane sector
officials consider the level of illegal activity to be significantly
higher than that reflected by the number of drug seizures and
apprehensions. Border Patrol Spokane sector data showed that from
fiscal years 2007 through 2009, the number of drug seizures decreased
from 43 to 33 across the sector overall and apprehensions decreased
from 341 to 277. However, these federal lands--which include five
national forests, two wilderness areas, and a national park--are in
areas where the Border Patrol has limited capability to reliably
detect the full extent of illegal cross-border activity, according to
Border Patrol threat and operational assessments. For example,
according to Border Patrol assessments, using Department of Defense
technology during a 30-day joint operation in fiscal year 2008, Border
Patrol agents in the Spokane sector detected significantly more
aircraft crossing the border than the number of cross-border aircraft
normally detected in a given year without this additional technology.
Border Patrol assessments also cited risks related to potential
terrorism and gangs, and there are indications that smuggling of drugs
and other contraband may be substantial.
About two-thirds of the border miles in the Spokane sector were
defined as a low-level monitored area that remains vulnerable to
exploitation because of issues related to accessibility and resource
availability, according to the 2010 Spokane sector operational
assessment. Border Patrol headquarters officials stated that other
sectors had a higher priority for resources because they had higher
threat levels when compared to the Spokane sector.[Footnote 19] Border
Patrol challenges related to responding to the threat of illegal
entries on Spokane sector federal lands resulted from the inability to
patrol physically inaccessible terrain, limited resources and
infrastructure to combat the air threat, and insufficient staff to
cover each of the seven stations' area of responsibility, according to
the sector's 2010 operational assessment.
Border Patrol operational and threat assessments also mentioned
adapting operational strategy to patrol environmentally sensitive
areas as a challenge, but not a primary factor in achieving border
control. For example, roadless areas, such as the Pasayten Wilderness,
limit motorized access. In addition, the Spokane sector Acting Chief
Patrol Agent said that Forest Service officials had blocked road
access in areas of core grizzly bear habitat, which negatively
affected their ability to patrol these areas of the border, but these
challenges were not reflected in the Spokane sector's 2010 operational
assessment.[Footnote 20] Officials from the Forest Service, Northern
Region said that the road closures were in response to their
responsibility to recover the threatened grizzly bear pursuant to the
Endangered Species Act, as regulated by DOI's Fish and Wildlife
Service.[Footnote 21] The Forest Service is required to restrict
motorized access in the recovery areas during the time of year when
bears are outside of their dens, according to Forest Service
officials.[Footnote 22] However, Border Patrol Spokane sector
officials said they are working with USDA's Forest Service and DOI's
Fish and Wildlife Service on agreements related to road use in grizzly
bear habitat areas.[Footnote 23]
Additional Guidance May Help Tucson Sector Federal Land Managers
Determine When to Restrict or Close Federal Lands to Public Access:
Federal land managers and law enforcement officials from five of six
DOI and USDA agencies we visited in the Tucson sector said that they
would like additional guidance to determine when risks related to
cross-border illegal activity warrant closure or restricted access to
federal borderlands. DOI and USDA have regulatory authority to
temporarily close or restrict portions of federal land units because
of factors such as resource preservation or to protect public health
and safety during wildland fires and other emergency events, but defer
development of guidance to implement this authority to their component
agencies.[Footnote 24] We found that guidance developed by each
component agency we visited varied regarding factors federal land
managers should consider in making decisions in response to border
security threats and most federal land managers and law enforcement
officials that represent six federal land units in the Tucson sector
stated that they would like additional guidance to more easily respond
to changes in border security threats. DHS has developed contingency
plans for cross-border violence on the southwest border, but these
plans do not include information federal land managers could use to
guide their decisions to close or restrict access to federal
borderlands.[Footnote 25]
Federal land law enforcement officials from the six DOI and USDA
agencies we visited in the Tucson sector estimated spending 75 to 97
percent of their time responding to concerns about public safety or
resource damage that were directly related to threats from illegal
cross-border activity. For example:
* Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument. Drug smugglers frequently used
the parking lot of the Visitor Center on the Organ Pipe Cactus
National Monument as a staging area, according to Border Patrol threat
assessments. Because of safety concerns, federal land law enforcement
officials spent much of their time providing armed escorts for agency
personnel, such as park researchers and scientists, conducting work in
certain areas of the park.
* Coronado National Forest. Criminal organizations continue to use the
Coronado National Forest to facilitate illegal entry into the United
States. According to a Forest Service law enforcement official, the
majority of time law enforcement officials spend in the national
forest is spent responding to public safety and resource protection
issues directly related to illegal cross-border activity.
* Cabeza Prieta National Wildlife Refuge. A law enforcement official
responsible for monitoring wilderness access restrictions on the
refuge spent a significant amount of time addressing issues related to
illegal trafficking of humans and drugs.
DOI's Southwest Border Coordinator said that the lack of DOI guidance
has resulted in different practices to close or restrict access across
federal borderlands, despite similar border security threats to public
safety. Federal land managers who represent six federal land units in
the Tucson sector made different decisions on whether to close or
restrict access to federal lands, and some managers said they
considered such action but would like additional guidance that would
allow them to more easily decide to close and reopen federal lands to
reflect changes in cross-border threats.[Footnote 26] For example:
* The Chief Ranger for the Coronado National Memorial said that he had
safety concerns regarding border-related hazards. However, the Park
Superintendent said she has not exercised her authority to close areas
of the park because the National Park Service at the local, regional
and national level has not fully analyzed the level of cross-border
illegal traffic within the memorial or the severity of the threat to
visitors and employees. In the meantime, the Chief Ranger posted signs
to warn the public about illegal cross-border activity (see figure 5)
that are used throughout the National Park Service lands along the
Mexico border. The Chief Ranger and the Superintendent for the
Coronado National Memorial agreed that they would like more standard
and specific guidance to aid in the decision-making process for
opening and closing the park.[Footnote 27]
Figure 5: A Warning Sign about Illegal Cross-Border Activity on the
Coronado National Memorial:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph and information on sign]
Warning:
Smuggling and/or illegal entry is common in this area due to the
proximity of the International border.
Please be aware of your surroundings at all times and do not travel
alone in remote areas.
Report suspicious persons and/or activities to the National Park
Service. Dial 1-800-637-9152.
Source: National Park Service.
[End of figure]
* The Acting Supervisor for the Coronado National Forest said that the
Forest Service has the authority to issue orders to close or restrict
the use of areas within its jurisdiction, but does not have specific
guidance to assist federal land managers in making closure decisions
to protect the public from potential dangers of cross-border illegal
activity. On major roads likely to be used by public visitors, forest
rangers have posted travel caution signs warning the public that
smuggling and other illegal activity may be encountered in certain
areas when they get information from the Border Patrol and Forest
Service law enforcement officers indicating potential risk areas.
However, there are no standard procedures dictating when and how the
public should be informed of illegal border activity, and such
guidance may help provide support for taking action. For example, the
Border Liaison for the Coronado National Forest said the Forest
Service had posted warning signs along the Arizona state highway to
warn visitors of illegal activity before entering the forest, but had
been asked by Arizona state officials to remove them because of
political sensitivities. These signs were reposted on forest land that
could not be seen from the highway.
* The Chief Ranger for the Sonoran Desert National Monument stated
that it would be useful to have additional DOI guidance in making
Bureau of Land Management land closure decisions. He stated that he
had previously proposed the closure of this monument, but was
unsuccessful in convincing Bureau of Land Management officials of the
threats posed by cross-border illegal activity in this area because of
the requirement to demonstrate "extreme danger" based on law
enforcement intelligence information, which he was unable to
demonstrate because of staffing limitations.[Footnote 28] Nonetheless,
in response to increased threats to the monument, including the
wounding of an Arizona county deputy sheriff in April 2010 and the
killing of two suspected drug smugglers shot by a rival drug
organization in May 2010, Bureau of Land Management officials posted
warning signs at 11 entrance locations of the monument to warn the
public against travel on portions of the monument because of potential
encounters with armed criminals and smugglers' vehicles traveling at
high rates of speed (see figure 6).
Figure 6: A Warning Sign about Illegal Activity on the Sonoran Desert
National Monument:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph of sign]
Danger - Public Warning - Travel Not Recommended:
* Active Drug and Human Smuggling Area.
* Visitors May Encounter Armed Criminals and Smuggling Vehicles
Traveling at High Rates of Speed.
* Stay Away From Trash, Clothing, Backpacks, and Abandoned Vehicles.
* If You See Suspicious Activity, Do Not Confront! Move Away and Call
911.
* BLM Encourages Visitors To Use Public Lands North of Interstate 8.
For more information, call (623) 580-5500.
National System of Public Lands.
Source: Bureau of Land Management.
[End of figure]
Additional guidance to assist federal land managers to more easily
determine when public access to federal borderlands should be
restricted in response to changes in risks associated with cross-
border illegal activity is consistent with requirements for internal
controls for the federal government. Standards for Internal Control in
the Federal Government states that internal control and all
transactions and other significant events need to be clearly
documented, and the documentation should be readily available for
examination. The documentation should appear in management directives,
administrative policies, or operating manuals and all documentation
and records should be properly managed and maintained.[Footnote 29]
Additional guidance could also enhance DHS contingency plans for
southwest cross-border violence since these plans do not include
information on closing or restricting access to federal borderlands.
DOI and USDA efforts to determine whether additional, and what type
of, guidance is needed could help federal land managers more easily
determine when to close and reopen public lands in response to
changing levels of border security threats in order to balance public
safety and access to federal lands. In addition, interagency
consultation among DHS, DOI, and USDA on the adequacy of current
guidance could assist federal land managers who may find it difficult,
under current guidance, to determine when border security threats pose
a significant enough threat to public safety to warrant the closure of
federal borderlands. DOI and USDA headquarters officials stated that
additional guidance could be helpful in balancing public safety and
access to federal borderlands. Interagency assessments of whether
additional guidance is needed may also prove helpful in aligning
federal response should DHS find it necessary to implement its
contingency plan for cross-border violence on the southwest border.
Federal Agencies Reported That Information Sharing and Communication
Had Improved, but Additional Coordination Is Needed to Close Critical
Gaps:
Information sharing and communications among agencies have generally
increased over the last several years, according to Border Patrol and
federal land law enforcement officials in the Tucson and Spokane
sectors, but critical gaps remained in implementing agreements to (1)
share daily threat information needed to coordinate a timely and
actionable law enforcement response in the Tucson and Spokane sectors
and (2) ensure that radio communications of daily operations are
compatible among law enforcement partners operating in common areas of
responsibility in the Tucson sector. DHS, DOI, and USDA have
established agreements requiring coordination in these areas and have
established liaisons and forums to facilitate compliance and resolve
coordination issues among agencies. However, federal land law
enforcement officials remain concerned that the lack of early and
continued consultation among agencies to implement these agreements
has resulted in critical information-sharing gaps that compromise
officer safety and a timely and effective coordinated law enforcement
response.
Interagency Agreements, Forums, and Liaisons Have Increased
Information Sharing:
Information sharing among agencies has generally increased since the
2006 MOU, according to Border Patrol officials and federal land law
enforcement officials in the locations we visited. The 2006 MOU
stipulated that DHS, DOI, and USDA should establish forums and meet as
needed to facilitate working relationships and coordination, and that
Border Patrol provide federal land management agencies with statistics
on illegal cross-border activity relevant to lands they manage. The
majority of Border Patrol and federal land law enforcement officials
we spoke with stated that forums and liaisons had been established to
exchange information as required by the MOU and that Border Patrol was
complying with the requirement to share statistics on illegal cross-
border activity on federal lands.
Officials on federal lands we visited in the Tucson sector said that
mechanisms were in place to exchange information. Mechanisms most
often cited as improving information sharing included interagency
forums, such as the Borderlands Management Task Force (BMTF)[Footnote
30] and the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) working
groups.[Footnote 31] Federal land law enforcement officials agreed
that the BMTF, which meets every other month, was a useful mechanism
for discussions and mitigation of environmental issues related to
border security construction projects and enforcement activities,
while the HIDTA was useful for weekly exchanges of information related
to cross-border drug trafficking issues in specific areas of Arizona.
Interagency liaisons were also key mechanisms for sharing more
specific information of mutual concern and interest between agencies.
For example, the PLLA from the Tucson sector facilitated weekly
exchanges of Border Patrol enforcement statistics with federal land
law enforcement officials, such as apprehensions and drug seizures. In
addition, Border Patrol officials said that the DOI liaison colocated
at the Tucson sector and a USDA liaison for the Coronado National
Forest were also useful as central points for information sharing
regarding federal borderlands. Personal relationships among agency
personnel were also commonly cited as a critical mechanism for
information exchange between agencies.
Border Patrol and federal land law enforcement officials operating in
the Spokane sector also reported that interagency forums such as the
BMTF and Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBET)[Footnote 32] had
improved information sharing and communication about border security
issues on federal lands. These officials agreed that the BMTF had
served as a venue to discuss and resolve road access issues on
national forest lands, while Border Patrol officials stated that the
monthly IBET meetings were a means for law enforcement partner
agencies to exchange information related to illegal cross-border
activity throughout the sector. Forest Service officials reported
receiving Border Patrol information related to illegal cross-border
activity at monthly intelligence meetings held at some field
locations, as well as at quarterly task force meetings. They also
reported receiving Border Patrol enforcement statistics on a monthly
basis from the sector, and while these statistics were not broken out
by federal land unit, the officials said they were satisfied with the
frequency and content of these reports. Border Patrol and federal land
law enforcement officials operating in national parks said that they
had established good relationships, as personal relationships were
important to increased information sharing among agencies. However,
Border Patrol officials and federal land law enforcement officials
operating in national forests said they were working to improve
relationships between the agencies in some locations.
Continuous Interagency Coordination Could Address Gaps in Sharing
Threat Information and Radio Communications Critical to Law
Enforcement on Federal Lands:
DHS, DOI, and USDA did not coordinate to ensure that federal land law
enforcement officials had access to daily situation reports on threats
to federal lands and compatible secure radio communications to
coordinate daily operations in the Tucson sector, according to Border
Patrol and federal land law enforcement officials in locations we
visited. The 2006 MOU requires DHS, DOI, and USDA to establish a
framework for sharing threat information, but officials in the Tucson
and Spokane sectors did not implement this provision. In addition, a
2008 MOU designated a common encryption key to enable secure radio
communications for Border Patrol and federal land law enforcement
officials operating on federal borderlands.[Footnote 33] However,
officials in the Tucson sector did not consistently consult with
federal land agencies to ensure continued sharing of secure radio
communications on daily operations. The lack of continuous interagency
consultation to implement these agreements has raised concerns that
law enforcement officials do not have a common awareness of immediate
threats on the federal borderlands they patrol and lack the ability to
communicate when attempting to provide a coordinated law enforcement
response.
Agencies Have Not Coordinated to Ensure That All Law Enforcement
Officials Patrolling Federal Lands Have Access to Timely and
Actionable Threat Information:
DHS, DOI, and USDA officials in the Tucson and Spokane sectors have
not coordinated to ensure that all law enforcement agencies have
access to the most recent information they need to respond to actual
or potential threats on federal borderlands on a timely basis. For
example, Border Patrol officials in the Tucson sector did not consult
with federal land management agencies before discontinuing
dissemination of daily situation reports that federal land law
enforcement officials relied on for a common awareness of the types
and locations of illegal activities observed on federal borderlands.
On the northern border in the Border Patrol's Spokane sector, Border
Patrol and Forest Service law enforcement officials did not coordinate
to determine if they could address concerns about the type and
frequency of information they received to respond to threats on
national forests. Federal land law enforcement officials on both
borders stated that they had no other sources of comparable
information about cross-border threats to federal borderlands that
could assist them in effectively deploying their scarce law
enforcement resources to safeguard agency personnel and the public.
[Footnote 34]
Border Patrol Tucson sector officials said that they were no longer
providing federal land law enforcement officials with daily situation
reports on border security threats because this information-sharing
responsibility was transferred to the Alliance to Combat Transnational
Threats (ACTT).[Footnote 35] This multiagency forum has recently been
initiated in Arizona to integrate intelligence and operations among
homeland security partners. However, the Border Patrol Tucson sector
and the ACTT did not coordinate to ensure that federal land law
enforcement officials would continue to receive threat information
similar to that provided in the daily situation reports to ensure that
partners had a common awareness of the types and locations of illegal
activities observed on federal borderlands. In the absence of this
coordination, ACTT officials said that the ACTT leadership had decided
to produce weekly intelligence summaries rather than daily situation
reports, and that the new summaries did not include information
specific to federal lands because tracking trends and changes in
illegal cross-border activity specific to federal lands on a daily
basis was manpower intensive.
Border Patrol Tucson sector officials noted that federal land law
enforcement officials were invited to participate in ACTT from its
inception, including the DOI and Forest Service liaisons colocated at
the sector, but that federal land management agencies were not engaged
in ACTT to ensure that their threat information needs were met.
However, ACTT officials added that they did not include federal land
management agencies in their leadership structure as of May 2010,
although officials said this may change since the organization is
still in development.
Border Patrol Spokane sector officials stated that because of low
levels of illegal cross-border activity relative to other Border
Patrol sectors, there is a limited amount of threat information that
the sector needs to share with federal land law enforcement officials
on a regular basis. A National Park Service law enforcement official
at one location agreed, stating that the information he received from
the Border Patrol was adequate for his needs. However, Forest Service
law enforcement officials at another location noted that they had not
received any Border Patrol reports of illegal cross-border activity in
the Spokane sector since 2008, despite the fact that such activity
persists on national forests in the sector, and emphasized that they
relied on Border Patrol information to understand border security
threats to federal lands. Border Patrol and Forest Service officials
in the Spokane sector stated that they were working together to
resolve these information-sharing challenges.
Implementation of the 2006 MOU's requirement for DHS, DOI, and USDA to
establish a framework for sharing threat information could help to
ensure that law enforcement officials operating on federal lands have
access to threat information they consider necessary to efficiently
and effectively complete their missions.
Agencies in the Tucson Sector Did Not Coordinate to Ensure That All
Law Enforcement Officials Were Sharing Radio Communications of
Information on Daily Operations:
DHS, DOI, and USDA officials did not coordinate to ensure that all
federal law enforcement partners could monitor secure radio
communications regarding daily operations on federal lands in the
Tucson sector.[Footnote 36] The 2008 MOU between DHS, DOI, and USDA
established a common secure radio encryption key for use by component
agencies when communicating information on daily operations.[Footnote
37] The MOU was established to address past challenges between
agencies operating in common areas of responsibility, and Border
Patrol headquarters officials stated that following the 2008 MOU, CBP
assisted DOI in aligning its radios with Border Patrol radios by
coordinating funding and reprogramming of DOI's radios on the entire
southwest border. In November 2009, however, Border Patrol changed the
secure radio encryption key used by Border Patrol agents in the Tucson
sector to communicate information on daily operations without
consulting with DOI or USDA. Border Patrol headquarters officials said
that the change was made as part of a national modernization
initiative to increase the capabilities, coverage, and encryption
levels of digital communications equipment.[Footnote 38]
Border Patrol headquarters officials stated that they remained in
compliance with the 2008 MOU, despite the change to the secure radio
encryption key, because Border Patrol agents in the field could be
trained to switch their radios back and forth between the new
encryption key and the common encryption key shared with federal land
law enforcement officials. However, federal land law enforcement
officials at all six of the locations we visited in the Tucson sector
stated that this action was insufficient to meet their information
needs regarding daily Border Patrol operations on federal borderlands.
These officials provided examples of how the inability to monitor
daily operations across agencies may jeopardize officer safety and
efficient deployment of law enforcement personnel.
* A Bureau of Land Management law enforcement official noted that in
late 2009, a federal land law enforcement official on the Ironwood
Forest National Monument radioed Border Patrol agents for help with
apprehending a smuggler who failed to yield, but could not determine
if his call for assistance was heard because agents did not respond on
the same frequency.
* A Fish and Wildlife Service law enforcement official reported a case
in which federal land law enforcement officials on the Buenos Aires
National Wildlife Refuge had engaged in a high-speed vehicle chase and
could not coordinate the operation with nearby Border Patrol agents
because they lacked access to the Border Patrol's new secure radio
encryption key.
* A National Park Service law enforcement official expressed concern
that the inability to monitor Border Patrol agents' secure radio
transmissions during emergency situations on the Organ Pipe Cactus
National Monument could result in a lack of awareness of other law
enforcement officials responding to a threat and accidental shootings
among law enforcement officials.
* A National Park Service law enforcement official stated that losing
the ability to monitor the Border Patrol's secure radio transmissions
decreased his awareness of where Border Patrol agents are operating in
areas of joint responsibility and how best to coordinate their daily
patrols on the Coronado National Memorial.
In order to remedy these communication challenges, Border Patrol
headquarters issued guidance in April 2010 instructing that secure
radio communications of information regarding daily operations should
be switched from the new encryption key back to the common encryption
key compatible with DOI and USDA; however, this guidance applies only
to the Tucson sector. The Office of National Drug Control Policy's
2009 Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy outlines the need for
homeland security partners to be able to communicate using secure
radio along the southwest border, and states that partners should
ensure that new systems allow for federal interagency
connectivity.[Footnote 39] However, since the Border Patrol's April
2010 guidance applies only to the Tucson sector, secure radio
compatibility problems could persist in other Border Patrol sectors.
Border Patrol headquarters officials stated that future DHS-DOI radio
issues will be addressed in a proactive manner in order to avoid radio
communication complications. For example, based on the lessons learned
from the Tucson sector encryption issue, Border Patrol has established
a headquarters-level working group with DOI to address future radio
communications issues in the Tucson sector and all other sectors
throughout the country. However, as of June 2010, the Border Patrol
had excluded USDA representation from the working group because of an
oversight. Border Patrol headquarters officials we spoke with stated
that new compatibility challenges could arise as other sectors
complete upgrades from analog to digital communication systems.
Continuous coordination among DHS, DOI, and USDA headquarters
officials to ensure that the working group consults all law
enforcement agencies operating on federal lands on future upgrades to
secure radio communication capabilities could help ensure that there
is a safe, efficient, and coordinated response among law enforcement
personnel on federal borderlands across sectors.
Additional Interagency Coordination of Threat Assessments and Budgets
for Federal Lands, and Joint Operations, Could Enhance Border Security
Efforts:
There was little interagency coordination to share periodic
assessments of overall border security threats to federal lands,
little interagency consultation to develop budget requests for
resources necessary to address these threats, and limited coordination
to conduct joint operations on federal lands, according to Border
Patrol and federal land management agency officials in the two sectors
we visited. Provisions of the 2006 MOU require the agencies to
establish a framework by which threat assessments may be exchanged and
the Border Patrol consult early with federal land managers affected by
DHS budgetary and operational plans. The lack of up-front interagency
consultation has raised concerns among federal land officials about
missed opportunities to leverage knowledge and resources of all law
enforcement partners for more effective border security operations on
federal lands.
Increased Agency Coordination of Threat Assessments Could Help Ensure
Common Awareness of Threats and Border Security Vulnerabilities on
Federal Lands:
DHS, DOI, and USDA in the Tucson and Spokane sectors did not
coordinate to share intelligence assessments that are used to describe
border security threats and vulnerabilities in each sector and inform
efforts needed to address them. The 2006 MOU states that parties will
establish a framework by which threat assessments and other
intelligence information may be exchanged, including intelligence
training to be conducted by all parties. Federal land officials in the
Tucson and Spokane sectors stated that DOI and USDA had not prepared
threat assessments for federal lands in recent years because of
resource constraints.[Footnote 40] Border Patrol officials at the two
sectors we visited said that they developed annual threat assessments
that describe the overall threat environment and border security
vulnerabilities across the sector--including federal lands--that are
used to inform budget requests for resources and operational
strategies. However, while federal land law enforcement officials in
locations we visited in the Tucson and Spokane sectors said that they
relied on the Border Patrol for information about border security
threats on federal lands, not all agencies received Border Patrol
threat assessments or were aware that the Border Patrol produced them.
Border Patrol Spokane sector officials said that they routinely
disseminated threat assessments to DOI agencies but not to the USDA's
Forest Service, which sector officials noted as an oversight and
corrected after our inquiry. Spokane sector Border Patrol officials
noted that information contained in their annual threat assessment is
provided to the IBET, which in turn includes this information in its
annual threat assessment. Forest Service officials in Spokane stated
that they receive the annual IBET reports but were unaware that these
reports contained the Border Patrol's threat information. Border
Patrol Tucson sector officials said that they do not routinely share
threat assessments outside the agency because these reports contain
sensitive law enforcement information but would consider sharing
threat assessments upon request. Border Patrol officials said that
they had not received such a request from federal land managers in
locations we visited. Neither sector had conducted intelligence
training for federal land law enforcement officials that could inform
them of the types of threat reports available and help them determine
their specific information needs. However, the Border Patrol noted
that federal land management agencies had never requested intelligence
training. Border Patrol headquarters officials said they had not
monitored whether sectors were implementing the 2006 MOU's provisions.
Implementing provisions for determining agencies' specific information
needs--including the sharing of threat assessments and intelligence
training--could help to ensure a common understanding among law
enforcement officials of border security threats and vulnerabilities.
Enhanced Coordination on Budget Requests and Consultations for Federal
Lands' Resource Deployment Plans Could Maximize Border Security
Resources:
DHS, DOI, and USDA officials in the Tucson and Spokane sectors did not
coordinate budget requests for border security on federal lands, and
while agencies said they generally consulted on Border Patrol
deployment of sector personnel, infrastructure, and technology
agencies disagreed on how early consultation needed to occur prior to
planning the deployment of the SBI fencing and technology projects.
The 2006 MOU places primary responsibility on the Border Patrol to
coordinate its budget with federal land management agencies,
specifically to ensure that federal land managers can provide input
and are--in the early stages of planning--aware of what personnel,
infrastructure, and technology the Border Patrol would like to deploy
on federal lands. On the southwest border, however, five of the six
federal land managers we spoke with in the Tucson sector said that the
Border Patrol had not consulted them in developing fiscal year 2009
budget requirements, and three of the six managers said that the
Border Patrol had never consulted with them in this regard. At the
sixth location, Forest Service officials had developed a joint budget
strategy with the Border Patrol in fiscal year 2007 to collaboratively
gain and maintain operational control of the Coronado National Forest
along the Arizona international border.[Footnote 41] In the Spokane
sector, Forest Service officials said that the Border Patrol had never
consulted them about budget requests, while National Park Service
officials said that they had last consulted with the Border Patrol on
the budget in 2007.
With the exception of two Border Patrol stations responsible for
patrolling the Coronado National Forest, Border Patrol officials from
six of the eight stations we interviewed in the Tucson and Spokane
sectors stated that they had not consulted with federal land managers
on budget requests. The primary infrastructure project in the Tucson
sector was the border fencing project under SBI, and towers and roads
to support the SBInet technology project, which are included in CBP
headquarters' budgets instead of the sector's budget.[Footnote 42] The
SBI office, however, said that it does not engage in outside
coordination, relying on its component customers to perform this
function. By coordinating budgets with federal land management
agencies, Border Patrol stations could leverage federal land
management agencies' knowledge of threats, vulnerabilities, and risks
to federal lands, which could result in greater efficiencies in
operations to patrol the border.
In regard to resource deployment by the Border Patrol Tucson sector,
Border Patrol agents and federal land managers operating on federal
lands we visited all agreed that federal land managers were able to
provide input on the deployment of the sector's resources on federal
lands. Federal land managers provided the following examples of
interagency coordination in deploying resources to strengthen border
security.
* Federal land managers stated that the Border Patrol had coordinated
the placement of forward operating bases on the Organ Pipe Cactus
National Monument, the Cabeza Prieta National Wildlife Refuge, and the
Coronado National Forest in order to address cross-border illegal
activity on remote federal lands.
* Forest Service land managers in the Tucson sector said that they had
worked with the Border Patrol to coordinate upgrades to Forest Service
roads to facilitate border security operations. The Forest Service was
providing engineering services and the Border Patrol was providing
funding for this infrastructure project.
However, federal land managers at three of the six federal lands we
visited in the Tucson sector cited several examples in which
consultations were not conducted in the early stages of planning, as
required by the 2006 MOU, but occurred after the Border Patrol had
developed plans to deploy infrastructure projects on federal lands.
For example, a federal land manager said that the Border Patrol had
not consulted with him prior to building a road on the Buenos Aires
National Wildlife Refuge to use its mobile surveillance technology.
However, the refuge manager allowed Border Patrol to continue using
the road as it had been beneficial in reducing illegal cross-border
activity on the refuge.
Federal land managers we interviewed were also concerned about the
lack of early consultation regarding CBP deployment of the SBI border
fencing, and towers and roads supporting SBInet technology. Border
Patrol Tucson sector officials disagreed, stating that CBP and SBI
officials made numerous efforts to meet with partner agencies related
to infrastructure and explained that in the spring of 2008, before
fence construction was initiated, the Border Patrol held a meeting at
the Tucson sector Border Patrol station with representatives from the
Border Patrol, DOI, and USDA to discuss fence construction projects
throughout the sector.
Border Patrol headquarters officials also stated that earlier
consultations were not feasible because the Border Patrol had to first
determine its own operational requirements before consulting with
federal land managers. However, DOI's Director of Law Enforcement and
Security stated that early consultations with DOI could ensure that
environmental considerations--such as designing fencing to address
wildlife migration patterns--were fully vetted in the earliest stages
of Border Patrol infrastructure planning. Moreover, federal land
managers cited examples where early consultations could have leveraged
their expertise and knowledge to better ensure that the infrastructure
was engineered and designed to succeed across different border
environments.
* One National Park Service federal land manager said that he was
unaware of Border Patrol plans to install SBI fencing on the border
adjacent to the Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument until park
personnel encountered CBP's contractor--the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers--surveying the area for installation. This land manager said
that the contractor had been instructed to not discuss the project at
the time, and said that he would have appreciated earlier notification
of the project to provide input. Border Patrol headquarters officials
disagreed that they did not consult early enough with the land
manager, stating that while still in the planning process, CBP and the
U.S. Army Corp of Engineers met with this land manager to discuss
fence alignment, time constraints, and the type of engineering that
was feasible in order to meet the presidential mandate for
constructing the fence.[Footnote 43] However, the manager stated that
the lack of early consultation between agencies about the project had
created distrust and hindered good working relationships.
* A Fish and Wildlife Service federal land manager said that he has
only received piecemeal information from the Border Patrol about the
placement of SBInet infrastructure and radio communications towers on
the Cabeza Prieta National Wildlife Refuge, with the Border Patrol
generally providing information on a project-by-project basis. Lack of
information about the overall deployment plan for the refuge made it
difficult to provide input on the project in a way that effectively
balanced the Border Patrol's operational needs with environmental
constraints at this location. Border Patrol headquarters officials
disagreed, stating that they had extensive dialogue with this refuge
manager and Fish and Wildlife Service biologists regarding the
placement of SBInet towers in order to reduce the potential effects on
the Sonoran pronghorn, an endangered species whose habitat is located
on this federal land. However, Border Patrol headquarters officials
noted that radio communications towers were a separate project from
SBInet towers, which resulted in the perception of a piecemeal
approach to these two distinct projects.
Moreover, federal land managers in the Tucson sector said that the
Border Patrol had not consulted with them to discuss whether federal
land law enforcement officials would have access to the intelligence
information resulting from the SBInet infrastructure and technology
deployed on their lands. The 2008 DHS Information Sharing Strategy
states that DHS will strive to ensure that technology platforms are
developed to facilitate information sharing with its federal partners.
However, DHS plans to install over 20 SBInet towers on the Coronado
National Forest, but the Border Patrol has not consulted with the
Forest Service law enforcement officials about sharing the live SBInet
video feeds for lands patrolled by Forest Service law enforcement
officials.[Footnote 44] A law enforcement official from the National
Park Service said that the ability to benefit from SBInet technology
deployed on land he patrols is necessary for federal land law
enforcement officials to be fully integrated partners in border
security operations.
CBP headquarters officials administering the SBInet program said that
Border Patrol Tucson sector officials were responsible for requesting
that information resulting from SBInet technology be shared with
federal land management agencies, and that Border Patrol sector
officials had not made this request. Border Patrol headquarters
officials noted that discussions with DOI's headquarters law
enforcement liaison regarding the sharing of SBInet technology
information are ongoing, but that they could not make any commitments
to share the information until the full capabilities of SBInet
technology were realized.[Footnote 45] However, Border Patrol
officials did not mention any coordination efforts underway with USDA
officials. We previously reported that CBP has not provided key SBInet
capabilities for Border Patrol agents and has identified the need to
increase input from these agents in SBInet design and development.
[Footnote 46]
DHS oversight to ensure adherence to the 2006 interagency MOU across
all of its component and headquarters offices--including any necessary
discussions with DOI and USDA to address Border Patrol concerns--could
help ensure that interagency consultations occur in developing budget
requests and design requirements for new infrastructure and technology
on federal lands that can best enhance border security and other
federal law enforcement missions on federal lands.
Differences in Coordination of Joint Operations on Federal Lands to
Leverage Law Enforcement Resources:
DHS, DOI, and USDA officials in the Tucson and Spokane sectors
reported differences in the extent to which agencies had coordinated
to conduct joint operations for border security across federal lands
as outlined by the 2006 MOU. Federal land law enforcement officials in
the Tucson sector provided examples where joint operations had
increased, stayed the same, or decreased.
* Federal land law enforcement officials at two of the six federal
lands we visited reported that there had been increased coordination
among the agencies to develop joint enforcement strategies. For
example, these officials reported that they had conducted joint
operations or joint patrols with Border Patrol agents on the Organ
Pipe Cactus National Monument and the Cabeza Prieta National Wildlife
Refuge.
* Federal land law enforcement officials at three other federal lands
said that there had been no change in coordination because joint
operations had never been conducted on the Coronado National Forest,
the Buenos Aires National Wildlife Refuge, and the Coronado National
Monument.
* Bureau of Land Management law enforcement officials said that as of
January 2010, coordination had decreased on the Sonoran Desert
National Monument because of barriers created by a new Border Patrol
requirement to provide a 3-week advance notice for conducting joint
operations. However, as of June 2010, Bureau of Land Management
officials stated that the advance notice time frame had been
significantly reduced because of improved coordination efforts.
A Border Patrol Tucson sector official said that agents in charge of
each station that patrol federal lands determine whether joint
strategies and operations will be conducted. However, this official
said that Border Patrol agents outnumber federal land law enforcement
officials to such an extent that joint strategies and operations for
border security are not generally necessary.
In the Spokane sector, the Border Patrol differed in the extent to
which agents conducted joint operations with DOI and USDA law
enforcement personnel. The Border Patrol conducted joint operations
with National Park Service law enforcement officials. For example,
Border Patrol and law enforcement officials on Glacier National Park
said they had conducted joint patrols that were beneficial in
leveraging expertise and stretching the resources of both agencies.
However, joint operations between Border Patrol and Forest Service
personnel in certain locations of the Spokane sector were hindered by
fundamental disagreements on the mission boundaries between these
agencies for patrolling and interdicting illegal activity on forest
lands. Forest Service regional officials and Border Patrol Spokane
sector officials responsible for these locations have taken steps to
resolve disagreements on roles and responsibilities between agency
personnel. These steps included issuing two joint memorandums to
clarify the national MOU, one at the sector level and one subsequently
at the station level.
Conclusions:
The ongoing challenges in deterring cross-border illegal activity and
apprehending those involved on federal lands highlight the importance
of interagency coordination of law enforcement resources by DHS, DOI,
and USDA. Given Border Patrol estimates that a significant amount of
illegal activity continues to cross federal lands, and that DHS has
developed contingency plans for potential cross-border violence, it
has become especially important that DOI and USDA determine whether
additional guidance is needed for federal land managers in these areas
to more easily determine when public safety is at risk and access to
federal lands should be restricted. Although existing MOUs and
agreements have established several important provisions for sharing
critical threat information, as well as for leveraging personnel,
technology, and infrastructure, agencies have not fully leveraged
these agreements to achieve an effective and coordinated approach to
address border security threats on federal lands. Achieving an
integrated border security response will be difficult, however, unless
the provisions in existing agreements are implemented at all levels
within each agency. Creating a common understanding of the benefits
that can be realized by coordinating threat information, budget
requests, and resource deployment may encourage greater action to help
achieve an integrated law enforcement response on federal borderlands.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To more easily balance public safety and access to federal borderlands
and to help ensure that DHS, DOI, and USDA coordinate efforts to
provide an effective interagency law enforcement response on these
lands, we recommend that the Secretaries of Homeland Security, the
Interior, and Agriculture take the following seven actions.
To help ensure that federal land managers have guidance to more easily
balance public safety and access to federal borderlands, we recommend
that the Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture review and
determine whether their field units on the southwest border have
adequate guidance to assist federal land managers in determining when
public access to federal borderlands should be restricted in response
to risks associated with cross-border illegal activity. After
completion of this review, and if additional guidance is needed, DOI
and USDA should consult with DHS to ensure that any additional
guidance developed is consistent with DHS contingency plans for
southwest border violence.
To help ensure that DHS, DOI, and USDA partners operating on federal
lands have a common understanding of existing cross-border threats and
coordinate to provide an effective interagency law enforcement
response, we recommend that the Secretaries of Homeland Security, the
Interior, and Agriculture take necessary action to ensure that
personnel at all levels of each agency conduct early and continued
consultations to implement provisions of the 2006 MOU, specifically
coordination of:
* threat information for federal lands that is timely and actionable;
* future plans for upgrades of compatible radio communications used
for daily law enforcement operations on federal lands;
* efforts to determine agencies' information needs for intelligence,
including coordination of Border Patrol annual assessments of the
threat environment and vulnerabilities affecting border security on
federal lands;
* Border Patrol budget requests for personnel, infrastructure, and
technology that affect federal lands;
* deployment plans for personnel, infrastructure, and technology on
federal lands before such deployment is initiated; and:
* access to information resulting from deployment of technology on
federal lands.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of the sensitive version of this report to DHS,
DOI, and USDA for review and comment. All agencies responded and
agreed with our recommendations. Their responses are reprinted in
appendixes II, III, and IV, respectively. DHS also provided technical
comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. USDA's Forest Service
stated that the Forest Service looks forward to working with DHS and
DOI to enhance coordination efforts on border security.
DHS's CBP also provided some planned corrective actions in response to
our recommendations. CBP stated that it would issue a memorandum to
all Border Patrol sectors and stations emphasizing the importance of
USDA and DOI partnerships to address border security threats on
federal lands. CBP plans to issue this memorandum by December 31,
2010. This action is a positive step toward implementing our
recommendations. We encourage DHS, DOI, and USDA to take the
additional steps necessary to monitor and uphold implementation of the
existing interagency agreements in order to enhance border security on
federal lands.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 20 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the
Secretaries of Homeland Security, the Interior, and Agriculture; the
Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection; and interested
congressional committees as appropriate. The report also will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix V.
Signed by:
Richard M. Stana:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
List of Requesters:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Charles E. Grassley:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Finance:
United States Senate:
The Honorable George V. Voinovich:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal
Workforce, and the District of Columbia:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Jon Tester:
United States Senate:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
The report addresses the following three questions:
* To what extent have border security threats changed from fiscal year
2007 to the present in Office of Border Patrol (Border Patrol) sectors
on the northern and southwest borders with large concentrations of
federal borderlands?
* To what extent have Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
Department of the Interior (DOI), and Department of Agriculture (USDA)
units operating in these areas shared threat information and
communications?
* To what extent have DHS, DOI, and USDA coordinated budget requests,
resource deployment, and joint strategies to address border security
threats on federal lands?
In conducting our work, we gathered information and interviewed
officials from federal agencies providing security on federal and
tribal lands along the U.S. borders with Mexico and Canada, excluding
international ports of entry. Specifically, we analyzed threat
assessments, budget, and operational documents provided by the Border
Patrol. At agency headquarters, we interviewed law enforcement and
program officials from DHS's U.S. Customs and Border Protection, DOI,
and USDA regarding their coordination on issues stemming from cross-
border illegal activity occurring on federal borderlands.
To supplement our analyses of DHS, DOI, and USDA documentation, we
conducted site visits to selected southwest and northern border
locations. We selected these locations based on (1) the level of
threat as defined by Border Patrol statistics, (2) the number of
federal land linear miles within these sectors, and (3) environmental
considerations associated with these lands. On the southwest border,
we visited the Border Patrol's Tucson sector in the state of Arizona,
where we observed conditions on federal lands and conducted
semistructured interviews with officials at six federal land units;
two units administered by DOI's Fish and Wildlife Service (Cabeza
Prieta National Wildlife Refuge and Buenos Aires National Wildlife
Refuge), two units administered by DOI's National Park Service (Organ
Pipe Cactus National Monument and the Coronado National Memorial), one
unit administered by DOI's Bureau of Land Management (Sonoran Desert
National Monument), and one unit administered by the Forest Service
(Coronado National Forest). In addition, we interviewed tribal police
officials from the Tohono O'odham Nation Indian Reservation. We also
conducted semistructured interviews with officials from five Border
Patrol stations in Arizona responsible for patrolling the southwest
border on the six federal land units we reviewed, including the
stations located in Ajo, Casa Grande, Sonoita, Tucson, and Wellton.
[Footnote 47] We also discussed our observations with Border Patrol
Tucson sector officials, DOI's Southwest Border Coordinator and the
Forest Service's dedicated liaison in the Tucson sector. We selected
the Tucson sector because most of the border in this sector comprises
a mix of tribal and federal lands, and these borderlands have
experienced the highest volume of illegal cross-border activity,
indicated by marijuana seizures and illegal alien apprehensions, among
all of the Border Patrol's southwest border sectors.
On the northern border, we conducted field work in the Border Patrol's
Spokane sector, which comprises eastern Washington, Idaho, and western
Montana. We conducted semistructured interviews with Forest Service
officials responsible for national forests in Washington, Idaho, and
Montana (the Okanogan-Wenatchee National Forests, Idaho Panhandle
National Forests, Colville National Forest, Kootenai National Forest
and Flathead National Forest, and two wilderness areas) and with a
National Park Service official responsible for overseeing Glacier
National Park in Montana. We also conducted semistructured interviews
with officials at three Border Patrol stations responsible for
patrolling these borderlands, located in Oroville, Washington; Bonners
Ferry, Idaho; and Whitefish, Montana. We also discussed our
observations with Border Patrol Spokane sector officials and northern
border coordinators from DOI and the Forest Service. We selected the
Spokane sector because most of the border in this sector comprises
federal lands and these borderlands have low levels of Border Patrol
personnel and resources and limited ability to detect cross-border
illegal activity relative to other northern Border Patrol sectors.
While we cannot generalize our work from visits to these Border Patrol
stations and federal borderlands to all locations along the northern
and southwest border, we chose these locations to provide examples of
the way in which the Border Patrol and federal land management
agencies coordinate their efforts.
To assess changes to border security threats, we reviewed Border
Patrol annual threat assessments, data on illegal activity, and
operational assessments. Our review of threat assessments from fiscal
years 2007 through 2009 for the Spokane and Tucson sectors provided an
overall view of the types of threats in each sector and challenges in
the operational environment.[Footnote 48] Our review of Border Patrol
data provided a more detailed view of illegal activity occurring on
federal lands. We reviewed and analyzed Border Patrol data related to
apprehensions of persons illegally crossing the border onto federal
lands and seizures of smuggled narcotics on federal lands for the
Spokane and Tucson sectors. We assessed the reliability of these data
by interviewing headquarters and Border Patrol sector officials
responsible for overseeing quality control procedures for these data.
We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable to be used in
this report.
Because apprehension data do not provide a complete picture related to
the total volume of illegal activity, we also reviewed Border Patrol
estimates of total illegal entries for federal borderlands in the
Tucson sector for fiscal years 2007 through 2009. From our discussions
with Border Patrol agents in the Tucson sector who collect and review
these data, we agreed with Border Patrol statements that these data
are likely understated but sufficient to compare relative trends in
the volume of illegal activity.[Footnote 49] We did not use entry data
for the Spokane sector because operational assessments indicate that
the sector does not have the capability to reliably estimate illegal
cross-border entries. Our review of the Border Patrol fiscal year 2009
operational assessments for the Tucson and Yuma sectors and the 2010
assessment for the Spokane sector provided information about Border
Patrol resources needed to address threats and any existing
operational challenges to achieve control of the border.[Footnote 50]
These operational assessments were included in each sector's
Operational Requirements Based Budget Process (ORBBP) document. To
assess how federal land management agencies determine when illegal
cross-border activity poses a threat to public safety, we analyzed
regulations related to federal land restrictions and closures from DOI
bureaus and USDA's Forest Service and discussed these regulations with
DOI and USDA officials. We also compared DOI and USDA's regulations to
our Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government.[Footnote
51]
To determine the extent to which DHS, DOI, and USDA have shared
information and communications regarding border security threats to
federal borderlands, we reviewed policies and guidance developed by
the Border Patrol that address information sharing and communication
between the three agencies. We identified various memorandums of
understanding and agreements made and entered into by DHS, DOI, and
USDA regarding coordination and cooperation among the parties related
to information sharing among officials on federal lands. We reviewed
provisions in these agreements related to information sharing and--as
part of our semistructured interviews with officials in the Tucson and
Spokane sectors--examined the extent to which DHS, DOI, and USDA were
implementing these provisions. We also identified and reviewed
strategies outlining DHS requirements for sharing information with
other federal agencies.
To analyze the extent to which DHS, DOI, and USDA officials have
coordinated budget requests, resource deployment, and joint strategies
to address border security threats on federal borderlands, we analyzed
the Tucson sector's fiscal year 2009 ORBBP document and the Spokane
sector's 2010 ORBBP document. We also analyzed these documents to
determine Border Patrol resource needs for these sectors in the areas
of personnel, technology, and infrastructure. As part of our
semistructured interviews with officials in the Tucson and Spokane
sectors, we also examined the extent to which DHS, DOI, and USDA were
coordinating the deployment of personnel, technology, and
infrastructure as outlined in memorandums of understanding,
interagency agreements, and departmental strategies.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2009 through
November 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
October 8, 2010:
Mr. Richard M. Stana:
Director:
Homeland Security and Justice:
Government Accountability Office:
Washington, D.C. 20548P:
Dear Mr. Stana:
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) draft report entitled, "Border Security:
Additional Actions Needs to Better Ensure a Coordinated Federal
Response to Illegal Activity on Federal Lands," GAO-10-931 SU, dated
September 2010. GAO was asked to examine the extent that (1) border
security threats have changed on federal lands; (2) federal agencies
operating on these lands have shared threat information and
communications: and (3) federal agencies have coordinated budgets,
resources, and strategies. GAO concluded that although existing
memorandums of understanding (MOUs) and agreements have established
several important provisions for sharing critical threat information,
as well as for leveraging personnel, technology, and infrastructure,
agencies have not fully leveraged these agreements to achieve an
effective and coordinated approach to address border security threats
on federal lands.
This report included seven recommendations. The first recommendation
was directed to the Department of the Interior (DOI) and to the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA). Recommendations two through seven
were directed to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), DOI, and
USDA. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) concurs with the six
recommendations addressed to DHS. As always, CBP appreciates the
opportunity to highlight our current efforts that will not only comply
with the recommendations, but will also improve our overall
operational effectiveness.
The recommendations and CBP's corrective actions to address the
recommendation are described below.
Recommendation 1: To help ensure that federal land managers have
guidance to more easily balance public safety and access to federal
borderlands, GAO recommends that the Secretaries of the Interior and
Agriculture review and determine whether their field units on the
southwest border have adequate guidance to assist federal land
managers in determining when public access to federal borderlands
should be restricted in response to risks associated with cross-border
illegal activity. After completion of this review, and if additional
guidance is needed, DOI and USDA should consult with DHS to ensure
that any additional guidance developed is consistent with DHS
contingency plans for southwest border violence.
Response: This recommendation was directed to DOI and USDA.
Recommendation 2: To help ensure that DHS, DOI, and USDA partners
operating on federal lands have a common understanding of existing
cross-border threats and coordinate to provide an effective
interagency law enforcement response, GAO recommends that Secretaries
of Homeland Security, the Interior, and Agriculture take necessary
action to ensure that personnel at all levels of each agency conduct
early and continued consultations to implement provisions of the 2006
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), specifically coordination of threat
information for federal lands that is timely and actionable.
Response: Concur. The Borders Patrol's goal is to attain operational
control of our Nation's border. The National Border Patrol Strategy
sets forth six elements essential to achieving our goal. Among these
elements are coordinating and partnering with other law enforcement
agencies and improving border awareness and intelligence. The 2006 MOU
between DHS, DOI, and USDA is an example of the efforts of these
agencies to implement increased collaboration. The MOU effectively
unites the agencies' assets and resources in order to promote our
joint interest of protecting the Nation.
The Border Patrol has aggressively worked to implement programs that
facilitate the partnerships with DOI and USDA. On December 8, 2005,
having recognized the need for coordination on Federal lands, OBP
created the Public Lands Liaison Agent (PLLA) Program, which requires
each sector to staff an agent dedicated to interacting with
organizations and agencies involved in land management issues. The
PLLA agents work to implement and sustain the partnerships and
practices initiated by the 2006 MOU.
The Border Patrol has also provided work space to allow the co-
location of DOI and USDA liaison personnel at U.S. Border Patrol
Headquarters and the Tucson and Spokane Sector Headquarters. These
personnel are vital to the communication of time sensitive threat and
intelligence materials. Their presence at Border Patrol locations
provides for daily interactions with, observations of, and influence
on Border Patrol strategies, objectives, and operations.
The Border Patrol has created several other initiatives to promote the
sharing of intelligence and threat information. In June 2009, DOI and
USDA law enforcement partners were invited by the Border Patrol to
participate in the Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats (ACTT) in
the Tucson Sector. ACTT holds weekly meetings concerning intelligence
and threat assessments created by and shared amongst the numerous
participating law enforcement agencies. The ACTT participants then
create resourcing strategies for the current operation and share
intelligence perspectives. Involvement in ACTT provides each law
enforcement partner the opportunity to gain insight on border and
other security threats as well as the ability to coordinate operations
and intelligence gathering.
In Northern Border sectors, Integrated Border Enforcement Teams
(IBETs) act similarly to ACTT to provide DOI, USDA, and other law
enforcement partners with threat assessments as well as coordinated
intelligence. Sectors on the Northern Border have a vast expanse of
border to secure and rely heavily on their ability to communicate with
and involve other Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies
in daily operations and enforcement of laws. IBETs are critical tools
for coordinating law enforcement activity while maximizing the
effective use of limited resources.
The Borderland Management Task Force (BMTF) is a less formalized
version of IBETs. BMTFs consist of agencies that have a vested
interest and operational need within certain areas. The BMTF is formed
to meet periodically, usually monthly or quarterly, to provide a forum
for the sharing of coordinated intelligence, operational plans, and
other concerns.
OBP strives to improve and expand its relationships with all pertinent
law enforcement partners. As part of OBP's continuing efforts to ally
our efforts with those of our DOI and USDA partners, a memorandum will
be sent to all Border Patrol sectors and stations emphasizing the
importance of these partnerships. The memorandum will specifically
address the importance of remaining persistent and diligent in our
timely and actionable management of threat information related to
federal lands. Issuance of this memo is planned to occur by December
31,2010.
Recommendation 3: To help ensure that DHS, DOI, and USDA partners
operating on federal lands have a common understanding of existing
cross-border threats and coordinate to provide an effective
interagency law enforcement response, GAO recommends that Secretaries
of Homeland Security, the Interior, and Agriculture take necessary
action to ensure that personnel at all levels of each agency conduct
early and continued consultations to implement provisions of the 2006
MOU, specifically coordination of future plans for upgrades of
compatible radio communications used for daily law enforcement
operations on federal lands.
Response: Concur. CBP recently awarded contracts for the modernization
of radio systems in the Houlton and Rio Grande Valley Sectors. We are
on the verge of awarding the radio system modernization contract for
El Paso and will initiate procurement activities for the modernization
of Laredo in fiscal year (FY) 2011.
Each modernization project includes a requirements gathering process,
which includes gathering the interoperability requirements of CBP
users. The project will work to meet all documented and approved
interoperability requirements that are supported by a MOU between
necessary parties. As part of this process, CBP will coordinate with
the Border Patrol PLLA as required.
The delivery of interoperable communications capability is a function
of the project schedule for delivering the modernized radio systems.
The Houlton, El Paso, and Rio Grande Valley modernization efforts are
targeted for completion in summer FY 2012.
The interoperability of the communications systems used by Border
Patrol, DOI, and USDA is imperative. As Federal law enforcement
partners in protecting the United States, it is well understood that
lines of communication are essential to field agents via compatible
radio communications. DHS, DOI, and USDA signed an MOU in 2008
regarding secure radio communication. This memo was a concerted effort
to bridge the communication gaps and provide radio interoperability
between Border Patrol agents and their local law enforcement partners
in DOI and USDA. Since the signing of the 2008 MOU, a primary repeater
channel has been designated, and a common encryption key has been
created and distributed to all Border Patrol agents and DOI and USDA
law enforcement personnel. This interoperability has been strictly
maintained by the Border Patrol.
In April 2010, OBP determined that, in the Tucson Sector specifically,
DOI needed more extensive access to Border Patrol communications than
provided for in the 2008 MOU. To address this concern, OBP manually
eliminated the Border Patrol-specific tactical encryption key from all
Tucson Sector radios, making all communications available to DOI
partners. DOI is now able to monitor all radio traffic in the Tucson
Sector, as opposed to only having access to the joint operations
channel.
OBP will continue to adhere to the covenants of the 2008 MOU. As part
of OBP's continuing efforts to ally our efforts with those of our DOI
and USDA partners, a memorandum will be sent to all Border Patrol
sectors and stations emphasizing the importance of these partnerships.
The memorandum will specifically address the importance of maintaining
radio communication interoperability with DOI and USDA, and will
stress the need for coordinating future plans for upgrades of
compatible radio communications used for daily law enforcement
operations on Federal lands. Issuance of this memorandum is planned to
occur by December 31, 2010.
The U.S. Government is working with the governments of Canada and
Mexico on cross-border emergency management issues. Future
coordination of interoperable communications plans will take
international coordination into account, as appropriate.
Recommendation 4: To help ensure that DHS, DOI, and USDA partners
operating on federal lands have a common understanding of existing
cross-border threats and coordinate to provide an effective
interagency law enforcement response, GAO recommends that Secretaries
of Homeland Security, the Interior, and Agriculture take necessary
action to ensure that personnel at all levels of each agency conduct
early and continued consultations to implement provisions of the 2006
MOU, specifically coordination of efforts to determine agencies'
information needs for intelligence, including coordination of Border
Patrol annual assessments of the threat environment and
vulnerabilities impacting border security on federal lands.
Response: Concur. As displayed in the response to Recommendation 2,
OBP has created and maintains several avenues for information sharing
with DOI, USDA, and its other law enforcement partners. Annual
assessments of the threat environment and vulnerabilities impacting
border security on federal lands are analysis products that OBP
consistently makes available to all members of the relevant law
enforcement community, when requested.
OBP endeavors to effectively inform its law enforcement partners as to
the situational environment that exists at the border to include those
areas designated as Federal lands. As part of OBP's continuing efforts
to ally our efforts with those of our DOI and USDA partners, a
memorandum will be sent to all Border Patrol sectors and stations
emphasizing the importance of these partnerships. The memorandum will
specifically address the significance of continuing to develop annual
assessments of the threat environment and vulnerabilities impacting
border security on Federal lands with the input of and communication
with DOI, USDA, and other local law enforcement team members. Issuance
of this memorandum is planned to occur by December 31, 2010.
Recommendation 5: To help ensure that DHS, DOI, and USDA partners
operating on federal lands have a common understanding of existing
cross-border threats and coordinate to provide an effective
interagency law enforcement response, GAO recommends that Secretaries
of Homeland Security, the Interior, and Agriculture take necessary
action to ensure that personnel at all levels of each agency conduct
early and continued consultations to implement provisions of the 2006
MOU, specifically coordination of Border Patrol budget requests for
personnel, infrastructure, and technology that impact federal lands.
Response: Concur. In addition to the consistent and concerted efforts
made to share information and intelligence with DOI and USDA, OBP is
also inclusive of the Federal land management agencies in providing
information and soliciting opinions in our budget process.
Each Border Patrol station within a sector requests resources (e.g.,
personnel, technology and infrastructure) through the Operational
Requirements-Based Budget Program (ORBBP) each year. These requests
are consolidated at each Border Patrol sector and are sent to Border
Patrol Headquarters. At Headquarters, each sector's requests are
prioritized based upon the National Border Patrol Strategy, the
threat, and the traffic flow. Budgetary resources are then allocated
to support each sector's and stations' requests based upon the
priority and the amount of funding allocated.
While the ORBBP request is still in its early state, Border Patrol
station and sector management rehashes and solidifies the collective
understanding of and requirements for the securing of Federal lands
garnered throughout the year's continuous interagency communication.
This methodology is employed by OBP to make informed decisions on the
import of various programs and assets during the budgetary analysis of
alternatives. The ORBBP process proceeds from this point until final
funding decisions are made for the year.
OBP recognizes that the information provided by DOI and USDA is highly
valuable in its ability to improve the ORBBP decision making process.
As part of OBP's continuing efforts to ally our efforts with those of
our DOI and USDA partners, a memorandum will be sent to all Border
Patrol sectors and stations emphasizing the importance of these
partnerships. The memorandum will specifically address the value that
the area knowledge of DOI and USDA land managers can have on the
effectual budgetary planning of Border Patrol resources. Issuance of
this memorandum is planned to occur by December 31, 2010.
Recommendation 6: To help ensure that DHS, DOI, and USDA partners
operating on federal lands have a common understanding of existing
cross-border threats and coordinate to provide an effective
interagency law enforcement response, GAO recommends that Secretaries
of Homeland Security, the Interior, and Agriculture take necessary
action to ensure that personnel at all levels of each agency conduct
early and continued consultations to implement provisions of the 2006
MOU, specifically coordination of deployment plans for personnel,
infrastructure, and technology on federal lands before such deployment
is initiated.
Response: Concur. OBP recognizes the value of consulting with DOI and
USDA land managers during the budgetary process and, likewise,
understand that similar consultation is highly useful once monies have
been allocated and resources are to be deployed.
When personnel, technology, and infrastructure requests are funded,
OBP works directly with DOI and USDA land managers during the
environmental assessment process and biological opinion process. CBP
conducts early and continued consultations with DOI and USDA partners
regarding deployment of personnel. infrastructure and technology on
Federal lands. Once border security requirements are made within OBP,
CBP immediately engages the Federal partners to coordinate deploying
assets to meet changing threats. CBP holds biweekly meetings with DOI
and USDA headquarters offices regarding all CBP planned projects. In
addition, Border Patrol sectors meet with DOI and USDA local and
regional representatives periodically, usually monthly or quarterly,
to coordinate law enforcement actions and associated projects via the
Borderlands Management Task Force. Associated with these meetings are
reviews of current and planned tactical infrastructure and technology
projects. Through these meetings, CBP, DOI, and USDA employ a
cooperative problem-solving process that enables CBP to effectively
and efficiently leverage resources and information in a manner that
addresses border security, human safety, and natural and cultural
resource protection.
As stated previously, OBP recognizes that the information provided by
DOI and USDA is highly valuable in its ability to improve the decision
making process by providing a unique point of view and understanding
of Federal land. As part of OBP's continuing efforts to ally our
efforts with those of our DOI and USDA partners, a memorandum will be
sent to all Border Patrol sectors and stations emphasizing the
importance of these partnerships. The memorandum will specifically
address the value that the area knowledge of DOI and USDA land
managers can have on the effectual use of Border Patrol resources.
Issuance of this memorandum is planned to occur by December 31, 2010.
Recommendation 7: To help ensure that DHS, DOI, and USDA partners
operating on federal lands have a common understanding of existing
cross-border threats and coordinate to provide an effective
interagency law enforcement response, GAO recommends that Secretaries
of Homeland Security, the Interior, and Agriculture take necessary
action to ensure that personnel at all levels of each agency conduct
early and continued consultations to implement provisions of the 2006
MOU, specifically coordination of access to information resulting from
deployment of technology on federal lands.
Response: Concur. As evidenced by the previous responses, OBP is aware
of the need for information sharing and is willing to impart upon DOI
and USDA partners all of the intelligence available within established
guidelines. The Border Patrol will continue to make available to its
DOI and USDA law enforcement counterparts the information gained from
deployment of technology on Federal lands. DHS, DOI, and USDA are all
committed to ensuring the security of the United States, and together
we are an effective and formidable enforcement team. As such, OBP will
continue to facilitate and feed this collaborative relationship,
resulting in improved border security.
As part of OBP's continuing efforts to ally our efforts with those of
our DOI and USDA partners, a memorandum will be sent to all Border
Patrol sectors and stations emphasizing the importance of these
partnerships. The memorandum will specifically address our continued
work to avail our technological information and intelligence to our
DOI and USDA law enforcement partners. Issuance of this memorandum is
planned to occur by December 31, 2010.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Jerald E. Levine:
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of the Interior:
United States Department of the Interior:
Office Of The Secretary:
Washington, DC 20240:
October 8, 2010:
Mr. Richard M. Stana:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.0 20548:
Dear Mr. Stana:
Thank you for providing the Department of the Interior the opportunity
to review and comment on the draft Government Accountability Office
Report entitled Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better
Ensure a Coordinated Federal Response to Illegal Activity on Federal
Lands (GA0-10-931SU).
The Department has no comments and concurs with the major findings and
recommendations included in the report.
If you have any questions, or need additional information, contact
John Kmetz, Assistant Director, Law Enforcement at (202) 208-5903.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Rhea Suh:
Assistant Secretary:
Policy, Management and Budget:
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S. Department of Agriculture:
USDA:
United States Department of Agriculture:
Forest Service:
Washington Office:
1400 Independence Avenue, SW:
Washington, DC 20250:
File Code: 1420:
Date: September 22, 2010:
Richard M. Stana:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Stana:
Thank you for the opportunity to review and provide comment on the
draft Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report on "Border
Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Ensure a Coordinated
Federal Response to Illegal Activity on Federal Lands (GAO-10-931SU)."
The report recommended that the Department of Interior (DOI) and the
Department of Agriculture (USDA) determine whether additional guidance
is needed for federal land closure decisions; and that the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS), DOI, and USDA implement interagency
agreements to ensure coordination occurs. The USDA Forest Service has
reviewed the report and generally concurs with the report's
observations and recommendations We value the strong relationship we
have with DHS and DOI, and look forward to working with them to
enhance coordination efforts on border security.
If you have any questions, please contact Donna M. Carmical, Chief
Financial Officer, at 202-205-1321 or dcarmical@fs.fed.us.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Tim DeCoster, for:
Thomas L. Tidwell:
Chief:
cc:
Debbie L Everhart, Sandy T. Coleman, Mary King, David Ferrell.
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Richard M. Stana, (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Cindy Ayers, Assistant
Director, and Joel Aldape, analyst-in-charge, managed this assignment.
Brian Lipman and Arian Terrill made significant contributions to the
work. David Alexander assisted with design and methodology. Frances
Cook and Christine Davis provided legal support. Jessica Orr assisted
with report preparation, and Lydia Araya developed the report's
graphics.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Ports of entry are government-designated locations where CBP
inspects persons and goods to determine whether they may be lawfully
admitted into the country. A land port of entry may have more than one
border crossing point where CBP inspects travelers for admissibility
into the United States.
[2] GAO, Border Security: Agencies Need to Better Coordinate Their
Strategies and Operations on Federal Lands, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-590] (Washington, D.C.: June 16,
2004).
[3] We did not review the Border Patrol fiscal year 2010 operational
assessments for the Tucson and Yuma sectors because the Border Patrol
provided these documents after our audit work was complete.
[4] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). These standards, issued pursuant to
the requirements of the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of
1982 (FMFIA), provide the overall framework for establishing and
maintaining internal control in the federal government. Also pursuant
to FMFIA, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued Circular A-
123, revised December 21, 2004, to provide the specific requirements
for assessing the reporting on internal controls. Internal control
standards and the definition of internal control in OMB Circular A-123
are based on GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
Government.
[5] The Wilderness Act of 1964 (16 U.S.C. § §1131-1136) defines
wilderness as an area of undeveloped federal land retaining its
primeval character and influence, without permanent improvement or
human habitation, and designated for preservation and protection in
its natural condition. There are over 756 areas in 44 states and
Puerto Rico designated as wilderness, with Alaska, California,
Arizona, Idaho, and Washington having the most wilderness acres. The
Forest Service manages the most wilderness areas and the National Park
Service manages the most wilderness acres.
[6] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-590].
[7] The 2006 MOU also states that DHS, DOI and USDA recognize that
Border Patrol access to federal lands can facilitate the rescue of
cross-border violators, protect these lands from environmental damage,
and have a role in protecting wilderness and wildlife resources.
Department of Homeland Security, Department of the Interior, and
Department of Agriculture, Memorandum of Understanding Regarding
Cooperative National Security and Counterterrorism Efforts on Federal
Lands along the United States' Border (Washington, D.C., March 2006).
[8] Department of Homeland Security, Department of the Interior, and
Department of Agriculture, Memorandum of Understanding Regarding
Secure Radio Communication (Washington, D.C., July 18, 2008).
[9] Department of Homeland Security, Department of Homeland Security
Information Sharing Strategy (Washington, D.C., Apr. 18, 2008).
[10] Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security
Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland
(Washington, D.C., February 2010).
[11] The remaining 933 Border Patrol agents were staffed to coastal
sectors and other locations.
[12] GAO, Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays
Persist and the Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-896] (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 9, 2009).
[13] GAO, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Has Faced Challenges Deploying
Technology and Fencing Along the Southwest Border, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-651T] (Washington, D.C.: May 4,
2010).
[14] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-651T].
[15] The Border Patrol fiscal year 2009 Tucson sector threat
assessment and operational assessment show that the Tucson sector was
responsible for about half of all marijuana seizures on the southwest
border.
[16] Border Patrol officials stated that illegal entrants who are not
apprehended either cross back over the Mexican border or continue
traveling to the U.S. interior, and may be apprehended in other
locations.
[17] The distance from each of these five stations to the
international border within each station's area of operations ranged
from approximately 25 to 110 miles.
[18] For example, Border Patrol officials said that they are not
limited in their ability to conduct motorized off-road operations in
environmentally sensitive areas in conducting border security
operations. The Border Patrol's authority to conduct off-road
operations in these areas is outlined in the 2006 MOU between DHS,
DOI, and USDA.
[19] Border Patrol reported that 196 of 308 total border miles in the
Spokane sector were defined at this level of border control, which the
agency reports is not an acceptable end state.
[20] According to Border Patrol Spokane sector officials, the
restriction and closure of roads on federal lands within the sector's
area of operations have occurred over the course of approximately 20
years. For example, one road was eliminated in 2002 for the purpose of
creating a roadless habitat for the grizzly bear.
[21] This DOI bureau has national responsibility for managing
endangered species.
[22] This time of the year is generally from April 1 through November
15.
[23] Border Patrol Spokane sector officials noted that they reserve
the right to access the grizzly bear habitat if they have an
operational need to do so.
[24] Under 36 C.F.R. § 1.5, the National Park Service has the
authority to close all or a portion of a park area when necessary for
the maintenance of public health and safety, among other reasons.
Under 50 C.F.R. § 25.21, the Fish and Wildlife Service has the
authority to close all or any part of a refuge, for both nonemergency
and emergency situations that endanger human life and safety. Under 43
C.F.R. § 8364.1, the Bureau of Land Management has the authority to
close or restrict the use of designated public lands in order to
protect persons, property, and public lands and resources. Under 36
C.F.R. §§ 261.50, 261.53 the Forest Service has the authority to close
or restrict the use of an area of a national forest for a variety of
reasons, including the protection of public health or safety. In
addition, DOI headquarters and field officials stated that the
authority and decision to close and reopen federal lands is further
delegated to federal land managers at the local level.
[25] DHS has a plan in place to address border violence. The
contingency plan, known as the Southwest Border Violence Operations
Plan, outlines a layered response to provide the appropriate level of
support to local law enforcement and DHS components in the event of
escalating violence. The first part of this contingency plan involves
support of state and local first responders in the event of spillover
violence from Mexico to the United States.
[26] For the six federal land units, closures on federal lands ranged
from 0 percent to approximately 55 percent. Two of the six federal
land units had closed or restricted public access. Approximately 55
percent of the Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument and less than 1
percent of the Buenos Aires National Wildlife have been closed to the
public.
[27] According to the National Park Service Intermountain Regional
Chief Ranger, the National Park Service has adopted a risk management
process that lists seven steps--(1) define mission, (2) identify
hazards, (3) assess risks, (4) identify options, (5) evaluate risk
versus gain, (6) execute decisions, and (7) supervise (watch for
changes)--to be used to assess southwest border parks and develop
actions to take to reduce the risk to resources, employees, and the
public, including park closures. However, our review of the agency's
seven-step risk management process showed that the guidance has no
specific factors to link border security threats to personnel and
public safety.
[28] The need to demonstrate "extreme danger" is outlined in Bureau of
Land Management guidance issued in May 2009. This guidance requires
land managers to monitor safety issues on borderlands and outlines
steps needed to close lands if extreme danger is identified on these
lands. In instances where extreme danger is identified, land managers
can--in coordination with the Arizona State Director and Bureau of
Land Management headquarters--close lands to the public. Arizona
Borderlands Safe Work Policy (May 7, 2009).
[29] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1].
[30] The BMTF acts as a mechanism to address issues of security and
resources among federal, tribal, state, and local governments located
along the international borders.
[31] The HIDTA program, administered by the Office of National Drug
Control Policy, acts as a mechanism to enhance and coordinate drug
control efforts among federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies. HIDTA working groups in Arizona are located in Phoenix and
Tucson.
[32] IBETs are multiagency, field-level groups of law enforcement
officials dedicated to securing the integrity of the shared border
between Canada and the United States, while representing the laws and
jurisdictions of each nation. IBETs are multidisciplinary intelligence
and enforcement units that focus on national security, organized
crime, and other criminal activity between ports of entry.
[33] Department of Homeland Security, Department of the Interior, and
Department of Agriculture, Memorandum of Understanding Regarding
Secure Radio Communication.
[34] Forest Service managers in the Spokane sector said they had only
12 law enforcement officials to protect thousands of acres of national
forest along the border. Similarly, Forest Service managers on the
Coronado National Forest in the Tucson sector said that there are only
10 law enforcement officials to protect nearly 2 million acres of
national forest.
[35] ACTT--initially established as the Arizona Operational Plan in
the fall of 2009--is a multiagency law enforcement partnership in
Arizona designed to address smuggling of aliens, drugs and bulk cash;
exportation of weapons; and hostage taking, among other illegal
activities.
[36] On the northern border in the Border Patrol Spokane sector, radio
communications were compatible for daily operations, but limited in
certain areas lacking the infrastructure necessary for radio signal
coverage.
[37] Department of Homeland Security, Department of the Interior, and
Department of Agriculture, Memorandum of Understanding Regarding
Secure Radio Communication.
[38] The modernization initiative, Project 25, is a standards-
development process for the design, manufacture, and evaluation of
interoperable, digital two-way wireless communications products
created by and for public safety professionals. Project 25 standards
are administered by the Telecommunications Industry Association. Radio
equipment that demonstrates compliance with Project 25 must meet a set
of minimum requirements to fit certain needs of public safety,
including interoperability, allowing users on different systems to
talk with direct radio contact.
[39] Office of National Drug Control Policy, Southwest Border
Counternarcotics Strategy (Washington, D.C., June 2009).
[40] In the Tucson sector, the Arizona Army National Guard prepared a
threat assessment for DOI in 2003; in the Spokane sector, federal land
management agencies had not prepared a threat assessment since 2000.
[41] This joint budget strategy states that the Coronado National
Forest and the Tucson sector Border Patrol will collaboratively
support the priority mission of public and employee safety,
antiterrorism, detection, arrest, prosecution, and deterrence of cross-
border illegal trafficking. The Forest Service official responsible
for this budget strategy explained that he was seeking to update it
for the current fiscal year.
[42] Budgeting and implementation of SBI infrastructure and technology
is led by CBP's SBI Program Executive Office, a stand-alone office
with a separate funding stream that is not overseen by Border Patrol
sector officials.
[43] The U.S. Army Corp of Engineers did not always coordinate its
activities to align with CBP timing of communications with federal
land managers at field locations, according to a CBP headquarters
official and DOI's Director of Law Enforcement and Security.
[44] In March 2010, DHS froze funding for SBInet--pending completion
of a program review--as a result of cost overruns and performance
problems.
[45] This DOI law enforcement liaison--whose position is funded by
DHS--is colocated at CBP headquarters to coordinate with CBP on SBInet
projects.
[46] GAO, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant
Risks in Delivering Key Technology Investment, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1086] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22,
2008) and Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Reconsider Its
Proposed Investment in Key Technology Program, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-340] (Washington, D.C.: May 5,
2010).
[47] The Wellton station is part of the Yuma sector, but we included
this station because it shares the responsibility for patrolling the
Cabeza Prieta National Wildlife Refuge with the Ajo station, which is
part of the Tucson sector.
[48] We also reviewed threat assessments for six additional sectors:
Blaine, Havre, and Swanton along the northern border and San Diego, El
Centro, and Yuma along the southwest border to compare threats on
federal lands across these sectors, but focused our review on the
Spokane and Tucson sectors because of the high concentration of
federal lands and threats in these locations.
[49] Border Patrol operational and intelligence officials in the
Tucson sector said that the number of illegal entries is estimated
daily for defined geographic zones using a variety of means that
depend on the operational environment, including, but not limited to,
visual observation; information obtained from remote ground sensors,
video camera, scopes, or other technological sources; fresh "sign,"
such as footprints, or other physical indications, such as broken
foliage or trash; or intelligence information from interviews with
apprehended aliens. These daily estimates of illegal entries are
tracked over time and compared with apprehensions as one of the
indicators for determining the extent and progress toward operational
control of the border.
[50] We did not review the Border Patrol fiscal year 2010 operational
assessments for the Tucson and Yuma sectors because the Border Patrol
provided these documents after our audit work was complete.
[51] GAO Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). These standards, issued pursuant to
the requirements of the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of
1982 (FMFIA), provide the overall framework for establishing and
maintaining internal control in the federal government. Also pursuant
to FMFIA, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued Circular A-
123, revised December 21, 2004, to provide the specific requirements
for assessing the reporting on internal controls. Internal control
standards and the definition of internal control in OMB Circular A-123
are based on our Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
Government.
[End of section]
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