International Trade
Comparison of U.S. and Foreign Antidumping Practices Gao ID: NSIAD-91-59 November 7, 1990Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO compared the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-related antidumping policies and practices of the United States and its major trading partners, focusing on government, legal, and industry views on the: (1) sufficiency of evidence for initiating investigations; (2) transparency of antidumping practices to the parties involved and to the public; and (3) rights of appeal on antidumping decisions.
GAO found that: (1) U.S. screening of petitions was the least stringent of all the signatories, since the Department of Commerce could not consider information from respondents during initial investigations, adhered to set time frames, and focused on the extent of dumping rather than on injury and causation; (2) European Community (EC) screening was also relatively less stringent because of its reliance on injury evidence, low regulatory threshold for dumping evidence, and high level of discretion in making decisions; (3) Mexican antidumping regulations were vague and open to protectionist use due to the system's newness, the lack of implementing guidelines, and a history of protecting its infant industries; (4) U.S. antidumping procedures were relatively transparent because of its public hearings, comprehensive antidumping decisions, and thorough disclosures of decision bases; (5) Australia and Canada also had fairly transparent procedures, although both countries lacked some U.S. features; (6) Mexico and EC had transparency deficiencies in terms of antidumping decision disclosure, information exchanges between parties, and party meetings; (7) the United States and Canada used administrative orders to protect confidential information while keeping procedures transparent, but EC, Mexico, and Australia would have several practical difficulties in implementing similar administrative protective order systems; (8) administrative reviews of dumping and injury determinations were much more frequent in the United States and Canada than in EC and Australia; and (9) judicial review in the United States was more extensive and effective than that of other signatories due to the broad scope and jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of International Trade.