Iraq

U.S. Military Items Exported or Transferred to Iraq in the 1980s Gao ID: NSIAD-94-98 February 7, 1994

This unclassified version of a classified 1992 GAO report discusses U.S. policy and practices on sales of U.S. military equipment to Iraq during the 1980s. Since 1980, U.S. policy has been to deny export licenses for commercial sales of defense items to Iraq, and the Pentagon has not made any foreign military sales to Iraq since 1967. In contrast, U.S. policy on sales to Iraq of dual-use items--items with both civilian and military uses--has not been constrained by security controls. As a result, the Commerce Department approved licenses for exporting $1.5 billion worth of dual-use items between 1985 and 1990. The licensed items included computers and other high-tech equipment, civilian helicopters, and machine tools. In addition, several countries shipped U.S. military equipment to Iraq without U.S. approval, including ammunition and howitzer spare parts. In five cases, countries proposed that they serve as transshipment points for military equipment for Iraq, proposals that the State Department rejected.

GAO found that: (1) U.S. foreign trade policy prohibited commercial sales of defense items to Iraq except when the items were for the protection of the head of state; (2) the Department of Defense (DOD) has not made any foreign military sales to Iraq since 1967; (3) between 1985 and 1990, the Department of Commerce approved export licenses for dual-use items totalling $1.5 billion; (4) U.S. foreign trade policy did not limit sales of dual-use items through national security or foreign policy controls; (5) two countries transferred various U.S. military items to Iraq without U.S. approval; (6) three other Middle East countries proposed to serve as transshipment points for Iraq-bound military equipment, but the proposals were rejected by the Department of State; (7) it was unable to determine whether U.S.-origin mortar bomb fuses shipped to UAE were diverted to Iraq because of sovereign political sensitivities and its inability to conduct an on-site physical inspection; and (8) although the U.S. Embassy in UAE reported that the U.S.-origin mortar bomb fuses shipped to UAE were not diverted to Iraq, it needs to find an alternative method of verifying that the fuses remain in UAE possession.

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