2010 Census
Planning and Testing Activities Are Making Progress Gao ID: GAO-06-465T March 1, 2006Rigorous planning is key to a successful census as it helps ensure greater effectiveness and efficiency. The U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) estimates the 2010 Census will cost around $11.3 billion, which would make it the most expensive census in our country's history, even after adjusting for inflation. GAO was asked to testify on (1) the Bureau's progress in preparing for the 2010 Census, (2) the challenges that Hurricanes Katrina and Rita might pose for the Bureau's future activities, and, (3) more broadly, the importance of planning for a range of events that could severely disrupt the census.
The Bureau's preparations for the 2010 Census are making progress along several fronts. Of particular note is (1) the re-engineered design of the census, which holds promise for controlling costs and maintaining accuracy; (2) the Bureau's early planning process which was more rigorous than for the 2000 Census; and (3) the Bureau's greater willingness to outsource key census-taking operations that would be difficult for it to carry out on its own. At the same time, it will be important for the Bureau to resolve issues that pose a risk to a successful census. For example, the Bureau plans to use hand-held mobile computing devices (MCD) to develop the census address list and collect data from millions of households that do not respond to the initial census questionnaire. The MCDs are an important step forward because they are designed to replace many of the paper questionnaires and maps that were used in past censuses, and are a key element of the Bureau's Field Data Collection Automation program. The Bureau has never before used the devices in a decennial. In tests held in 2004 and 2006 to date, census workers found the MCDs easy to use, but sometimes unreliable, which reduced efficiency. Some workers also deviated from prescribed procedures which points to the need for better training. The Bureau has taken steps to address these issues and future tests will help determine the effectiveness of the Bureau's actions. The Bureau also faces a possible brain drain, as 45 percent of its workforce will be eligible to retire by 2010. Although the Bureau has taken preventative measures, it could improve those efforts by, among other actions, strengthening the monitoring of its mission-critical workforce. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita highlight the importance of contingency planning and examining whether the Bureau's existing operations are adequate for capturing the demographic and physical changes that have occurred along the Gulf Coast. Overall, as the Bureau's preparations for 2010 continue, it will be important for Congress to monitor the Bureau's progress in (1) identifying and diagnosing problems, (2) devising solutions, and (3) integrating refinements in time to be evaluated during the Census Dress Rehearsal scheduled for 2008.
GAO-06-465T, 2010 Census: Planning and Testing Activities Are Making Progress
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Federalism and the Census, Committee on
Government Reform, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST:
Wednesday, March 1, 2006:
2010 Census:
Planning and Testing Activities Are Making Progress:
Statement of Brenda S. Farrell:
Acting Director:
Strategic Issues:
GAO-06-465T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-465T, a report to the Subcommittee on Federalism
and the Census, Committee on Government Reform, House of
Representatives:
Why GAO Did This Study:
Rigorous planning is key to a successful census as it helps ensure
greater effectiveness and efficiency. The U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau)
estimates the 2010 Census will cost around $11.3 billion, which would
make it the most expensive census in our country‘s history, even after
adjusting for inflation. GAO was asked to testify on (1) the Bureau‘s
progress in preparing for the 2010 Census, (2) the challenges that
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita might pose for the Bureau‘s future
activities, and, (3) more broadly, the importance of planning for a
range of events that could severely disrupt the census.
What GAO Found:
The Bureau‘s preparations for the 2010 Census are making progress along
several fronts. Of particular note is (1) the re-engineered design of
the census, which holds promise for controlling costs and maintaining
accuracy; (2) the Bureau‘s early planning process which was more
rigorous than for the 2000 Census; and (3) the Bureau‘s greater
willingness to outsource key census-taking operations that would be
difficult for it to carry out on its own.
Census Costs Are Increasing (Average Cost per Housing Unit in Constant
Fiscal 2000 Dollars):
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
At the same time, it will be important for the Bureau to resolve issues
that pose a risk to a successful census. For example, the Bureau plans
to use hand-held mobile computing devices (MCD) to develop the census
address list and collect data from millions of households that do not
respond to the initial census questionnaire. The MCDs are an important
step forward because they are designed to replace many of the paper
questionnaires and maps that were used in past censuses, and are a key
element of the Bureau‘s Field Data Collection Automation program. The
Bureau has never before used the devices in a decennial. In tests held
in 2004 and 2006 to date, census workers found the MCDs easy to use,
but sometimes unreliable, which reduced efficiency. Some workers also
deviated from prescribed procedures which points to the need for better
training. The Bureau has taken steps to address these issues and future
tests will help determine the effectiveness of the Bureau‘s actions.
The Bureau also faces a possible brain drain, as 45 percent of its
workforce will be eligible to retire by 2010. Although the Bureau has
taken preventative measures, it could improve those efforts by, among
other actions, strengthening the monitoring of its mission-critical
workforce. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita highlight the importance of
contingency planning and examining whether the Bureau‘s existing
operations are adequate for capturing the demographic and physical
changes that have occurred along the Gulf Coast.
Overall, as the Bureau‘s preparations for 2010 continue, it will be
important for Congress to monitor the Bureau‘s progress in (1)
identifying and diagnosing problems, (2) devising solutions, and (3)
integrating refinements in time to be evaluated during the Census Dress
Rehearsal scheduled for 2008.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is not making new recommendations at this time, but past reports
have contained GAO‘s views on steps the Bureau needs to take to improve
its planning processes, MCDs, enumerator training, human capital
planning, and other aspects of the census. The Bureau generally
concurred with these prior recommendations and has taken action to
implement some of them.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-465T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Brenda S. Farrell at
(202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Clay, and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to provide the
subcommittee a progress report on the U.S. Census Bureau's (Bureau)
preparations for the 2010 Census. For the past several years, we have
issued several reports on the Bureau's 2010 planning and testing
efforts at the subcommittee's request.[Footnote 1] My remarks today
highlight some of the key findings in our reports on preparations for
2010, as well as present the preliminary results of ongoing work we
plan to issue in the near future on the Bureau's efforts to build a
complete and accurate address list. Additionally, I will provide our
preliminary observations on the challenges that Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita might pose for the Bureau's future activities and, more broadly,
for the Bureau's continuity of operations planning to help it prepare
for a range of events that could severely disrupt the census.
Importantly, our perspective on the census goes well beyond these
recent studies. Because the decennial has grown in cost and complexity
since 1970, we have been reviewing the national enumeration for decades
on behalf of Congress. Over the years, through scores of reports and
testimonies, we have acquired broad institutional knowledge that gives
us a historical view of the key ingredients of a successful census.
Today's hearing is particularly timely. The Bureau is holding a test
census in the central portion of Travis County, Texas, and at the
Cheyenne River American Indian Reservation and Tribal Trust Lands in
South Dakota, where it is evaluating key operations and equipment it
plans to employ for the full enumeration in 2010. "Census Day" for this
exercise is April 1, 2006; after this, the Bureau will have only one
more major opportunity to assess its census taking-procedures--a "dress
rehearsal" scheduled for 2008. Moreover, the actual census is little
more than 4 years away, and before too long the Bureau will transition
from preparatory to operational activities, leaving little room for
delays and missteps.
With this in mind, I commend the subcommittee for calling today's
hearing, as past experience has shown that strong and continuing
congressional involvement--especially while there is still time to make
decisions and influence the direction of the census--is essential to
the decennial's ultimate success. An accurate population count is
critical because the Constitution requires a census to apportion seats
in the House of Representatives. Census data are also used to redraw
congressional districts, allocate approximately $200 billion in federal
assistance to state and local governments each year, and for numerous
other public and private sector purposes.
My remarks are based on our analysis of Bureau documents and data, and
interviews with key Bureau officials. In addition, to get a street-
level perspective of the performance of key operations, we visited the
Texas and South Dakota test sites, as well as Queens, New York, and
several counties in rural south-central Georgia, where an earlier field
test was held in 2004. During these visits, we interviewed local census
office managers and staff, viewed various data collection activities,
and observed training sessions the Bureau held for two different field
worker positions: address canvassers, who go door-to-door verifying
addresses as part of the Bureau's effort to build a complete and
accurate address list, and enumerators, who collect information from
those households that do not return their initial census questionnaire.
My major point today is that the Bureau is further along in planning
the 2010 Census compared to a similar point during the 2000 Census
cycle. Particularly noteworthy is (1) the re-engineered design of the
census, which holds promise for controlling costs and maintaining
accuracy; (2) the Bureau's early planning process which was more
rigorous than for the 2000 Census; and (3) the Bureau's greater
willingness to outsource key census-taking operations that would be
difficult for it to carry out on its own.
At the same time, it will be important for the Bureau to resolve issues
that pose a risk to a successful census. Specific steps we have
recommended in our prior work include (1) improving the reliability of
the hand-held mobile computing devices (MCD) the Bureau plans to use
for collecting field data, (2) ensuring census workers follow
prescribed procedures, and (3) strengthening its human capital efforts
so that it has the skill mix necessary to meet its future requirements.
The Bureau is aware of these issues and has taken actions to address
them. Future tests will shed light on the effectiveness of the Bureau's
efforts.
As a backdrop to these findings, I want to highlight several broad
themes that have emerged from our work over the years--lenses really--
through which to view the Bureau's business environment. They are
important because they ultimately affect the Bureau's readiness to
conduct the census and the quality of the results.
First, because the scale of the census is enormous, streamlined and
efficient operations are critical for cost-effectiveness. For example,
during the 2000 Census, the Bureau hired more than 500,000 enumerators,
temporarily making it one of the nation's largest employers; opened
nearly 24,000 questionnaire assistance centers; processed 1.5 billion
pieces of paper; and, in 10 weeks, followed up with 42 million
households that did not mail back their census questionnaires. The size
of the census means that small problems can magnify quickly, and big
problems could be overwhelming. For example, 60 seconds might seem like
an inconsequential amount of time, but in 2000, if enumerators had
spent just 1 minute more at each household during nonresponse follow-
up, it could have added almost $10 million in labor costs to the
census, assuming a pay rate of around $13 per hour (wages ranged from
$8.25 to $18.50 per hour for enumerators in 2000, depending on
location).
A second theme is the importance of sound risk management, as the risks
to a successful census are interrelated, and a shortcoming in one
operation could trigger other activities to spiral downward. For
example, a low mail response rate would drive up the follow-up
workload, which in turn would increase staffing needs and costs. Of
course the reverse is also true, where a success in one operation could
have a number of positive downstream impacts. Rigorous up-front
preparations, testing, and where feasible, contingency planning, are
the best ways to stave off problems. Likewise, management information
systems capable of tracking key operations with real-time measures are
essential because they enable the Bureau to quickly address trouble
spots. The Bureau did this successfully in recruiting enumerators for
the 2000 Census where, to help ensure it had a steady supply of
candidates for its 500,000 enumerator positions, it set a recruiting
goal of 2.4 million qualified applicants. Because the Bureau tracked
the progress local census offices were making in meeting their
individual goals, it was able to quickly raise pay rates and take other
actions at those offices where recruiting was lagging. Partly as a
result of its monitoring efforts, the Bureau exceeded its recruitment
goal by 100,000 people.
Third, it is important for the Bureau to stay on schedule, as the
census is conducted against a backdrop of immutable deadlines and an
elaborate chain of interrelated pre-and post-Census Day activities are
predicated upon those dates. Specifically, the Secretary of Commerce is
legally required to (1) conduct the census on April 1 of the decennial
year, (2) report the state population counts to the President for
purposes of congressional apportionment by December 31 of the decennial
year, and (3) send population tabulations to the states for purposes of
redistricting no later than one year after the April 1 census date. To
meet these reporting requirements, census activities need to take place
at specific times and in the proper sequence. Moreover, considerable
risk could accompany any significant design changes that occur late in
the decade because of the difficulties in properly testing, evaluating,
and integrating them with existing operations. As Census Day
approaches, the tolerance for any operational delays or changes becomes
increasingly small.
Fourth, the decennial census is a shared national undertaking, where
Congress, other federal agencies, state and local governments,
nonprofit and private organizations, and ultimately the American
public, all play vital roles in securing a complete and accurate
population tally. Recognizing this, the Bureau fosters partnerships
with these various entities to help with such activities as recruiting
census workers, boosting participation, and building the Bureau's
master address list. Mobilizing and coordinating these organizations
requires an enormous effort on the Bureau's part. During the 2000
Census, about 140,000 organizations participated in its partnership
program, according to the Bureau.
Collectively, these themes point to the following: The decennial census
is an inherently fragile endeavor. On the one hand, if all the
enumeration activities perform as planned, the response rate is as
expected, the Bureau meets its enumerator hiring goals, and operations
stay on schedule, the 2010 Census will likely produce acceptable
results. On the other hand, everything from a technological glitch to
national and world events could trigger a chain of setbacks that could
jeopardize the accuracy and completeness of the count. This is why it
is so important for Congress to follow the census closely and help
ensure it stays on track.
Background:
Thorough and comprehensive planning is crucial to the success of any
large, long-term project, especially one with the cost, complexity, and
high stakes of the decennial census. Indeed, the Bureau's past
experience has shown that the lack of proper planning can increase the
costs and risks of downstream operations.
Past experience has also underscored the importance of strong oversight
of the census to (1) inform congressional decision making on budgetary
and operational matters, (2) raise Congress's confidence that the
Bureau has chosen an optimum design and will manage operations and
control costs effectively, and (3) help ensure the progress the Bureau
has made thus far in refining, planning, and testing census-taking
activities, continues as the Bureau shifts into the operational phases
of the decennial.
Given the escalating cost of the census in an era of serious national
fiscal challenges, oversight will be particularly important. Bureau
officials estimate the total life-cycle cost of the 2010 Census will be
around $11.3 billion, which would make it the most expensive census in
our country's history, even after adjusting for inflation.[Footnote 2]
Although some cost growth can be expected, in part, because the number
of housing units--and hence the Bureau's workload--has grown, the cost
escalation has far exceeded the housing unit increase. The Bureau
estimates that the number of housing units for the 2010 Census will
increase by 10 percent over 2000 Census levels; meanwhile, the average
cost per housing unit for 2010 is expected to increase by approximately
29 percent from 2000 levels (from $56 to $72), nearly five and a half
times greater than the $13 it cost to count each household in 1970 (see
fig. 1).
Figure 1: Decennial Census Average Cost per Housing Unit (in Constant
Fiscal Year 2000 Dollars):
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
A key reason for the increasing cost of the census is that because of
various societal trends such as concerns over personal privacy, more
non-English speakers, and more people residing in makeshift and other
nontraditional living arrangements, the Bureau is finding it
increasingly difficult to locate people and get them to participate in
the census. As a result, the Bureau needs to spend more money simply to
achieve the accuracy of earlier enumerations. This can be seen, for
example, in the rising cost of securing public participation in the
census. During the 1990 Census, the Bureau spent an average of $0.88
per housing unit (in 2000 dollars) to market the census and was able to
rely on a pro-bono advertising campaign. The response rate was 65
percent. For the 2000 Census, recognizing that extra effort would be
needed to motivate participation, the Bureau used a paid advertising
campaign developed by a consortium of private-sector advertising
agencies. It cost an average of $3.19 per housing unit (in 2000
dollars) and achieved a response rate of 64 percent. As the Bureau
plans for 2010, maintaining cost effectiveness will be one of the
single greatest challenges confronting the agency.
The Bureau's Preparations for 2010 Are Progressing but Certain
Challenges Will Need to Be Addressed:
The Bureau's preparations for the 2010 Census appear to be further
along than at a similar point during the planning cycle for the 2000
Census. For example, the fundamental design of the 2010 Census has the
potential to contain costs and improve coverage and accuracy, and the
Bureau's planning process for 2010 is generally more thorough than was
the case for the 2000 Census. At the same time, the 2004 test and, to
date, the 2006 test, have identified areas where improvements are
needed. Uncovering trouble spots is an important objective of any test,
thus it is not surprising, and, in fact, should be expected and
commended that problems were found. Moreover, the Bureau has taken
steps to resolve the issues that have surfaced. Remaining activities in
the 2006 test, and the 2008 Dress Rehearsal, will help determine the
effectiveness of the Bureau's efforts.
The Design of the 2010 Census Shows Promise:
The Bureau developed a design for the 2010 Census early in the decade,
and Congress has been supportive of the Bureau's approach. The
situation 10 years ago was vastly different. In testimony before
Congress in late 1995, we expressed concern that Congress and the
Bureau had not agreed on the fundamental design and budget of the
census, and that the longer this situation continued, the opportunity
for a well-planned census would be lost and the greater the risk that
hundreds of millions of dollars would be spent inefficiently.[Footnote
3]
Key features of the design of the 2010 Census include the following:
* Enhancing procedures for building its address list, known as the
Master Address File, and its associated geographic information system,
called the Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing
(TIGER)® database;[Footnote 4]
* Replacing the census long-form questionnaire with the American
Community Survey (ACS)[Footnote 5]; and:
* Conducting a short-form-only decennial census supported by early
research and testing.
Also noteworthy is the fact that for the 2010 Census, the Bureau plans
to make the most extensive use of contractors in its history, turning
to the private sector to supply a number of different mission-critical
functions, including the Bureau's nationwide data processing
activities, and improvements to the Master Address File and TIGER. The
Bureau estimates that of the $11.3 billion total cost of the census,
around $1.9 billion (approximately 17 percent) will be spent via its
seven largest contracts which include information technology systems,
advertising, and the leasing of local census offices.
The Bureau is relying more heavily on contractors because it recognizes
it needs to look outside the agency to obtain the expertise and
services essential for a successful enumeration. That said, the
Bureau's contracting efforts during the 2000 Census did not always go
smoothly, and it will be important for Bureau management to focus on
its procurement activities to help ensure the 2010 contractors fulfill
the Bureau's expectations. Our companion testimony at today's hearing
provides greater detail on two of the Bureau's information technology
contracts.[Footnote 6]
In concept, the Bureau's approach has the potential to achieve its
principal goals for the 2010 Census which include (1) increasing the
relevance and timeliness of data, (2) reducing operational risk, (3)
increasing coverage and accuracy, and (4) containing costs. However,
some aspects of the design, including the use of technology that has
never been employed for the decennial, as well as the heavy reliance on
contractors, introduce new risk. This is not inappropriate as the need
to secure a complete count and addressing problems with past censuses
call for bold new initiatives that entail risk. What will be important
is how effectively the Bureau manages those risks.
The 2010 Planning Process Is Generally More Rigorous Than for Past
Efforts:
Another sign of progress can be found in the thoroughness of the
Bureau's planning process where the Bureau has taken several positive
steps to correct problems it encountered when planning past censuses.
For example, early in the decade, senior Bureau staff considered
various goals for the 2010 Census and articulated a design to achieve
those goals. Moreover, staff with operational experience in the census
participated in the 2010 design process. According to Bureau officials,
this was a departure from the 2000 planning effort when Bureau staff
with little operational experience played key roles in the design
process, which resulted in impractical reform ideas that could not be
implemented.
At the same time, the Bureau's planning process could benefit from an
overall business or project plan that (1) includes milestones for
completing key activities; (2) itemizes the estimated cost of each
component; (3) articulates a clear system of coordination among project
components; and (4) translates key goals into measurable, operational
terms to provide meaningful guidance for planning and measuring
progress. Some, but not all of this information is available in various
documents, but one would need to piece it together. Noting the
importance of this information to inform congressional decision-making
and oversight of the census, as well as to improve the Bureau's
planning process, in our January 2004 report, we recommended that the
Bureau combine this information into a single, comprehensive document.
The Bureau disagreed with the recommendation although it said it would
develop such a plan nonetheless and provide it to GAO, Congress, and
other stakeholders. The Bureau has not yet issued this document.
Address File and Map Improvements Could Help Resolve Past Problems if
Operational Challenges Are Resolved:
A complete and accurate address list is the cornerstone of a successful
census because it identifies all households that are to receive a
census questionnaire, and serves as the control mechanism for following
up with households that fail to respond. Although the Bureau went to
great lengths to build a complete and accurate Master Address File for
the 2000 Census, of the 116 million housing units contained in the
database, the Bureau estimates it incorrectly included 2.3 million
housing units and missed another 2.7 million housing units. In light of
these and other problems, the Bureau concluded that enhancements to the
Master Address File and TIGER were necessary to make census data more
complete and accurate.
In the preliminary results of our ongoing work on enhancements to the
Master Address File and TIGER, we found that the Bureau has developed
procedures to help resolve each of the broad categories of problems
experienced in 2000 including addresses that were duplicated, missed,
deleted, and incorrectly located on a map (a problem known as geocoding
error). The Bureau has several ongoing evaluations that should provide
valuable information on the effectiveness of these procedures.
The Bureau is also taking steps to improve the accuracy of the TIGER
maps which, among other benefits, should help prevent geocoding errors.
In June 2002, the Bureau awarded an 8-year contract, in excess of $200
million intended to, among other tasks, correct in TIGER the location
of every street, boundary, and other map feature so that coordinates
are aligned with their true geographic locations. According to the
Bureau, the contractor completed this work for 250 counties in 2003,
602 counties in 2004, and 623 counties in 2005. Furthermore, the
contractor plans to deliver the remaining 1,758 county maps between
2006 and 2008.
However, based on this time line, it appears that several hundred
county TIGER maps will not be updated in time for the Local Update of
Census Addresses (LUCA) program, through which the Bureau gives local
and tribal government officials the opportunity to review and suggest
corrections to the address lists and maps for their jurisdictions. LUCA
is to begin in July 2007 when, according to the current schedule, the
Bureau will still have 368 counties to update in 2008 alone. These
counties will not have the most current maps to review but will instead
be given the most recent maps the Bureau has available. According to
the Bureau, some of the maps have been updated for the American
Community Survey, but others have not been updated since the 2000
Census, which could affect the quality of a local government's review.
The Bureau is aware of the overlapping schedules, but told us that it
needs to start LUCA in 2007 in order to complete the operation in time
for address canvassing.
LUCA is an example of how the Bureau partners with external entities,
tapping into their knowledge of local populations and housing
conditions in order to secure a more complete count. In 1994, Congress
required the Bureau to develop a local address review program to give
local and tribal governments greater input into the Bureau's address
list development process.[Footnote 7]
When the Bureau conducted LUCA for the 2000 Census, the results were
mixed. In our 1999 congressional testimony, we noted that many local
governments said they were satisfied with specific aspects of the
materials and assistance the Bureau provided to them. At the same time,
LUCA may have stretched the resources of local governments, and
participation in the program could have been better. [Footnote 8]
The census schedule will also be a challenge for an operation called
address canvassing, where census workers are to walk every street in
the country, verifying addresses and updating maps as necessary. The
Bureau has allotted 6 weeks to verify the nation's inventory of 116
million housing units. This translates into a completion rate of over
2.75 million housing units every day. The challenge in maintaining this
schedule can be seen in the fact that for the 2000 Census, it took the
Bureau 18 weeks just to canvass "city-style" address areas, which are
localities where the U.S. Postal Service uses house-number and street-
name addresses for most mail delivery.
The Unreliability of Mobile Computing Devices Has Been Problematic:
Of particular concern is the previous unreliability of the MCDs the
Bureau plans to use for its address canvassing and nonresponse follow-
up operations (see fig. 2).
Figure 2: The Census Bureau Plans to Use Mobile Computing Devices to
Collect and Transmit Field Data:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
For address canvassing, the MCDs are to be loaded with address
information and maps; for nonresponse follow-up, they will be used in
lieu of paper questionnaires and maps to collect household information.
The MCDs are also equipped with global positioning system (GPS)
receivers, a satellite-based navigational system to help enumerators
locate street addresses and to collect coordinates for each structure
in their assignment area. Bureau officials expect the MCDs will help
improve the cost-effectiveness of the census by allowing it to
eliminate millions of paper questionnaires and maps, improve the
quality of address data, and update enumerators' nonresponse follow-up
workload on a daily basis.
The move from paper to digital was a very positive step. At the same
time, rigorous testing is essential to assess their durability,
functionality, and that enumerators are able to use them. The MCDs were
first evaluated for nonresponse follow-up as part of the 2004 Census
Test, and for address canvassing in 2005 as part of the 2006 Census
Test. The Bureau will use MCDs next month for nonresponse follow-up in
the 2006 test.
In both our prior and ongoing work, we found the test results have been
mixed. On the one hand, the census workers we observed had little
difficulty using the MCDs. For example, address canvassers we
interviewed said the electronic maps were accurate and that they were
able to find their assignment areas with relative ease. On the other
hand, the reliability of the MCDs proved troublesome during the 2004
and to date, the 2006 test. For example, in 2004, the MCDs experienced
transmission problems, memory overloads, and difficulties with a
mapping feature--all of which added inefficiencies to the nonresponse
follow-up operation.
The Bureau is using MCDs made by a different manufacturer for the 2006
test which resolved some of these problems, but other difficulties
emerged during address canvassing. For example, the device was slow to
pull up and exit address registers, accept the data entered by the
canvassers, and link map locations to addresses for multi-unit
structures. Furthermore, the MCDs would sometimes lock up, requiring
canvassers to reboot them.
Canvassers also found it difficult to transmit an address and map
location that needed to be deleted from the master list. The Bureau was
unable to fix this problem so canvassers had to return to the local
census office where technicians dealt with the problem. The reliability
of the GPS was also problematic. Some workers had problems receiving a
signal, and when a signal was available, it was sometimes slow to
locate assignment areas and correct map locations.
According to the Bureau, these problems reduced the productivity of the
canvassers, and the Bureau stopped the operation 10 days after it was
scheduled to finish. Even with the extension, however, the Bureau was
unable to complete the job, leaving census blocks in both Austin and on
the Cheyenne Indian Reservation unverified.
According to the Bureau, the problems were caused by unstable software
and insufficient memory. The Bureau delayed the start of address
canvassing for a month at both test sites to troubleshoot the MCDs.
However, it was unable to fix all the problems and decided to move
forward with the test.
The MCDs will be evaluated again next month as part of the 2006 Census
Test and we will be on-site to assess the extent to which the Bureau
has fixed the MCD problems. However, even if the MCDs prove to be more
reliable, questions remain for the future. The Bureau has acknowledged
that the MCD's performance is an issue, but believes it will be
addressed as part of its contract for the Field Data Collection
Automation (FDCA) program, which is aimed at automating the Bureau's
field data collection efforts, and is scheduled to be awarded later
this month (the MCDs used for the 2006 test are off-the-shelf purchases
that were customized by the Bureau).
As a result, the 2008 Dress Rehearsal will be the first time the entire
system--including the contractor's MCD--will be tested under conditions
that are as close as possible to the actual census. If new problems
emerge, little time will be left to develop and test any refinements.
Our field observations also suggest that the training of census workers
could be improved to help ensure they follow proper procedures. Failure
to do so could affect the reliability of census data. During the 2004
test, for example, we observed enumerators who did not read the
coverage and race/ethnicity question exactly as worded, and did not
properly use flashcards the Bureau had developed that were designed to
help respondents answer specific questions. During the address
canvassing operation for the 2006 test, we observed workers who were
not properly verifying addresses, or were unsure of what to do when
they happened upon dwellings such as duplex housing units. In our past
work, we recommended that the Bureau take a more strategic approach to
training, and that local census offices include in their instruction
special modules covering the unique living arrangements that might be
prevalent in that particular jurisdiction.[Footnote 9]
The Bureau acknowledged that the shortcomings we identified require
improvement, and indicated that for the 2006 test, it will enhance
training to reinforce the procedural requirements. The Bureau also
intends to incorporate additional training to prepare enumerators to
handle realistic situations encountered in their work. As part of our
field work for the 2006 test, we will review the improvements the
Bureau made to its training procedures.
Succession Planning and Management Will Be Important in the Years
Ahead:
If the operational challenges of conducting a census were not daunting
enough, the Bureau faces the additional challenge of a possible brain
drain. In our June 2005 report, we noted that the Bureau has projected
that 45 percent of its workforce will be eligible to retire by
2010.[Footnote 10] The Bureau has long benefited from its core group of
managers and experienced staff who developed their expertise over
several census cycles; their institutional knowledge is critical to
keeping the census on track. Indeed, according to Bureau officials,
many experienced employees retired or left the agency after the 1990
Census which affected planning efforts for the 2000 Census.
Leading organizations go beyond simply backfilling vacancies, and
instead focus on strengthening both current and future organizational
capacity. In this regard the Bureau acknowledges that re-engineering
the 2010 Census requires new skills in project, contract, and financial
management; advanced programming and technology; as well as other
areas. To help address this important human capital issue, the Bureau
has implemented various succession planning and management efforts to
better position the agency to meet its future skill requirements.
Still, we found that the Bureau could take additional steps to enhance
its succession planning and management efforts and recommended that the
Bureau (1) strengthen the monitoring of its mission-critical workforce,
(2) seek appropriate opportunities to coordinate and share core
succession training and development programs with other outside
agencies, and (3) evaluate core succession training and development
programs to gauge the extent to which they contribute to enhancing
organizational capacity. The Bureau agreed with our recommendations and
indicated it was taking steps to implement them.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Highlight the Importance of Disaster
Preparedness:
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina devastated the coastal
communities of Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, and Alabama. A few weeks
later, Hurricane Rita plowed through the border area of Texas and
Louisiana.
Damage was widespread. In the wake of Katrina, for example, the Red
Cross estimated that nearly 525,000 people were displaced. Their homes
were declared uninhabitable, and streets, bridges, and other landmarks
were destroyed. Approximately 90,000 square miles were affected overall
and, as shown in figure 3, entire communities were obliterated.
Figure 3: Aerial Photograph of the Devastation in the Lower 9th Ward in
New Orleans:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The destruction and chaos caused by the storms underscore the nation's
vulnerability to all types of hazards, and highlights how important it
is for government agencies to consider disaster preparedness and
continuity of operations as part of their planning. We have had a
preliminary discussion with the Bureau on this topic and will continue
to assess the Bureau's contingency planning as part of our oversight of
the 2010 Census.
Moreover, it will be important for the Bureau to assess the impact the
storms might have on its census-taking activities, as well as whether
the affected areas have any special needs for data. Securing a complete
count, a difficult task under normal circumstances, could face
additional hurdles along the Gulf Coast, in large part because the
baseline the Bureau will be working with--streets, housing stock, and
the population itself--will be in flux for some time to come. According
to the Bureau, different parts of the agency work on hurricane-related
issues at different times, but no formal body has been created to deal
with the hurricanes' impact on the 2010 Census. The Bureau anticipates
that by 2008, as it is preparing to conduct address canvassing, people
will have decided whether or not to return. At that time, the Bureau
believes it will be in a better position to identify vacant, occupied,
and new construction for 2010.
Although Census Day is still several years away, preliminary
activities, such as operations for building the Master Address File,
are to occur sooner. Consequently, a key question is whether the
Bureau's existing operations are adequate for capturing the migration
that has taken place along the Gulf Coast, the various types of
dwellings in which people live, and the changes to roads and other
geographic features that have occurred, or does the Bureau need to
develop enhanced and/or additional procedures to account for them? For
example, new housing and street construction could require more
frequent updates of the Bureau's address file and maps, while local
governments' participation in LUCA might be affected because of the
loss of key personnel, information systems, or records needed to verify
the Bureau's address lists and maps.
It will also be important for the Bureau to work with Congress and
state and local governments to determine whether the hurricane-affected
areas have any special data needs to track the economic and social well-
being of the region and benchmark the recovery process. Although the
decennial census would not be the instrument to collect this
information, it might be feasible doing so through one of the Bureau's
other survey programs. To date, the Bureau plans to do a special
tabulation of its American Community Survey (ACS) data for the areas
affected by Katrina that will provide information on the population
that remained in the region. However, because of several methodological
issues, it will not be an "official" ACS data product. The Bureau is
also trying to use data from administrative records to update its
population estimates of the area.
Building on these efforts, some key considerations for the future
include the following:
1. How have the hurricanes affected the counties and parishes in the
Gulf Coast region and what are the implications, if any, for the
Bureau's future operations?
2. Which external and internal stakeholders including federal, state,
and local government agencies, as well as nonprofit organizations and
specific areas of expertise need to be included in the Bureau's
decision-making process?
3. To what extent does the Bureau have a plan (including objectives,
tasks, milestones, etc.) for assessing and acting on any new
requirements imposed by the hurricanes?
4. Do the hurricane-affected areas have any special data requirements,
and if so, how should they be addressed and which stakeholders need to
be involved?
In summary, over the last few years, the Bureau has put forth a
tremendous effort to help ensure the success of the 2010 Census. The
Bureau is moving forward along a number of fronts, and has been
responsive to the recommendations we made in our past work aimed at
improving its planning process, address file, MCDs, training, human
capital, and other census-taking activities. Still, some aspects of the
census are proving to be problematic and a number of operational
questions need to be resolved.
To be sure, challenges are to be expected in an endeavor as vast and
complex as the decennial census. Moreover, shortcomings with prior
censuses call for the Bureau to consider bold initiatives for 2010 that
entail some risk. Thus, in looking toward the future, as the planning
and testing phases of the 2010 Census begin to wind down, it will be
important for Congress to monitor the Bureau's progress in (1)
identifying and diagnosing problems, (2) devising cost-effective
solutions, and (3) integrating refinements and fixes in time to be
evaluated during the Dress Rehearsal in 2008. Indeed, while the ramp-up
to 2010 is making progress, past experience has shown that Congress has
every reason to remain vigilant. As we have done throughout the past
several decades, we look forward to supporting the subcommittee in its
decision-making and oversight efforts.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Clay, this concludes my prepared statement. I would
be pleased to respond to any questions that you or other members of the
subcommittee might have.
Contact and Acknowledgments:
For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Brenda
S. Farrell on (202) 512-3604, or by e-mail at farrellb@gao.gov.
Individuals making contributions to this testimony included Betty
Clark, Robert Goldenkoff, Carlos E. Hazera, Shirley Hwang, Andrea
Levine, Anne McDonough-Hughes, Lisa Pearson, Michael Volpe, and Timothy
Wexler.
FOOTNOTES
[1] See for example, GAO, 2010 Census: Cost and Design Issues Need to
Be Addressed Soon, GAO-04-37 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 15, 2004), and
GAO, 2010 Census: Basic Design Has Potential, but Remaining Challenges
Need Prompt Resolution, GAO-05-9 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 12, 2005).
[2] The census life cycle extends over a number of years. For the 2000
Census, the life-cycle spanned from fiscal year 1991 through fiscal
year 2003 when the Bureau completed its evaluation activities.
[3] GAO, Decennial Census: Fundamental Design Decisions Merit
Congressional Attention, GAO/T-GGD-96-37 (Washington D.C.: Oct. 25,
1995).
[4] TIGER is a registered trademark of the U.S. Census Bureau.
[5] ACS is intended to be a monthly survey of 250,000 households.
[6] GAO, Census Bureau: Important Activities for Improving Management
of Key 2010 Decennial Acquisitions Remain to be Done, GAO-06-444T,
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 2006).
[7] Census Address List Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-430, Oct. 31,
1994.
[8] GAO, 2000 Census: Local Address Review Program Has Had Mixed
Results to Date, GAO/T-GGD-99-184 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 1999).
[9] See GAO-05-9, p. 30.
[10] GAO, Human Capital: Selected Agencies Have Opportunities to
Enhance Existing Succession Planning and Management Efforts, GAO-05-585
(Washington D.C.: June 30, 2005).
