U.S. Tsunami Preparedness
Federal and State Partners Collaborate to Help Communities Reduce Potential Impacts, but Significant Challenges Remain Gao ID: GAO-06-519 June 5, 2006The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami raised questions about U.S. preparedness for such an event. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) leads U.S. detection and warning efforts and partners with federal and state agencies in the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP) to reduce tsunami risks. In 2005, Congress appropriated $17.24 million in supplemental funding to enhance these efforts. This report (1) identifies U.S. coastal areas facing the greatest tsunami hazard and the extent to which potential impacts have been assessed, (2) discusses the effectiveness of the existing federal tsunami warning system, (3) describes efforts to mitigate the potential impacts of tsunamis on coastal communities, and (4) assesses NOAA's efforts to develop long-range plans for federal tsunami programs.
NOAA has determined that the Pacific coast states of Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon and Washington, as well as Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands in the Caribbean Sea, face the greatest tsunami hazard. The east and Gulf coasts are relatively low-hazard areas. While high-hazard areas have been identified, limited information exists on the likely impacts of a tsunami in those areas. Some coastal areas lack inundation maps showing the potential extent of tsunami flooding in communities, and others have maps that may be unreliable. State assessments of likely tsunami impacts on people and infrastructure have been limited, in part, due to a lack of tsunami loss estimation software, as exists for floods and other hazards. Although federal warning centers quickly detect potential tsunamis and issue warnings, false alarms and warning system limitations hamper their effectiveness. Some state and local emergency managers have raised concerns about false alarms--the 16 warnings issued since 1982 were not followed by destructive tsunamis on U.S. shores--potentially causing citizens to ignore future warnings. Furthermore, limitations in the Emergency Alert System and NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards may impede timely warnings to communities. For example, signal coverage for these two systems is insufficient to transmit warnings to some coastal areas and failure to properly activate them has resulted in warnings being delayed or not transmitted to some locations. NOAA has begun addressing false alarms but, according to agency officials, lacking the states' permission elsewhere, has only conducted "live" end-to-end testing of the warning systems in Alaska to identify problems. The at-risk communities GAO visited have mitigated potential tsunami impacts through planning, warning system improvements, public education, and infrastructure protection, but the level of implementation varies considerably by location. Most of the states and some communities GAO visited have basic mitigation plans identifying tsunami hazards. While all of these locations have multiple warning mechanisms in place, disruptions to key infrastructure such as telephone lines may hamper timely warnings. Furthermore, key educational efforts, such as distributing evacuation maps and developing school curricula have not been consistently implemented. In addition, few states and communities protect critical infrastructure from tsunamis through land-use and building design restrictions. Emergency managers attributed variability in their efforts to the need to focus on more frequent hazards like wildfires and to funding limitations. Furthermore, few communities participate in NOAA's preparedness program, according to NOAA officials, because they perceive the threat of a tsunami to be low. The nationwide expansion of NOAA's tsunami-related activities and NTHMP is under way; however, the future direction of these efforts is uncertain because they lack long-range strategic plans. NOAA has yet to identify long-range goals, establish risk-based priorities, and define performance measures to assess whether its tsunami-related efforts are achieving the desired results.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-519, U.S. Tsunami Preparedness: Federal and State Partners Collaborate to Help Communities Reduce Potential Impacts, but Significant Challenges Remain
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Report to Congressional Committees and Senator Dianne Feinstein:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
June 2006:
U.S. Tsunami Preparedness:
Federal and State Partners Collaborate to Help Communities Reduce
Potential Impacts, but Significant Challenges Remain:
GAO-06-519:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-519, a report to congressional committees and
Senator Dianne Feinstein.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami raised questions about U.S. preparedness
for such an event. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) leads U.S. detection and warning efforts and partners with
federal and state agencies in the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation
Program (NTHMP) to reduce tsunami risks. In 2005, Congress appropriated
$17.24 million in supplemental funding to enhance these efforts.
This report (1) identifies U.S. coastal areas facing the greatest
tsunami hazard and the extent to which potential impacts have been
assessed, (2) discusses the effectiveness of the existing federal
tsunami warning system, (3) describes efforts to mitigate the potential
impacts of tsunamis on coastal communities, and (4) assesses NOAA‘s
efforts to develop long-range plans for federal tsunami programs.
What GAO Found:
NOAA has determined that the Pacific coast states of Alaska,
California, Hawaii, Oregon and Washington, as well as Puerto Rico and
the U.S. Virgin Islands in the Caribbean Sea, face the greatest tsunami
hazard. The east and Gulf coasts are relatively low-hazard areas. While
high-hazard areas have been identified, limited information exists on
the likely impacts of a tsunami in those areas. Some coastal areas lack
inundation maps showing the potential extent of tsunami flooding in
communities, and others have maps that may be unreliable. State
assessments of likely tsunami impacts on people and infrastructure have
been limited, in part, due to a lack of tsunami loss estimation
software, as exists for floods and other hazards. Although federal
warning centers quickly detect potential tsunamis and issue warnings,
false alarms and warning system limitations hamper their effectiveness.
Some state and local emergency managers have raised concerns about
false alarms”the 16 warnings issued since 1982 were not followed by
destructive tsunamis on U.S. shores”potentially causing citizens to
ignore future warnings. Furthermore, limitations in the Emergency Alert
System and NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards may impede timely warnings to
communities. For example, signal coverage for these two systems is
insufficient to transmit warnings to some coastal areas and failure to
properly activate them has resulted in warnings being delayed or not
transmitted to some locations. NOAA has begun addressing false alarms
but, according to agency officials, lacking the states‘ permission
elsewhere, has only conducted ’live“ end-to-end testing of the warning
systems in Alaska to identify problems.
The at-risk communities GAO visited have mitigated potential tsunami
impacts through planning, warning system improvements, public
education, and infrastructure protection, but the level of
implementation varies considerably by location. Most of the states and
some communities GAO visited have basic mitigation plans identifying
tsunami hazards. While all of these locations have multiple warning
mechanisms in place, disruptions to key infrastructure such as
telephone lines may hamper timely warnings. Furthermore, key
educational efforts, such as distributing evacuation maps and
developing school curricula have not been consistently implemented. In
addition, few states and communities protect critical infrastructure
from tsunamis through land-use and building design restrictions.
Emergency managers attributed variability in their efforts to the need
to focus on more frequent hazards like wildfires and to funding
limitations. Furthermore, few communities participate in NOAA‘s
preparedness program, according to NOAA officials, because they
perceive the threat of a tsunami to be low. The nationwide expansion of
NOAA‘s tsunami-related activities and NTHMP is under way; however, the
future direction of these efforts is uncertain because they lack long-
range strategic plans. NOAA has yet to identify long-range goals,
establish risk-based priorities, and define performance measures to
assess whether its tsunami-related efforts are achieving the desired
results.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends, among other things, that NOAA take steps to develop
software for tsunami loss estimation, conduct periodic end-to-end
warning system tests, increase high-risk community participation in its
tsunami preparedness program and prepare risk-based strategic plans for
its efforts.
NOAA reviewed a draft of this report and generally agreed with the
findings and recommendations.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-519].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Anu Mittal at (202) 512-
3841or mittala@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
The Tsunami Hazard Is Greatest in the Pacific States and Caribbean
Territories, but the Potential Impacts Have Not Been Comprehensively
Assessed:
Federal Warning Centers Quickly Detect Potential Tsunamis, but Warning
Systems Have Limitations:
State and Local Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Activities Are Under Way,
although Implementation Varies Considerably among Locations:
Significant Expansion of National Tsunami Preparedness Activities Is
Occurring in the Absence of Long-Term Strategic Planning:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Commerce:
GAO Comment:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
GAO Comments:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of the Interior:
GAO Comment:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Relative Tsunami Hazard for Distant and Local Tsunamis in U.S.
Coastal Areas:
Figures:
Figure 1: Subduction Zone Earthquakes Generate Tsunamis:
Figure 2: Sea-Level Tsunami Detection Methods:
Figure 3: Overview of Tsunami Warning Flow:
Figure 4: Pacific Ocean Subduction Zones Surround Hawaii:
Figure 5: The Cascadia Subduction Zone:
Figure 6: The Aleutian Subduction Zone:
Figure 7: The Puerto Rico Trench Subduction Zone:
Figure 8: Tsunami Warning Signal Transmission for EAS and NOAA Weather
Radio:
Figure 9: Tsunami Hazard Zone Signs:
Figure 10: TsunamiReady Sign for Communities:
Abbreviations:
DART: Deep-ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis:
EAS: Emergency Alert System:
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency:
HAZUS--MH: Hazards U.S.-- Multi-Hazard:
NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration:
NTHMP: National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program:
NWS: National Weather Service:
USGS: U.S. Geological Survey:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 5, 2006:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Chairman:
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Co-Chairman:
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Don Young:
Chairman:
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable James L. Oberstar:
Ranking Democratic Member:
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Dianne Feinstein:
United States Senate:
The Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004 killed more than 200,000
people, displaced more than 1.5 million, and caused significant damage
in 12 countries in Asia and East Africa. Although the earthquake that
triggered the tsunami was immediately detected, the existence of a
tsunami was not quickly confirmed, and a warning message was not
delivered to most of those in the tsunami's path. As a result,
casualties and damage occurred not only near the earthquake's source,
where communities had little time to react, but also in distant coastal
communities that were impacted by tsunami waves hours later. The
devastation caused by the Indian Ocean tsunami has raised concerns
about the vulnerability and preparedness of U.S. coastal communities
and the ability of our detection and warning systems to help prevent a
similarly destructive event.
A tsunami is a series of ocean waves typically generated by an
underwater earthquake.[Footnote 1] A tsunami wave may be very small in
the deep ocean, but as it approaches land can increase to tens of feet
in height and reach shore as a fast-moving wall of turbulent water.
Tsunamis pose an inundation threat to low-lying coastal communities
from multiple destructive waves that can penetrate far inland. Tsunamis
are categorized as either distant or local. Distant tsunamis travel
long distances from their triggering events to strike the coast hours
later, allowing time to warn and evacuate threatened communities. Local
tsunamis strike the coast minutes after their near-shore triggering
event, allowing little time for warning and evacuation. However, the
frequency of damaging tsunamis in the United States has been low,
compared with other natural hazards, such as hurricanes, earthquakes,
and floods.
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) manages
federal tsunami detection and warning efforts. NOAA's National Weather
Service (NWS) operates two tsunami warning centers whose staff monitor
seismic data and, based on the location and magnitude of earthquakes,
issue warnings when tsunamis are likely. The warning centers transmit a
tsunami warning message to NWS forecast offices and state emergency
management centers, among others.[Footnote 2] NWS forecast offices
transmit the warning over NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards (NOAA Weather
Radio) and the Emergency Alert System. NOAA Weather Radio is a
nationwide network of radio stations broadcasting continuous weather
information, including warnings, watches, forecasts and other hazard
information, 24 hours a day directly from NWS weather forecast offices.
The Federal Communication Commission's Emergency Alert System, designed
to provide the President a means to communicate with the American
people in the event of an emergency, can decode and retransmit NOAA
Weather Radio warning messages over radio and television broadcast and
cable systems.
Federal, state, and local government agencies are all involved in
efforts to reduce the potential impacts of tsunamis through education,
hazard assessment, mitigation planning, and other activities. For
example, NOAA operates a tsunami preparedness recognition program known
as TsunamiReady that encourages communities to educate citizens on
tsunami hazards, develop tsunami hazard plans, and establish local
warning systems, among other things. In addition, NOAA provides
leadership and funding for the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation
Program (NTHMP). This program, initiated in 1996, has been a
partnership between NOAA; the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS); the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); and five states--Alaska,
California, Hawaii, Oregon and Washington--to assess tsunami hazards,
improve and coordinate tsunami warning systems, and develop state and
local hazard mitigation programs.[Footnote 3] For example, under the
NTHMP, NOAA provides funding and technical support to help the states
produce inundation maps showing the extent to which coastal areas may
be flooded by a tsunami. Communities use these maps to help identify
people and property at-risk and to develop strategies for mitigating
the hazard. Furthermore, the Stafford Act, as amended by the Disaster
Mitigation Act of 2000, requires all states and localities to develop
FEMA-approved hazard mitigation plans to qualify for certain disaster
relief funding.[Footnote 4] These plans provide a framework for states
and communities to assess their vulnerability to all hazards and, if a
significant tsunami threat exists, develop approaches to reduce tsunami
impacts on people and infrastructure within their jurisdictions.
In May 2005, the Congress appropriated $17.24 million in supplemental
funds for NOAA to expand and improve its tsunami detection
capabilities, enhance warning center operations and facilities, produce
tsunami inundation forecast models, and expand the TsunamiReady program
participation nationwide.[Footnote 5] In fiscal year 2006, $9.82
million in appropriations were designated for tsunami-related
activities, and NOAA requested $21.66 million for fiscal year
2007.[Footnote 6] NOAA is initially spending these funds primarily on
enhancing its tsunami detection capabilities, for example, by expanding
its network of Deep-ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis (DART)
detection stations in the Pacific Ocean to 39 stations covering the
Pacific and Atlantic Oceans and the Caribbean Sea.
To address questions regarding the status of national tsunami
preparedness, this report (1) identifies U.S. coastal areas facing the
greatest tsunami hazard and the extent to which potential tsunami
impacts on people and infrastructure have been assessed; (2) discusses
the effectiveness of the existing federal tsunami warning system; (3)
describes ongoing local, state, and federal agency efforts to mitigate
the potential impacts of tsunamis on coastal communities; and (4)
assesses NOAA's efforts to develop long-range plans for federal tsunami
programs.
In conducting our work, we visited the states participating in the
NTHMP--Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington--as well as
Puerto Rico and Florida. We met with federal, state, and local
officials, reviewed documentation related to tsunami hazard assessment,
warning and mitigation efforts, and analyzed plans for current and
future tsunami preparedness activities. To identify the U.S. coastal
areas facing the greatest tsunami hazard and the extent to which their
vulnerability to tsunami impacts has been assessed, we reviewed
historic and seismic data and analysis from NOAA and other federal and
state sources. For the states facing the greatest tsunami hazards, we
determined the extent to which tsunami inundation maps identifying the
potential vulnerability of people and infrastructure have been
prepared, and reviewed each state's FEMA-approved, all-hazard
mitigation plan to determine how and to what extent tsunami impacts
have been assessed.
To discuss the effectiveness of the current federal tsunami warning
system, we visited both of NOAA's tsunami warning centers and met with
officials to discuss how they conduct their detection and warning
responsibilities and how they measure their effectiveness. In addition,
we visited selected NOAA warning forecast offices, met with officials
to determine how tsunami warnings are disseminated and tracked, and met
with state emergency managers to determine how they receive warnings
and to obtain their views regarding the effectiveness of the warnings.
We also reviewed reports prepared by NOAA and by state emergency
managers that evaluated the effectiveness of warnings issued by NOAA on
June 14, 2005, due to a potentially tsunami-generating earthquake off
the Northern California coastline.
To describe local, state, and federal agency efforts to mitigate the
potential impacts of tsunamis on coastal communities, we initially met
with state emergency managers and reviewed state mitigation documents.
Because comprehensive statewide data on local mitigation activities
does not exist, we next visited selected at-risk communities
recommended by state emergency managers. The communities we visited are
Seward and Kodiak, Alaska; San Mateo County and Crescent City,
California; Hilo and Honolulu, Hawaii; Seaside and Gold Beach, Oregon;
Mayaguez and Rincon, Puerto Rico; and Ocean Shores and Long Beach,
Washington. We discussed tsunami preparedness efforts with the
community emergency managers, such as planning, warning, education and
outreach, infrastructure protection, and the TsunamiReady program and
obtained documentation of their efforts and activities in these areas.
We also met with NOAA officials involved with the TsunamiReady program
and reviewed program documentation.
To assess NOAA's efforts to develop long-range plans for federal
tsunami programs, we met with NOAA officials and reviewed plans for
NOAA's ongoing tsunami activities, as well as schedules for the
completion of NOAA's Tsunami Program expansion. We also met with
National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program participants, including
NOAA, USGS, FEMA, and state representatives and reviewed program
documentation to determine how NOAA is planning for the future
management and direction of its tsunami activities.
We conducted our work between April 2005 and March 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
The coastal areas of the five states bordering the Pacific Ocean and
U.S. territories in the Caribbean face the greatest tsunami hazard, but
reliable and comprehensive assessments of the potential impacts on
people and infrastructure have not been completed for many of these
areas. According to NOAA, the general areas most threatened by both
distant and local tsunamis are Hawaii and the west coast states of
California, Oregon, and Washington, whereas Alaska, Puerto Rico, and
the U.S. Virgin Islands are threatened primarily by local tsunamis.
Historically, the east coast and the Gulf coast tsunami hazards are
relatively low. Because inundation maps are the foundation for
evaluating potential tsunami impacts on communities, map production has
been a high priority for NOAA and the threatened states. However,
progress on this front has been slow--for example, Alaska has
inundation maps for only 5 of 60 at-risk communities--primarily because
accurate maps are complex and costly for states to produce. To
effectively prepare for a tsunami, states and localities also need to
assess the potential impacts of a tsunami on people and infrastructure.
While FEMA has standardized computer software for comprehensively
estimating the likely human, structural, and economic damages from
natural disasters such as floods, hurricanes and earthquakes, no such
tool exists for tsunamis. For this and other reasons, California and
Alaska have not specifically assessed potential tsunami losses, while
the other at-risk areas have produced limited tsunami damage
assessments. Consequently, emergency managers in the at-risk states and
U.S. territories do not have comprehensive information on how many and
what types of structures would be exposed and damaged, how many people
could be injured or killed, or the extent of potential short and long-
term economic impacts of a tsunami. We are recommending that NOAA work
with FEMA and USGS to create standardized tsunami loss estimation
software.
Although NWS's warning centers can quickly detect potential tsunamis
and issue warnings, the effectiveness of these warnings is hampered by
false alarms and limitations in the federal systems that transmit
warnings to the local level. NWS's warning centers have rapidly
analyzed seismic data to detect potential tsunamis, and if the location
and magnitude of an earthquake indicated that a tsunami was likely, the
centers generally issued a warning within 5 to 10 minutes for local
tsunamis. However, some state and local emergency management officials
have raised concerns about false alarms, because the warnings proved to
be unnecessary--no damaging waves actually reached U.S. shores
following the 16 warnings issued since 1982--or were overly broad and
included communities that were not imminently threatened. Such warnings
can cause unnecessary and costly evacuations and, experts warn, may
cause people to ignore future warnings. NWS has begun addressing false
alarm concerns, for example, by expanding the network of DART stations
that help warning centers confirm whether a tsunami has been generated,
but it has not set specific performance targets for reducing the
number, scope, and duration of false alarms. We are recommending that
NOAA take specific steps, such as reexamining its rules for when a
warning will be issued and to which areas, to reduce false alarms.
Furthermore, although NWS warning centers effectively transmit tsunami
warnings to NWS forecast offices, these offices do not always send
timely warnings to affected local areas because the two primary federal
warning alert systems--the Emergency Alert System and NOAA Weather
Radio--have significant limitations. For example, signal coverage for
these two systems is insufficient to transmit warnings to some coastal
areas. This shortcoming was highlighted in June 2005, when an actual
tsunami warning for the west coast was issued but signal problems
prevented the warning from reaching portions of the coasts of
Washington and Oregon. Also, to properly activate these warning
systems, NWS forecast office staff must enter a tsunami-specific code
into a computer. During the June 2005 event, failure to do so in a
timely manner or at all resulted in warnings being delayed or not
transmitted to some locations. NOAA has only conducted end-to-end tests
of the tsunami warning system using actual "live" warning codes, rather
than test codes, in Alaska to identify problems before actual events
occur. In commenting on a draft of this report, NOAA said that it
conducts such end-to-end testing where allowed and uses test codes in
other states. We are recommending that NOAA continue to work with the
states to conduct end-to-end testing that ensures the system will
function as intended during an emergency.
The at-risk communities we visited have taken actions to mitigate
tsunami impacts through planning, warning system improvements, public
education, and infrastructure protection; however, the level of
implementation among these locations varies considerably. Each of the
six states we visited have FEMA-approved, all-hazard mitigation plans
that identify tsunami hazards; and most have taken the additional step
of identifying actions to mitigate those hazards, such as relocating
critical facilities out of inundation zones. However, only 4 of the 12
communities we visited have developed FEMA-approved plans that include
tsunami mitigation projects. Further, while all of the states and
communities we visited have developed some mechanisms for warning
people about a tsunami threat, communications problems may hamper some
communities' ability to receive and disseminate warnings in a timely
manner. For example, during the west coast tsunami warning in June
2005, many 911 dispatch centers and telephone lines were overloaded, in
some cases, preventing local emergency managers from quickly
disseminating the warning to other local officials and preventing
telephone-based warning systems from reaching residents. Moreover,
while state and local officials recognize the need to educate the
public, key efforts identified by tsunami preparedness experts--such as
distributing evacuation maps and developing school curricula--have not
been consistently implemented across the states and communities we
visited. For example, only two of the six at-risk states we visited
have developed and implemented tsunami preparedness curricula in
schools. In addition, few states and localities have implemented long-
term mitigation efforts such as land-use restrictions and building
design codes to prevent loss of life and reduce economic damage.
Overall, state and local emergency managers attributed the variability
in tsunami preparedness efforts to a variety of factors, including
their focus on other higher priority natural hazards and a lack of
funding. Furthermore, only a few communities in coastal areas have
chosen to participate in NOAA's voluntary TsunamiReady program, which
is designed to help them take the initial steps in tsunami mitigation.
NOAA officials believe that TsunamiReady participation is limited
because of community perceptions of a low tsunami threat and perceived
high cost versus benefit. We are recommending that NOAA evaluate the
TsunamiReady program to determine how to increase participation by high-
risk communities.
Efforts are under way to significantly expand federal tsunami detection
and related activities as well as the NTHMP; however, the future
direction of these efforts is uncertain because NOAA has not
established long-range strategic plans to guide them. Strategic plans
are important because they help agencies set specific program goals and
objectives, define performance measures for assessing program
effectiveness, ensure coordination of existing activities and establish
risk-based priorities. Prior to the Indian Ocean tsunami in December
2004, NOAA's various tsunami-related activities, such as warning center
operations, the TsunamiReady program, and tsunami-related research,
were not managed as a formal, integrated program. NOAA combined the
activities in 2005 into a single program and is currently strengthening
and expanding certain elements of the program. However, NOAA has not
yet adopted a comprehensive, risk-based strategic plan to guide its
expanded tsunami program into the future. NOAA officials told us they
expect to finalize such a plan during 2006. In addition, the plan that
NOAA is using to guide the NTHMP activities has not been updated since
1996, and the program's performance has not been formally assessed
since 2001. As a result, some issues raised in the 2001 assessment,
such as lack of performance measures, remain concerns of state NTHMP
members today. Representatives of the five original high-hazard NTHMP
states are also concerned that the program's funding decisions and
strategic direction may become less risk-based as states that face
relatively low hazards join the program. Without an updated, risk-based
strategic plan for the expanded NTHMP, NOAA will have difficulty
ensuring that the most threatened states get the resources they need to
continue and complete key mitigation activities. We are recommending
that NOAA evaluate the NTHMP to determine what has worked well and what
high-priority activities remain to be completed and develop
comprehensive risk-based strategic plans for the Tsunami Program and
NTHMP.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Commerce
representing NOAA agreed with all of our recommendations and indicated
that steps will be taken to implement them. The Department of Homeland
Security representing FEMA concurred with our recommendation that NOAA
should work with FEMA and USGS to create standardized tsunami loss
estimation software. However the department noted that FEMA does not
have the resources to pursue such a request; and therefore, any request
of assistance on this issue from NOAA would have to address these
resource constraints. The Department of the Interior did not comment on
our recommendations. The comments from the Departments of Commerce,
Homeland Security, and the Interior appear in appendixes I, II and III.
Background:
Tsunamis are typically generated by underwater earthquakes--
landslides, volcanic activity, and meteor strikes are other known, but
less common, tsunami sources. Tsunami generating earthquakes usually
occur in subduction zones, such as those found in the Pacific Ocean off
the U.S. western and Alaskan coasts, as well as in the Caribbean.
Marked by deep trenches in the seafloor, subduction zones are formed
where one of the earth's outer shell of tectonic plates plunges
underneath another.[Footnote 7] Usually the plates are gradually moving
past each other, but friction may temporarily lock them together,
causing stress to build up between the plates. Sometimes the stress is
relieved suddenly in the form of a large earthquake. As shown in figure
1, the bottom plate dives farther down, snapping the top plate
violently upward, disturbing the overlying seawater. The size of the
resulting tsunami depends on a complex set of factors, including the
size of the earthquake, its depth below the ocean floor, the depth of
the water, the type and amount of seafloor movement and the energy
released.
Figure 1: Subduction Zone Earthquakes Generate Tsunamis:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Once generated, some tsunami waves move quickly inland while other
waves head toward the open ocean, often at speeds up to 600 miles per
hour. Therefore, a tsunami generated by an earthquake off the coast of
Alaska would be a local tsunami for that state's coastal areas, and
could strike within minutes of the event, while the same event is
considered a distant tsunami for the coast of Washington state, which
would not likely be hit until 3 or more hours later.
While tsunamis can be a high impact natural hazard, the frequency of
damaging tsunamis in the United States has been low, compared with
other natural hazards. According to NOAA's records, the last tsunami
causing significant impacts was at Skagway, Alaska, in November 1994,
where the landslide and associated tsunami caused one death and $25
million in damages. According to FEMA, flooding, severe storms, and
hurricanes are the most common and costly causes of disaster
declarations in the United States; at least 10 such events since 1989
have each required FEMA relief expenditures in excess of a billion
dollars. Although damaging tsunamis are relatively rare, the
devastation caused by the Indian Ocean tsunami demonstrates the need
for assessing the threat, and for monitoring and preparing for an event
in at-risk areas, particularly low-lying, seismically active coastal
areas.
The West Coast/Alaska Tsunami Warning Center in Palmer, Alaska, is
responsible for warning Alaska, the west coast and east coast states,
and states along the Gulf of Mexico, while the Richard H. Hagemeyer,
Pacific Tsunami Warning Center in Ewa Beach, Hawaii, is responsible for
warning Hawaii and U.S. territories in the Pacific Ocean and Caribbean
Sea.[Footnote 8] These warning centers use two types of data for
determining when to issue a tsunami warning. First, they receive and
analyze earthquake data from seismic networks operated by NOAA, USGS,
the states, and universities to determine whether to issue a
warning.[Footnote 9] If the seismic data indicate that a local tsunami
may be generated, the responsible warning center issues a warning based
on the earthquake data alone. Second, the warning centers analyze sea-
level data to determine whether a tsunami has actually been generated,
and if not, cancel the warning. The centers receive sea-level data
through a network of DART stations and sea-level gauges, as shown in
figure 2. DART stations consist of a seafloor bottom-pressure recording
system that is capable of detecting tsunamis smaller than 1 inch and is
connected to a surface buoy that transmits the data by satellite to
NOAA. Scientists at the warning centers incorporate the data from the
DART stations into tsunami forecast models to estimate the size of the
expected waves and the potential impact on coastal areas. The tsunami
warning centers have used forecast models they developed, as well as
models developed by NOAA's Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory,
which produce expected tsunami inundations at nine high-risk
locations.[Footnote 10]
Figure 2: Sea-Level Tsunami Detection Methods:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
A network of federal, state, and local government agencies are
responsible for ensuring that a tsunami warning reaches the public.
Figure 3 provides an overview of the key components of this process.
The federal tsunami warning centers send a warning to NWS forecast
offices and state emergency management centers by multiple means, such
as FEMA's National Warning System, a dedicated telephone hotline, and
NWS's satellite-based National Weather Wire Service.[Footnote 11] The
forecast offices, in turn, transmit the warning over NOAA Weather Radio
and the Emergency Alert System (EAS). State emergency managers receive
tsunami warnings from NWS and then warn counties and local communities
using multiple methods, including a dedicated telephone network for
state and local emergency management officials. Finally, county and
local officials are responsible for warning the public and issuing
evacuation orders, using a variety of methods including bullhorns,
sirens, and telephone systems.
Figure 3: Overview of Tsunami Warning Flow:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Federal, state, and local government agencies also conduct hazard
mitigation activities to reduce the potential impacts of tsunamis. At
the federal level, NWS operates the TsunamiReady community recognition
program. Initiated in 2000, TsunamiReady is modeled after NWS's
StormReady program for hurricanes and tornados. NWS meteorologists in
regional forecast offices are responsible for reviewing applications
from coastal communities and ensuring that they meet program
requirements in conjunction with state emergency management officials.
NOAA also provides a chairperson and funding for the NTHMP. From 1998
through 2001, NOAA provided $2.3 million annually for the NTHMP,
increasing to $4.3 million annually in 2002 through 2005, and returning
to $2.3 million in 2006. Initially, the five participating states each
received less than $100,000 annually from the NTHMP, but in recent
years they have each received approximately $275,000 annually to
directly supplement their individual mitigation efforts, while NOAA and
the other federal partners used the remaining funds to support their
own activities under the program. NOAA estimates that since the
program's inception the states have matched the NTHMP funding by a
ratio of six state in-kind or dollar contributions for every program
dollar.
The Tsunami Hazard Is Greatest in the Pacific States and Caribbean
Territories, but the Potential Impacts Have Not Been Comprehensively
Assessed:
Tsunamis pose the greatest hazard to the coastal areas of the five
states bordering the Pacific Ocean and U.S. territories in the
Caribbean, but for many of these areas reliable, comprehensive
assessments of potential tsunami impacts on people and infrastructure
have not been completed. Some high-hazard coastal areas do not have
tsunami inundation maps--the foundation for evaluating potential
tsunami impacts on communities--showing the extent to which a tsunami
would penetrate inland and flood communities, while others have maps
that may not be reliable. Progress in developing these maps has been
slow, primarily because accurate maps are complex and costly for states
to produce. Furthermore, states and communities do not have
comprehensive information on the potential human, structural, and
economic impacts of a tsunami. While FEMA has standardized computer
software for estimating losses resulting from natural disasters such as
floods, hurricanes, and earthquakes, no such tool exists for assessing
tsunamis.
The Coastal Areas of the Pacific United States, Puerto Rico, and the
U.S. Virgin Islands Face the Greatest Tsunami Hazards:
According to NOAA, the general areas most threatened by both distant
and local tsunami hazards are Hawaii and the west coast states of
California, Oregon, and Washington, whereas Alaska and the Caribbean
Islands of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands are threatened
primarily by local tsunamis, as shown in table 1. The hazard levels are
primarily based on tsunami source, height, and frequency information
since 1900--the most reliable and accurate information available--from
NOAA's National Geophysical Data Center tsunami database.
Table 1: Relative Tsunami Hazard for Distant and Local Tsunamis in U.S.
Coastal Areas:
Coastal area: Hawaiian;
Distant tsunami hazard: High;
Local tsunami hazard: High.
Coastal area: Western;
Distant tsunami hazard: High;
Local tsunami hazard: Medium.
Coastal area: Alaskan;
Distant tsunami hazard: Low;
Local tsunami hazard: High.
Coastal area: Caribbean;
Distant tsunami hazard: Low;
Local tsunami hazard: High.
Coastal area: Eastern;
Distant tsunami hazard: Low;
Local tsunami hazard: Low.
Coastal area: Gulf;
Distant tsunami hazard: Low;
Local tsunami hazard: Low.
Source: NOAA.
[End of table]
According to NOAA, Hawaii is a high-hazard area for distant and local
tsunamis. Hawaii has experienced many destructive tsunamis because of
its location in the Pacific Ocean, as shown in figure 4, where about 80
percent of all recorded tsunamis have occurred. More than one-half of
all tsunamis recorded in the Hawaiian Islands were generated in the
distant Aleutian regions of the northern and northwestern Pacific
Ocean, and about one-fourth were generated along the western coast of
South America. Hawaii's local tsunami threat stems from earthquake and
volcanic activity, which cause underwater landslides off the coast.
Hawaii suffered its greatest tsunami death and destruction in 1946,
when an earthquake in the Aleutian Islands generated a tsunami that
reportedly killed 159 people. Hilo, Hawaii suffered the greatest loss-
-96 deaths and the destruction of its waterfront area. Since 1946, an
additional five tsunamis--four distant and one local--have caused a
reported 63 deaths and widespread destruction.
Figure 4: Pacific Ocean Subduction Zones Surround Hawaii:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
NOAA considers the west coast a high-hazard area for distant tsunamis
and medium-hazard area for local tsunamis. Like Hawaii, the west coast
historically has suffered the most destruction from tsunamis generated
by Pacific earthquakes in the distant South America and Aleutian
regions. In California, two tsunamis have caused significant damage.
The 1960 Chilean earthquake caused estimated tsunami damages of over $1
million, and the tsunami generated by the 1964 Alaskan event killed 12
in Northern California and caused an estimated $15 million in
destruction, including damages inside San Francisco Bay. Oregon and
Washington both have sustained damages in coastal areas from distant
tsunamis over the years. Although distant tsunamis historically have
been most common, a local tsunami generated by the 750 mile long
Cascadia subduction zone, lying just 50 to 100 miles off the coasts of
Washington, Oregon, and Northern California, is considered a major
threat. (See fig. 5.) Geologic and other records from a Cascadia
earthquake in 1700 suggest that the fault could generate a tsunami wave
of up to 30 feet that would likely reach the Oregon coast in 15 to 30
minutes, raising concerns of a catastrophic future event.
Figure 5: The Cascadia Subduction Zone:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Alaska is a high-hazard area for local tsunamis, but a low-hazard area
for distant tsunamis, according to NOAA. The local tsunami threat to
Alaska is caused by seismic activity in the Aleutian subduction zone
where the Pacific and North-American tectonic plates collide, as shown
in figure 6. Tsunamis generated by earthquake induced landslides
occurring inside bays have been responsible for most death and damage
in Alaska. The 1964 Alaskan earthquake triggered several tsunamis that
in some cases struck land within 2 minutes of being generated. The
tsunamis caused 106 deaths in Alaska and caused significant damage in
the towns of Kodiak, Seward, Whittier, and Valdez. Only once has a
distant tsunami caused damage in Alaska; the 1960 Chilean earthquake
caused relatively minor tsunami impacts on Alaskan harbors.
Figure 6: The Aleutian Subduction Zone:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The Caribbean area, including the U.S. territories of Puerto Rico and
the U.S. Virgin Islands, is a high-hazard area for local tsunamis but a
low-hazard area for distant tsunamis, according to NOAA. The local
tsunami threat posed to the islands comes primarily from the potential
for earthquakes and underwater landslides in the Puerto Rico Trench
subduction zone that lies to the north of both Puerto Rico and the U.S.
Virgin Islands, as shown in figure 7. Puerto Rico's most devastating
event of the last century occurred in 1918, when an earthquake off the
northwest coast generated a tsunami of more than 15 feet, causing an
estimated 140 deaths and about $4 million in property damages. In the
town of Aguadilla, nearly 300 homes were destroyed. In the U.S. Virgin
Islands, an 1867 earthquake in the Anegada Trench sent destructive
waves into the harbor of Charlotte Amelie on the island of Saint
Thomas, destroying boats, the wharf, and the waterfront.
Figure 7: The Puerto Rico Trench Subduction Zone:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
According to NOAA, the Atlantic and Gulf state coasts are relatively
low-hazard areas for distant or local tsunamis, with few reliable
reports of tsunami waves of any size ever reaching either coast. This
is a consequence of the low level of tsunami generating seismic
activity nearby--the nearest subduction zones are in the Caribbean.
Historically, none of the tsunamis generated in the Atlantic Ocean
region has significantly affected the east coast of the United States.
For example, the 1929 Grand Banks earthquake-induced landslide caused a
tsunami which killed 29 in Newfoundland but only resulted in a wave
height of 1 foot on the U.S. coast, and a distant tsunami generated by
a massive earthquake near Lisbon, Portugal in 1755 had no observed
impact on the U.S. coast. The potential distant threat from the
collapse of a volcanic island off the coast of Africa is the subject of
scientific debate, and the potential for a local tsunami-generating
collapse of the continental shelf off of the east coast is being
investigated but is unconfirmed. Regarding the Gulf coast, an
earthquake in the Caribbean is considered the most likely source of a
tsunami; however, scientists believe that Florida and Cuba protect the
Gulf from Caribbean tsunamis and that the Gulf is unlikely to propagate
a large, destructive tsunami wave.
Potential Tsunami Impacts on People and Infrastructure Have Not Been
Comprehensively or Reliably Assessed:
Because inundation maps are the foundation for evaluating the potential
impacts of tsunami events, producing such maps has been a high priority
since 1996 for NOAA and the five states participating in the NTHMP. To
optimize time and resources, the NTHMP partners agreed that (1) the
states would identify the high-priority communities to be mapped; (2)
NOAA, state, and university tsunami modeling scientists would use
models to produce inundation information for high-priority areas
identified by the states; and (3) state and local officials would
produce and publish official inundation maps. NOAA's Center for Tsunami
Inundation Mapping Efforts at its Pacific Marine Environmental
Laboratory assists the modelers and the states in their efforts.
Although the NTHMP planned to complete mapping for all at-risk U.S.
coastal communities by 1999, progress has been slowed, primarily
because more accurate--but also more complex and costly--mapping
techniques have been adopted by the states. Initially, the NTHMP
planned to use relatively simple modeling technology because this
approach would require fewer resources than the more advanced
technique, known as two-dimensional modeling, which requires detailed
seafloor and coastal terrain data to accurately model wave action and
impact. Upon comparison of these two technologies, the NTHMP decided in
December 1996 to use two-dimensional modeling techniques for all
mapping. While the NTHMP members recognized that adopting two-
dimensional modeling would reduce the pace of modeling and mapping,
they agreed that the decision would result in products of improved
detail, quality, and reliability.
Consequently, in the five states participating in the NTHMP, some
coastal areas currently do not have two-dimensional tsunami inundation
maps, while other coastal areas have inundation maps that predate
current modeling standards and therefore may not be reliable.[Footnote
12] Specifically:
* Alaska has produced two-dimensional inundation maps for 5
communities, while 60 additional communities are prioritized, but have
yet to be mapped;
* California has produced two-dimensional inundation maps for 11
coastal counties, excluding some areas such as harbors, while maps are
being produced for the remaining 4 counties;
* Hawaii has 66 maps covering the entire coastline that predate current
modeling standards; because the existing maps may underestimate
inundation areas, the state initiated a two-dimensional mapping program
in 2005 that has produced one map;
* Oregon has 52 maps covering the entire coastline that predate current
modeling standards; since 1996 the state has produced two-dimensional
maps for 9 communities, and 17 additional communities are prioritized
but have not yet been mapped; and:
* Washington has two-dimensional maps for its southern coast as well as
many northern areas, while eight additional maps have been prioritized
but remain incomplete for certain coastal bay and Puget Sound
communities.
To effectively prepare for a tsunami, states and localities also need
to assess potential impacts on people and infrastructure. According to
FEMA risk assessment guidance, after mapping how and where hazards will
impact an area, planners should determine what elements of the
population, infrastructure, and economy will be impacted by the hazards
and estimate the potential losses that could occur. According to FEMA,
estimating losses is essential for decision making at all levels of
government, including providing a basis for developing mitigation plans
and policies, emergency preparedness, and response and recovery
planning.
Each of the five Pacific region states, as well as Puerto Rico and the
U.S. Virgin Islands, have identified tsunamis as a hazard in their FEMA-
approved, all-hazard mitigation plans.[Footnote 13] To obtain FEMA
approval, states are required to describe and estimate losses--based on
their own and local jurisdiction assessments--for state-owned or -
operated buildings, infrastructure, and critical facilities in areas
subject to hazards. According to FEMA, the agency deliberately took the
approach of not being highly prescriptive regarding the development of
the plans--focusing its requirements more on what should be done rather
than how it should be done--in recognition of the inherent differences
among states in terms of size, resources, capabilities, and
vulnerability. For example, states are highly encouraged, but not
required, to consider impacts on vulnerable populations, in particular
elderly, disabled, and low-income persons, and to analyze the potential
economic and human impact that each hazard would have statewide. FEMA
also encourages the use of several tools in preparing damage
assessments, such as HAZUS-MH (Hazards U.S.--Multi-Hazard), which is
standardized computer software for comprehensively estimating the
likely human, structural, and economic damages from earthquakes,
floods, and hurricane winds. However, HAZUS-MH does not include a
tsunami loss estimation module; and according to FEMA, there is no
similarly reliable tool for estimating tsunami losses.
The National Science and Technology Council's December 2005 report on
tsunami risk reduction specifically called for FEMA, NOAA, and USGS to
take responsibility for developing a coordinated risk-assessment tool-
-e.g., HAZUS--for effective use in tsunami risk assessments.[Footnote
14] The National Institute of Building Sciences--which produced the
existing HAZUS-MH software for other hazards in partnership with FEMA-
-has estimated that developing tsunami loss estimation methods and
software would take about 3 years, at a cost of up to $10 million. A
standardized tsunami loss estimation tool would not only help the
existing five NTHMP-member states conduct risk assessments, but it
would also be useful to any additional states joining the NTHMP as it
expands into a national program; and it could also help the NTHMP and
NOAA prioritize tsunami activities to focus on the areas most
vulnerable to tsunami losses.
Because of the lack of tsunami inundation maps, the variability in
approaches that was allowed in the all-hazard plans, and the lack of a
standardized tsunami loss estimation tool, some at-risk states have not
specifically assessed potential tsunami impacts, while other at-risk
states or territories have produced assessments that do not provide
complete loss information for all areas. Consequently, emergency
managers in the at-risk states and territories do not have
comprehensive information on how many and what types of structures
would be exposed and damaged, how many people would likely be injured
or killed, or the extent of likely short-and long-term economic impacts
in the event of a tsunami.[Footnote 15] For example:
* Alaska has not assessed tsunami impacts because the state lacks
detailed inundation information for many at-risk coastal communities;
* California assessed impacts from its high-risk earthquake hazard
where tsunamis are identified as a subhazard, but the state has not
specifically assessed tsunami impacts; and:
* Hawaii assessed tsunami impacts on the state's critical
infrastructure and estimated the average annualized property loss; but
the state did not estimate injuries, deaths or the overall economic
impacts due to tsunamis.
According to NOAA officials, risk assessments for coastal areas
requires the careful analysis of information such as tsunami frequency,
site-specific tsunami inundation levels, and population density; but
they acknowledge that such information is not available for many at-
risk areas. Nevertheless, in March 2006, NOAA developed a preliminary
estimate of the tsunami risk to people on beaches in various areas,
including the Pacific region, Florida's east coast, and the Caribbean
region. Based on historical tsunami frequency information from the
1700's to the present, and estimates of current daily beach attendance,
NOAA's analysis suggests that while large tsunamis occur more often in
the Pacific region, over a 100-year time frame, the potential loss of
life in the Caribbean and Florida regions could be greater due to
higher beach attendance in these warm water locations.
Federal Warning Centers Quickly Detect Potential Tsunamis, but Warning
Systems Have Limitations:
NWS's two tsunami warning centers quickly detect potential tsunamis and
issue warnings, but the effectiveness of these warnings has been
hampered by frequent false alarms and limitations in the federal
systems that transmit warnings to the local level. Experts warn that
false alarms may generate unnecessary and costly evacuations and cause
people to ignore future warnings. NWS is working to reduce the number
and duration of false alarms, but it has not established any specific
performance targets for reducing them. Furthermore, although the
warning centers quickly transmit tsunami warnings to NWS forecast
offices, the forecast offices do not always send timely warnings to
affected local areas because the two primary federal warning systems--
the Emergency Alert System and NOAA Weather Radio--have significant
limitations.
NWS Quickly Detects Potential Tsunamis and Issues Warnings, but False
Alarms Are a Concern:
NWS's tsunami warning centers' goal is to issue "timely, accurate,
reliable, and effective" warnings to protect coastal populations from
tsunamis. Based on warning center data, the centers issued timely
warning bulletins, generally within 5 to 10 minutes for local
events.[Footnote 16] The tsunami warning centers have consistently
reduced their average annual time to issue bulletins--from 11 minutes
in 1996 to 6.4 minutes in 2005 for the center in Alaska, and from 16
minutes in 1996 to 4.5 minutes in 2005 for the center in Hawaii.
According to tsunami warning center officials, more and better quality
seismic data, as well as improved analysis techniques and computer
equipment over the last decade, have enabled faster bulletin issuance.
While the warning centers are able to detect potential tsunamis and
issue timely warnings, some state and local officials have raised
concerns about their accuracy and reliability due to false alarms. No
destructive tsunami has reached U.S. shores following any of the 16
warnings--primarily for local tsunamis--issued to states by the warning
centers since 1982. According to warning center officials, their
responsibility to provide timely warnings requires them to broadcast
warnings based on limited, preliminary earthquake information before
any resulting tsunami wave is actually observed. However, according to
emergency response experts, such false alarms can generate costly,
potentially dangerous evacuations and may cause people to ignore
critical warnings in the future. For example, according to the state of
Hawaii's most recent estimate, an evacuation from a tsunami false alarm
in 1996 would have cost the state $58.2 million in economic losses, or-
-adjusted for inflation--about $71 million in 2006 dollars.
According to some state and local emergency management officials, a
false alarm occurred in June 2005, when they received a tsunami warning
from NWS that they felt was too broad. On June 14, 2005, the warning
center in Alaska detected a 7.2 magnitude earthquake 90 miles off the
Northern California coast. The center quickly issued a warning for all
coastal areas that were within two hours of the tsunami's forecasted
travel time, including areas from the northern tip of Canada's
Vancouver Island to the California-Mexico border. Knowing that it would
take hours for the tsunami to reach his community, a Southern
California emergency management official who received the warning
sought to confirm the tsunami's existence by contacting his Northern
California counterparts closer to the source. He learned that a
destructive tsunami had not been generated and determined that his
community should not evacuate. According to this official, because his
area was not imminently threatened by a tsunami, it should not have
been included in the initial warning. As a result of the feedback
received after the June 14, 2005 event, the warning center in Alaska
has changed its warning protocols so that it will issue a tsunami
warning for only about half of the area that received a warning during
the June event, if a similar situation should occur in the future.
Seismologists outside of NOAA have suggested that the tsunami warning
centers could reduce the duration--and perhaps the number--of false
alarms by relying more on seismic analyses that assess the type and
direction of an earthquake. For example, according to some state and
USGS seismologists, the June 14, 2005, earthquake's horizontal motion
should have indicated that the generation of a tsunami was highly
unlikely, enabling the warning center to cancel the warning within
minutes, rather than over an hour later. However, a NWS review of the
event noted that horizontal-motion earthquakes can trigger submarine
landslides that can in turn produce tsunamis, so the warning center
should not cancel a warning solely based on seismic analysis. According
to warning center officials, they receive feedback from outside
seismologists regarding warning procedures through organizations such
as the NTHMP. However, some outside seismologists are concerned that
warning center seismologists are reluctant to seek feedback or adopt
new analytical procedures for issuing and canceling warnings.
NOAA expects that false alarms will be reduced with the expansion of
the sea-level data network and through an upgrade of its forecasting
tools. DART stations help reduce false alarms for distant tsunamis
because the stations detect slight changes in deep-ocean waves far from
shore that help forecast how these waves will grow as they approach the
coast. In addition to expanding the DART network, NOAA is upgrading the
models that use DART data to forecast tsunami flooding and is also
expanding and upgrading its network of sea-level gauges that the
warning centers use to confirm or cancel tsunami warnings. The tide
gauge expansion plan calls for deploying a total of 16 new gauges and
upgrading 33 gauges by November 2006.
NOAA acknowledges the importance of reducing tsunami false alarms but
has not yet established performance goals or related metrics for
identifying progress toward this goal, such as tracking the number and
duration of warnings to areas that do not experience destructive
tsunamis. According to NWS officials, they are currently evaluating
outcome goals and performance measures for warnings and other tsunami-
related activities and expect to finalize these goals and measures in
2006.
Limitations in Federal Emergency Warning Systems Impede Rapid and
Comprehensive Tsunami Warning Transmission:
Technical gaps and procedural limitations have impeded federal
emergency warning systems from broadcasting rapid and comprehensive
tsunami warnings to affected local areas. For example, technical gaps
such as weak signals and transmitter failures have prevented
comprehensive warning transmission over the EAS and NOAA Weather Radio.
Broadcasting tsunami warnings over EAS and NOAA Weather Radio requires
NOAA-owned transmitters to relay a signal from the NWS forecast offices
to the broadcast stations and NOAA Weather Radio, as shown in figure 8.
Figure 8: Tsunami Warning Signal Transmission for EAS and NOAA Weather
Radio:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
According to NOAA officials, NOAA transmitters provide signal coverage
for 97 percent of the nation's population; however, some coastal
locations including portions of Hawaii receive such weak signals that
NOAA Weather Radio is unlikely to function. Transmitter failure has
also prevented warnings from being sent over EAS and NOAA Weather
Radio. For example, on June 14, 2005, some coastal communities in
Washington and Oregon did not receive the warning over EAS or NOAA
Weather Radio because transmitters failed to send a signal. A September
2005 test of the federal tsunami warning systems in California, Oregon,
and Washington found improvements in problematic transmission areas
identified during the June event but uncovered new signal transmission
issues in other areas. NWS is adding new transmitters to improve signal
coverage and refurbishing old transmitters to improve their
reliability.
In addition, procedural limitations such as the NWS forecast offices'
inconsistent activation of EAS and NOAA Weather Radio can impede rapid
and comprehensive transmission of tsunami warnings. On June 14, 2005,
the forecast offices responded to the tsunami warning in a variety of
ways, some of which caused delays or nontransmission of EAS or NOAA
Weather Radio warnings to affected local areas. For example, staff in
some NWS forecast offices did not enter a tsunami-specific warning code
into a computer, resulting in EAS and NOAA Weather Radio not activating
rapidly, if at all. According to a subsequent NWS assessment of the
event, guidance to forecast office staff on tsunami warning procedures
was inadequate. Since the June 2005 event, coastal NWS forecast offices
in Washington, Oregon, and California have received guidance that, for
example, lists EAS activation as the proper first step when a tsunami
warning is received.
Although the warning centers conduct monthly tests of their
communication systems to ensure that NWS forecast offices and state
emergency management centers receive the warnings, NWS does not
routinely conduct periodic end-to-end tests of the tsunami warning
system using the actual "live" computer codes rather than test codes.
Such an end-to-end test would check the systems and procedures used to
transmit an actual tsunami warning from the tsunami warning center to
the public and identify technical gaps and procedural shortcomings. NWS
conducted the first such end-to-end test of the tsunami warning system
in Alaska, including activation of EAS and NOAA Weather Radio in March
2005. The test uncovered breakdowns in EAS warning transmission at
television and radio stations whose EAS systems were not set up to use
the tsunami warning code. NWS is working with emergency managers and
broadcasters in Alaska to take corrective actions and retest the
system. In commenting on a draft of this report, NOAA stated that while
it supports broadening end-to-end testing in at-risk states it can
conduct end-to end testing using "live" warning codes for the EAS
system only in those states that permit it to do so. In other states,
end-to-end testing is conducted by using test codes for the EAS system.
NOAA said it will continue to encourage state participation in the end-
to-end testing of the tsunami warning system.
State and Local Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Activities Are Under Way,
although Implementation Varies Considerably among Locations:
The 12 coastal communities in the six at-risk states and territories
that we visited are taking actions to mitigate tsunami impacts through
planning, warning system improvements, public education, and some
infrastructure protection efforts, although the level of implementation
varies considerably among locations.[Footnote 17] While state and local
tsunami mitigation plans and warning systems have largely been
developed, limitations exist that have raised concerns about their
effectiveness. In addition, key public education efforts have not been
consistently implemented in all coastal communities we visited, and
only a few communities have taken steps to protect critical
infrastructure from potential tsunami damage. Overall, tsunami
mitigation efforts have been mixed due to a number of challenges,
including competing priorities, funding constraints, and lack of
authority to implement legislative or policy changes. Finally, while 7
of the 12 communities we visited participate in NOAA's TsunamiReady
preparedness program, nationwide few coastal communities have chosen to
participate in the program.
State and Local Tsunami Mitigation Plans and Warning Systems Have Been
Largely Developed, but Concerns Exist about Warning System
Effectiveness:
According to FEMA guidance, the purpose of mitigation planning is to
identify natural hazards, consider actions and activities to reduce
potential losses from those hazards, and coordinate the implementation
of a hazard mitigation plan. All six of the states and territories we
visited have developed FEMA-approved, all-hazard mitigation plans, a
requirement to qualify for certain disaster-related grant funds under
the Stafford Act, as amended by the Disaster Mitigation Act of
2000.[Footnote 18] These plans identify tsunami hazards and describe in
general terms the vulnerability of people and property to tsunami
threats. Most of the state level plans we reviewed take the additional
step of identifying specific actions to mitigate the risks identified,
such as relocating critical facilities out of tsunami inundation zones.
While only 4 of the 12 communities we visited have FEMA-approved plans,
each of the four has identified projects to mitigate tsunami hazards.
State and local emergency managers whom we spoke with cited resource
and time constraints as significant barriers to improving mitigation
planning.
All of the states and communities we visited have developed warning
systems, but they have various limitations that may impact their
effectiveness. State and local tsunami warning systems help ensure that
all at-risk residents and tourists are warned about a potential tsunami
in a timely manner. Most of the coastal communities we visited employ
some technologically sophisticated methods to warn residents. For
example, 8 of the 12 communities we visited had at least one tsunami
warning siren and three alerted residents by an automated telephone
system. However, local emergency managers told us that inadequate
warning siren coverage was a significant issue in many locations, such
as Ocean Shores, Washington, and on Alaska's Kenai Peninsula. In
addition, many of the warning methods used by communities--such as
sirens and internet-based messaging systems--are dependent on telephone
lines and other infrastructure that would likely be disrupted by a
strong earthquake. During the June 2005 tsunami warning on the west
coast, officials in several communities noted that telephone lines were
overloaded by a surge of incoming 911 calls from concerned residents,
in some cases, preventing emergency managers from contacting other
local officials and preventing telephone-based warning systems from
reaching all residents. Some emergency managers expressed concern that
they do not have adequate backup systems to receive and disseminate
warning messages if telephone lines fail. Finally, three of the
communities we visited rely on warning methods such as verbal
notifications by bullhorns or radio broadcasts.
State and local emergency managers are aware of the limitations of
existing tsunami warning systems and are involved in a number of
projects to address them. For example, some of the communities we
visited have attempted to obtain additional sirens and replace
unreliable ones to provide better coverage to residents. For Crescent
City, California, and Gold Beach, Oregon, county officials obtained a
number of used civil defense sirens for a nominal cost but reported
that installation and maintenance costs pose additional challenges.
Washington state has provided seven at-risk communities with advanced
All Hazard Alert Broadcasting sirens, but their high cost--
approximately $50,000, twice as much as a new, conventional siren--may
be prohibitive for other communities.[Footnote 19] In addition,
communities have taken actions to ensure more effective communications
between emergency management officials and first responders. For
example, some have purchased satellite phones and digital
communications systems that are not vulnerable to earthquake damages or
interoperable radios that ensure that first responders can talk to each
other if telephone lines are disrupted. In coastal areas with high
population and building densities--where roads, bridges, and other
horizontal evacuation methods are limited or where warning time is
short--vertical evacuation to the upper floors of buildings that are
capable of withstanding the initial earthquake and subsequent tsunami
can be an alternative or supplement to horizontal evacuation.[Footnote
20]
Most of the states and communities we visited have made efforts to test
their evacuation plans and warning systems, but few comprehensive
drills have been conducted. Recent events, such as Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita, have illustrated that robust training and testing are
important to identify problems in advance of an actual event.[Footnote
21] However, only Seaside, Oregon, has conducted comprehensive tsunami
exercises involving multiple agencies and full public participation.
Five of the communities we visited have conducted exercises involving
multiple agencies in mock tsunami scenarios to discuss plans and
procedures involved in responding to a real event. While these efforts
are useful, their limited scope may not adequately identify all of the
issues that would emerge in an actual event. For example, in an actual
emergency, traffic control and public evacuations may take
substantially longer than estimated. Local officials told us that more
comprehensive drills would be beneficial, but they have limited funding
and staff to plan and conduct them and getting community involvement is
very difficult due to the disruption to the local economy.
Tsunami Education and Outreach Efforts Have Not Been Consistently
Implemented:
Education and outreach efforts are important because plans and warning
systems may do little to save lives if the public does not know what to
do when it receives a warning. Two such efforts, distributing
evacuation maps and posting tsunami evacuation signs, raise awareness
of tsunami threats and educate the public on appropriate escape routes.
Ten of the 12 communities we visited have either received evacuation
maps from the state or developed their own maps identifying appropriate
evacuation routes. However, only five of the communities reported
distributing evacuation maps to all residents, either by mailing them
to all registered utility customers, publishing them in the local
telephone book, or in one case distributing them door-to-door.[Footnote
22] A few communities have taken other actions to reach the public such
as posting evacuation maps in police stations and on grocery store
reader boards. Several communities have made efforts to reach tourists
by providing evacuation maps at areas they frequent, such as the local
visitor's center and distributing tsunami hazard information and
evacuation maps to hotels. Regarding tsunami signs, 9 of the 12
communities reported posting tsunami hazard or evacuation route signs
in their communities, such as those shown in figure 9, although in a
few locations, local emergency managers reported that the signs are
frequently stolen.
Figure 9: Tsunami Hazard Zone Signs:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
According to emergency management officials and other emergency
preparedness experts, focusing on educating youth--the adults of
tomorrow--has considerable promise for increasing tsunami preparedness.
Specifically, two key efforts--developing and implementing school
curricula and conducting tsunami evacuation drills in schools--may help
improve tsunami preparedness now and in the future. Of the six at-risk
states and territories we visited, only two-
-Oregon and Washington--have developed tsunami specific curricula and
are teaching them in schools, according to state emergency
managers.[Footnote 23] The Washington state curriculum is targeted at
two age groups--grades K through 6 and grades 7 through 12--and
provides various lessons to help students plan ahead for a tsunami and
protect themselves and their families when a tsunami occurs. In
addition, Hawaii has developed a tsunami specific curriculum that will
be tailored to each of its counties. Oregon and Hawaii also require
schools in tsunami inundation areas to conduct tsunami drills at least
once a year, often in conjunction with Tsunami Awareness month
activities. For example, in Hilo, Hawaii, an elementary school located
in a known tsunami inundation area conducts an annual evacuation drill
in which students practice responding to a tsunami warning by walking
from the school to a safe location. Three of the communities we visited
in Washington, Puerto Rico, and Alaska also reported conducting tsunami
evacuation drills in schools at least once a year, even though the
states do not require them.
All six of the at-risk states and territories we visited have conducted
a variety of education and outreach activities to distribute tsunami
hazard information to communities. For example, the states we visited
have developed a variety of print materials, produced videos, made
tsunami information available on the Internet, and conducted forums and
other workshops to educate citizens on tsunami risks and preparedness.
At the community level, 11 of the 12 emergency managers we visited
stated that forums and workshops have been conducted to educate
residents and tourists about tsunami hazards.[Footnote 24] However,
only two local emergency managers reported meeting with special needs
populations, such as community hospitals and senior centers, to
distribute tsunami hazard information and encourage them to develop
tsunami evacuation plans.
All of the at-risk states and territories acknowledged the need for
additional education and outreach but cited two primary challenges to
increasing and sustaining such efforts. First, many of the state
emergency managers whom we spoke with noted that they are responsible
for other, higher priority hazards--such as floods and wildland fires-
-that occur more frequently than tsunamis. Second, the states have
limited funding dedicated to tsunami preparedness activities. Of the
approximately $275,000 in NTHMP funds provided annually to each state,
the states have chosen to use most of it to develop or upgrade existing
tsunami inundation maps rather than for education or outreach efforts.
Local emergency managers echoed these challenges. Moreover, in many
areas that depend on tourism, local emergency managers said that
businesses are reluctant to post tsunami hazard information because it
may scare tourists and negatively impact the economy. Many noted,
however, that since the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the
subsequent June 2005 tsunami warning on the west coast, community
interest in workshops and forums has increased. Local businesses--in
particular hotels and motels--have become increasingly interested in
receiving tsunami hazard information to distribute to patrons.
States and Localities Have Undertaken Few Efforts to Protect
Infrastructure from Potential Tsunami Damage:
According to tsunami experts, land-use planning and zoning strategies-
-for example, designating tsunami hazard areas for open-space uses,
such as parks, and locating new infrastructure and critical facilities
(i.e., police stations, hospitals, and potable water systems) out of
tsunami hazard areas--can mitigate loss of life and property from a
devastating tsunami.[Footnote 25] However, many of the at-risk states
we visited have not adopted any land-use planning strategies to address
the tsunami threat. Oregon is the only at-risk state we visited that
has passed a land-use statute placing limits on the construction of
certain high occupancy structures within tsunami inundation
areas.[Footnote 26] Alaska also places restrictions on development in
certain designated "natural hazard" areas, including coastal areas
potentially affected by tsunamis.[Footnote 27] One at-risk community
also has been successful in implementing a land-use strategy to
mitigate future tsunami losses. The city of Hilo, Hawaii, developed an
Urban Renewal Plan--based on the devastation from the 1960 tsunami--
that set aside certain "open areas" for limited use in order to
minimize the danger of loss of life or damage to property in areas
potentially subject to inundation from tsunamis.[Footnote 28]
Tsunami experts believe that constructing new buildings in a tsunami
inundation area to better withstand tsunami forces can reduce loss of
life and property damage in cases where land-use planning and zoning
are not feasible. Building design and construction in the United States
is governed at the local level by building codes that establish minimum
acceptable requirements for preserving public safety. Although the
Uniform Building Code contains design requirements and standards for
fire, wind, floods, and earthquakes, it does not include requirements
for tsunami-resilient design.[Footnote 29] Nonetheless, two communities
we visited, Hilo and Honolulu, Hawaii, have developed guidelines for
constructing tsunami-resilient structures. For example, a 2000 Honolulu
building ordinance requires, among other things, that the inhabitable
space in buildings at-risk from tsunamis must be elevated above the
regulatory flood elevation through the use of posts, piles, piers or
shear walls parallel to the expected flow of a tsunami wave.[Footnote
30] None of the at-risk states we visited have developed guidelines for
constructing tsunami-resilient structures although legislation
establishing tax incentives for such construction is pending in
Washington.[Footnote 31] Hawaii's state legislature is currently
considering a bill to develop a state building code based on the
International Building Code, which, according to state emergency
management officials, would strengthen buildings against tsunamis and
other hazards.[Footnote 32] In commenting on a draft of this report,
FEMA noted that, the International Building Code, which has replaced
the Uniform Building Code as the national model code, also does not
contain specific requirements addressing the tsunami hazard. However,
structures built in conformance with the International Building Code
are likely to perform better during a tsunami because of other code
provisions, particularly seismic requirements.
Several states, including California and Oregon, have adopted laws and
ordinances for retrofitting existing buildings to reduce losses from
future earthquakes.[Footnote 33] For existing infrastructure,
earthquake retrofits may improve tsunami resistance, or help minimize
floating debris that can damage nearby buildings.[Footnote 34]
Earthquake retrofits could be particularly important in the case of a
locally generated tsunami off the west coast of the United States,
where a magnitude 9.0 or greater earthquake is likely to precede a
tsunami. FEMA has developed guidance for rehabilitating buildings to
resist earthquake forces.[Footnote 35]
Most of the states and coastal communities we visited have not
attempted to mitigate tsunami risk through land-use planning and
infrastructure requirements for several reasons. First, state and local
emergency managers said that although they recognize the need for
additional infrastructure protections, such decisions typically reside
with a community's city council or other governing body. Second, many
coastal communities rely on coastal-dependent development such as ports
and harbors that, by their nature, must be situated on the coast; and
in other cases, communities have already built to capacity in tsunami
hazard areas, and relocation is not a practical or cost-effective
option. Finally, few states or coastal communities have adopted tsunami
building codes because model codes generally have not included
requirements for designing tsunami-resilient structures and few have
implemented retrofitting projects because of their high costs.
Community Participation in NOAA's TsunamiReady Hazard Preparedness
Program Is Limited:
Of the approximately 500 coastal communities at-risk from a tsunami in
five Pacific states and Puerto Rico, only 25 communities--including 7
of the 12 we visited--have been recognized by NWS as TsunamiReady, the
primary federal effort to encourage communities to prepare for tsunami
hazards.[Footnote 36] According to NWS, the program was developed to
provide minimum standard guidelines for communities to follow and to
enhance tsunami readiness by increasing public awareness and
understanding of the tsunami hazard, among other things.[Footnote 37]
Communities that meet program standards are provided signs such as
those shown in figure 10.
Figure 10: TsunamiReady Sign for Communities:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
While the majority of at-risk coastal communities have not joined the
TsunamiReady program, we found that four of the five at-risk
communities we visited that are not yet recognized as TsunamiReady do
plan to pursue recognition in the future. Two of the four communities
are currently taking steps to meet program requirements by installing
additional warning infrastructure, such as NOAA Weather Radios.
Emergency management officials generally agreed that the TsunamiReady
program is a good first step toward helping communities mitigate the
potential impact of a tsunami. Specifically, in the TsunamiReady
communities we visited, most officials stated that they sought
recognition to increase community tsunami awareness, and officials
noted that the TsunamiReady signs had helped them move toward that
goal. One emergency manager whom we spoke with stated that the
TsunamiReady recognition had "opened doors" to conduct outreach with
hotels and that hotel managers had begun seeking tsunami hazard
information. However, some of the state emergency managers with whom we
spoke expressed three concerns about the TsunamiReady program: (1) it
is too limited in scope--for example, emphasizing warning
infrastructure but not requiring tsunami specific evacuation and
mitigation plans; (2) it should be more focused on education,
particularly regarding the local tsunami threat; and (3) the name
"TsunamiReady" promotes a false perception of readiness, since
preparedness is a continuous process.
NOAA officials believe that the lack of program participation may be
due to community perceptions of a low tsunami threat and perceived high
cost versus benefit, but the agency has not formally assessed the
program to identify barriers to participation or potential program
modifications to encourage participation. The agency's 2005 Report to
Congress on the Tsunami Community Preparedness Implementation Plan,
identifies achieving tsunami preparedness recognition for at-risk
communities in the United States as a vital part of its tsunami
activities.[Footnote 38] To that end, according to the report, the
agency has committed to work with each at-risk coastal community across
the nation to ensure that community and emergency management officials
fully understand the tsunami hazard and take action to prepare.
Significant Expansion of National Tsunami Preparedness Activities Is
Occurring in the Absence of Long-Term Strategic Planning:
A significant expansion of federal tsunami detection, warning, and
related activities, as well as the NTHMP, is under way; however, the
future direction of these efforts is unclear because NOAA has not
developed long-range strategic plans to guide them. In 2005, NOAA
combined its various tsunami-related activities into a single program
and is currently strengthening and expanding certain elements of the
program. However, NOAA has not yet adopted a comprehensive strategic
plan that sets specific program goals and objectives, defines
performance measures, ensures coordination of existing activities, and
establishes risk-based priorities to guide the expansion of the warning
program into the future. Furthermore, with the likely expansion of the
NTHMP from 5 state participants to potentially 28 state and territorial
participants in 2006, it will be difficult for NOAA to ensure that the
most threatened states receive the resources they need to continue and
to complete key mitigation activities without an updated, risk-based
strategic plan.
NOAA Is Expanding Elements of Its Tsunami Program, but the Program
Lacks a Long-Range Strategic Plan:
Prior to the Indian Ocean tsunami, NOAA's various tsunami-related
activities, such as warning center operations, the TsunamiReady
program, and tsunami-related research were not managed as a formal,
integrated program within the agency. The administration's initiative
to expand NOAA's tsunami activities--and the receipt of supplemental
funding from the Congress for that purpose--led NOAA in April 2005, to
establish an integrated national Tsunami Program. NOAA is strengthening
the Tsunami Program by (1) expanding the Pacific warning center and
National Data Buoy Center facilities by the end of 2005;[Footnote 39]
(2) expanding tsunami warning center operating hours to 24 hours, 7
days a week in April 2006; (3) upgrading and expanding water level
observation capabilities by November 2006; (4) expanding and upgrading
the earthquake detection network by the end of 2006; (5) establishing a
long-term tsunami data archive by late 2007; (6) increasing DART
tsunami detection stations in the Pacific, Atlantic, and Caribbean by
early 2008; (7) expanding TsunamiReady participation nationwide through
2012; and (8) developing a tsunami forecast system, including 75
inundation forecast models by 2013.
While NOAA has developed a schedule for strengthening elements of the
Tsunami Program, it has not developed a long-range strategic plan that
includes specific detection, warning and mitigation outcome goals, and
performance measures to evaluate progress in achieving them. For
example, NOAA does not have program outcome goals and performance
measures for reducing false alarms or other critical tsunami-related
activities such as mapping, modeling, research, education, and
outreach. Although strategic planning is required for the major
functions and operations of agencies by the Government Performance and
Results Act of 1993, it is not specifically required for individual
programs within agencies. However, our work related to the act and the
experience of leading organizations have shown the importance of
identifying long-term goals and establishing performance measures to
guide program operations and help policy makers determine if program
activities are achieving the desired results. In addition, the
Department of Commerce's Inspector General has identified improving
strategic planning as a top priority and reported on the need for
NOAA's programs to improve how they report and measure performance
toward achieving specific outcomes.[Footnote 40]
In this context, a strategic plan would provide NOAA a framework for
ensuring that its tsunami-related activities are planned and
implemented in a risk-based manner. Our recent reports have emphasized
the importance of federal agencies using risk-based planning. For
example, in a June 2005 testimony on the Department of Homeland
Security's resource allocation, we reported that the department must
carefully weigh the benefit of activities and allocate resources where
the benefit of reducing risks is worth the additional cost.[Footnote
41] Any actions taken by NOAA absent risk-based analysis have the
potential to divert funds away from locations, such as the Pacific and
Caribbean regions, where the tsunami hazard--particularly from local
tsunamis--is well documented. Some of NOAA's activities designed to
strengthen the tsunami program are scheduled in a manner that raises
questions about the extent to which they are risk-based. For example,
there is little historical evidence of tsunamis on the Atlantic coast
or Gulf coast, yet expansion activities already implemented or
scheduled in 2006 include the placement of DART stations in the
Atlantic Ocean, tsunami forecast modeling of an east coast community,
and recognition of new TsunamiReady communities on the east coast. In
addition, NOAA's initial strengthening efforts emphasize detection and
warning for distant tsunamis, while the greater risk to most locations
in the United States--according to NOAA data as well as the National
Science and Technology Council's December 2005 report on tsunami risk
reduction--are likely to be posed by local tsunamis. For example, the
deployment of DART stations and warning center enhancements will not
reduce the local tsunami risk as directly as other strategies such as
educating vulnerable populations to immediately head for high ground
when the earth shakes near the coast. According to NWS officials, they
are in the process of evaluating outcome goals and performance measures
for the Tsunami Program, and expect to finalize a strategic plan in
2006. In commenting on a draft of this report, NOAA stated that it will
work with its partners to begin a risk assessment following the
completion of a tsunami hazard assessment in November 2006, which will
improve its future ability to allocate funds in a manner consistent
with established risk management practices.
Concerns Exist about the Management and Direction of the Expanded
National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program:
Since its inception in 1996, NOAA has used the Tsunami Hazard
Mitigation Implementation Plan to guide NTMHP activities. The plan has
four specific goals: (1) raise awareness of affected populations, (2)
supply tsunami inundation and evacuation maps, (3) improve tsunami
warning systems, and (4) incorporate tsunami planning into state and
federal all-hazards mitigation programs. In August 2001, an expert
panel reviewed the NTHMP's progress and performance under the plan and
provided a number of suggestions for improving the program. While the
then-chairman of the NTHMP drafted some goals based on the suggestions,
NOAA did not update or revise the plan to incorporate the experts'
suggestions or the proposed goals because, according to the subsequent
chairman, the plan's four original goals had not yet been achieved.
Five years later, two key issues raised by the expert panel review
remain concerns of the state NTHMP participants. First, the positive
impacts of the program were being largely assumed and not effectively
measured. State members of the NTHMP still believe that more needs to
be done to measure the effectiveness of tsunami mitigation activities-
-such as surveys to measure the effectiveness of public education
programs. Second, the NTHMP was "seriously out of balance," in terms of
focusing on detection and risk assessment at the expense of working
with communities to educate and modify behaviors in ways that could
save lives. State members of the NTHMP remain concerned about the focus
on detection and warning systems improvements, which are perceived as
"federal solutions," rather than state and local educational and
behavioral activities, such as conducting tsunami preparedness drills,
which they see as key to community preparedness, particularly for local
tsunamis.
The NTHMP had planned to conduct another program review and develop an
updated implementation plan in 2006. These plans have been placed on
hold, according to the chairman of the NTHMP, because the decision to
make the NTHMP a nationwide program--likely including representatives
of the 23 states on the Pacific, Atlantic, and Gulf coasts as well as
the two commonwealths and three U.S. territories in the Pacific Ocean
and Caribbean Sea--raised significant issues that needed to be settled
before any revisions to the program's goals and objectives could be
considered.[Footnote 42] However, failing to conduct a program review
now means that the program will not have vital information regarding
(1) what has worked or not worked in implementing the program since
2001 and (2) what tsunami mitigation activities remain incomplete in
the five original Pacific area states with high tsunami hazards. A
program review could contribute to the development of a risk-based
strategic plan that ensures that the activities that remain uncompleted
in areas with the greatest threat get the highest priority for funding.
According to NOAA officials, the agency expects to implement the nine
recommended actions for the NTHMP and the Tsunami Program contained in
the National Science and Technology Council's December 2005 report on
tsunami risk reduction. The report, developed by NOAA, USGS, FEMA, and
other federal agencies, recommends actions such as developing
standardized and coordinated tsunami hazard and risk assessments for
all U.S. coastal areas, improving tsunami detection and warning data
and infrastructure, enhancing tsunami forecast and warning
capabilities, promoting the development of model mitigation measures,
and increasing outreach to communities. However, because the report and
recommendations were developed without the participation of the NTHMP
members, they question whether the recommendations and priorities
represent the best strategic direction for the NTHMP. All of the state
NTHMP members agree that full participation in program decision making
by individuals with state and local level knowledge of tsunami
mitigation activities is key to the efficiency and success of the
NTHMP.
In addition, state NTHMP members are particularly concerned that the
program's funding decisions and strategic direction may become less
risk-based with the inclusion of numerous eastern and southern coastal
states with lower known tsunami hazards. These members want to ensure
that communities facing the greatest threat obtain the greatest
benefits from the program, particularly since many tsunami preparedness
activities remain incomplete and unfunded in the original five at-risk
states. For example, in 2005, the Director of the California Governor's
Office of Emergency Services estimated that in California alone over
the next five years about $19.5 million was needed for state
preparedness activities and about $7.5 million for local government
activities. As such, state NTHMP members were surprised to learn that
some eastern states have already submitted proposals for NTHMP funding.
Conclusions:
In the hazardous Pacific region, NOAA and its federal and state
partners are working to help prepare communities for tsunamis. However,
much is left to be done to improve tsunami hazard assessment,
detection, warning, and mitigation for these areas and other at-risk
areas of the United States. It is particularly important that when at-
risk states complete their inundation mapping, they then conduct
comprehensive assessments of the expected damage from a tsunami.
Without this basic information, emergency managers will not be able to
effectively formulate plans to mitigate potential tsunami impacts on
people and infrastructure. In addition, improved technical capabilities
to detect tsunamis will be of limited value if the warning systems and
processes that NOAA depends on to disseminate this information cannot
reliably ensure that all threatened individuals and communities will
receive an accurate and timely warning.
Because tsunamis are an infrequent hazard that may be overlooked due to
higher priority reoccurring natural hazards such as hurricanes and
flooding, NOAA and its federal and state partners face a significant
challenge ensuring that communities are sufficiently engaged in
preparedness activities. The Indian Ocean tsunami, however, has created
a window of opportunity by spotlighting the devastation and destruction
that can result from a lack of planning, preparedness, and education
for such an event--no matter how rare. We believe that federal and
state partners can take advantage of this current sense of urgency and
develop a strategic approach that will ensure that the significantly
increased resources that have been made available to expand U.S.
tsunami detection and preparedness programs are being effectively
targeted. As part of this effort, all federal tsunami-related
activities, including the TsunamiReady program and the NTHMP, should be
reassessed to determine how to increase their effectiveness. Moreover,
NOAA needs to address the lack of long-range, risk-based strategic
planning for these activities. Without strategic planning and
performance measures to guide these efforts, the Congress and the
public will lack important information about the extent to which
resources are being directed to activities that are of the greatest
benefit to the most vulnerable communities and to what extent
measurable progress is being made toward the desired results. We
believe U.S. tsunami programs guided by long-term strategic plans with
demonstrable achievements will be better able to sustain their efforts
for vulnerable coastal communities into the future.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To help improve national tsunami preparedness, we are recommending that
the Secretary of Commerce direct the NOAA Administrator to take the
following six actions:
* work with the FEMA Director and the USGS Director to create
standardized tsunami loss estimation software to help communities
determine the potential impact of tsunamis and identify appropriate
mitigation actions;
* reduce the number of tsunami warning false alarms by (1) completing
the planned expansion of tsunami detection stations, (2) reexamining
NWS's rules dictating when a warning will be issued and to which areas,
(3) establishing a routine process for other federal and state experts
to formally review and comment on the centers' use of seismic data, and
(4) setting performance goals to guide improvements;
* work with the states to conduct periodic end-to-end tests of the
tsunami warning system, including NOAA Weather Radio and the Emergency
Alert System, to ensure the system will function as intended during a
tsunami emergency;
* evaluate the TsunamiReady program to determine what barriers, if any,
exist to participation and what modifications are needed to encourage
more high-risk communities to participate;
* evaluate the NTHMP to determine what has worked well in the past and
what high priority activities remain to be completed and to help inform
strategic planning efforts, and;
* develop comprehensive risk-based strategic plans for the Tsunami
Program and National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program that consider
input from states and federal partners and include metrics for
measuring progress toward achieving program goals.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided copies of a draft of this report to the Departments of
Commerce, Homeland Security and the Interior for their review and
comment. Commerce, representing NOAA, concurred with all six
recommendations and generally agreed with our findings, although it
provided technical and factual clarifications, which we have
incorporated into the report as appropriate. However, in its comments,
NOAA suggested a revision to one of the recommendations with which we
disagree. In response to our recommendation that NOAA evaluate the
TsunamiReady program to determine what barriers, if any, exist to
participation and what modifications are needed to encourage more high-
risk communities to participate, NOAA suggested changing the
recommendation's focus from "high-risk" to "at-risk" communities.
According to NOAA all U.S. coastal communities should be prepared for a
tsunami no matter how rare. While we agree that preparing all U.S.
coastal communities for a tsunami may be a laudable long-term goal,
given the agency's limited resources, it may be an unrealistic goal in
the short-term. Therefore, we believe that NOAA should use a risk-based
approach and target initial participation in the TsunamiReady program
to those communities that face the greatest risk. Commerce's specific
comments and our detailed responses are presented in appendix I.
Homeland Security, representing FEMA, commented on one of the six
recommendations and indicated that while it concurred with the
recommendation that NOAA work with FEMA and USGS to create standardized
tsunami loss estimation software, it was concerned that FEMA did not
have the funding or the staff resources to pursue such a request and
that such a request from NOAA would have to address these resource
needs. Homeland Security also noted that the report did not mention
other programs such as FEMA's Pre-disaster Mitigation Program and the
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, which can be used by states and
communities to fund tsunami mitigation projects. We revised the report
to mention that these programs have funded tsunami mitigation projects.
Finally, Homeland Security stated that the report's description of the
TsunamiReady program as it relates to response, preparedness, and
mitigation activities is unclear. We believe that we have clearly
characterized the program as providing minimum guidelines that
communities can use to enhance tsunami readiness and therefore have not
revised the report in response to this comment. Homeland Security's
specific comments and our detailed responses are presented in appendix
II.
The Department of the Interior commented that the report was a thorough
well-researched examination of the nation's tsunami warning system and
that it correctly recognizes the need for close collaboration at the
federal, state, and local levels to have an effective tsunami warning
system. Interior also said that it supports the need for a risk-based
approach to prioritizing federal investments in this system and is
actively collaborating with NOAA to provide the hazard assessments
necessary for such an approach. In addition, Interior said that one
area it felt was inadequately addressed in the report was the
importance of a long-term federal role in research to improve tsunami
warnings and mitigate tsunami risks and noted that none of our
recommendations involved improving or expanding research. While we
agree that tsunami-related research is an important issue, it was not
included in the scope of our review, and consequently, this report does
not cover issues related to tsunami research or offer any
recommendations in this area. Interior's specific comments and our
detailed responses are presented in appendix III.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Commerce,
Homeland Security, and the Interior; appropriate congressional
committees; and other interested Members of Congress. We also will make
copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will
be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3841 or mittala@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to
this report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Anu K. Mittal:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Commerce:
The Deputy Secretary Of Commerce:
Washington, D.C. 20230:
May 8, 2006:
Ms. Anu K. Mittal:
Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Ms. Mittal:
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the Government
Accountability Office's draft report entitled U.S. Tsunami
Preparedness: Federal and State Partners Collaborate To Help
Communities Reduce Potential Impacts, But Significant Challenges Remain
(GAO-06-519). I enclose the Department of Commerce's comments to the
draft report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
David A. Sampson:
Enclosure:
Department of Commerce's Comments on the GAO Draft Report Entitled
"U.S. Tsunami Preparedness: Federal and State Partners Collaborate To
Help Communities Reduce Potential Impacts, But Significant Challenges
Remain" (GAO-06-519/May 2006):
General Comments:
The Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) appreciates the opportunity to review this
report. The report captures and addresses the major elements of the
tsunami program and acknowledges the involvement and roles of all
levels of government. The U.S. Tsunami Warning System depends on multi-
agency coordination where all parts must be working for optimal
operation. While the Federal Government is the integrator of the
program, the states play a key role in disseminating tsunami warning
messages. The Nation's Tsunami Warning System's biggest challenge in
most U.S. coastal areas is getting warning messages to those in the
potentially hazardous area. The report acknowledges this issue,
focusing primarily on NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards (NWR) and the
Emergency Alert System dissemination systems. While these are important
systems, individuals are more likely to rely on local and state
emergency management for their warnings.
NOAA Response to GAO Recommendations:
The draft GAO report states, "To help improve national tsunami
preparedness, we are recommending that the Secretary of Commerce direct
the NOAA Administrator to take the following six actions:"
Recommendation 1: "...work with the FEMA Administrator and the USGS
Director to create standardized tsunami loss estimation software to
help communities determine the potential impact of tsunamis and
identify appropriate mitigation actions;..."
NOAA Response: NOAA agrees with this recommendation and will work with
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the agency responsible
for creating loss-estimation software and the U.S. Geological Survey
(USGS) to identify required modules and the state of research, prior to
creating standardized tsunami loss estimation software.
Recommendation 2: "...reduce the number of tsunami warning false alarms
by (1) completing the planned expansion of tsunami detection stations,
(2) reexamining NWS's rules dictating when a warning will be issued and
to which areas, (3) establishing a routine process for other federal
and state experts to formally review and comment on the centers' use of
seismic data, and (4) setting performance goals to guide
improvements;..."
NOAA Response: NOAA agrees with this recommendation and provides the
following comments:
(1) NOAH expects to complete the planned expansion of the tsunami Deep-
ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunami (DART) detection stations by
mid-fiscal year 2008.
(2) The Tsunami Warning Centers will continue to re-evaluate their
rules specifying when a warning will be issued and for which areas,
incorporating new technologies and modeling efforts as they become
available.
(3) NOAA will continue to solicit feedback on warning procedures
through the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP) and the
International Coordination Group/Pacific Tsunami Warning System. In
addition, NOAA will consider the establishment of an ad hoc advisory
committee under the NTHMP that would review warning center procedures
and propose changes.
(4) NOAA is reviewing and updating its performance measures (e.g.,
response time and false alarm rates). The review will be completed by
the end of fiscal year 2006, and the performance measures will continue
to be used to guide program improvements.
Recommendation 3: "...conduct periodic end-to-end tests of the tsunami
warning system, including NOAA Weather Radio and the Emergency Alert
System, to ensure the system will function as intended during a tsunami
emergency;..."
NOAA Response: NOAA agrees with the recommendation for end-to-end
testing and will continue to perform these tests where permitted. NOAA
can only conduct tests with live warning codes with permission from
state emergency management agencies. To date, only Alaska has approved
EAS tests with live warning codes. In states where tests with live
warning codes are not permitted, NOAA conducts periodic tests fully
exercising the NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards, but only activates EAS
with test codes. NOAA will continue to encourage state participation in
end-to-end testing of the tsunami warning system.
Recommendation 4: "...evaluate the TsunamiReady program to determine
what barriers, if any, exist to participation and what modifications
are needed to encourage more high-risk communities to participate;..."
NOAA Response: NOAA believes all of the Nation's coastal areas should
be prepared for a tsunami - no matter how rare. As such, NOAA
recommends changing the wording of this recommendation from ".evaluate
the TsunamiReady program to determine what barriers, if any, exist to
participation and what modifications are needed to encourage more high-
risk communities to participate;." to "...evaluate the TsunamiReady
program to determine what barriers, if any, exist to participation and
what modifications are needed to encourage more at-risk communities to
participate;..."
NOAA agrees with this recommendation to encourage more "at-risk"
communities to participate in the TsunamiReady Program. NOAA will
review the program at its annual Storm/TsunamiReady National Board
meeting during summer 2006 and will coordinate any changes with members
of the NTHMP.
Recommendation 5: "evaluate the NTHMP to determine what has worked well
in the past and what high priority activities remain to be completed
and to help inform strategic planning efforts;"
NOAA Response: NOAA agrees with this recommendation and will coordinate
with NTHMP members during the next year to identify successes, areas
for improvement, and high priority activity gaps. This information,
along with existing planning documentation from the NTHMP subcommittee,
will be used to inform strategic planning efforts, which acknowledge
the:
expansion of the program to other states and territories, as well as
the types of projects the program funds.
Recommendation 6: "...develop comprehensive risk-based strategic plans
for the Tsunami Program and National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program
that consider input from states and federal partners and include
metrics for measuring progress towards achieving program goals..."
NOAA Response: NOAA agrees with this recommendation; however, it is
important to note that the necessary risk assessments cannot be begun
until the tsunami hazard assessment is completed in November of 2006.
NOAA will then work with its partners to begin the risk assessments,
which require detailed information including inundation maps, land-use,
and population. NOAA will incorporate risk assessments, once available,
into the strategic plans for the Tsunami Program and the NTHMP.
NOAA has developed a draft Tsunami Program Strategic Plan and will
coordinate with state and federal partners. A final Tsunami Program
Strategic Plan is expected to be released by January 2007.
The NOAA will begin to develop an NTHMP Strategic Plan during Fiscal
Year 2006. The success of the strategic plan depends heavily on the
participation and commitment from state and federal NTHMP members. NOAA
will work with its partners to complete an NTHMP Strategic Plan.
Note: GAO comment supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
The following is GAO's comment on the Department of Commerce's letter
dated May 8, 2006.
GAO Comment:
1. Having all coastal communities be prepared for a tsunami may be a
worthwhile long-term goal; however, given limited resources, in the
short-term we believe that it is important to prioritize the efforts of
the TsunamiReady program to encourage higher-risk communities to
participate.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
May 12, 2006:
Ms. Anu K. Mittal, Director:
Natural Resource and Environment:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Mittal:
Re: Draft Report GAO Report 06-519 "U.S. Tsunami Preparedness: Federal
and State Partners Collaborate To Help Communities Reduce Potential
Impacts, But Significant Challenges Remain.
Thank you for the opportunity to review the draft report. Although none
of the recommendations are directed to DHS/FEMA, the following
represents our response to the content of the report and the
recommendations made to the Department of Commerce National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The GAO report does a very good job
of introducing the hazard and the issues, and of describing the role of
NOAA and the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP);
however FEMA continues to have some significant concerns. These
concerns are as follows:
The first recommendation for Executive Action is that the "Secretary of
Commerce direct the NOAA Administrator to . work with the FEMA
Administrator and the USGS Director to create standardized tsunami loss
estimation software to help communities determine the potential impact
of tsunamis and identify appropriate mitigation actions." FEMA agrees
that this need exists and that the existing FEMA HAZUS-MH (Hazards U.S.
- Multi-Hazard) standardized loss estimation software program would be
the most appropriate vehicle for such a tool. However, while FEMA work
currently underway includes funding for the development and maintenance
of modules that address earthquake, hurricane winds, coastal storm
surge, and coastal and riverine flooding, we do not have or anticipate
funding for additional modules to the HAZUS-MH package. While there are
several additional hazards that could be added to the HAZUS-MH package,
including wildfire and tornado as well as tsunami, FEMA does not have
the funding or staff resources to pursue this. Any request from NOAA in
this regard would need to address these needs. As a technical point,
FEMA is led by a Director, not an Administrator.
The GAO report makes no mention of other federal agency's programs that
address the tsunami hazard and encourage the States and local
communities to take preparedness and mitigation action. One example of
this would be FEMA's Community Rating System (CRS) in the National
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). The NFIP is a federally-backed flood
insurance program administered by FEMA that makes flood insurance
available for citizens of communities that adopt and enforce certain
flood loss reduction ordinances. The NFIP also covers flooding due to
tsunami. The CRS provides incentives to reward communities that take
actions above and beyond the minimum requirements of the NFIP to help
their citizens prevent or reduce flood losses or to initiate new flood
protection activities, including "special" flood hazards like tsunami.
The benefit for communities that undertake these CRS activities is
lower flood insurance premiums for their citizens. Under the CRS, FEMA
has worked over many years to develop tsunami credits in order to
provide incentives for communities to implement special tsunami loss
reduction activities. These activities range from direct acquisition
and relocation projects to zoning to prohibit future development in
high risk areas.
FEMA programs that could be used to fund tsunami mitigation projects
that have been identified as part of a State or communities mitigation
plan should also be described in the report. These include FEMA's Pre-
Disaster Mitigation Program, which is a competitive grant program
available to all States, and FEMA's Hazard Mitigation Grant Program,
which is a grant program that is made available after a Presidentially-
declared disaster. These programs should be described as another
federal activity under the section entitled "State and Local Tsunami
Hazard Mitigation Activities are Underway, Although Implementation
Varies Considerably Among Locations", probably in the subsection that
ends on page 37.
FEMA continues to be concerned that the report's description of the
NOAA TsunamiReady Program and how it relates to response, preparedness
and mitigation is confusing. "Response" is immediate action taken to
save lives, including responding to a warning. "Mitigation" is
sustained actions taken to reduce or eliminate long-term risk to people
and property from natural hazards and their effects. Mitigation actions
often involve safer land use measures and building practices, and the
improvement of existing structures and supporting infrastructure. The
NOAA TsunamiReady Program is an important program, but is limited in
scope to identifying and improving a local community's tsunami warning
system and how it would be used, which the report covers very well. The
program "encourages" and "rewards" preparedness, but does not include
preparedness and mitigation activities such as developing school plans
and curriculum, facilitating community workshops or campaigns, working
with various community target groups such as policy decision makers or
businesses, or helping with planning beyond warning systems.
Further, the report does not adequately describe the role of emergency
management organizations at the local, State and Federal levels and how
they deal with mitigation and preparedness issues. These government
organizations work together in the NTHMP Mitigation Subcommittee, which
is made up of State emergency managers and geoscientists and led by
FEMA. This subcommittee developed and has been implementing a strategic
plan for mitigation and preparedness, and has been producing outreach
products since the NTHMP began in 1996. Under the subcommittee,
community needs are prioritized and gaps reviewed and addressed, State
program activities are shared and several multi-State products have
been developed and disseminated.
GAO may wish to include recent program discussions suggesting staff
from the TsunamiReady Program could work more closely with or as part
of the NTHMP Mitigation Subcommittee. This action would bring community
preparedness, mitigation and outreach components together in a
comprehensive and mutually supportive partnership between the emergency
management members and National Weather Service (NWS) TsunarniReady
Program staff that can build together on past successes as the NTHMP
expands.
The last sentence of the first paragraph on page 31 states "vertical
evacuation to the upper floors of a building can be an alternative or
supplement to horizontal evacuation" and then includes a reference to
the FEMA/NOAA Tsunami Vertical Evacuation Shelter Guide currently under
development. While vertical evacuation in a structure is certainly a
feasible option, and in some cases the only option, the report needs to
be careful to state that this should only be planned and promoted for
buildings that are capable of withstanding the initial earthquake loads
as well as the subsequent tsunami loads. Such a determination will be a
key component of the FEMA/NOAA document.
The first paragraph on page 36 references the Uniform Building Code
(UBC). While this model building code may still be used in some areas,
it is obsolete and has been replaced by the International Building Code
(IBC). The last sentence in that paragraph states that the IBC "would
strengthen buildings against tsunamis and other hazards." This
statement needs to clarify that, like the UBC, the IBC does not contain
specific requirements addressing the tsunami hazard, but that
structures built in conformance with the IBC will overall tend to
perform better due to other code provisions, particularly seismic
requirements.
Thank you for the opportunity to review the GAO report. We would be
happy to answer any questions or address any information needs you or
your staff may have.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Steven J. Pecinovsky:
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
Page numbers in draft report may differ from those in this report.
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Homeland
Security's letter dated May 12, 2006.
GAO Comments:
1. We revised the text to show the correct title for the FEMA Director.
2. We describe FEMA's Community Rating System in a report footnote. For
this reason, we did not revise the report.
3. We revised the report to indicate that FEMA's Pre-disaster
Mitigation Program and Hazard Mitigation Grant Program have funded
tsunami mitigation activities.
4. We believe that the report clearly describes the TsunamiReady
program as providing minimum guidelines for communities to use to
enhance tsunami preparedness, not as a program that requires all of the
activities that could be taken to maximize community protection. For
this reason, we did not revise the report.
5. We believe that the report adequately describes the NTHMP's federal
and state partnership as well as the roles of emergency management
organizations at the federal, state, and local levels, not only for
warning systems, but also for planning, education and outreach, and
infrastructure protection mitigation activities. For this reason, we
did not revise the report.
6. We revised the report to clarify that vertical evacuation should
only occur in buildings that are capable of withstanding the initial
earthquake and subsequent tsunami.
7. We revised the report to clarify the extent to which building codes
address the tsunami hazard.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of the Interior:
Note: GAO comment supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
United States Department of the Interior:
Office Of The Assistant Secretary Policy, Management And Budget:
Washington, DC 20240:
May 04 006:
Ms. Anu K. Mittal:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N. W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Ms. Mittal:
Thank you for providing the Department of the Interior (DOI) the
opportunity to review the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
draft report entitled, "U.S. TSUNAMI PREPAREDNESS: Federal and State
Partners Collaborate to Help Communities Reduce Potential Impacts, But
Significant Challenges Remain" (Report Number GAO-06-519).
The GAO staff is to be commended for conducting a thorough, well-
researched examination of the Nation's tsunami warning system. The
report correctly recognizes the need for close collaboration at the
Federal, State, and local levels to have an effective end-to-end
system. The report also acknowledges the unique challenge of providing
adequate warning to coasts vulnerable to locally generated tsunamis,
but the agencies could benefit from more specific recommendations in
this regard.
The DOI supports the need for a risk-based approach to prioritizing
Federal investments in this system and is actively collaborating with
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to provide the
hazard assessments that necessarily underpin such an approach.
One area that we feel is inadequately addressed is the importance of a
long-term Federal role in research to improve tsunami warnings and
mitigate tsunami risks. None of the recommendations involve improving
or expanding research. Yet because tsunamis are rare and tsunami risk
reduction is a multi-decadal undertaking, major improvements to tsunami
warning and risk reduction will come as a result of research. Multiple
agencies support research programs in the geological and ocean sciences
and in monitoring and observing systems, including satellite systems.
Such research spanning fundamental investigations to applications will
provide opportunities to apply new technologies such as the Global
Positioning System and hydro-acoustic monitoring methods developed in
other fields for other uses to advance tsunami warning and
preparedness.
We hope our comments will assist you in preparing the final report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
R. Thomas Weimer:
Assistant Secretary:
cc: Secretary Surname:
ES:
AS/WS:
AS/PMB:
Dir Files, MS 114:
Dir Chron (4), MS 114:
Office of Budget & Performance File, MS 105:
Office of Budget & Performance Read, MS 105 Author, MS 105:
USGS/DO/bbageant: cr/4/ 17/06: ext703-648-4328:2006332-DO:
The following is GAO's comment on the Department of the Interior's
letter dated May 4, 2006.
GAO Comment:
1. The analysis of the federal role in research on tsunami warnings and
mitigation was not included in the scope of this report. Consequently,
we did not examine issues related to tsunami research or offer any
recommendations.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Anu K. Mittal, (202) 512-3841:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to those named above, Stephen D. Secrist, Assistant
Director; Brad C. Dobbins; Joel A. Green; Ryan S. Lambert; and Susan M.
Zimmerman made key contributions to this report. Also contributing to
the report were Claudia K. Becker; John W. Delicath; Gregory A.
Marchand; John G. Smale, Jr; Anne O. Stevens; and Randall B.
Williamson.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Landslides, volcanic activity, and meteor strikes may also generate
a tsunami.
[2] NWS is the official U.S. source of warnings for life-threatening
weather conditions, as well as tsunamis. NWS operates 122 weather
forecast offices nationwide, providing weather, water and climate
forecasts and warnings for the United States, its territories, adjacent
waters and ocean areas to protect life and property and enhance the
national economy.
[3] As of March 2006, NOAA was expanding the NTHMP into a nationwide
program open to participation by 28 coastal states and territories.
[4] 42 U.S.C. § 5165.
[5] After a tsunami-generating event, inundation forecast models
combine actual wave data with precomputed flooding scenarios to predict
the size of the wave and the extent of potential flooding for specific
locations.
[6] The $9.82 million designated for tsunami-related activities in
fiscal year 2006 includes over $2.5 million for specific activities,
such as $500,000 for warning sirens for the state of Washington.
[7] Tectonic plates are the large plates of rock that compose the
earth's outermost layer and move in relation to each other as they ride
atop the hot, mobile material below them.
[8] The warning center in Alaska is also responsible for providing
warnings to Canada, and the warning center in Hawaii is responsible for
warning 27 countries in the Pacific. In addition, each warning center
provides operational backup for the other center.
[9] In May 2005, the Congress appropriated $8.1 million in supplemental
funds for USGS to, among other things, begin expanding the Global
Seismographic Network.
[10] The nine completed tsunami forecast models are for Kodiak, AK;
Crescent City, CA; Hilo, HI; Newport, OR; Seaside, OR; San Francisco,
CA; Willapa Bay, WA; Neah Bay, WA; and Port Angeles, WA.
[11] The National Weather Wire Service transmits text-based weather
forecasts and warnings to an array of subscribers, including the media.
[12] Separate from the NTHMP, Puerto Rico has produced two-dimensional
tsunami inundation maps for its entire coastline, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands has produced maps for St. Croix, St. John, and St. Thomas that
roughly estimate tsunami inundation based on the wave that struck the
islands in 1867.
[13] In addition, the Atlantic coast states of Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Maine, and North Carolina have also
identified tsunamis as a hazard.
[14] "Tsunami Risk Reduction for the United States: A Framework for
Action." National Science and Technology Council, December 2005.
[15] The seven Atlantic coast states that identified tsunamis as a
hazard did not assess tsunami impacts either because they concluded
that the tsunami risk was low or because they lacked adequate
information on the hazard to permit assessment of tsunami impacts.
[16] Warning bulletins include "tsunami warnings" to inform areas where
a tsunami is likely, "tsunami watches" that alert areas outside of a
warned area, and "tsunami information bulletins" that inform areas that
an earthquake has occurred but a tsunami is unlikely.
[17] The six at-risk states and territories are Alaska, California,
Hawaii, Oregon, Puerto Rico, and Washington. The 12 communities are
Seward and Kodiak, Alaska; Crescent City and San Mateo County,
California; Hilo and Honolulu, Hawaii; Seaside and Gold Beach, Oregon;
Mayaguez and Rincon, Puerto Rico; and Ocean Shores and Long Beach,
Washington.
[18] According to FEMA, the states used FEMA Pre-disaster Mitigation
Program grant funds to develop their all-hazard mitigation plans. In
addition, FEMA's Hazard Mitigation Grant Program has funded tsunami
mitigation projects in Alaska and Puerto Rico.
[19] The All Hazard Alert Broadcasting Radio is an outdoor system that
provides both tone and voice alert and notification to residents/
visitors by federal, state, and local emergency authorities; an intense
blue light is also activated at each location to further indicate the
area is in a hazardous situation.
[20] FEMA and NOAA, with a grant from the NTHMP and the National
Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program, are currently developing guidance
for constructing vertical evacuation shelters.
[21] See GAO, Statement by Comptroller General David Walker on GAO's
Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, GAO-06-365R (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1,
2006).
[22] In Hawaii, evacuation maps are printed in each county's telephone
book.
[23] In 1995, the Oregon legislature passed Senate Bill 378, requiring
that at least 30 minutes of earthquake, tsunami, and other disaster-
related education be taught in schools each month, among other things.
Or. Rev. Stat. § 336.071 (2003).
[24] One comprehensive education effort was funded by the NTHMP. In
September 2004, the city of Seaside, Oregon, launched a 9-month Tsunami
Awareness Program to determine the feasibility of educating the public
on tsunami hazards and preparedness practices. The community
implemented five outreach strategies to reach target audiences,
including a neighborhood educator project, business workshop, school
outreach program, public workshop, and a tsunami evacuation drill that
included Seaside residents, businesses, and visitors.
[25] Designing for Tsunamis: Seven Principles for Planning and
Designing for Tsunami Hazards. NTHMP, March 2001.
[26] Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 455.446-447 (2003).
[27] Alaska Admin. Code tit. 11, § 112.210 (2006).
[28] Urban Renewal Plan for the Kaiko'o Project, Hawaii Redevelopment
Agency, County of Hawaii, Hilo, Hawaii, June 1965.
[29] Most local building codes in the Pacific states are based on the
Uniform Building Code prepared by the International Conference of
Building Officials.
[30] Revised ordinances of Honolulu, Ch. 16-11, available at http://
www.co.honolulu.hi.us/refs/roh/16a11.htm.
[31] H.B. 1022, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wa. 2006).
[32] H.B. 3230, 23rd Leg. Reg. Sess. (Hi. 2005).
[33] See e.g., Cal. Gov. Code § 8875 (2006); S.B. 2-5, 73rd Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Or. 2005).
[34] Retrofitting is making changes to an existing building to protect
it from flooding, or other hazards such as high winds and earthquakes.
[35] FEMA-172, National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program, Handbook
of Techniques for the Seismic Rehabilitation of Existing Buildings.
[36] In January 2006, FEMA developed a proposal that encourages
communities to map and manage tsunami hazards by providing credits in
the Community Rating System that reduce their flood insurance rates.
The Community Rating System, part of the National Flood Insurance
Program, is a voluntary incentive program that recognizes and
encourages community floodplain management activities that exceed the
minimum program requirements. Communities that participate in the
National Flood Insurance Program receive federally subsidized flood
insurance.
[37] As of March 2006, there were a total of 27 TsunamiReady recognized
communities in the United States, including 2 on the East Coast -
Indian Harbour Beach, Florida, and Norfolk, Virginia. All counties in
the state of Hawaii are also recognized as TsunamiReady.
[38] NOAA, FY 2005 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-
13), Report to Congress on NOAA's Tsunami Community Preparedness
Implementation Plan.
[39] The National Data Buoy Center, under the NWS, designs, develops,
operates, and maintains a network of data collecting buoys and coastal
stations.
[40] National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: Improvements
Needed in the Reporting for NOAA GOALS--Build Sustainable Fisheries,
Recover Protected Species, and Predict and Assess Decadel to Centennial
Climate Change, Final Audit Report No. FSD-15989-4-0001, September
2004; National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: Improvements
Needed in the Reporting of Performance Measures Related to Promoting
Safe Navigation and Sustaining Healthy Coasts, Audit Report No. FSD-
14998-3-0001, February 2003; and National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration: Improvements Needed in the Reporting of Performance
Measures Related to Goals for Advancing Short-term Warnings and
Implementing Seasonal to Interannual Climate Forecasts, Audit Report
No. FSD-15643-3-0001, September 2003.
[41] GAO, Strategic Budgeting: Risk Management Principles Can Help DHS
Allocate Resources to Highest Priorities, GAO-05-824T (Washington,
D.C.: June 29, 2005).
[42] The commonwealths are Puerto Rico and the Northern Mariana
Islands, and the territories are American Samoa, Guam, and the U.S.
Virgin Islands.
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