Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
Steps Remain in Incorporating Lessons Learned from Other Satellite Programs Gao ID: GAO-06-993 September 6, 2006The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) plans to procure the next generation of geostationary operational environmental satellites, called the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites-R series (GOES-R). This new series is considered critical to the United States' ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting through the year 2028. GAO was asked to (1) determine the status of and plans for the GOES-R series procurement, and (2) identify and evaluate the actions that the program management team is taking to ensure that past problems experienced in procuring other satellite programs are not repeated.
NOAA is nearing the end of the preliminary design phase of its GOES-R system--which was estimated to cost $6.2 billion and scheduled to have the first satellite ready for launch in 2012. It expects to award a contract in August 2007 to develop this system. However, according to program officials, NOAA's plans for the GOES-R procurement could change in the near future. Recent analyses of the GOES-R program cost--which in May 2006 the program office estimated could reach $11.4 billion--have led the agency to consider reducing the scope of requirements for the satellite series. NOAA officials estimated that a decision on the future scope and direction of the program could be made by the end of September 2006. NOAA has taken steps to implement lessons learned from past satellite programs, but more remains to be done. Prior satellite programs--including a prior GOES series, a polar-orbiting environmental satellite series, and various military satellite programs--often experienced technical challenges, cost overruns, and schedule delays. Key lessons from these programs include the need to (1) establish realistic cost and schedule estimates, (2) ensure sufficient technical readiness of the system's components prior to key decisions, (3) provide sufficient management at government and contractor levels, and (4) perform adequate senior executive oversight to ensure mission success. NOAA has established plans to address these lessons by conducting independent cost estimates, performing preliminary studies of key technologies, placing resident government offices at key contractor locations, and establishing a senior executive oversight committee. However, many steps remain to fully address these lessons. Until it completes these activities, NOAA faces an increased risk that the GOES-R program will repeat the increased cost, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls that have plagued past procurements.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-993, Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: Steps Remain in Incorporating Lessons Learned from Other Satellite Programs
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-06-993
entitled 'Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: Steps
Remain in Incorporating Lessons learned from Other Satellite Programs'
which was released on September 29, 2006.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Report to the Subcommittee on Environment, Technology, and Standards,
Committee on Science, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
September 2006:
Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites:
Steps Remain in Incorporating Lessons Learned from Other Satellite
Programs:
Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites:
GAO-06-993:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-993, a report to the Subcommittee on Environment,
Technology, and Standards, Committee on Science, House of
Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) plans to
procure the next generation of geostationary operational environmental
satellites, called the Geostationary Operational Environmental
Satellites-R series (GOES-R). This new series is considered critical to
the United States‘ ability to maintain the continuity of data required
for weather forecasting through the year 2028. GAO was asked to (1)
determine the status of and plans for the GOES-R series procurement,
and (2) identify and evaluate the actions that the program management
team is taking to ensure that past problems experienced in procuring
other satellite programs are not repeated.
What GAO Found:
NOAA is nearing the end of the preliminary design phase of its GOES-R
system”which was estimated to cost $6.2 billion and scheduled to have
the first satellite ready for launch in 2012. It expects to award a
contract in August 2007 to develop this system. However, according to
program officials, NOAA‘s plans for the GOES-R procurement could change
in the near future. Recent analyses of the GOES-R program cost”which in
May 2006 the program office estimated could reach $11.4 billion”have
led the agency to consider reducing the scope of requirements for the
satellite series. NOAA officials estimated that a decision on the
future scope and direction of the program could be made by the end of
September 2006.
NOAA has taken steps to implement lessons learned from past satellite
programs, but more remains to be done. Prior satellite
programs”including a prior GOES series, a polar-orbiting environmental
satellite series, and various military satellite programs”often
experienced technical challenges, cost overruns, and schedule delays.
Key lessons from these programs include the need to (1) establish
realistic cost and schedule estimates, (2) ensure sufficient technical
readiness of the system‘s components prior to key decisions, (3)
provide sufficient management at government and contractor levels, and
(4) perform adequate senior executive oversight to ensure mission
success. NOAA has established plans to address these lessons by
conducting independent cost estimates, performing preliminary studies
of key technologies, placing resident government offices at key
contractor locations, and establishing a senior executive oversight
committee. However, many steps remain to fully address these lessons
(see table). Until it completes these activities, NOAA faces an
increased risk that the GOES-R program will repeat the increased cost,
schedule delays, and performance shortfalls that have plagued past
procurements.
Table: Key Lessons Learned and the Activities Taken or Remaining to
Fully Address Them:
Lessons learned: Establish realistic cost and schedule estimates;
Actions taken or under way:
* Obtaining multiple independent cost estimates;
* Conducting risk analysis of schedule estimates; Actions remaining:
Ensuring objectivity when reconciling alternative estimates.
Lessons learned: Ensure sufficient technical readiness of the system‘s
components prior to critical decisions; Actions taken or under way:
Conducted preliminary studies of key technologies and components;
Actions remaining: Ensuring sufficient technical maturity before
proceeding to production.
Lessons learned: Provide sufficient management of contractors and
subcontractors; Actions taken or under way:
* Increased presence at contractor sites;
* Plan to increase number of system engineers;
* Plan to hire three specialists in earned value; Actions remaining:
Assessing the number of earned value specialists needed commensurate
with increased acquisition activities.
Lessons learned: Perform effective executive-level oversight; Actions
taken or under way: NOAA‘s program management council meets regularly
to oversee project; Actions remaining: [Empty].
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of Table]
What GAO Recommends:
We are making recommendations to the Secretary of Commerce to direct
its NOAA Program Management Council to establish a process for
reconciling the government and independent cost estimates; perform a
comprehensive review of a key instrument prior to moving it into
production; and to evaluate the appropriate levels of resources needed
at the program office to oversee the contractor‘s performance in
meeting cost and schedule targets. In written comments, the Department
of Commerce agreed with the recommendations and identified plans for
implementing them.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-993].
To view the full product, including the scop and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Dave Powner at (202)512-
9286 or pownerd@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
GOES-R Procurement Activities Are Under Way, but System Requirements
and Cost Estimates May Change:
The GOES-R Program Office Has Taken Steps to Address Past Lessons
Learned, but Significant Actions Remain:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Current Shortfalls in Contractor Performance on Key
Instrument Development:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Commerce:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Summary of the Procurement History of GOES:
Table 2: Summary of Key GOES-R System Improvements:
Table 3: Expected GOES-R Series Instruments, as of June 2006:
Table 4: Key Problems Experienced on Selected Major Space Systems:
Table 5: Status of GOES-R Program Contracts, as of June 2006:
Table 6: GOES-R Program Life Cycle Cost Estimate, as of June 2006:
Table 7: GOES-R Program Schedule, as of June 2006:
Figures:
Figure 1: Approximate GOES Geographic Coverage:
Figure 2: Generic GOES Data Relay Pattern:
Figure 3: GOES-R Program Office Structure and Staffing:
Figure 4: Cumulative Cost Variance of the ABI Instrument Contract over
an 11-month Period:
Figure 5: Cumulative Schedule Variance of the ABI Instrument Contract
over an 11-month Period:
Abbreviations:
ABI: Advanced Baseline Imager:
AEHF: Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite System:
DOD: Department of Defense:
GOES-R: Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites-R series:
NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
NESDIS: National Environmental Satellite Data and Information Service:
NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration:
NPOESS: National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite
System:
SBIRS-High: Space Based Infrared System High Program:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 6, 2006:
The Honorable Vernon J. Ehlers:
Chairman:
The Honorable David Wu:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Environment, Technology, and Standards:
Committee on Science:
House of Representatives:
Operational geostationary environmental satellites play a critical role
in our nation's weather forecasting. These satellites--which are
managed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)-
-provide critical information on atmospheric, oceanic, climatic, and
solar conditions that help meteorologists observe and predict global
and local weather events. They also provide the best means to identify
severe storm conditions, such as hurricanes and tornadoes, and to track
the movement and intensity of these storms once they develop.
NOAA, with the aid of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), is planning to procure the next generation of geostationary
satellites, called the Geostationary Operational Environmental
Satellites-R series (GOES-R). The GOES-R series is to replace the
current series of satellites which will likely begin to reach the end
of their useful lives in approximately 2012. This new series is
expected to mark the first major technological advance in GOES
instrumentation since 1994. It is also considered critical to the
United States' ability to maintain the continuity of data required for
weather forecasting through the year 2028.
This report responds to your request that we review NOAA's management
of the GOES-R program. Specifically, we were asked to (1) determine the
status of and plans for the GOES-R series procurement, and (2) identify
and evaluate the actions that the program management team is taking to
ensure that past problems experienced in procuring other satellite
programs are not repeated.
To determine GOES-R status and plans, we reviewed program documents on
the planned acquisition schedules, cost estimates, and system
requirements, and interviewed program officials. To assess the program
office's actions to address lessons learned from past satellite
programs, we analyzed lessons learned from past satellite programs--
including a prior GOES satellite series (called GOES I-M), the National
Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS), and
selected military satellite programs. We analyzed program management
documents, including data on a critical instrument's development, to
determine and evaluate plans for addressing past lessons. We also
interviewed program officials from NOAA and NASA.
We conducted our work at NOAA and NASA offices in the Washington, D.C.,
metropolitan area between December 2005 and August 2006, in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix I
contains further details on our objectives, scope, and methodology.
Results in Brief:
NOAA is nearing the end of the preliminary design phase of its GOES-R
system, which is officially estimated to cost $6.2 billion and
scheduled to have the first satellite ready for launch in 2012. To
date, NOAA has issued contracts for the preliminary design of the
overall GOES-R system to three vendors and expects to award a contract
to one of these vendors in August 2007 to develop the satellites. In
addition, to reduce the risks associated with developing new
instruments, NOAA has issued contracts for the early development of one
critical instrument and for the preliminary designs of four other
instruments. The agency plans to turn these instrument contracts over
to the vendor that is awarded the contract for the overall GOES-R
program. However, according to program officials, NOAA's plans for the
GOES-R procurement could change in the near future. Recent analyses of
the GOES-R program cost--which in May 2006 the program office estimated
could reach $11.4 billion--have led the agency to consider reducing the
scope of requirements for the satellite series. NOAA officials
estimated that a decision on the future scope and direction of the
program could be made by the end of September 2006.
NOAA has taken steps to implement lessons learned from past satellite
programs, but more remains to be done. Prior satellite programs--
including a prior GOES series, a polar-orbiting environmental satellite
series, and various military satellite programs--often experience
technical challenges, cost overruns, and schedule delays. Key lessons
from these programs include the need to (1) establish realistic cost
and schedule estimates, (2) ensure sufficient technical readiness of
the system's components prior to key decisions, (3) provide sufficient
management at government and contractor levels, and (4) perform
adequate senior executive oversight to ensure mission success. NOAA has
established plans to address these lessons by conducting independent
cost estimates, performing preliminary studies of key technologies,
placing resident government offices at key contractor locations, and
establishing a senior executive oversight committee. However, many
steps remain to fully address these lessons. Specifically, NOAA has not
yet developed a process to evaluate and reconcile the independent and
government cost estimates. In addition, NOAA has not yet determined how
it will ensure that a sufficient level of technical maturity will be
achieved in time for an upcoming decision milestone, nor has it
determined the appropriate level of resources it needs to adequately
track and oversee the program using earned value management.[Footnote
1] Until it completes these activities, NOAA faces an increased risk
that the GOES-R program will repeat the increased cost, schedule
delays, and performance shortfalls that have plagued past procurements.
We are making recommendations to the Secretary of Commerce to direct
its NOAA Program Management Council to establish a process for
objectively evaluating and reconciling the government and independent
life cycle cost estimates once the program requirements are finalized;
to establish a team of system engineering experts to perform a
comprehensive review of the Advanced Baseline Imager instrument to
determine the level of technical maturity achieved on the instrument
before moving it into production; and to seek assistance in determining
the appropriate levels of resources needed at the program office to
adequately track and oversee the contractor's earned value management
data.
The Department of Commerce provided written comments on a draft of this
report in which it agreed with our recommendations and identified
planned steps for implementing them (see app. III). The department also
provided technical corrections, which we have incorporated in this
report as appropriate.
Background:
Since the 1960s, geostationary and polar-orbiting environmental
satellites have been used by the United States to provide
meteorological data for weather observation, research, and forecasting.
NOAA's National Environmental Satellite Data and Information Service
(NESDIS) is responsible for managing the civilian geostationary and
polar-orbiting satellite systems as two separate programs, called GOES
and the Polar Operational Environmental Satellites, respectively.
Unlike polar-orbiting satellites, which constantly circle the earth in
a relatively low polar orbit, geostationary satellites can maintain a
constant view of the earth from a high orbit of about 22,300 miles in
space. NOAA operates GOES as a two-satellite system that is primarily
focused on the United States (see fig. 1). These satellites are
uniquely positioned to provide timely environmental data to
meteorologists and their audiences on the earth's atmosphere, its
surface, cloud cover, and the space environment. They also observe the
development of hazardous weather, such as hurricanes and severe
thunderstorms, and track their movement and intensity to reduce or
avoid major losses of property and life. Furthermore, the satellites'
ability to provide broad, continuously updated coverage of atmospheric
conditions over land and oceans is important to NOAA's weather
forecasting operations.
Figure 1: Approximate GOES Geographic Coverage:
[See PDF for image]
Source: NOAA (data); MapArt (map).
[End of figure]
To provide continuous satellite coverage, NOAA acquires several
satellites at a time as part of a series and launches new satellites
every few years. Three satellites--GOES-11, GOES-12, and GOES-13--are
currently in orbit. Both GOES-11 and GOES-12 are operational
satellites, while GOES-13 is in an on-orbit storage mode. It is a
backup for the other two satellites should they experience any
degradation in service. The others in the series, GOES-O and GOES-P,
are planned for launch over the next few years.[Footnote 2] NOAA is
also planning a future generation of satellites, known as the GOES-R
series, which are planned for launch beginning in 2012.
Each of the operational geostationary satellites continuously transmits
raw environmental data to NOAA ground stations. The data are processed
at these ground stations and transmitted back to the satellite for
broadcast to primary weather services both in the United States and
around the world, including the global research community. Raw and
processed data are also distributed to users via ground stations
through other communication channels, such as dedicated private
communication lines and the Internet. Figure 2 depicts a generic data
relay pattern from the geostationary satellites to the ground stations
and commercial terminals.
Figure 2: Generic GOES Data Relay Pattern:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data.
[End of figure]
A Brief History of Prior GOES Series:
To date, NOAA has procured three series of GOES satellites and is in
the planning stages to acquire a fourth one (see table 1).
Table 1: Summary Of The Procurement History Of Goes
Series name: Original GOES[B];
Procurement duration[A]: 1970-1987;
Satellites: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7.
Series name: GOES I-M;
Procurement duration[A]: 1985-2001;
Satellites: 8, 9, 10, 11, 12.
Series name: GOES-N;
Procurement duration[A]: 1998-2011;
Satellites: 13, O, P, Q[C].
Series name: GOES-R;
Procurement duration[A]: 2007-2020;
Satellites: R, S, T, U.
Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data.
[A] Duration includes time from contract award to final satellite
launch.
[B] The procurement of these satellites consisted of four separate
contracts for (1) two early prototype satellites and GOES-1, (2) GOES-
2 and -3, (3) GOES-4 through -6, and (4) GOES-G (failed on launch) and
GOES-7.
[C] NOAA decided not to exercise the option for this satellite.
[End of table]
Original GOES Satellites:
In 1970, NOAA initiated its original GOES program based on experimental
geostationary satellites developed by NASA. While these satellites
operated effectively for many years, they had technical limitations.
For example, this series of satellites was "spin-stabilized," meaning
that the satellites slowly spun while in orbit to maintain a stable
position with respect to the earth. As a result, the satellite viewed
the earth only about 5 percent of the time and had to collect data very
slowly, capturing one narrow band of data each time its field-of-view
swung past the earth. A complete set of sounding data took 2 to 3 hours
to collect.
GOES I-M Series:
In 1985, NOAA and NASA began to procure a new generation of GOES,
called the GOES I-M series, based on a set of requirements developed by
NOAA's National Weather Service, NESDIS, and NASA, among others. GOES I-
M consisted of five satellites, GOES-8 through GOES-12, and was a
significant improvement in technology from the original GOES
satellites. For example, GOES I-M was "body-stabilized," meaning that
the satellite held a fixed position in orbit relative to the earth,
thereby allowing for continuous meteorological observations. Instead of
maintaining stability by spinning, the satellite would preserve its
fixed position by continuously making small adjustments in the rotation
of internal momentum wheels or by firing small thrusters to compensate
for drift. These and other enhancements meant that the GOES I-M
satellites would be able to collect significantly better quality data
more quickly than the older series of satellites.
GOES-N Series:
In 1998, NOAA began the procurement of satellites to follow GOES I-M,
called the GOES-N series. This series used existing technologies for
the instruments and added system upgrades, including an improved power
subsystem and enhanced satellite pointing accuracy. Furthermore, the
GOES-N satellites were designed to operate longer than its
predecessors. This series originally consisted of four satellites, GOES-
N through GOES-Q. However, the option for the GOES-Q satellite was
cancelled based on NOAA's assessment that it would not need the final
satellite to continue weather coverage. In particular, the agency found
that the GOES satellites already in operation were lasting longer than
expected and that the first satellite in the next series could be
available to back up the last of the GOES-N satellites. As noted
earlier, the first GOES-N series satellite--GOES-13--was launched in
May 2006. The GOES-O and GOES-P satellites are currently in production
and are expected to be launched in July 2008 and July 2011,
respectively.
Planned GOES-R Series:
NOAA is currently planning to procure the next series of GOES
satellites, called the GOES-R series. This series will consist of four
satellites, GOES-R through GOES-U, and is intended to provide the first
major technological advance in instrumentation since the first
satellite of the GOES I-M series was launched in 1994.[Footnote 3]
GOES-R Program--An Overview:
NOAA is planning for the GOES-R program to improve on the technology of
prior GOES series, in terms of both system and instrument improvements.
The system improvements are expected to fulfill more demanding user
requirements and to provide more rapid information updates. Table 2
highlights key system-related improvements GOES-R is expected to make
to the geostationary satellite program.
Table 2: Summary Of Key Goes-R System Improvements
Key feature: Total products;
GOES-N (current): 41;
GOES-R: ~152.
Key feature: Downlink rate of raw data collected by instruments (from
satellite to ground stations);
GOES-N (current): 2.6 Mbps;
GOES-R: 132 Mbps.
Key feature: Broadcast rate of processed GOES data (from satellite to
users);
GOES-N (current): 2.1 Mbps;
GOES-R: 17-24 Mbps.
Key feature: Raw data storage (the length of time that raw data will be
stored at ground stations);
GOES-N (current): 0 days;
GOES-R: 30 days.
Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data.
[End of table]
The instruments on the GOES-R series are expected to significantly
increase the clarity and precision of the observed environmental data.
NOAA plans to acquire five different types of instruments. The program
office considers two of the instruments--the Advanced Baseline Imager
and the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite--to be most critical because
they will provide data for key weather products. Table 3 summarizes the
planned instruments and their expected capabilities.
Table 3: Expected Goes-R Series Instruments, As Of June 2006
Planned instrument: Advanced Baseline Imager;
Description: Expected to provide variable area imagery and radiometric
information of the earth's surface, atmosphere, and cloud cover. Key
features include;
* monitoring and tracking severe weather,;
* providing images of clouds to support forecasts, and;
* providing higher resolution, faster coverage, and broader coverage
simultaneously.
Planned instrument: Hyperspectral Environmental Suite;
Description: Expected to provide information about the earth's surface
to aid in the prediction of weather and climate monitoring. Key
features include;
* providing atmospheric moisture and temperature profiles to support
forecasts and climate monitoring,;
* monitoring coastal regions for ecosystem health, water quality,
coastal erosion, and harmful algal blooms, and;
* providing higher resolution and faster coverage.
Planned instrument: Space Environmental In-Situ Suite;
Description: Expected to provide information on space weather to aid in
the prediction of particle precipitation, which causes disturbance and
disruption of radio communications and navigation systems. Key features
include;
* measuring magnetic fields and charged particles,;
* providing improved heavy ion detection, adding low energy electrons
and protons, and;
* enabling early warnings for satellite and power grid operation,
telecom services, astronauts, and airlines.
Planned instrument: Solar Imaging Suite;
Description: Expected to provide coverage of the entire dynamic range
of solar X-ray features, from coronal holes to X-class flares, as well
as estimate the measure of temperature and emissions. Key features
include;
* providing images of the sun and measuring solar output to monitor
solar storms and;
* providing improved imager capability.
Planned instrument: Geostationary Lightning Mapper;
Description: Expected to continuously monitor lightning activity over
the United States and provide a more complete dataset than previously
possible. Key features include;
* detecting lightning strikes as an indicator of severe storms and;
* providing a new capability to GOES that only previously existed on
polar satellites.
Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data.
[End of table]
GOES-R Program Office Structure:
The program management structure for the GOES-R program differs from
past GOES programs. Prior to the GOES-R series, NOAA was responsible
for program funding, procurement of the ground elements, and on-orbit
operation of the satellites, while NASA was responsible for the
procurement of the spacecraft, instruments, and launch services. NOAA
officials stated that this approach limited the agency's insight and
management involvement in the procurement of major elements of the
system.
Alternatively, under the GOES-R management structure, NOAA has
responsibility for the procurement and operation of the overall system-
-including spacecraft, instruments, and launch services. NASA is
responsible for the procurement of the individual instruments until
they are transferred to the overall GOES-R system contractor for
completion and integration onto the spacecraft. Additionally, to take
advantage of NASA's acquisition experience and technical expertise,
NOAA located the GOES-R program office at NASA's Goddard Space Flight
Center. It also designated key program management positions to be
filled with NASA personnel (see fig. 3). These positions include the
deputy system program director role for advanced instrument and
technology infusion, the project manager for the flight portion of the
system, and the deputy project manager for the ground and operations
portion of the system. NOAA officials explained that they changed the
management structure for the GOES-R program in order to streamline
oversight and fiduciary responsibilities, but that they still plan to
rely on NASA's expertise in space system acquisitions.
Figure 3: GOES-R Program Office Structure and Staffing:
[See PDF for image]
Source: NOAA.
[End of figure]
Satellite Programs Often Experience Technical Problems, Cost Overruns,
and Schedule Delays:
Satellite programs are often technically complex and risky
undertakings, and as a result, they often experience technical
problems, cost overruns, and schedule delays. We and others have
reported on a historical pattern of repeated missteps in the
procurement of major satellite systems, including the National Polar-
orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS), the GOES
I-M series, the Space Based Infrared System High Program (SBIRS-High),
and the Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite System
(AEHF).[Footnote 4] Table 4 lists key problems experienced with these
programs and is followed by a summary of each program.
Table 4: Key Problems Experienced On Selected Major Space Systems
Problem: Insufficient technical readiness prior to critical decision
points;
NPOESS: [Empty];
GOES I-M: [Empty];
SBIRS-High: [Empty];
AEHF: [Empty].
Problem: Inadequate preliminary studies prior to the decision to award
a development contract;
NPOESS: X;
GOES I-M: X;
SBIRS-High: X;
AEHF: [Empty].
Problem: Insufficient technical maturity prior to the decision to move
to production;
NPOESS: X;
GOES I-M: X;
SBIRS-High: X;
AEHF: X.
Problem: Unrealistic cost and schedule estimates;
NPOESS: [Empty];
GOES I-M: [Empty];
SBIRS-High: [Empty];
AEHF: [Empty].
Problem: Optimistic assumptions including: savings from heritage
systems;
NPOESS: X;
GOES I-M: X;
SBIRS- High: X;
AEHF: [Empty].
Problem: Optimistic assumptions including: readiness of technology
maturity;
NPOESS: X;
GOES I-M: X;
SBIRS-High: X;
AEHF: X.
Problem: Optimistic assumptions including: constant and available
industrial base;
NPOESS: [Empty];
GOES I-M: [Empty];
SBIRS-High: X;
AEHF: [Empty].
Problem: Optimistic assumptions including: no weight growth;
NPOESS: X;
GOES I-M: [Empty];
SBIRS-High: X;
AEHF: X.
Problem: Optimistic assumptions including: no requirements growth;
NPOESS: [Empty];
GOES I-M: [Empty];
SBIRS-High: [Empty];
AEHF: X.
Problem: Optimistic assumptions including: savings from lot buys versus
single-unit purchase;
NPOESS: [Empty];
GOES I-M: [Empty];
SBIRS-High: X;
AEHF: [Empty].
Problem: Optimistic assumptions including: overly aggressive schedule;
NPOESS: X;
GOES I-M: X;
SBIRS- High: X;
AEHF: X.
Poor program and contractor management:
Problem: Quality and subcontractor issues;
NPOESS: X;
GOES I-M: X;
SBIRS-High: X;
AEHF: X.
Problem: Inadequate systems engineering capabilities;
NPOESS: X;
GOES I-M: X;
SBIRS-High: X;
AEHF: X.
Problem: Inadequate earned value management capabilities;
NPOESS: X;
GOES I-M: [Empty];
SBIRS-High: X;
AEHF: X.
Problem: Insufficient management reserve;
NPOESS: X;
GOES I-M: [Empty];
SBIRS-High: [Empty];
AEHF: X.
Problem: Ineffective contract award fee structure;
NPOESS: X;
GOES I-M: X;
SBIRS-High: X;
AEHF: [Empty].
Problem: Poor senior executive level oversight:
Problem: Infrequent meetings;
NPOESS: X;
GOES I-M: [Empty];
SBIRS-High: [Empty];
AEHF: [Empty].
Problem: Inability to make timely decisions;
NPOESS: X;
GOES I-M: [Empty];
SBIRS-High: [Empty];
AEHF: [Empty].
Problem: Other;
NPOESS: [Empty];
GOES I-M: [Empty];
SBIRS-High: [Empty];
AEHF: [Empty].
Problem: Unstable funding stream;
NPOESS: X;
GOES I-M: [Empty];
SBIRS- High: X;
AEHF: X.
Problem: Unstable requirements;
NPOESS: [Empty];
GOES I-M: [Empty];
SBIRS-High: X;
AEHF: X.
Source: GAO analysis of NOAA and DOD data.
[End of table]
National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System:
NPOESS is being developed to combine two separate polar-orbiting
environmental satellite systems currently operated by NOAA and the
Department of Defense (DOD) into a single state-of-the-art environment
monitoring system. A tri-agency program office--comprised of officials
from DOD, NOAA, and NASA--is responsible for managing this program.
Within the program office, each agency has the lead on certain
activities. NOAA has overall program management responsibility for the
converged system and for satellite operations; DOD has the lead on the
acquisition; and NASA has primary responsibility for facilitating the
development and incorporation of new technologies into the converged
system.
Since its inception, the NPOESS program has encountered cost overruns
and schedule delays. Specifically, within a year of the contract award,
the program cost estimate increased by $1.2 billion, from $6.9 billion
to $8.1 billion, and the expected availability of the first satellite
was delayed by 20 months. We reported in September 2004 that these cost
increases and schedule delays were caused, in part, by changes in the
NPOESS funding stream.[Footnote 5] Subsequently, in November 2005, we
reported that problems in the development of a critical sensor would
likely cause program costs to grow by at least another $3 billion and
the schedule for the first launch would likely be delayed by almost 3
years.[Footnote 6] The senior executive oversight committee for NPOESS
was expected to make a decision in December 2005 on the direction of
the program--which involved increased costs, delayed schedules, and
reduced functionality. We urged this committee to make a decision
quickly so that the program could proceed. However, in late November
2005, the NPOESS program's anticipated cost growth triggered a
legislative requirement forcing DOD to reassess its options and to
recertify the program.[Footnote 7] In June 2006, DOD decided to reduce
the system's capabilities and number of satellites from six to four,
and announced that the newly-restructured program was estimated to cost
$11.5 billion and the launch of the first satellite had been delayed by
at least 4 years from the time the contract was awarded.
NPOESS' problems involved a number of factors, including unrealistic
cost and schedule estimates, insufficient technical maturity of
critical sensors at a key development milestone, poor performance at
multiple levels of contractor and government management, insufficient
executive oversight, and excessive award fee payments to the
contractor. Specifically, in 2003, an Air Force cost group performed an
independent cost estimate for NPOESS and found that, based on actual
outcomes from historical programs similar to NPOESS, the program office
underestimated contract costs by almost $1 billion. This group also
concluded that the program office underestimated the required time
needed to integrate the sensors onto the spacecraft by almost 80
percent. Despite the differences in planned cost and schedule, the
program office moved forward with its own estimates--and, in turn,
established unrealistic budgets that led, in part, to the eventual
restructuring of the program.
Further, an independent review team charged with assessing the NPOESS
program found that the program management office did not sufficiently
validate the subcontractors' design work on various sensors. As a
result, the sensors were approved to move into production before they
reached a sufficient level of technical maturity. This resulted in
unexpected technical problems during sensor production.
We also reported that the development issues on one critical sensor
were attributed, in part, to the subcontractor's inadequate project
management.[Footnote 8] Specifically, after a series of technical
problems, internal review teams sent by the prime contractor and the
program office found that the sensor's subcontractor had deviated from
a number of contract, management, and policy directives set out by the
main office and that both management and process engineering were
inadequate. Neither the contractor nor the program office recognized
the underlying problems in time to fix them. Further, an independent
review team reported that the program management office did not have
the technical system engineering support it needed to effectively
manage the contractor. In addition, the program office and contractor
set aside less than 10 percent of their budgets in management reserve-
-an amount which was insufficient to effectively deal with these
technical problems. With just 2 years into the contract, the prime
contractor had spent or allocated over 90 percent of its reserves.
The involvement of the NPOESS executive leadership committee was also
inconsistent and indecisive--it wavered from frequent heavy involvement
to occasional meetings with few resulting decisions. In the 32-month
period from May 2003 through December 2005, the committee met formally
six times. Despite mounting evidence of the seriousness of the critical
sensor problems, the committee did not effectively challenge the
program manager's optimistic assessments, and from May 2003 through
December 2004, convened only twice to consider the program's
status.[Footnote 9]
In May 2006, the Department of Commerce's (Commerce) Inspector General
reported that the NPOESS award fee structure was not an effective
system for promoting high-quality performance by the contractor.
Despite the significant delays and cost overruns on the program, the
contractor received about 84 percent of the available fee pool for the
first six billing periods.
GOES I-M Series:
In its development of the GOES I-M series, NOAA experienced severe
technical challenges, massive cost overruns, and risky schedule delays.
The overall development cost of the program was over three times
greater than planned, escalating from $640 million to approximately $2
billion. Additionally, the launch of the first satellite of this
series, which had been planned for July 1989, did not occur until April
1994. This nearly 5-year schedule delay left NOAA in danger of losing
geostationary satellite coverage, although no gap in coverage occurred.
We reported that these problems were caused by a number of factors,
including insufficient technical readiness of the satellite design
prior to contract award, unrealistic cost and schedule estimates, and
inadequate management by NOAA and NASA.[Footnote 10]
Specifically, NOAA and NASA did not require any engineering analyses to
be completed prior to the award of the GOES I-M contract. As a result,
both agencies were unable to anticipate the level of complexity of
NOAA's requirements (related to the satellite's pointing accuracy) or
the contractor's approach to meeting those requirements. This
unanticipated design complexity led to additional analyses, redesigns,
and remanufacture of parts, which resulted in increased costs and
schedule delays. Additionally, the lack of adequate understanding of
the system prior to contract award also prevented program officials
from establishing realistic cost and schedule estimates for the
program.
The inadequate management of the GOES I-M program--by both the
government and contractor--played a significant part in its cost
increases and program delays. Specifically, NASA and NOAA made the
decision to forgo preliminary studies of the system because of fiscal
constraints and pressure to launch the first satellite as quickly as
possible. This decision was compounded by NASA's limited technical
support in the areas of optics, satellite control systems, and thermal
engineering. Additionally, both the prime contractor and major
subcontractor had little experience in directing the design of complex
weather instruments. The subcontractor had also noted that it was not
prepared for GOES I-M. For example, the instruments were expected to
meet manufacturing and testing standards that the subcontractor had
never experienced before. We recommended Congress consider directing
NASA and NOAA to report on their progress in resolving these problems
and the timeframe and cost for achieving proposed solutions. Further,
we recommended that funds for the production and testing of the
satellites be withheld until a favorable solution was identified and
reported to Congress.
Space Based Infrared System High Program:
SBIRS-High satellites are being developed to replace DOD's older
missile warning satellites. In addition to missile warning and missile
defense missions, the satellites are also expected to perform technical
intelligence and battlespace characterization missions. After the
program was initiated in 1994, it faced cost, scheduling, and
technology problems. SBIRS-High had experienced schedule slips of at
least 6 years and cost increases that have triggered legislative
requirements to reassess and recertify the program several times--most
recently in 2005. While DOD's total program cost estimate was initially
about $3.9 billion, it is now $9.9 billion--nearly a 150 percent unit
cost increase. DOD is currently reexamining this program, potential
alternatives, and cost estimates.
Our reviews have attributed past problems on the SBIRS-High program to
serious hardware and software design problems, insufficient oversight
of contractors, and technology challenges.[Footnote 11] Further, an
independent review team chartered by DOD reported that a root cause of
these problems was that system requirements were not well understood by
DOD when the program began. Specifically, the requirements-setting
process was often ad hoc, many decisions on requirements were deferred
to the contractor, and the program was too immature to enter system
design and development. As a result, there was too much instability on
the program after the contract award--leading DOD to undertake four
major replanning efforts. We made multiple recommendations to improve
this program, including commissioning an independent task force to
assess the development schedule, the stability of the program design,
and software development practices, and to provide guidance for
addressing the program's underlying problems. In addition, we
recommended that DOD establish a mechanism for ensuring that the
knowledge gained from the assessment was used to determine whether
further programmatic changes were needed to strengthen oversight,
adjust cost and schedule estimates, and address requirements changes.
Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite System:
AEHF is a satellite system intended to be DOD's next generation of high-
speed, protected communication satellites and to replace the existing
Milstar system. In 2003, we reported that cost estimates developed by
the Air Force for this program increased from $4.4 billion in January
1999 to $5.6 billion in June 2001 for five satellites.[Footnote 12]
Moreover, DOD would not meet its accelerated target date for launching
the first satellite in December 2004. To minimize costs, DOD then
decided to purchase three satellites with options to purchase the
fourth and fifth--which brought the program cost to $4.7 billion.
Despite this action, AEHF costs grew to about $6.1 billion--an increase
of more than 15 percent over the baseline estimate, which triggered
legislative requirements to assess and certify the program. Schedule
slippages for launching this communication system have now stretched to
over 3 years.
A number of factors contributed to cost and schedule overruns and
performance shortfalls. First, in the early phases of the AEHF program,
DOD substantially and frequently altered requirements--resulting in
major design modifications that increased costs by millions of dollars.
For instance, a new requirement for additional anti-jamming protection
led to a cost increase of $100 million and an added set of requirements
for training, support, and maintainability that cost an additional $90
million. Second, based on a satellite constellation gap caused by the
failure of a Milstar satellite, DOD accepted a high-risk schedule that
turned out to be overly optimistic and highly compressed--leaving
little room for error and depending on a chain of events taking place
at certain times. Third, AEHF allocated 4 percent of its budget to
management reserve--which was an inadequate amount to cover unforeseen
problems for the duration of the program. Between December 2002 and
June 2005, the contractor had depleted about 86 percent of its reserves
with 5 years remaining on the contract. Lastly, at the time DOD decided
to accelerate the program, it did not have the funding needed to
support the activities or the manpower needed to design and build the
satellites more quickly. The lack of funding also contributed to
schedule delays, which in turn, caused more cost increases. We made a
number of recommendations to improve this program and others, including
implementing processes and policies that stabilize requirements and
addressing shortfalls in staff with science and engineering
backgrounds. These recommendations were made to assure that DOD had an
investment strategy in place that would better match resources to
requirements.
GOES-R Procurement Activities Are Under Way, but System Requirements
and Cost Estimates May Change:
NOAA is nearing the end of the preliminary design phase on its GOES-R
program and plans to award a contract for the system's development in
August 2007; however, because of concerns with potential cost growth,
NOAA's plans for the GOES-R procurement could change in the near
future. To date, NOAA has issued contracts for the preliminary design
of the overall GOES-R system to three vendors and expects to award a
contract to one of these vendors to develop the system in August 2007.
In addition, to reduce the risks associated with developing new
instruments, NASA has issued contracts for the early development of one
critical instrument and for the preliminary designs of four other
instruments. The agency plans to award these contracts and then turn
them over to the contractor responsible for the overall GOES-R program.
However, this approach is under review and NOAA may wait until the
instruments are fully developed before turning them over to the system
contractor. Table 5 provides a summary of the status of contracts for
the GOES-R program.
Table 5: Status Of Goes-R Program Contracts, As Of June 2006
Contract item: Instruments: Advanced Baseline Imager;
Date contract was awarded for design: May 2001;
Planned date contract will be awarded for development: September 2004
(actual).
Contract item: Instruments: Space Environmental In-Situ Suite;
Date contract was awarded for design: December 2004;
Planned date contract will be awarded for development: August 2006;
(actual).
Contract item: Instruments: Solar Imaging Suite;
Date contract was awarded for design: September 2004;
Planned date contract will be awarded for development: September 2006.
Contract item: Instruments: Hyperspectral Environmental Suite;
Date contract was awarded for design: June 2004;
Planned date contract will be awarded for development: June 2007.
Contract item: Instruments: Geostationary Lightning Mapper;
Date contract was awarded for design: February 2006;
Planned date contract will be awarded for development: August 2007.
Contract item: GOES-R System: Acquisition and Operations;
Date contract was awarded for design: October 2005;
Planned date contract will be awarded for development: August 2007.
Source: NOAA.
[End of table]
According to program documentation provided to the Office of Management
and Budget in 2005, the current life cycle cost estimate for GOES-R is
approximately $6.2 billion (see table 6). However, program officials
reported that this estimate is over 2 years old and is under review.
Table 6: Goes-R Program Life Cycle Cost Estimate, As Of June 2006
Major cost category: System level;
Dollars in millions: $533.
Major cost category: Space segment;
Dollars in millions: 2,494.
Major cost category: Ground segments;
Dollars in millions: 729.
Major cost category: Launch segment;
Dollars in millions: 686.
Major cost category: Operations and support;
Dollars in millions: 1,147.
Major cost category: Government program office;
Dollars in millions: 637.
Major cost category: Total;
Dollars in millions: $6,226.
Source: NOAA.
[End of table]
NOAA is tentatively planning to launch the first GOES-R series
satellite in September 2012. The development of the schedule for
launching the satellites was driven by a requirement that the
satellites be available to back up the last remaining GOES satellites
(GOES-O and GOES-P) should anything go wrong during the planned
launches of these satellites. Table 7 provides a summary of the planned
launch schedule for the GOES-R series.
Table 7: Goes-R Program Schedule, As Of June 2006
Milestone: GOES-O launch[A];
Planned date: April 2008.
Milestone: GOES-P launch[A];
Planned date: October 2009[B].
Milestone: GOES-R satellite available for launch;
Planned date: September 2012.
Milestone: GOES-S satellite available for launch;
Planned date: April 2014.
Milestone: GOES-T satellite available for launch;
Planned date: October 2015.
Milestone: GOES-U satellite available for launch;
Planned date: April 2017.
Milestone: End of operations and maintenance;
Planned date: 2028.
Source: NOAA.
[A] GOES-O and GOES-P are not part of the GOES-R series program. Their
launch dates are provided because of their relevance to the GOES-R
series satellite schedules.
[B] Because GOES satellites have been operating longer than expected,
NOAA is considering moving the planned launch of the GOES-P satellite
to July 2011.
[End of table]
Commerce is scheduled to make a major acquisition decision before the
end of this year. Commerce will decide whether or not the GOES-R series
should proceed into the development and production phase in December
2006. Program officials reported that the final request for proposal on
the GOES-R contract would be released upon completion of this decision
milestone.
However, NOAA's plans for the GOES-R procurement could change in the
near future because of concerns with potential cost growth. Given its
experiences with cost growth on the NPOESS acquisition, NOAA recently
asked program officials to recalculate the total cost of the estimated
$6.2 billion GOES-R program. In May 2006, program officials estimated
that the life cycle cost could reach $11.4 billion. The agency then
requested that the program identify options for reducing the scope of
requirements for the satellite series. Program officials reported that
there are over 10 viable options under consideration, including options
for removing one or more of the planned instruments. The program office
is also reevaluating its planned acquisition schedule based on the
potential program options. Specifically, program officials stated that
if there is a decision to make a major change in system requirements,
they will likely extend the preliminary design phase, delay the
decision to proceed into the development and production phase, and
delay the contract award date. NOAA officials estimated that a decision
on the future scope and direction of the program could be made by the
end of September 2006.
The GOES-R Program Office Has Taken Steps to Address Past Lessons
Learned, but Significant Actions Remain:
NOAA has taken steps to apply lessons learned from problems encountered
on other satellite programs to the GOES-R procurement. Key lessons
include (1) establishing realistic cost and schedule estimates, (2)
ensuring sufficient technical readiness of the system's components
prior to key decisions, (3) providing sufficient management at
government and contractor levels, and (4) performing adequate senior
executive oversight to ensure mission success. NOAA has established
plans designed to mitigate the problems faced in past acquisitions;
however, many activities remain to fully address these lessons. Until
it completes these activities, NOAA faces an increased risk that the
GOES-R program will repeat the increased cost, schedule delays, and
performance shortfalls that have plagued past procurements.
NOAA Is Taking Steps to Improve the Reliability of Cost and Schedule
Estimates, but Key Steps Remain in Reconciling Cost Estimates:
We and others have reported that space system acquisitions are strongly
biased to produce unrealistically low cost and schedule estimates in
the acquisition process. For example, we testified last July on the
continued large cost increases and schedule delays being encountered on
military space acquisition programs--including NPOESS, SBIRS-High, and
AEHF.[Footnote 13] We noted that during program formulation, the
competition to win funding is intense and has led program sponsors to
minimize their program cost estimates.[Footnote 14] Furthermore, a task
force chartered by DOD to review the acquisition of military space
programs found that independent cost estimates and government program
assessments have proven ineffective in countering this
tendency.[Footnote 15] NOAA programs face similar unrealistic
estimates. For example, the total development cost of the GOES I-M
acquisition was over three times greater than planned, escalating from
$640 million to $2 billion. The delivery of the first satellite was
delayed by 5 years.
NOAA has several efforts under way to improve the reliability of its
cost and schedule estimates for the GOES-R program. NOAA's Chief
Financial Officer has contracted with a cost-estimating firm to
complete an independent cost estimate, while the GOES-R program office
has hired a support contractor to assist with its internal program cost
estimating. The program office is re-assessing its estimates based on
preliminary information from the three vendors contracted to develop
preliminary designs for the overall GOES-R system. Once the program
office and independent cost estimates are completed, program officials
intend to compare them and to develop a revised programmatic cost
estimate that will be used in its decision on whether to proceed into
system development and production. In addition, NOAA has planned for an
independent review team--consisting of former senior industry and
government space acquisition experts--to provide an assessment of the
program office and independent cost estimates for this decision
milestone. To improve its schedule reliability, the program office is
currently conducting a schedule risk analysis in order to estimate the
amount of adequate reserve funds and schedule margin needed to deal
with unexpected problems and setbacks. Finally, the NOAA Observing
System Council[Footnote 16] submitted a prioritized list of GOES-R
system requirements to the Commerce Undersecretary for approval. This
list is expected to allow the program office to act quickly in deleting
lower priority requirements in the event of severe technical challenges
or shifting funding streams.
While NOAA acknowledges the need to establish realistic cost and
schedule estimates, several hurdles remain. As discussed earlier, the
agency is considering reducing the requirements for the GOES-R program
to mitigate the increased cost estimates for the program. Therefore,
the agency's efforts to date to establish realistic cost estimates
cannot be fully effective in addressing this lesson until this
uncertainty is resolved. NOAA suspended the work being performed by its
independent cost estimator until a decision is made on the scope of the
program. Further, the agency has not yet developed a process to
evaluate and reconcile the independent and program office cost
estimates once final program decisions are made. Without this process,
the agency may lack the objectivity necessary to counter the optimism
of program sponsors and is more likely to move forward with an
unreliable estimate. Until it completes this activity, NOAA faces an
increased risk that the GOES-R program will repeat the cost increases
and schedule delays that have plagued past procurements.
NOAA Is Conducting Preliminary Studies in Order to Avoid Technical
Problems in Later Acquisition Phases, but Steps Remain in Determining
Components' Technical Maturity:
Space programs often experience unforeseen technical problems in the
development of critical components as a result of having insufficient
knowledge of the components and their supporting technologies prior to
key decision points. One key decision point is when an agency decides
on whether the component is sufficiently ready to proceed from a
preliminary study phase into a development phase; this decision point
results in the award of the development contract. Another key decision
point occurs during the development phase when an agency decides
whether the component is ready to proceed from design into production
(also called the critical design review). Without sufficient technical
readiness at these milestones, agencies could proceed into development
contracts on components that are not well understood and enter into the
production phase of development with technologies that are not yet
mature. For example:
² On the GOES I-M series, NOAA and NASA did not require engineering
analyses prior to awarding the development contracts in order to
accelerate the schedule and launch the first satellite. The lack of
these studies resulted in unexpected technical issues in later
acquisition phases--including the inability of the original instrument
designs to withstand the temperature variations in the geostationary
orbit.
² Both the NPOESS and SBIRS-High programs committed funds for system
development before the design was proven and before the technologies
had properly matured. For instance, at the critical design review
milestone for a key NPOESS sensor, the program office decided that the
sensor was ready to proceed into production even though an engineering
model had not been constructed. This sensor has since faced severe
technical challenges that directly led to program-wide cost and
schedule overruns.
To address the lesson learned from the GOES I-M experience, in 1997,
NOAA began preliminary studies on technologies that could be used on
the GOES-R instruments. These studies target existing technologies and
assessed how they could be expanded for GOES-R. The program office is
also conducting detailed trade-off studies on the integrated system to
improve its ability to make decisions that balance performance,
affordability, risk, and schedule. For instance, the program office is
analyzing the potential architectures for the GOES-R constellation of
satellites--the quantity and configuration of satellites, including how
the instruments will be distributed over these satellites. These
studies are expected to allow for a more mature definition of the
system specifications.
NOAA has also developed plans to have an independent review team assess
project status on an annual basis once the overall system contract has
been awarded. In particular, this team will review technical,
programmatic, and management areas; identify any outstanding risks; and
recommend corrective actions. This measure is designed to ensure that
sufficient technical readiness has been reached prior to the critical
design review milestone. The program office's ongoing studies and plans
are expected to provide greater insight into the technical requirements
for key system components and to mitigate the risk of unforeseen
problems in later acquisition phases.
However, the progress currently being made on the only instrument
currently under development--the Advanced Baseline Imager--has
experienced technical problems and could be an indication of more
problems to come in the future. These problems relate to, among other
things, the design complexity of the instrument's detectors and
electronics. As a result, the contractor is experiencing negative cost
and schedule performance trends. As of May 2006, the contractor
incurred a total cost overrun of almost $6 million with the
instrument's development only 28 percent complete. In addition, from
June 2005 to May 2006, it was unable to complete approximately $3.3
million worth of work. Unless risk mitigation actions are aggressively
pursued to reverse these trends, we project the cost overrun at
completion to be about $23 million. (See app. II for further detail on
the Advanced Baseline Imager's cost and schedule performance.)
While NOAA expects to make a decision on whether to move the instrument
into production (a milestone called the critical design review) in
January 2007, the contractor's current performance raises questions as
to whether the instrument designs will be sufficiently mature by that
time. Further, the agency does not have a process to validate the level
of technical maturity achieved on this instrument or to determine
whether the contractor has implemented sound management and process
engineering to ensure that the appropriate level of technical readiness
can be achieved prior to the decision milestone. Until it does so, NOAA
risks making a poor decision based on inaccurate or insufficient
information--which could lead to unforeseen technical problems in the
development of this instrument.
Efforts to Strengthen Government and Contractor Management are Under
Way, but Significant Work on Program Controls Remains:
In the past, we have reported on poor performance in the management of
satellite acquisitions.[Footnote 17] The key drivers of poor management
included inadequate systems engineering and earned value
management[Footnote 18] capabilities, unsuitable allocation of contract
award fees, inadequate levels of management reserve, and inefficient
decision-making and reporting structure within the program office. The
NPOESS program office lacked adequate program control capabilities in
systems engineering and earned value management to effectively manage
the contractor's cost, schedule, and technical performance.
Furthermore, Commerce's Inspector General reported that NOAA awarded
the NPOESS contractor excessive award fees for a program plagued with
severe technical problems and a consistent failure to meet cost and
schedule targets.[Footnote 19] Additionally, on SBIRS-High, the program
management office had fewer systems engineers than other historical
space programs. As a result, the program did not have enough engineers
to handle the workload of ensuring that system requirements properly
flowed down into the designs of the system's components. Further, the
NPOESS and AEHF programs had less than 5 percent of funds allocated to
management reserve at the start of the system's development and spent
or allocated over 85 percent of that reserve within 3 years of
beginning development. On GOES I-M, NOAA found that it did not have the
ability to make quick decisions on problems because the program office
was managed by another agency.
NOAA has taken numerous steps to restructure its management approach on
the GOES-R procurement in an effort to improve performance and to avoid
past mistakes. These steps include:
² The program office revised its staffing profile to provide for
government staff to be located on-site at prime contractor and key
subcontractor locations.
² The program office plans to increase the number of resident systems
engineers from 31 to 54 to provide adequate government oversight of the
contractor's system engineering, including verification and validation
of engineering designs at key decision points (such as the critical
design review milestone).
² The program office has better defined the role and responsibilities
of the program scientist, the individual who is expected to maintain an
independent voice with regard to scientific matters and advise the
program manager on related technical issues and risks.
² The program office also intends to add three resident specialists in
earned value management to monitor contractor cost and schedule
performance.
² NOAA has work under way to develop the GOES-R contract award fee
structure and the award fee review board that is consistent with our
recent findings, the Commerce Inspector General's findings, and other
best practices, such as designating a non-program executive as the fee-
determining official to ensure objectivity in the allocation of award
fees.
² NOAA and NASA have implemented a more integrated management approach
that is designed to draw on NASA's expertise in satellite acquisitions
and increase NOAA's involvement on all major components of the
acquisition.
² The program office reported that it intended to establish a
management reserve of 25 percent consistent with the recommendations of
the Defense Science Board Report on Acquisition of National Security
Space Programs.[Footnote 20]
While these steps should provide more robust government oversight and
independent analysis capabilities, more work remains to be done to
fully address this lesson. Specifically, the program office has not
determined the appropriate level of resources it needs to adequately
track and oversee the program and the planned addition of three earned
value management specialists may not be enough as acquisition
activities increase. By contrast, after its recent problems and in
response to the independent review team findings, NPOESS program
officials plan to add 10 program staff dedicated to earned value, cost,
and schedule analysis. An insufficient level of established
capabilities in earned value management places the GOES-R program
office at risk of making poor decisions based on inaccurate and
potentially misleading information. Finally, while NOAA officials
believe that assuming sole responsibility for the acquisition of GOES-
R will improve their ability to manage the program effectively, this
change also elevates NOAA's risk for mission success. Specifically,
NOAA is taking on its first major system acquisition and an increased
risk due to its lack of experience. Until it fully addresses the lesson
of ensuring an appropriate level of resources to oversee its
contractor, NOAA faces an increased risk that the GOES-R program will
repeat the management and contractor performance shortfalls that have
plagued past procurements.
NOAA Has Established a Senior Executive Committee to Perform Critical
Oversight of the GOES-R Program:
We and others have reported on NOAA's significant deficiencies in its
senior executive oversight of NPOESS.[Footnote 21] The lack of timely
decisions and regular involvement of senior executive management was a
critical factor in the program's rapid cost and schedule growth. The
senior executive committee was provided with monthly status reports
that consistently described in explicit detail the growing costs and
delays attributable to the development of a key instrument. Despite
mounting evidence of the seriousness of the instrument's problems, this
committee convened only twice between May 2003 and December 2004 to
consider the program's status.
NOAA formed its program management council in response to the lack of
adequate senior executive oversight on NPOESS. In particular, this
council is expected to provide regular reviews and assessments of
selected NOAA programs and projects--the first of which is the GOES-R
program. The council is headed by the NOAA Deputy Undersecretary and
includes senior officials from Commerce and NASA. The council is
expected to hold meetings to discuss GOES-R program status on a monthly
basis and to approve the program's entry into subsequent acquisition
phases at key decision milestones--including contract award and
critical design reviews, among others. Since its establishment in
January 2006, the council has met regularly and has established a
mechanism for tracking action items to closure.
The establishment of the NOAA Program Management Council is a positive
action that should support the agency's senior-level governance of the
GOES-R program. In moving forward, it is important that this council
continue to meet on a regular basis and exercise diligence in
questioning the data presented to it and making difficult decisions. In
particular, it will be essential that the results of all preliminary
studies and independent assessments on technical maturity of the system
and its components be reviewed by this council so that an informed
decision can be made about the level of technical complexity it is
taking on when proceeding past these key decision milestones. In light
of the recent uncertainty regarding the future scope and cost of the
GOES-R program, the council's governance will be critical in making
those difficult decisions in a timely manner.
Conclusions:
Procurement activities are under way for the next series of
geostationary environmental satellites, called the GOES-R series--
which is scheduled to launch its first satellite in September 2012.
With the GOES-R system development contract planned for award in August
2007, NOAA is positioning itself to improve the acquisition of this
system by incorporating the lessons learned from other satellite
procurements, including the need to establish realistic cost estimates,
ensure sufficient government and contractor management, and obtain
effective executive oversight. However, further steps remain to fully
address selected lessons. Specifically, NOAA has not yet developed a
process to evaluate and reconcile the independent and government cost
estimates. In addition, NOAA has not yet determined how it will ensure
that a sufficient level of technical maturity will be achieved in time
for an upcoming decision milestone, or determined the appropriate level
of resources it needs to adequately track and oversee the program using
earned value management. Until it completes these activities, NOAA
faces an increased risk that the GOES-R program will repeat the
increased cost, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls that have
plagued past procurements.
Recent concerns about the potential for cost growth on the GOES-R
procurement have led the agency to consider reducing the scope of
requirements for the satellite series. A decision on the future scope
and direction of the program could by made by the end of September
2006. Once the decision is made, it will be important to move quickly
to implement the decision in the agency budgets and contracts.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve NOAA's ability to effectively manage the procurement of the
GOES-R system, we recommend that the Secretary of Commerce direct its
NOAA Program Management Council to take the following three actions:
² Once the scope of the program has been finalized, establish a process
for objectively evaluating and reconciling the government and
independent life cycle cost estimates.
² Perform a comprehensive review of the Advanced Baseline Imager, using
system engineering experts, to determine the level of technical
maturity achieved on the instrument, to assess whether the contractor
has implemented sound management and process engineering, and to assert
that the technology is sufficiently mature before moving the instrument
into production.
² Seek assistance from an independent review team to determine the
appropriate level of resources needed at the program office to
adequately track and oversee the contractor's earned value management.
Among other things, the program office should be able to perform a
comprehensive integrated baseline review after system development
contract award, provide surveillance of contractor earned value
management systems, and perform project scheduling analyses and cost
estimates.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We received written comments on a draft of this report from the
Department of Commerce (see app. III). In the department's response,
the Deputy Secretary of Commerce agreed with our recommendations and
identified plans for implementing them. Specifically, the department
noted that it plans to establish a process for reconciling government
and independent cost estimates and to evaluate the process and results
with an independent team of recognized senior experts in the satellite
acquisition field. The department also noted that an independent review
team is planning to perform assessments of the technical maturity of
the Advanced Baseline Imager and the extent to which the program
management structure and reporting process will provide adequate
oversight of the GOES-R system acquisition. Additionally, the
department expressed concern regarding our use of a cost estimate that
they considered to be premature and misleading. During the course of
our review, NOAA provided us with a cost estimate that was later
determined by agency officials to be inaccurate and was subsequently
corrected. We have incorporated the revised cost estimate of $11.4
billion for the overall GOES-R program to ensure that all cost
estimates reported at this time are accurate.
The department provided additional technical corrections, which we have
incorporated as appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to interested congressional committees, the Secretary of Commerce, the
Administrator of NASA, the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget, and other interested parties. In addition, this report will be
available at no charge on our Web site at [Hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you have any questions on matters discussed in this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-9286 or by e-mail at pownerd@gao.gov. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
David A. Powner:
Director, Information Technology Management Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Our objectives were to (1) determine the status of and plans for the
Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites-R series (GOES-R)
procurement and (2) identify and evaluate the actions that the project
management team is taking to ensure that past problems experienced in
procuring other satellite programs are not repeated. To accomplish
these objectives, we focused our review on the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) GOES-R program office, the
organization responsible for the overall GOES-R program.
To determine the status of and plans for the GOES-R series procurement,
we reviewed various program office plans and management reports such as
acquisition schedules, cost estimates, and planned system requirements.
Furthermore, we conducted interviews with NOAA and National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) officials to determine key dates for
future GOES-R acquisitions efforts and milestones, and potential
changes in program scope, cost, and schedule.
To identify the steps the GOES-R project management team is taking to
ensure that past problems experienced in procuring other satellite
series are not repeated, we analyzed our past body of work on major
space system acquisitions, including the Advanced Extremely High
Frequency satellites, the GOES I-M satellites, the National Polar-
orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System, and the Space
Based Infrared System High program in order to identify key lessons. We
also analyzed findings from other government reports on satellite
procurements, such as by the Defense Science Board-Air Force Scientific
Advisory Board Joint Task Force and the Department of Commerce's Office
of Inspector General. We assessed relevant management documents, such
as cost reports and program risk plans. Our evaluation included the
application of earned value analysis techniques[Footnote 22] to data
from contractor cost performance reports over an 11-month period (from
June 2005 to May 2006). We also conducted interviews with agency
officials to identify and to evaluate the adequacy of the actions taken
to address these lessons.
We obtained comments on a draft of this report from officials at the
Department of Commerce and incorporated these comments as appropriate.
We performed our work at NOAA and NASA offices in the Washington, D.C.,
metropolitan area between December 2005 and August 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Current Shortfalls in Contractor Performance on Key
Instrument Development:
The development of one of the critical GOES-R instruments, the Advanced
Baseline Imager (ABI), is experiencing technical challenges and, as a
result, the contractor is missing cost and schedule targets. Despite
the uncertainty regarding the future scope of the GOES-R program, it is
expected that the requirements for this instrument will not change.
Contractor-provided data from June 2005 to May 2006 indicates that
ABI's cost performance is experiencing a trend of negative variances.
Figure 4 shows the 11-month cumulative cost variance for the ABI
contract. As of May 2006, the contractor has incurred a total cost
overrun of almost $6 million with ABI development only 28 percent
complete. This information is useful because trends tend to continue
and can be difficult to reverse unless management attention is focused
on key risk areas and risk mitigation actions are aggressively pursued.
Studies have shown that, once work is 15 percent complete, the
performance indicators are indicative of the final outcome.
Based on contractor performance from June 2005 to May 2006, we
estimated that the current ABI instrument contract--which is worth
approximately $360 million--will overrun its budget by between $17
million and $47 million. Our projection of the most likely cost overrun
will be about $23 million. The contractor, in contrast, estimates about
a $7 million overrun at completion of the ABI contract. Given that the
contractor has 72 percent of work remaining and has already accumulated
a cost overrun of $5.9 million, the likelihood that the contractor will
meet its estimated projection is small.
Figure 4: Cumulative Cost Variance of the ABI Instrument Contract over
an 11-month Period:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis based on NOAA data.
[End of figure]
Our analysis also indicates that the contractor has been unable to meet
its planned schedule targets. Figure 5 shows the 11-month cumulative
schedule variance for the ABI contract. From June 2005 to May 2006, the
contractor was unable to complete approximately $3.3 million worth of
scheduled work. The contractor reported that its incorporation of
revised subcontractor budgets resulted in the fluctuations in schedule
performance data prior to March 2006. The current inability to meet
contract schedule performance could be a predictor of future rising
costs, as more spending is often necessary to resolve schedule
overruns.
Figure 5: Cumulative Schedule Variance of the ABI Instrument Contract
over an 11-month Period:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis based on NOAA data.
[End of figure]
According to contractor-provided documents, the cost and schedule
overruns were primarily caused by design complexity issues experienced
in the development of the instrument's detectors and the electronics
design for the cryocooler[Footnote 23] and the unplanned time and
manpower expended to resolve these issues. Other significant cost and
schedule drivers include software issues on the scanner and supplier
quality issues on some parts.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Commerce:
The Deputy Secretary Of Commerce:
Washington, D.C. 20230:
August 24, 2006:
Mr. David A. Powner:
Director:
Information Technology Management Issues:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Powner:
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the Government
Accountability Office's draft report entitled Geostationary Operational
Environmental Satellites: Steps Remain in Incorporating Lessons Learned
from Other Satellite Programs (GAO-06-993). I enclose the Department of
Commerce's comments to the draft report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
David A. Sampson:
Enclosure:
Department of Commerce's Comments on the Draft GAO Report Entitled
"Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: Steps Remain in
Incorporating Lessons Learned from Other Satellite Programs" (GAO-06-
993/September 2006):
General Comments:
The Department of Commerce appreciates the opportunity to review this
report on Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites,
specifically the R-Series (GOES-R). The report does a fair and thorough
job identifying past satellite program shortfalls and assessing GOES-R
efforts to leverage lessons learned from previous programs. Although
not specifically identified in the GAO recommendations, the report
notes the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is
taking on its first major system acquisition with GOES-R, which entails
increased risk due to NAAA's limited experience. As observed by the GAO
at several points in the report, NOAA has taken numerous steps to
strengthen its management approach and to incorporate lessons learned
to ensure effective program performance. Among these actions are
increasing systems engineering staff, co-locating government staff at
prime and subcontractor locations, incorporating recent GAO and
Department of Commerce's Office of Inspector General recommendations
concerning contract award fee structure, establishing a Program
Management Council to provide regular review and assessment of the GOES-
R program, and implementing comprehensive independent review of the
program. In addition, NOAA is evaluating DOC/NOAA and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration roles to ensure NASA's spacecraft
acquisition expertise is effectively leveraged. NOAA is scheduled to
provide DOC with an assessment on this issue this fall. NOAA believes
these steps will enable NOAA to effectively manage the GOES-R
acquisition; we will continue to assess the need for additional
actions, particularly in response to findings from the independent
review teams, and will take the necessary actions to ensure effective
performance on this critical acquisition.
NOAH concurs with the recommendations identified by the GAO in the
report, as discussed below. The report's discussion of the Advanced
Baseline Imager (ABI) earned value management (EVM) shortfalls is being
addressed. NOAA remains concerned with the report's use of a premature
and misleading cost estimate in a number of places. Specific instances
are addressed in the technical comments section of this response.
NOAA Response to GAO Recommendations:
The draft GAO report states, "To improve NAAA's ability to effectively
manage the procurement of the GOES-R system, we recommend that the
Secretary of Commerce direct its NOAA Program Management Council to
take the following three actions:"
Recommendation 1: "once the scope of the program has been finalized,
establish a process for objectively evaluating and reconciling the
government and independent life cycle cost estimates."
NOAA Response: NOAA agrees with this recommendation. As the program
scope is being finalized, NOAA will establish a process for evaluating
and reconciling government and independent life cycle cost estimates,
and will vet the process and results with an independent review team
comprised of recognized senior experts in the satellite acquisition
field.
Recommendation 2: "perform a comprehensive review of the Advanced
Baseline Imager, using system engineering experts, to determine the
level of technical maturity achieved on the instrument, to assess
whether the contractor has implemented sound management and process
engineering, and to assert that the technology is sufficiently mature
before moving the instrument into production."
NOAA Response: NOAA agrees with this recommendation. Comprehensive
reviews, including independent systems and technical reviews, are being
performed. In addition to the extensive NASA processes described below,
the GOES-R Independent Review Team is also looking at the ABI and other
instruments and providing its assessment of their technical maturity
and their level of risk to the program.
NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) has implemented the requested
processes in its "Integrated Independent Reviews" (IIRs). Each NASA
GSFC space flight hardware development contract is subject to IIRs
throughout the development cycle up to launch. The processes that are
followed are documented in: GPR 8700.4F - Integrated Independent
Reviews, GSFC STD 1001 - Criteria for Flight Project Critical Milestone
Reviews, and GSFC STD 1000 - Rules for the Design, Development,
Verification, and Operation of Flight Systems. The Integrated
Independent Review Teams (IIRTs) for GOES-R are co-chaired by NASA and
The Aerospace Corporation. The IIRT membership is comprised of NASA
Engineering and Systems Safety and Mission Assurance, Aerospace
Corporation, and NOAA personnel from outside of the GOES-R Program/
Projects. The IIRTs ensure that each development effort has achieved
the level of technical/design maturity required for the given phase of
the effort and that the appropriate processes are in place and are
followed. The ABI instrument and the ITT Industries Management Team
have been subjected to two IIRs to date: the System Concept Review
(SCR) in February 2005 and the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) in
December 2005. The next IIR is the Critical Design Review (CDR), which
is tentatively scheduled for February 2007.
Recommendation 3: "seek assistance from an independent review team to
determine the appropriate level of resources needed at the program
office to adequately track and oversee the contractor's earned value
management. Among other things, the program office should be able to
perform a comprehensive integrated baseline review after system
development contract award, provide surveillance of contractor earned
value management systems, and perform project scheduling analyses and
cost estimates."
NOAA Response: NOAA agrees with this recommendation, and has included
within the scope of the Independent Review Team an assessment of the
extent to which the program management structure and reporting process
will provide adequate oversight, and assessment of whether or not the
program is adequately staffed in terms of personnel numbers and skills.
The Independent Review Team is examining these elements and will
provide recommendations concerning this, to which the program will
respond.
The GOES-R Program Office currently plans to bring at least three EVM
specialists on board, and has subjected these plans to independent
review. In addition, the program is prepared to leverage additional
lessons learned from other programs.
EVM will remain a factor in award fee determinations for the ABI
developer. NOAH recognizes the importance of EVM and realizes that EVM
is an effective management tool, not a substitute for good program
management. Mission success is the key, and decisions will continue to
be made to ensure GOES-R is developed to meet performance requirements.
The GOES-R Program Office has made and implemented important management
actions to ensure mission success-including the use of on-site resident
managers who are able to oversee the procurement at the contractor's
facility.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
David A. Powner, (202) 512-9286 or pownerd@gao.gov.
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Carol Cha, Neil Doherty, Nancy
Glover, Kush Malhotra, Colleen Phillips, and Karen Richey made key
contributions to this report.
[End of section]
(310827):
FOOTNOTES
[1] Earned value management is a method that compares the value of work
accomplished during a given period with that of the work expected in
that period.
[2] Satellites in a series are identified by letters of the alphabet
when they are on the ground and by numbers once they are in orbit.
[3] The instruments were based on 1980s technology.
[4] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Space System Acquisition Risks and Keys
to Addressing Them, GAO-06-776R (Washington, D.C.: June 1, 2006); Polar-
orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Cost Increases Trigger
Review and Place Program's Direction on Hold, GAO-06-573T (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 30, 2006); Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental
Satellites: Technical Problems, Cost Increases, and Schedule Delays
Trigger Need for Difficult Trade-off Decisions, GAO-06-249T
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 2005); Polar-orbiting Environmental
Satellites: Information on Program Cost and Schedule Changes, GAO-04-
1054 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2004); Defense Acquisitions: Despite
Restructuring, SBIRS High Program Remains at Risk of Cost and Schedule
Overruns, GAO-04-48 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 2003); Military Space
Operations: Common Problems and Their Effects on Satellite and Related
Acquisitions, GAO-03-825R (Washington, D.C.: June 2, 2003); Defense
Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs, GAO-03-476
(Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003); Weather Satellites: Action Needed to
Resolve Status of the U.S. Geostationary Satellite Program, GAO/NSIAD-
91-252 (Washington, D.C.: July 24, 1991). Defense Science Board/Air
Force Scientific Advisory Board Joint Task Force, Report on the
Acquisition of National Security Space Programs (May 2003).
[5] GAO-04-1054.
[6] GAO-06-573T and GAO-06-249T.
[7] 10 U.S.C. section 2433, as amended by Pub. Law No. 109-163, Div. A,
section 802 (Jan. 6, 2006).
[8] GAO-06-249T.
[9] Department of Commerce Office of Inspector General, Poor Management
Oversight and Ineffective Incentives Leave NPOESS Program Well Over
Budget and Behind Schedule, OIG-17794-6-0001 (May 8, 2006).
[10] GAO/NSIAD-91-252.
[11] GAO-04-48 and GAO-03-476.
[12] GAO-03-825R and GAO-03-476.
[13] GAO, Space Acquisitions: Stronger Development Practices and
Investment Planning Needed to Address Continuing Problems, GAO-05-891T
(Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2005).
[14] GAO-05-891T.
[15] Defense Science Board/Air Force Scientific Advisory Board Joint
Task Force, Report on the Acquisition of National Security Space
Programs (May 2003).
[16] NOAA's Observing System Council is the principal advisory council
for NOAA's earth observation and data management activities. It
includes members from each NOAA line office, other relevant councils,
and program offices. The Assistant Administrator for Satellite and
Information Services and the Assistant Administrator for Weather
Services serve as the co-chairs of the council.
[17] GAO-06-573T, GAO-06-249T, GAO/NSIAD-91-252, Defense Acquisitions:
DOD Has Paid Billions in Award and Incentive Fees Regardless of
Acquisition Outcomes, GAO-06-66 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 19, 2005), and
Weather Satellites: Cost Growth and Development Delays Jeopardize U.S.
Forecasting Ability, GAO/NSIAD-89-169 (Washington, D.C.: June 30,
1989).
[18] Earned value management is a method, used by DOD for several
decades, to track a contractor's progress in meeting project
deliverables. It compares the value of work accomplished during a given
period with that of the work expected in that period. Differences from
expectations are measured in both cost and schedule variances.
[19] Department of Commerce Office of Inspector General, Poor
Management Oversight and Ineffective Incentives Leave NPOESS Program
Well Over Budget and Behind Schedule, OIG-17794-6-0001 (May 8, 2006).
[20] Defense Science Board/Air Force Scientific Advisory Board Joint
Task Force, Report on the Acquisition of National Security Space
Programs (May 2003).
[21] GAO, Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: Cost Increases
Trigger Review and Place Program's Direction on Hold, GAO-06-573T
(Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2006); Department of Commerce Office of
Inspector General, Poor Management Oversight and Ineffective Incentives
Leave NPOESS Program Well Over Budget and Behind Schedule, OIG-17794-6-
0001 (May 8, 2006).
[22] The earned value concept is applied as a means of placing a dollar
value on project status. It is a technique that compares budget versus
actual costs versus project status in dollar amounts. For our analysis,
we used standard earned value formulas to calculate cost and schedule
variance and forecast the range of cost overrun at contract completion.
[23] The cryocooler is a key component of the ABI instrument. It is
intended to cool down components of the instrument.
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of
Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability
of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use
of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides
analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make
informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's commitment to
good government is reflected in its core values of accountability,
integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through the Internet. GAO's Web site ( www.gao.gov ) contains
abstracts and full-text files of current reports and testimony and an
expanding archive of older products. The Web site features a search
engine to help you locate documents using key words and phrases. You
can print these documents in their entirety, including charts and other
graphics.
Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as "Today's Reports," on its
Web site daily. The list contains links to the full-text document
files. To have GAO e-mail this list to you every afternoon, go to
www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to e-mail alerts" under the "Order
GAO Products" heading.
Order by Mail or Phone:
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent.
Orders should be sent to:
U.S. Government Accountability Office
441 G Street NW, Room LM
Washington, D.C. 20548:
To order by Phone:
Voice: (202) 512-6000:
TDD: (202) 512-2537:
Fax: (202) 512-6061:
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Public Affairs:
Jeff Nelligan, managing director,
NelliganJ@gao.gov
(202) 512-4800
U.S. Government Accountability Office,
441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, D.C. 20548:
