Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
Restructuring Is Under Way, but Technical Challenges and Risks Remain Gao ID: GAO-07-498 April 27, 2007The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) is a tri-agency acquisition--managed by the Departments of Commerce and Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration--which experienced escalating costs, schedule delays, and technical difficulties. These factors led to a June 2006 decision to restructure the program thereby decreasing the program's complexity, increasing its estimated cost to $12.5 billion, and delaying the first two satellites by 3 to 5 years. GAO was asked to (1) assess progress in restructuring the acquisition, (2) evaluate progress in establishing an effective management structure, (3) assess the reliability of the cost and schedule estimate, and (4) identify the status and key risks facing the program's major segments. To do so, GAO analyzed program and contractor data, attended program reviews, and interviewed program officials
The NPOESS program office has made progress in restructuring the acquisition by establishing and implementing interim program plans guiding the contractors' work activities in 2006 and 2007; however, important tasks leading up to finalizing contract changes remain to be completed. Executive approvals of key acquisition documents are about 6 months late--due in part to the complexity of navigating three agencies' approval processes. Delays in finalizing these documents could hinder plans to complete contract negotiations by July 2007 and could keep the program from moving forward in fiscal year 2008 with a new program baseline. The program office has also made progress in establishing an effective management structure by adopting a new organizational framework with increased oversight from program executives and by instituting more frequent and rigorous program reviews; however, plans to reassign the recently appointed Program Executive Officer will likely increase the program's risks. Additionally, the program lacks a process and plan for identifying and filling staffing shortages, which has led to delays in key activities such as cost estimating and contract revisions. Until this process is in place the NPOESS program faces increased risk of further delays. The methodology supporting a June 2006 independent cost estimate with the expectation of initial satellite launch in January 2013 was reliable, but recent events could increase program costs and delay schedules. Specifically, the program continues to experience technical problems on key sensors and program costs will likely be adjusted during upcoming negotiations on contract changes. A new baseline cost and schedule reflecting these factors is expected by July 2007. Development and testing of major NPOESS segments--including key sensors and ground systems--are under way, but significant risks remain. For example, while work continues on key sensors, two of them experienced significant problems and are considered high risk. Additionally, while progress has been made in reducing delays in the data processing system, work remains in refining the algorithms needed to translate sensor observations into useable weather products. Given the tight time frames for completing this work, it will be important for program officials and executives to continue to provide close oversight of milestones and risks.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-07-498, Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Restructuring Is Under Way, but Technical Challenges and Risks Remain
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Restructuring Is Under Way, but Technical Challenges and Risks Remain'
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
April 2007:
Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites:
Restructuring Is Under Way, but Technical Challenges and Risks Remain:
GAO-07-498:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-498, a report to congressional requesters
Why GAO Did This Study:
The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
(NPOESS) is a tri-agency acquisition”managed by the Departments of
Commerce and Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration”which experienced escalating costs, schedule delays, and
technical difficulties. These factors led to a June 2006 decision to
restructure the program thereby decreasing the program‘s complexity,
increasing its estimated cost to $12.5 billion, and delaying the first
two satellites by 3 to 5 years. GAO was asked to (1) assess progress in
restructuring the acquisition, (2) evaluate progress in establishing an
effective management structure, (3) assess the reliability of the cost
and schedule estimate, and (4) identify the status and key risks facing
the program‘s major segments. To do so, GAO analyzed program and
contractor data, attended program reviews, and interviewed program
officials.
What GAO Found:
The NPOESS program office has made progress in restructuring the
acquisition by establishing and implementing interim program plans
guiding the contractors‘ work activities in 2006 and 2007; however,
important tasks leading up to finalizing contract changes remain to be
completed. Executive approvals of key acquisition documents are about 6
months late”due in part to the complexity of navigating three agencies‘
approval processes. Delays in finalizing these documents could hinder
plans to complete contract negotiations by July 2007 and could keep the
program from moving forward in fiscal year 2008 with a new program
baseline.
The program office has also made progress in establishing an effective
management structure by adopting a new organizational framework with
increased oversight from program executives and by instituting more
frequent and rigorous program reviews; however, plans to reassign the
recently appointed Program Executive Officer will likely increase the
program‘s risks. Additionally, the program lacks a process and plan for
identifying and filling staffing shortages, which has led to delays in
key activities such as cost estimating and contract revisions. Until
this process is in place the NPOESS program faces increased risk of
further delays.
The methodology supporting a June 2006 independent cost estimate with
the expectation of initial satellite launch in January 2013 was
reliable, but recent events could increase program costs and delay
schedules. Specifically, the program continues to experience technical
problems on key sensors and program costs will likely be adjusted
during upcoming negotiations on contract changes. A new baseline cost
and schedule reflecting these factors is expected by July 2007.
Development and testing of major NPOESS segments”including key sensors
and ground systems”are under way, but significant risks remain. For
example, while work continues on key sensors, two of them experienced
significant problems and are considered high risk (see table).
Additionally, while progress has been made in reducing delays in the
data processing system, work remains in refining the algorithms needed
to translate sensor observations into useable weather products. Given
the tight time frames for completing this work, it will be important
for program officials and executives to continue to provide close
oversight of milestones and risks.
Table: Key NPOESS Components and Corresponding Risk Levels:
NPOESS component: Visible/infrared imager radiometer suite; Risk Level:
High.
NPOESS component: Cross-track infrared sounder; Risk Level: High.
NPOESS component: Ozone mapper/profiler suite; Risk Level: Moderate.
NPOESS component: Advanced technology microwave sounder; Risk Level:
Low.
NPOESS component: Command, control, and communications system; Risk
Level: Low.
NPOESS component: Interface data processing system; Risk Level:
Moderate.
Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS Integrated Program Office data.
[End of table]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the appropriate executives approve key acquisition
documents, the Secretary of Defense delay reassigning the Program
Executive, and the Secretary of Commerce ensure that program
authorities identify and address staffing needs. Agency officials
agreed with all of the recommendations except delaying the Program
Executive‘s reassignment. GAO believes that proceeding with this
reassignment would increase program risks.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-498].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact David A. Powner, (202)
512-9286, and pownerd@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
NPOESS Acquisition Restructuring Is Well Under Way, but Key Steps
Remain To Be Completed:
Progress Has Been Made in Establishing an Effective NPOESS Management
Structure, but Executive Turnover Will Increase Risks, and Staffing
Problems Remain:
Methodology Supporting the June 2006 Cost and Schedule Estimate Was
Reliable, but Recent Events Could Increase Program Costs:
Major Program Segments Are Under Development, but Significant Risks
Remain:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Overview of Satellite Data Processing Algorithms and the
Calibration and Validation Process:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Commerce:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix V: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration:
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Expected NPOESS Instruments as of August 31, 2004 (critical
sensors are in bold):
Table 2: Summary of Changes to the NPOESS Program:
Table 3: Key Program Milestones:
Table 4: Changes to NPOESS Instruments (critical sensors are in bold):
Table 5: Planned Configuration of Sensors on NPP and NPOESS Satellites:
Table 6: Elements of a Sound Cost Estimating Methodology:
Table 7: Status of Selected Components of the Space Segment, as of
April 2007:
Table 8: Status of Ground Segment Components:
Figures:
Figure 1: Configuration of Operational Polar Satellites:
Figure 2: A Generic Data Relay Pattern for Polar Meteorological
Satellite Systems:
Figure 3: Satellite Data Processing Steps:
Figure 4: Analysis of Ozone Concentration from POES Satellite Data:
Figure 5: POES Image of Hurricane Katrina in 2005:
Figure 6: Organizations Coordinated by the NPOESS Integrated Program
Office:
Figure 7: Progress on Planned Milestones in Fiscal Year 2006, as of
October 1, 2006:
Figure 8: Progress on Planned Milestones in Fiscal Year 2007, as of
January 20, 2007:
Figure 9: Overview of New Management Structure:
Figure 10: Cumulative Cost and Schedule Variance for the NPOESS Space
Segment over a 13-Month Period:
Figure 11: Cumulative Cost and Schedule Variance for the NPOESS IDPS
Development over a 13-Month Period:
Figure 12: Cumulative Cost and Schedule Variance for the NPOESS
Command, Control, and Communications Segment over a 13-Month Period:
Figure 13: Satellite Data Processing Algorithms:
Figure 14: Describes the High-Level Calibration and Validation Process:
Abbreviations:
ATMS: advanced technology microwave sounder:
CMIS: conical-scanned microwave imager/sounder:
CrIS: cross-track infrared sounder:
DMSP: Defense Meteorological Satellite Program:
DOD: Department of Defense:
EDR: environmental data record:
IDPS: interface data processing system:
NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
NESDIS: National Environmental Satellite Data and Information Service:
NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration:
NPOESS: National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite
System:
NPP: NPOESS Preparatory Project:
POES: Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites:
OMPS: ozone mapper/profiler suite:
VIIRS: visible/infrared imager radiometer suite:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
April 27, 2007:
The Honorable Nick Lampson:
Chairman:
The Honorable Bob Inglis:
Ranking Republican Member:
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment:
Committee on Science and Technology:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable David Wu:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Vernon J. Ehlers:
House of Representatives:
The planned National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite
System (NPOESS) program is expected to be a state-of-the-art,
environment-monitoring satellite system that will replace two existing
polar-orbiting environmental satellite systems. Polar-orbiting
satellites provide data and imagery that are used by weather
forecasters, climatologists, and the military to map and monitor
changes in weather, climate, the oceans, and the environment. The
NPOESS program is considered critical to the United States' ability to
maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting
(including severe weather events such as hurricanes) and global climate
monitoring through the year 2026.
Three agencies share responsibility for the NPOESS acquisition: the
Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), the Department of Defense (DOD)/United States
Air Force, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA). To manage the NPOESS program, these agencies established a tri-
agency integrated program office. In recent years, this program has
experienced escalating costs, schedule delays, and technical
difficulties, leading to a June 2006 decision to restructure the
program. This decision decreased the complexity of the program by
reducing the number of satellites and sensors, increased the estimated
cost of the program to $12.5 billion, and delayed the launches of the
first two satellites by 3 to 5 years.
This report responds to your request that we (1) evaluate the NPOESS
program office's progress in restructuring the acquisition, (2)
evaluate the program office's progress in establishing an effective
management structure, (3) assess the reliability of the life cycle cost
estimate and proposed schedule, and (4) identify the status and key
risks facing the program's major segments and evaluate the adequacy of
the program's efforts to mitigate these risks.
To evaluate the program office's progress in restructuring the
acquisition, we assessed program documentation, attended management
status briefings, and interviewed program officials. To determine
progress in establishing a new management structure, we assessed the
status of efforts to implement past recommendations regarding the
management structure and staffing, attended senior-level management
review meetings, reviewed program documents, and interviewed program
officials. To assess the cost estimate, we evaluated the methodology
and assumptions used to develop the estimate and interviewed program
officials to identify any assumptions that may have changed. To
determine the status, risk, and risk mitigation efforts for the
program, we analyzed monthly program management documents and
interviewed NOAA, NASA, and DOD officials to determine concerns with
these mitigation efforts. In addition, this report builds on other work
we have done on environmental satellite programs over the last several
years.[Footnote 1]
We conducted our work at the NPOESS Integrated Program Office
headquarters and at DOD, NOAA, and NASA facilities in the Washington,
D.C., metropolitan area. We performed our work from July 2006 to April
2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Appendix I contains additional details on our objectives,
scope, and methodology.
Results in Brief:
The NPOESS program office has made progress in restructuring the
acquisition by establishing and implementing interim program plans
guiding the contractors' work activities in 2006 and 2007; however,
important tasks leading up to finalizing contract changes remain to be
completed. While the program office developed key acquisition
documents, including a memorandum of agreement on the roles and
responsibilities of the three agencies, a revised acquisition strategy,
and a system engineering plan, the responsible executives in the three
agencies have not yet approved these documents--even though they were
due by September 1, 2006. Finalizing these documents is essential to
ensure interagency agreement and will allow the program office to move
forward in completing other activities related to restructuring the
program. These activities include conducting an integrated baseline
review with the contractor to reach agreement on the schedule and work
activities and finalizing changes to the NPOESS development and
production contract--thereby allowing the program office to lock down a
new acquisition baseline cost and schedule. Until the key acquisition
documents are approved by the appropriate executives in each agency,
the program faces increased risk that restructuring activities will not
be completed in time to allow it to move forward in fiscal year 2008
with a new program baseline in place. This places the NPOESS program at
risk of continued delays and future cost increases.
The program office has also made progress in establishing an effective
management structure by adopting a new organizational framework with
increased oversight from program executives and by instituting more
frequent and rigorous program management reviews; however, planned
changes in executive management will likely increase program risk, and
the program lacks a process and plan for identifying and filling
staffing shortages. As a result, the program experienced delays in
beginning key activities such as cost estimating and contract
revisions. Until this process is in place and working, the NPOESS
program faces increased risk of further delays.
The methodology supporting a June 2006 cost and schedule estimate was
reliable, but recent events could lead to increased program costs and
delay schedules. DOD's independent cost estimating group used an
acceptable methodology in developing a June 2006 cost estimate of $11.5
billion for the acquisition portion of the restructured program with
the expectation of initial satellite launch in January 2013. Consistent
with DOD direction, this estimate did not include roughly $1 billion in
operations and support costs--bringing the total life cycle cost
estimate to $12.5 billion. However, the program continues to experience
technical problems on key sensors, and program costs will likely be
adjusted during upcoming negotiations on contract changes. The NPOESS
program office is developing its own cost estimate to further refine
the one developed in June 2006 to help it negotiate contract changes. A
new baseline cost and schedule will be established once the contract is
finalized--an event that the Program Director expects to occur by July
2007.
Development and testing of major program segments--including key
sensors and the ground systems--are under way, but significant risks
remain. For example, work continues on key sensors, but two sensors--
the Visible/Infrared Imager Radiometer Suite and the Cross-track
Infrared Sounder--continue to experience significant difficulties.
Specifically, the former encountered three significant problems with
image quality and reliability during environmental testing of the
engineering unit, and the latter suffered a major structural failure
during vibration testing. Additionally, while significant progress has
been made in reducing delays in the NPOESS data processing system, much
work remains in refining the algorithms needed to translate sensor
observations into usable weather products. Given the tight time frames
for completing key sensors, integrating them with the demonstration
spacecraft (called the NPOESS Preparatory Project or NPP) and getting
the ground-based data processing systems developed, tested, and
deployed, it will be important for the Integrated Program Office, the
Program Executive Office, and the Executive Committee to continue to
provide close oversight of milestones and risks.
We are making recommendations to the Secretaries of Commerce and
Defense and to the Administrator of NASA to ensure that the appropriate
executives finalize key acquisition documents by the end of April 2007
in order to allow the restructuring of the program to proceed. We are
also making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to direct the
Air Force to delay reassigning the recently appointed Program Executive
Officer until key program risks are resolved. We are also making
recommendations to the Secretary of Commerce to ensure that NPOESS
program authorities develop and implement a written process for
identifying and addressing human capital needs and that they establish
a plan to immediately fill needed positions.
The Department of Commerce, DOD, and NASA provided written comments on
our draft report (see apps. III, IV, and V). All three agencies agreed
that it was important to finalize key acquisition documents in a timely
manner, and DOD proposed extending the due dates for the documents to
July 2, 2007. In addition, the Department of Commerce concurred with
our recommendation to identify and address human capital needs and
immediately fill open positions in the NPOESS program office. Commerce
noted that NOAA was taking actions in both areas. However, DOD did not
concur with our recommendation to delay reassigning the Program
Executive Officer, noting that the Program Director responsible for the
acquisition program would remain in place for 4 years. While it is
important that the System Program Director remain in place to ensure
continuity in executing the acquisition, this position does not ensure
continuity in the important oversight and coordination functions
provided by the current Program Executive Officer. We remain concerned
that reassigning the Program Executive at a time when NPOESS is still
facing critical cost, schedule, and technical challenges will place the
program at further risk.
All three agencies also provided technical comments, which we have
incorporated in this report as appropriate.
Background:
Since the 1960s, the United States has operated two separate
operational polar-orbiting meteorological satellite systems: the Polar-
orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) series-- managed by
NOAA, and the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP)--managed
by the Air Force. These satellites obtain environmental data that are
processed to provide graphical weather images and specialized weather
products. These satellite data are also the predominant input to
numerical weather prediction models, which are a primary tool for
forecasting weather 3 or more days in advance-- including forecasting
the path and intensity of hurricanes. The weather products and models
are used to predict the potential impact of severe weather so that
communities and emergency managers can help prevent and mitigate their
effects. Polar satellites also provide data used to monitor
environmental phenomena, such as ozone depletion and drought
conditions, as well as data sets that are used by researchers for a
variety of studies such as climate monitoring.
Unlike geostationary satellites, which maintain a fixed position
relative to the earth, polar-orbiting satellites constantly circle the
earth in an almost north-south orbit, providing global coverage of
conditions that affect the weather and climate. Each satellite makes
about 14 orbits a day. As the earth rotates beneath it, each satellite
views the entire earth's surface twice a day. Currently, there are two
operational POES satellites and two operational DMSP satellites that
are positioned so that they can observe the earth in early morning,
midmorning, and early afternoon polar orbits. Together, they ensure
that, for any region of the earth, the data provided to users are
generally no more than 6 hours old. Figure 1 illustrates the current
operational polar satellite configuration. Besides the four operational
satellites, six older satellites are in orbit that still collect some
data and are available to provide limited backup to the operational
satellites should they degrade or fail. In the future, both NOAA and
the Air Force plan to continue to launch additional POES and DMSP
satellites every few years, with final launches scheduled for 2009 and
2012, respectively.[Footnote 2]
Figure 1: Configuration of Operational Polar Satellites:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO, based on NPOESS Integrated Program Office data.
[End of figure]
Each of the polar satellites carries a suite of sensors designed to
detect environmental data that are either reflected or emitted from the
earth, the atmosphere, and space. The satellites broadcast a subset of
these data in real time to properly equipped field terminals that are
within a direct line of sight; these field terminals are located at
universities, on battlefields, or on ships. Additionally, the polar
satellites store the observed environmental data and then transmit them
to NOAA and Air Force ground stations when the satellites pass
overhead. The ground stations then relay the data via communications
satellites to the appropriate meteorological centers for processing.
Under a shared processing agreement among four satellite data
processing centers--NOAA's National Environmental Satellite Data and
Information Service (NESDIS), the Air Force Weather Agency, the Navy's
Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography Center, and the Naval
Oceanographic Office--different centers are responsible for producing
and distributing, via a shared network, different environmental data
sets, specialized weather and oceanographic products, and weather
prediction model outputs.
Each of the four processing centers is also responsible for
distributing the data to its respective users. For the DOD centers, the
users include regional meteorology and oceanography centers, as well as
meteorology and oceanography staff on military bases, the Naval Fleet,
and mobile field sites. NESDIS forwards the data to NOAA's National
Weather Service for distribution and use by government and commercial
forecasters. The processing centers also use the Internet to distribute
data to the general public. NESDIS is responsible for the long-term
archiving of data and derived products from POES and DMSP. Figure 2
depicts a generic data relay pattern from the polar-orbiting satellites
to the data processing centers and field terminals.
Figure 2: A Generic Data Relay Pattern for Polar Meteorological
Satellite Systems:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO, based on NPOESS Integrated Program Office data.
[End of figure]
Polar Satellite Data and Products:
Polar satellites gather a broad range of data that are transformed into
a variety of products. Satellite sensors observe different bands of
radiation wavelengths, called channels, which are used for remotely
determining information about the earth's atmosphere, land surface,
oceans, and the space environment. When first received, satellite data
are considered raw data. To make them usable, the processing centers
format the data so that they are time-sequenced and include earth
location and calibration information. After formatting, these data are
called raw data records. The centers further process these raw data
records into channel-specific data sets, called sensor data records and
temperature data records. These data records are then used to derive
weather and climate products called environmental data records (EDR).
EDRs include a wide range of atmospheric products detailing cloud
coverage, temperature, humidity, and ozone distribution; land surface
products showing snow cover, vegetation, and land use; ocean products
depicting sea surface temperatures, sea ice, and wave height; and
characterizations of the space environment. Combinations of these data
records (raw, sensor, temperature, and environmental data records) are
also used to derive more sophisticated products, including outputs from
numerical weather models and assessments of climate trends. Figure 3 is
a simplified depiction of the various stages of satellite data
processing, and figures 4 and 5 depict examples of EDR weather
products.
Figure 3: Satellite Data Processing Steps:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of NOAA information.
[End of figure]
Figure 4: Analysis of Ozone Concentration from POES Satellite Data:
[See PDF for image]
Source: NOAA's National Environmental Satellite Data and Information
Service.
[End of figure]
Figure 5: POES Image of Hurricane Katrina in 2005:
[See PDF for image]
Source: NOAA's National Environmental Satellite Data and Information
Service.
[End of figure]
NPOESS Overview:
With the expectation that combining the POES and DMSP programs would
reduce duplication and result in sizable cost savings, a May 1994
Presidential Decision Directive required NOAA and DOD to converge the
two satellite programs into a single satellite program capable of
satisfying both civilian and military requirements.[Footnote 3] The
converged program, NPOESS, is considered critical to the United States'
ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather
forecasting and global climate monitoring through the year 2026. To
manage this program, DOD, NOAA, and NASA formed the tri-agency
Integrated Program Office, located within NOAA.
Within the program office, each agency has the lead on certain
activities: NOAA has overall program management responsibility for the
converged system and for satellite operations; DOD has the lead on the
acquisition; and NASA has primary responsibility for facilitating the
development and incorporation of new technologies into the converged
system. NOAA and DOD share the costs of funding NPOESS, while NASA
funds specific technology projects and studies. Figure 6 depicts the
organizations that make up the NPOESS program office and lists their
responsibilities.
Figure 6: Organizations Coordinated by the NPOESS Integrated Program
Office:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO, based on NPOESS Integrated Program Office data.
[End of figure]
The NPOESS program office is overseen by an Executive Committee, which
is made up of the Administrators of NOAA and NASA and the
Undersecretary of the Air Force.
NPOESS Acquisition Strategy:
NPOESS is a major system acquisition that was originally estimated to
cost about $6.5 billion over the 24-year life of the program from its
inception in 1995 through 2018. The program is to provide satellite
development, satellite launch and operation, and ground-based satellite
data processing. These deliverables are grouped into four main
categories: (1) the space segment, which includes the satellites and
sensors; (2) the integrated data processing segment, which is the
system for transforming raw data into EDRs and is to be located at the
four processing centers; (3) the command, control, and communications
segment, which includes the equipment and services needed to support
satellite operations; and (4) the launch segment, which includes the
launch vehicle services.
When the NPOESS engineering, manufacturing, and development contract
was awarded in August 2002, the cost estimate was adjusted to $7
billion. Acquisition plans called for the procurement and launch of six
satellites over the life of the program, as well as the integration of
13 instruments--consisting of 10 environmental sensors and three
subsystems. Together, the sensors were to receive and transmit data on
atmospheric, cloud cover, environmental, climatic, oceanographic, and
solar-geophysical observations. The subsystems were to support
nonenvironmental search and rescue efforts, sensor survivability, and
environmental data collection activities. The program office considered
4 of the sensors to be critical because they provide data for key
weather products; these sensors are in bold in table 1, which describes
each of the expected NPOESS instruments.
Table 1: Expected NPOESS Instruments as of August 31, 2004 (critical
sensors are in bold):
Instrument: Advanced technology microwave sounder (ATMS);
Description: Measures microwave energy released and scattered by the
atmosphere and is to be used with infrared sounding data from NPOESS's
cross-track infrared sounder to produce daily global atmospheric
temperature, humidity, and pressure profiles.
Instrument: Aerosol polarimetry sensor;
Description: Retrieves specific measurements of clouds and aerosols
(liquid droplets or solid particles suspended in the atmosphere, such
as sea spray, smog, and smoke).
Instrument: Conical-scanned microwave imager/sounder (CMIS);
Description: Collects microwave images and data needed to measure rain
rate, ocean surface wind speed and direction, amount of water in the
clouds, and soil moisture, as well as temperature and humidity at
different atmospheric levels.
Instrument: Cross-track infrared sounder (CrIS);
Description: Collects measurements of the earth's radiation to
determine the vertical distribution of temperature, moisture, and
pressure in the atmosphere.
Instrument: Data collection system;
Description: Collects environmental data from platforms around the
world and delivers them to users worldwide.
Instrument: Earth radiation budget sensor;
Description: Measures solar short-wave radiation and long-wave
radiation released by the earth back into space on a worldwide scale to
enhance long-term climate studies.
Instrument: Ozone mapper/profiler suite (OMPS);
Description: Collects data needed to measure the amount and
distribution of ozone in the earth's atmosphere.
Instrument: Radar altimeter;
Description: Measures variances in sea surface height/topography and
ocean surface roughness, which are used to determine sea surface
height, significant wave height, and ocean surface wind speed and to
provide critical inputs to ocean forecasting and climate prediction
models.
Instrument: Search and rescue satellite aided tracking system;
Description: Detects and locates aviators, mariners, and land-based
users in distress.
Instrument: Space environmental sensor suite;
Description: Collects data to identify, reduce, and predict the effects
of space weather on technological systems, including satellites and
radio links.
Instrument: Survivability sensor;
Description: Monitors for attacks on the satellite and notifies other
instruments in case of an attack.
Instrument: Total solar irradiance sensor;
Description: Monitors and captures total and spectral solar irradiance
data.
Instrument: Visible/infrared imager radiometer suite (VIIRS);
Description: Collects images and radiometric data used to provide
information on the earth's clouds, atmosphere, ocean, and land
surfaces.
Source: GAO, based on NPOESS Integrated Program Office data.
[End of table]
In addition, NPP was planned as a demonstration satellite to be
launched several years before the first NPOESS satellite in order to
reduce the risk associated with launching new sensor technologies and
to ensure continuity of climate data with NASA's Earth Observing System
satellites. NPP is to host three of the four critical NPOESS sensors
(VIIRS, CrIS, and ATMS), as well as one other noncritical sensor
(OMPS). NPP is to provide the program office and the processing centers
an early opportunity to work with the sensors, ground control, and data
processing systems.
When the NPOESS development contract was awarded, the schedule for
launching the satellites was driven by a requirement that the
satellites be available to back up the final POES and DMSP satellites
should anything go wrong during the planned launches of these
satellites. In general, satellite experts anticipate that roughly 1 out
of every 10 satellites will fail either during launch or during early
operations after launch.
Early program milestones included (1) launching NPP by May 2006, (2)
having the first NPOESS satellite available to back up the final POES
satellite launch in March 2008, and (3) having the second NPOESS
satellite available to back up the final DMSP satellite launch in
October 2009. If the NPOESS satellites were not needed to back up the
final predecessor satellites, their anticipated launch dates would have
been April 2009 and June 2011, respectively.
NPOESS Experienced Cost Increases, Schedule Delays, and Technical
Problems over Several Years:
Over the last few years, NPOESS has experienced continued cost
increases and schedule delays, requiring difficult decisions to be made
about the program's direction and capabilities. In 2003, we reported
that changes in the NPOESS funding stream caused a delay in the
program's schedule.[Footnote 4] Specifically, in late 2002, DOD shifted
the expected launch date for its final DMSP satellite from 2009 to
2010. As a result, the department reduced funding for NPOESS by about
$65 million between fiscal years 2004 and 2007. According to program
officials, because NOAA was required to provide the same level of
funding that DOD provides, this change triggered a corresponding
reduction in funding by NOAA for those years. As a result of the
reduced funding, program officials were forced to make difficult
decisions about what to focus on first. The program office decided to
keep NPP as close to its original schedule as possible because of its
importance to the eventual NPOESS development and to shift some of the
program's deliverables to later years. This shift affected the NPOESS
deployment schedule. To plan for this shift, the program office
developed a new program cost and schedule baseline.
After this new baseline was completed in 2004, we reported that the
program office increased the NPOESS cost estimate from about $7 billion
to $8.1 billion; delayed key milestones, including the planned launch
of the first NPOESS satellite--which was delayed by 7 months; and
extended the life of the program from 2018 to 2020.[Footnote 5] The
cost increases reflected changes to the NPOESS contract, as well as
increased program management funds. According to the program office,
contract changes included extension of the development schedule,
increased sensor costs, and additional funds needed for mitigating
risks. Increased program management funds were added for noncontract
costs and management reserves.
At that time, we also noted that other factors could further affect the
revised cost and schedule estimates. Specifically, the contractor was
not meeting expected cost and schedule targets on the new baseline
because of technical issues in the development of key sensors,
including the critical VIIRS sensor. Based on its performance through
May 2004, we estimated that the contractor would most likely overrun
its contract at completion in September 2011 by $500 million--thereby
increasing the projected life cycle cost to $8.6 billion. In addition,
we reported that risks associated with the development of the critical
sensors, integrated data processing system, and algorithms, among other
things, could contribute to further cost increases and schedule slips-
-and we noted that continued oversight was critical. The program
office's baseline cost estimate was subsequently adjusted to $8.4
billion.
In mid-November 2005, we reported that NPOESS continued to experience
problems in the development of a key sensor, resulting in schedule
delays and anticipated cost increases.[Footnote 6] At that time, we
projected that the program's cost estimate had grown to about $10
billion based on contractor cost and schedule data. We reported that
the program's issues were due, in part, to problems at multiple levels
of management--including subcontractor, contractor, program office, and
executive leadership. Recognizing that the budget for the program was
no longer executable, the NPOESS Executive Committee planned to make a
decision in December 2005 on the future direction of the program--what
would be delivered, at what cost, and by when. This involved deciding
among options involving increased costs, delayed schedules, and reduced
functionality. We noted that continued oversight, strong leadership,
and timely decision making were more critical than ever and we urged
the committee to make a decision quickly so that the program could
proceed.
However, we subsequently reported that, in late November 2005, NPOESS
cost growth exceeded a legislatively mandated threshold that requires
DOD to certify the program to Congress.[Footnote 7] This placed any
decision about the future direction of the program on hold until the
certification took place in June 2006. In the meantime, the program
office implemented an interim program plan for fiscal year 2006 to
continue work on key sensors and other program elements using fiscal
year 2006 funding.
Nunn-McCurdy Process Led to a Decision to Restructure the NPOESS
Program:
The Nunn-McCurdy law[Footnote 8] requires DOD to take specific actions
when a major defense acquisition program exceeds certain cost
thresholds. In November 2005, key provisions of the act required the
Secretary of Defense to notify Congress when a major defense
acquisition was expected to overrun its project baseline by 15 percent
or more and to certify the program to Congress when it was expected to
overrun its baseline by 25 percent or more.[Footnote 9] At that time,
NPOESS exceeded the 25 percent threshold, and DOD was required to
certify the program. Certifying a program entailed providing a
determination that (1) the program is essential to national security,
(2) there are no alternatives to the program that will provide equal or
greater military capability at less cost, (3) the new estimates of the
program's cost are reasonable, and (4) the management structure for the
program is adequate to manage and control costs. DOD established tri-
agency teams--made up of DOD, NOAA, and NASA experts--to work on each
of the four elements of the certification process.
In June 2006, DOD (with the agreement of both of its partner agencies)
certified a restructured NPOESS program, estimated to cost $12.5
billion through 2026. This decision approved a cost increase of $4
billion over the prior approved baseline cost and delayed the launch of
NPP and the first two satellites by roughly 3 to 5 years. The new
program also entailed establishing a stronger program management
structure, reducing the number of satellites to be produced and
launched from 6 to 4, and reducing the number of instruments on the
satellites from 13 to 9--consisting of 7 environmental sensors and 2
subsystems. It also entailed using NPOESS satellites in the early
morning and afternoon orbits and relying on European satellites for
midmorning orbit data.[Footnote 10] Table 2 summarizes the major
program changes made under the Nunn-McCurdy certification decision.
Table 2: Summary of Changes to the NPOESS Program:
Key area: Life cycle range;
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 1995-2020;
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 1995-2026.
Key area: Estimated life cycle cost;
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: $8.4 billion;
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: $12.5 billion.
Key area: Launch schedule;
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: NPP by October 2006; First
NPOESS by November 2009; Second NPOESS by June 2011;
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: NPP by January 2010; First
NPOESS by January 2013; Second NPOESS by January 2016.
Key area: Management structure;
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: System Program Director
reports to a tri-agency steering committee and the tri-agency Executive
Committee; Independent program reviews noted insufficient system
engineering and cost analysis staff;
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: System Program Director is
responsible for day-to-day program management and reports to the
Program Executive Officer; Program Executive Officer oversees program
and reports to the tri-agency Executive Committee.
Key area: Number of satellites;
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 6 (in addition to NPP);
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 4 (in addition to NPP).
Key area: Number of orbits;
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 3 (early morning, midmorning,
and afternoon);
Program after the Nunn- McCurdy decision: 2 (early morning and
afternoon; will rely on European satellites for midmorning orbit data).
Key area: Number and complement of instruments;
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 13 instruments (10 sensors
and 3 subsystems);
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 9 instruments (7 sensors and 2
subsystems); 4 of the sensors are to provide fewer capabilities.
Key area: Number of EDRs;
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 55;
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 39 (6 are to be degraded
products).
Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS Integrated Program Office data.
[End of table]
The Nunn-McCurdy certification decision established new milestones for
the delivery of key program elements, including launching NPP by
January 2010,[Footnote 11] launching the first NPOESS satellite (called
C1) by January 2013, and launching the second NPOESS satellite (called
C2) by January 2016. These revised milestones deviated from prior plans
to have the first NPOESS satellite available to back up the final POES
satellite should anything go wrong during that launch.
Delaying the launch of the first NPOESS satellite means that if the
final POES satellite fails on launch, satellite data users would need
to rely on the existing constellation of environmental satellites until
NPP data becomes available--almost 2 years later. Although NPP was not
intended to be an operational asset, NASA agreed to move NPP to a
different orbit so that its data would be available in the event of a
premature failure of the final POES satellite. However, NPP will not
provide all of the operational capability planned for the NPOESS
spacecraft. If the health of the existing constellation of satellites
diminishes--or if NPP data is not available, timely, and reliable--then
there could be a gap in environmental satellite data. Table 3
summarizes changes in key program milestones over time.
Table 3: Key Program Milestones:
Milestones: Final POES launch[A];
As of the August 2002 contract award: March 2008;
As of the February 2004 rebaselined program: March 2008;
As of the June 2006 certification decision: February 2009;
Change from 2004 rebaselined program: Not applicable.
Milestones: NPP launch;
As of the August 2002 contract award: May 2006;
As of the February 2004 rebaselined program: October 2006;
As of the June 2006 certification decision: January 2010[B];
Change from 2004 rebaselined program: 44-month delay.
Milestones: First NPOESS satellite planned for launch (C1);
As of the August 2002 contract award: April 2009;
As of the February 2004 rebaselined program: November 2009;
As of the June 2006 certification decision: January 2013;
Change from 2004 rebaselined program: 38-month delay.
Milestones: Final DMSP launch[A];
As of the August 2002 contract award: October 2009;
As of the February 2004 rebaselined program: May 2010;
As of the June 2006 certification decision: April 2012;
Change from 2004 rebaselined program: Not applicable.
Milestones: Second NPOESS satellite planned for launch (C2);
As of the August 2002 contract award: June 2011;
As of the February 2004 rebaselined program: June 2011;
As of the June 2006 certification decision: January 2016;
Change from 2004 rebaselined program: 55-month delay.
Source: GAO analysis, based on NPOESS Integrated Program Office data.
[A] POES and DMSP are not part of the NPOESS program. Their launch
dates are provided to indicate the increased risk of satellite data
gaps between when these systems launch and when the NPOESS satellites
launch.
[B] Although the certification decision specified NPP is to launch by
January 2010, NASA plans to launch it by September 2009 to reduce the
possibility of a gap in climate data continuity.
[End of table]
In order to reduce program complexity, the Nunn-McCurdy certification
decision decreased the number of NPOESS sensors from 13 to 9 and
reduced the functionality of 4 sensors. Specifically, of the 13
original sensors, 5 sensors remain unchanged, 3 were replaced with less
capable sensors, 1 was modified to provide less functionality, and 4
were cancelled. Table 4 shows the changes to NPOESS sensors, including
the 4 identified in bold as critical sensors.
Table 4: Changes to NPOESS Instruments (critical sensors are in bold):
Instrument: ATMS;
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Unchanged;
Change description: Sensor is to be included on NPP and on the first
and third NPOESS satellites.
Instrument: Aerosol polarimetry sensor;
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Cancelled;
Change description: Sensor was cancelled, but could be reintegrated on
future NPOESS satellites should another party choose to fund it[A].
Instrument: CMIS;
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Replaced;
Change description: CMIS sensor was cancelled, and the program office
is to procure a less complex Microwave imager/sounder for inclusion on
the second, third, and fourth NPOESS satellites.
Instrument: CrIS;
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Unchanged;
Change description: Sensor is to be included on NPP and on the first
and third NPOESS satellites.
Instrument: Data collection system;
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Unchanged;
Change description: Subsystem is to be included on all four NPOESS
satellites.
Instrument: Earth radiation budget sensor;
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Replaced;
Change description: Sensor was cancelled, and is to be replaced on the
first NPOESS satellite (and no others) by an existing sensor with fewer
capabilities called the Cloud's and Earth's Radiant Energy System.
Instrument: OMPS;
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Modified;
Change description: One part of the sensor, called OMPS (nadir), is to
be included on NPP and on the first and third NPOESS satellites; the
remaining part, called OMPS (limb), was cancelled on the NPOESS
satellites, but will be included on NPP[A].
Instrument: Radar altimeter;
Status of instrument after the Nunn- McCurdy decision: Cancelled;
Change description: Sensor was cancelled, but could be reintegrated on
future NPOESS satellites should another party choose to fund it.
Instrument: Search and rescue satellite aided tracking system;
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Unchanged;
Change description: Subsystem is to be included on all four NPOESS
satellites.
Instrument: Space environmental sensor suite;
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Replaced;
Change description: Sensor is to be replaced by a less capable, less
expensive, legacy sensor called the Space Environment Monitor on the
first and third NPOESS satellites.
Instrument: Survivability sensor;
Status of instrument after the Nunn- McCurdy decision: Cancelled;
Change description: Subsystem contract was cancelled, but could be
reintegrated on future NPOESS satellites should another party choose to
fund it.
Instrument: Total solar irradiance sensor;
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Cancelled;
Change description: Sensor contract was cancelled but could be
reintegrated on future NPOESS satellites should another party choose to
fund it.
Instrument: VIIRS;
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Unchanged;
Change description: Sensor is to be included on NPP and on all four
NPOESS satellites.
Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS Integrated Program Office data.
[A] While direct program funding for these instruments was eliminated,
the instruments could be reintegrated on NPOESS satellites should other
parties choose to fund them. The Nunn-McCurdy decision requires the
program office to allow sufficient space on the spacecraft for these
instruments and to provide the funding needed to integrate them.
[End of table]
The changes in NPOESS sensors affected the number and quality of the
resulting weather and environmental products, called EDRs. In selecting
sensors for the restructured program, the Nunn-McCurdy process placed
the highest priority on continuing current operational weather
capabilities and a lower priority on obtaining selected environmental
and climate measuring capabilities. As a result, the revised NPOESS
system has significantly less capability for providing global climate
measures than was originally planned. Specifically, the number of EDRs
was decreased from 55 to 39, of which 6 are of a reduced quality. The
39 EDRs that remain include cloud base height, land surface
temperature, precipitation type and rate, and sea surface winds. The 16
EDRs that were removed include cloud particle size and distribution,
sea surface height, net solar radiation at the top of the atmosphere,
and products to depict the electric fields in the space environment.
The 6 EDRs that are of a reduced quality include ozone profile, soil
moisture, and multiple products depicting energy in the space
environment.
Given the changes in planned sensors, program officials established a
planned configuration for NPP and the four satellites of the NPOESS
program, called C1, C2, C3, and C4 (see table 5). Program officials
acknowledged that this configuration could change if other parties
decided to develop the sensors that were cancelled. However, they noted
that the planned configuration of the first satellite cannot change
without increasing the risk that the launch will be delayed.
Table 5: Planned Configuration of Sensors on NPP and NPOESS Satellites:
Sensor: VIIRS;
NPP: X;
NPOESS C1: X;
NPOESS C2: X;
NPOESS C3: X;
NPOESS C4: X.
Sensor: Microwave imager/sounder (replacing CMIS);
NPP: [Empty];
NPOESS C1: [Empty];
NPOESS C2: X;
NPOESS C3: X;
NPOESS C4: X.
Sensor: CrIS;
NPP: X;
NPOESS C1: X;
NPOESS C2: [Empty];
NPOESS C3: X;
NPOESS C4: [Empty].
Sensor: ATMS;
NPP: X;
NPOESS C1: X;
NPOESS C2: [Empty];
NPOESS C3: X;
NPOESS C4: [Empty].
Sensor: Space environment monitor (replacing the space environmental
sensor suite);
NPP: [Empty];
NPOESS C1: X;
NPOESS C2: [Empty];
NPOESS C3: X;
NPOESS C4: [Empty].
Sensor: OMPS;
NPP: X;
NPOESS C1: X;
NPOESS C2: [Empty];
NPOESS C3: X;
NPOESS C4: [Empty].
Sensor: Data collection system;
NPP: [Empty];
NPOESS C1: X;
NPOESS C2: X;
NPOESS C3: X;
NPOESS C4: X.
Sensor: Search and rescue satellite aided tracking system;
NPP: [Empty];
NPOESS C1: X;
NPOESS C2: X;
NPOESS C3: X;
NPOESS C4: X.
Sensor: Cloud's and earth's radiant energy system (replacing the earth
radiation budget sensor);
NPP: [Empty];
NPOESS C1: X;
NPOESS C2: [Empty];
NPOESS C3: [Empty];
NPOESS C4: [Empty].
Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS Integrated Program Office data.
[End of table]
Earned Value Management Techniques Provide Insight on Program Cost and
Schedule:
To be effective, project managers need current information on a
contractor's progress in meeting contract deliverables. One method that
can help project managers track this progress is earned value
management. This method, used by DOD for several decades, compares the
value of work accomplished during a given period with that of the work
expected in that period.
Differences from expectations are measured in both cost and schedule
variances. Cost variances compare the earned value of the completed
work with the actual cost of the work performed. For example, if a
contractor completed $5 million worth of work and the work actually
cost $6.7 million, there would be a -$1.7 million cost variance.
Schedule variances are also measured in dollars, but they compare the
earned value of the work completed with the value of work that was
expected to be completed. For example, if a contractor completed $5
million worth of work at the end of the month but was budgeted to
complete $10 million worth of work, there would be a -$5 million
schedule variance. Positive variances indicate that activities are
costing less or are completed ahead of schedule. Negative variances
indicate activities are costing more or are falling behind schedule.
These cost and schedule variances can then be used in estimating the
cost and time needed to complete the program.
NPOESS Acquisition Restructuring Is Well Under Way, but Key Steps
Remain To Be Completed:
Since the June 2006 decision to revise the scope, cost, and schedule of
the NPOESS program, the program office has made progress in
restructuring the satellite acquisition; however, important tasks
leading up to revising and finalizing contract changes remain to be
completed. Restructuring a major acquisition program like NPOESS is a
process that involves identifying time critical and high priority work
and keeping this work moving forward, while reassessing development
priorities, interdependencies, deliverables, risks, and costs. It also
involves revising important acquisition documents including the
memorandum of agreement on the roles and responsibilities of the three
agencies, the acquisition strategy, the system engineering plan, the
test and evaluation master plan, the integrated master schedule
defining what needs to happen by when, and the acquisition program
baseline. The Nunn-McCurdy certification decision required the
Secretaries of Defense and Commerce and the Administrator of NASA to
sign a revised memorandum of agreement by August 6, 2006. It also
required that the program office, Program Executive Officer, and the
Executive Committee revise and approve key acquisition documents
including the acquisition strategy and system engineering plan by
September 1, 2006, in order to proceed with the restructuring. Once
these are completed, the program office can proceed to negotiate with
its prime contractor on a new program baseline defining what will be
delivered, by when, and at what cost.
The NPOESS program office has made progress in restructuring the
acquisition. Specifically, the program office has established interim
program plans guiding the contractor's work activities in 2006 and 2007
and has made progress in implementing these plans. Specifically, the
program office reported that it had completed 156 of 166 key
milestones[Footnote 12] during fiscal year 2006--including completing
ambient and thermal vacuum testing of the VIIRS engineering unit. Of
the 10 remaining milestones resulting from unanticipated problems in
the development of VIIRS and CrIS, 5 have since been completed, and 5
are still pending. The program office plans to complete 222 milestones
in fiscal year 2007--including completing performance tests on the OMPS
(nadir) sensor--and notes that they are slightly ahead of plans in that
they have completed 62 milestones through January 20, 2007, which is 2
more than had been planned. Figures 7 and 8 depict the program office's
progress against key milestones in fiscal year 2006 and to date in
fiscal year 2007.
Figure 7: Progress on Planned Milestones in Fiscal Year 2006, as of
October 1, 2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS Integrated Program office data.
[End of figure]
Figure 8: Progress on Planned Milestones in Fiscal Year 2007, as of
January 20, 2007:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS Integrated Program Office data.
[End of figure]
The program office has also made progress in revising key acquisition
documents. It revised the system engineering plan, the test and
evaluation master plan, and the acquisition strategy plan, and obtained
approval of these documents by the Program Executive Officer. The
program office and contractor also developed an integrated master
schedule for the remainder of the program--beyond fiscal year 2007.
This integrated master schedule details the steps leading up to
launching NPP by September 2009, launching the first NPOESS satellite
in January 2013, and launching the second NPOESS satellite in January
2016. Near-term steps include completing and testing the VIIRS, CrIS,
and OMPS sensors; integrating these sensors with the NPP spacecraft and
completing integration testing; completing the data processing system
and integrating it with the command, control, and communications
segment; and performing advanced acceptance testing of the overall
system of systems for NPP.
However, key steps remain for the acquisition restructuring to be
completed. These steps include obtaining the approval of the
Secretaries of Commerce and Defense and the Administrator of NASA on
the memorandum of agreement among the three agencies, and obtaining the
approval of the NPOESS Executive Committee on key acquisition
documents, including the system engineering plan, the test and
evaluation master plan, and the acquisition strategy. These approvals
are currently over 6 months past due. Agency officials noted that the
September 1, 2006, due date for the key acquisition documents was not
realistic given the complexity of coordinating documents among three
different agencies, but did not provide a new estimate for when these
documents would be approved.
Finalizing these documents is critical to ensuring interagency
agreements and will allow the program office to move forward in
completing other activities related to restructuring the program. These
activities include conducting an integrated baseline review with the
contractor to reach agreement on the schedule and work activities, and
finalizing changes to the NPOESS development and production contract--
thereby allowing the program office to lock down a new acquisition
baseline cost and schedule. The program office expects to conduct an
integrated baseline review by May 2007 and to finalize the contract
changes by July 2007. Until key acquisition documents are finalized and
approved, the program faces increased risk that it will not be able to
complete important restructuring activities in time to move forward in
fiscal year 2008 with a new program baseline in place. This places the
NPOESS program at risk of continued delays and future cost increases.
Progress Has Been Made in Establishing an Effective NPOESS Management
Structure, but Executive Turnover Will Increase Risks, and Staffing
Problems Remain:
The NPOESS program has made progress in establishing an effective
management structure, but--almost a year after this structure was
endorsed during the Nunn-McCurdy certification process--the Integrated
Program Office still faces staffing problems. Over the past few years,
we and others have raised concerns about management problems at all
levels of the NPOESS program, including subcontractor and contractor
management, program office management, and executive-level
management.[Footnote 13] Two independent review teams also noted a
shortage of skilled program staff, including budget analysts and system
engineers. Since that time, the NPOESS program has made progress in
establishing an effective management structure--including establishing
a new organizational framework with increased oversight by program
executives, instituting more frequent subcontractor, contractor, and
program reviews, and effectively managing risks and performance.
However, DOD's plans for reassigning the Program Executive Officer in
Summer 2007 increase the program's risks. Additionally, the program
lacks a staffing process that clearly identifies staffing needs, gaps,
and plans for filling those gaps. As a result, the program office has
experienced delays in getting core management activities under way and
lacks the staff it needs to execute day-to-day management activities.
NPOESS Program Has Made Progress in Establishing an Effective
Management Structure and Increasing Oversight Activities, but Executive
Turnover Will Increase Program Risks:
The NPOESS program has made progress in establishing an effective
management structure and increasing the frequency and intensity of its
oversight activities. Over the past few years, we and others have
raised concerns about management problems at all levels of management
on the NPOESS program, including subcontractor and contractor
management, program office management, and executive-level management.
In response to recommendations made by two different independent review
teams, the program office began exploring options in late 2005 and
early 2006 for revising its management structure.
In November 2005, the Executive Committee established and filled a
Program Executive Officer position, senior to the NPOESS Program
Director, to streamline decision making and to provide oversight to the
program. This Program Executive Officer reports directly to the
Executive Committee. Subsequently, the Program Executive Officer and
the Program Director proposed a revised organizational framework that
realigned division managers within the Integrated Program Office
responsible for overseeing key elements of the acquisition and
increased staffing in key areas. In June 2006, the Nunn-McCurdy
certification decision approved this new management structure and the
Integrated Program Office implemented it. Figure 9 provides an overview
of the relationships among the Integrated Program Office, the Program
Executive Office, and the Executive Committee, as well as key divisions
within the program office.
Figure 9: Overview of New Management Structure:
[See PDF for image]
Source: NOAA.
[End of figure]
Operating under this new management structure, the program office
implemented more rigorous and frequent subcontractor, contractor, and
program reviews, improved visibility into risk management and
mitigation activities, and institutionalized the use of earned value
management techniques to monitor contractor performance. Specifically,
program officials and the prime contractor now review the
subcontractors' cost and schedule performance on a weekly basis. The
information from these meetings feeds into monthly government meetings
with the prime contractor to review progress against milestones,
issues, and risks. Further, the Program Director conducts monthly
reviews with each technical division lead to review the divisions'
achievements, risks, and plans. Program officials note that these
frequent reviews allow information on risks to be quickly escalated
from subcontractors to contractors, to the program component level, and
to the Program Director--and they allow program officials to better
manage efforts to reduce risks. The program office also reported that
all division leads were trained in earned value management techniques
and were effectively using these techniques both to monitor
subcontractor and contractor performance on a weekly basis and to
identify potential problems as soon as possible.
In addition to these program office activities, the Program Executive
Officer implemented monthly program reviews and increased the frequency
of contacts with the Executive Committee. Specifically, the Program
Executive Officer holds monthly program management reviews where the
Program Director and program division leads (for example, those in
charge of systems engineering or ground systems) provide briefings on
the program's earned value, progress, risks, and concerns. We observed
that these briefings allow the Program Executive Officer to have direct
insight into the challenges and workings of the Integrated Program
Office and allow risks to be appropriately escalated and addressed.
These meetings also provide an open forum for managers to raise
concerns and ask questions about operational challenges. For example,
when NASA officials expressed concerns that vibration levels used
during testing were higher than necessary and were causing damage to
key sensor components, the Program Director and Program Executive
Officer immediately established a forum to discuss and mitigate this
issue. The Program Executive Officer briefs the Executive Committee in
monthly letters, apprising committee members of the program's status,
progress, risks, and earned value and the Executive Committee now meets
on a quarterly basis--whereas in the recent past, we reported that the
Executive Committee had met only five times in 2 years.[Footnote 14]
While the NPOESS program has made progress in establishing an effective
management structure, this progress is currently at risk. We recently
reported that DOD space acquisitions are at increased risk due in part
to frequent turnover in leadership positions, and we suggested that
addressing this will require DOD to consider matching officials' tenure
with the development or delivery of a product.[Footnote 15] In March
2007, NPOESS program officials stated that DOD is planning to reassign
the recently appointed Program Executive Officer in Summer 2007 as part
of this executive's natural career progression. As of March 2007, the
Program Executive Officer has held this position for 16 months. Given
that the program is currently still being restructured, and that there
are significant challenges in being able to meet critical deadlines to
ensure satellite data continuity, such a move adds unnecessary risk to
an already risky program.
NPOESS Program Has Filled Key Vacancies but Lacks A Programwide
Staffing Process:
The NPOESS program office has filled key vacancies in recent months but
lacks a staffing process that identifies programwide staffing
requirements and plans for filling those needed positions. Sound human
capital management calls for establishing a process or plan for
determining staffing requirements, identifying any gaps in staffing,
and planning to fill critical staffing gaps. Program office staffing is
especially important for NPOESS, given the acknowledgment by multiple
independent review teams that staffing shortfalls contributed to past
problems. Specifically, these review teams noted shortages in the
number of system engineers needed to provide adequate oversight of
subcontractor and contractor engineering activities and in the number
of budget and cost analysts needed to assess contractor cost and earned
value reports. To rectify this situation, the June 2006 certification
decision directed the Program Director to take immediate actions to
fill vacant positions at the program office with the approval of the
Program Executive Officer.
Since the June 2006 decision to revise NPOESS management structure, the
program office has filled multiple critical positions, including a
budget officer, a chief system engineer, an algorithm division chief,
and a contracts director. In addition, on an ad hoc basis, individual
division managers have assessed their needs and initiated plans to hire
individuals for key positions. However, almost a year after the
certification, the program office still lacks a programwide process for
identifying and filling all needed positions. As a result, division
managers often wait months for critical positions to be filled. For
example, in February 2006, the NPOESS program estimated that it needed
to hire up to 10 new budget analysts. As of September 2006, none of
these positions had been filled. Today, program officials estimate that
they only needed to fill 7 budget analyst positions, of which 2
positions have been filled, and 5 remain vacant. Additionally, even
though the certification decision directed immediate action to fill
critical vacancies, the program still has vacancies in 5 systems
engineering positions and 10 technical manager positions. The majority
of the vacancies--4 of the 5 budget positions, 4 of the 5 systems
engineering positions, and 8 of the 10 technical manager positions--are
to be provided by NOAA. NOAA officials noted that each of these
positions is in some stage of being filled--that is, recruitment
packages are being developed or reviewed, vacancies are being
advertised, or candidates are being interviewed, selected, and
approved.
The program office attributes its staffing delays to not having the
right personnel in place to facilitate this process--and did not even
begin to develop a staffing process--until November 2006. Program
officials noted that the tri-agency nature of the program adds unusual
layers of complexity to the hiring and administrative functions because
each agency has its own hiring and performance management rules. In
November 2006, the program office brought in an administrative officer
who took the lead in pulling together the division managers' individual
assessments of needed staff--currently estimated to be 25 vacant
positions--and has been working with the division managers to refine
this list. This new administrative officer plans to train division
managers in how to assess their needs and to hire needed staff and to
develop a process by which evolving needs are identified and positions
are filled. However, there is as yet no date set for establishing this
basic programwide staffing process.
As a result of the lack of a programwide staffing process, there has
been an extended delay in determining what staff are needed and in
bringing those staff on board--which has resulted in delays in
performing core management activities such as establishing the program
office's cost estimate and bringing in needed contracting expertise.
Additionally, until a programwide staffing process is in place, the
program office risks not having the staff it needs to execute day-to-
day management activities.
Methodology Supporting the June 2006 Cost and Schedule Estimate Was
Reliable, but Recent Events Could Increase Program Costs:
In June 2006, DOD certified a restructured NPOESS program that was
estimated to cost $11.5 billion for the acquisition portion of the
program[Footnote 16] and scheduled to launch the first satellite in
2013. The Office of the Secretary of Defense's Cost Analysis
Improvement Group (cost analysis group)--the independent cost
estimators charged with developing the estimate for the acquisition
portion of the program--used an acceptable methodology to develop this
estimate. When combined with an estimated $1 billion for operations and
support after launch, this brings the program life cycle cost to $12.5
billion. Recent events, however, could further increase program costs
or delay schedules. Specifically, the program continues to experience
technical problems on key sensors, and costs and schedules will be
adjusted during negotiations on contract changes. The NPOESS program
office is developing its own cost estimate to refine the one developed
in June 2006 that it will use to negotiate contract changes. A new
baseline cost will be established once the contract is finalized.
Certified Program Estimates Were Developed Using an Acceptable
Methodology:
The cost and schedule estimate for the restructured NPOESS program was
developed by DOD's cost analysis group using an acceptable methodology.
Cost-estimating organizations throughout the federal government and
industry use certain key practices--related to planning, conducting,
and reporting the estimate--to ensure a sound estimate. Table 6 lists
the elements of a sound cost estimating methodology. In addition, to
ensure the validity of the data assumptions that go into the estimate,
leading organizations use actual historical costs and seek an
independent validation of critical cost drivers.
Table 6: Elements of a Sound Cost Estimating Methodology:
Activity area: Planning the estimate;
Key practices: Define the estimate's purpose;
Define the program or system characteristics;
Identify ground rules and assumptions;
Determine the estimating approach;
Develop the estimating plan.
Activity area: Conducting the estimate;
Key practices: Obtain the data;
Perform the estimate;
Conduct a risk and uncertainty analysis;
Conduct a sensitivity analysis.
Activity area: Reporting the estimate;
Key practices: Document the estimate;
Review and provide results;
Update the estimate with actual cost data and document lessons learned.
Source: GAO analysis of leading practices.
[End of table]
DOD's cost analysis group used an acceptable methodology in developing
the NPOESS cost estimate in that they planned, conducted, and reported
the estimate consistent with leading practices. The cost analysis
group's cost estimating approach was largely driven by the program's
principal "ground rule" to maintain the continuity of weather data
without a gap. Specifically, the cost analysis group assessed two
risks: (1) the uncertainty of the health of the current polar-satellite
constellation and (2) the uncertainty of when the new satellite system
could be delivered (including the time needed to evaluate new
satellites once in orbit). The resulting analysis showed that the
restructured NPOESS system could be delivered and the first satellite
launched by 2013 with a high level of confidence in maintaining
satellite data continuity.[Footnote 17]
To determine specific costs, the group used the existing work breakdown
structure employed by the program office as the basis for performing
its work. This work breakdown structure consists of seven major
elements, including ground systems; spacecraft; sensors; assembly,
integration and test; system engineering/contractor program management;
government program management; and launch.
The cost analysis group also took steps to ensure the validity of the
data that went into the estimate. For each element, the cost analysis
group visited all major contractor sites to collect program data
including:
* schedule (including the original, rebaselined, and current schedules,
and risks affecting the current schedule);
* current staffing profile by month;
* the history of staffing used;
* the qualifications of people charging the program;
* the program's technical approaches;
* system diagrams;
* bills of materials;
* funding profile; and:
* the contractor's program legacy (a justification that the contractor
has worked on similar projects in the past and that the contractor
should be able to adapt that knowledge to the current work).
The cost analysis group also compared this data with contractor labor
rates from the Defense Contract Management Agency and obtained NASA's
validation of the costs associated with the most significant cost
driver, the VIIRS sensor.
Since schedule was the primary uncertainty factor in the cost analysis,
it also was the driver of overall costs. Specifically, the cost
analysis group took its risk-adjusted schedule durations for the major
cost elements and adjusted the contractor-submitted manning profiles
accordingly. They then used NPOESS historical data on labor rates and
materials to calculate the cost of these elements.
Consistent with DOD practice, the cost analysis group established its
cost estimate at a 50 percent confidence level.[Footnote 18] However,
cost analysts could not provide an upper limit for potential cost
growth, explaining that the program contains "failsafe" measures to use
alternative technologies (such as using legacy systems) if schedules
are delayed and costs increase. As a result, cost analysts reported
that they have a high level of confidence that acquisition costs will
not exceed $11.5 billion--but a lower level of confidence that the
configuration of sensors will remain unchanged.
Recent Events Could Lead to Increased Program Costs or Delayed
Schedules:
While the June 2006 cost estimate for the acquisition portion of the
program was reasonable at the time it was made, several recent events
could cause program life cycle costs to grow or schedules to be
delayed. Specifically, the program continues to experience technical
problems on key sensors. The CrIS sensor being developed for the NPP
satellite suffered a major structural failure in October 2006. A
failure review board is currently working to resolve the root causes of
the failure. While program officials note that they should be able to
cover costs related to investigating the problem, the full cost and
schedule to fix the sensor is not yet known. Also, VIIRS development,
which has been the program's primary cost driver, is not yet complete
and continues to be a high-risk development. This too, could lead to
higher final program costs or delayed schedules.
Program costs are also likely to be adjusted during upcoming
negotiations on contract changes. The NPOESS program office is
developing its own cost estimate to refine the one developed in June
2006. Program officials plan to use this revised cost estimate to
negotiate contract changes. A new baseline cost will be established
once the contract is finalized--an event that the Program Director
expects to occur by July 2007.
Major Program Segments Are Under Development, but Significant Risks
Remain:
Major segments of the NPOESS program--the space segment, the ground
systems segment, and the launch segment--are under development;
however, significant problems have occurred and risks remain. The
program office is aware of these risks and is working to mitigate them,
but continued problems could affect the program's overall cost and
schedule. Given the tight time frames for completing key sensors,
integrating them on the NPP spacecraft, and getting the ground-based
data processing systems developed, tested, and deployed, it will be
important for the NPOESS Integrated Program Office, the Program
Executive Office, and the Executive Committee to continue to provide
close oversight of milestones and risks.
Space Segment--Progress Made, but Key Sensors Continue to Face Major
Risks:
The space segment includes the sensors and the spacecraft. Four sensors
are of critical importance--VIIRS, CrIS, OMPS, and ATMS--because they
are to be launched on the NPP satellite. Initiating work on another
sensor, the Microwave imager/sounder, is also important because this
new sensor--replacing the cancelled CMIS sensor--will need to be
developed in time for the second NPOESS satellite launch. Over the past
year, the program made progress on each of the sensors and the
spacecraft. However, two sensors, VIIRS and CrIS, have experienced
major problems. The status of each of the components of the space
segment is described in table 7.
Table 7: Status of Selected Components of the Space Segment, as of
April 2007:
Space segment component: VIIRS;
Risk level: High;
Status: VIIRS development has continued in 2006 and in early 2007. In
December 2006, the contractor completed environmental tests of VIIRS'
engineering design unit (a prototype) and identified three problems.[A]
While these problems were being studied, the program office approved
the delivery of the engineering unit to the subcontractor responsible
for integration and testing on NPP. In late February 2007, program
officials determined that the contractor was able to mitigate all but
one of the problems, and they approved the flight unit to proceed to
system level integration with a goal of resolving the final problem
before a technical readiness review milestone in May 2007. VIIRS flight
unit is scheduled to be delivered to NPP by July 2008.
Space segment component: CrIS;
Risk level: High;
Status: Development of CrIS was put on hold in October 2006 when the
flight unit designated to go on NPP experienced a major structural
failure during its vibration testing. As of March 2007, a failure
review board established by the contractors and the NPOESS program
office identified causes for failure and has planned an approach to
completing flight unit development and delivery for NPP. The review
board has also initiated inspections of all sensor modules and
subsystems for damage. The program office expects to restart acceptance
testing in July 2007, and the CrIS flight unit is expected to be
delivered to NPP by February 2008.
Space segment component: OMPS;
Risk level: Moderate;
Status: As part of the Nunn-McCurdy certification in June 2006, one
element of the OMPS sensor, called OMPS (limb), was removed from the
program. In February 2007, program officials agreed to reintegrate OMPS
(limb) on NPP if NOAA and NASA would fund it. This funding was approved
in early April 2007. OMPS is currently on schedule for delivery to NPP
by May 2008; however, there are concerns that the OMPS flight unit
delivery will be so late in the integration testing process that there
could be an insufficient schedule margin, should a problem arise.
Space segment component: ATMS;
Risk level: Low;
Status: The ATMS flight unit for NPP was developed by a NASA contractor
and delivered to the program in October 2005. NASA integrated the
flight unit on the spacecraft and is awaiting delivery of the other
sensors in order to complete integration testing.
Space segment component: Microwave imager/ sounder;
Risk level: Not yet rated;
Status: A new microwave imager/sounder sensor is being planned to
replace the cancelled CMIS sensor. It is planned to be ready for launch
on the second NPOESS satellite. In October 2006, the program office
issued a request for information seeking industry ideas for the design
of the new sensor, and responses were due by the end of December 2006.
The program office anticipates awarding a contract to develop the
sensor by October 2008.
Space segment component: Spacecraft;
Risk level: Low;
Status: The development of the spacecrafts for NPP and NPOESS are on
track. The NPP spacecraft was completed in June 2005. Integration
testing will be conducted once the NPP sensors are delivered; Early
issues with the NPOESS spacecraft (including issues with antennas and a
data storage unit) have been resolved; however, risks remain that could
delay the completion of the spacecraft. A key risk involves delays in
the delivery of the solar array, which may arrive too late to be
included in some key testing. Other risks associated with the
electrical power subsystem are taking longer than anticipated to
resolve.
Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS Integrated Program Office data.
[A] The three problems are (1) band-to-band co-registration, an issue
in which band registration shifts with different temperatures; (2)
cross-talk, which involves information from sensor cells leaking into
other cells; and (3) line-spread function issues, in which the
instrument's focus changes with changes in temperature.
[End of table]
Earned Value Data Show Problems on the Space Segment:
Earned value management tools are used to compare the value of work
accomplished with the work expected during a given time period, and any
differences are measured in cost and schedule variances. The NPOESS
space segment experienced negative cost and schedule variances between
January 2006 and January 2007 (see fig. 10).
Figure 10: Cumulative Cost and Schedule Variance for the NPOESS Space
Segment over a 13-Month Period:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis based on contractor data.
[End of figure]
From January 2006 to January 2007, the contractor exceeded cost targets
for the space segment by $17 million--which is 4 percent of the space
segment budget for that time period. Similarly, the contractor was
unable to complete $14.6 million worth of work in the space segment.
The main factors in the cost and schedule variances were due to
underestimation of the scope of work, pulling resources from lower
priority tasks to higher priority items, and unforeseen design issues
on key sensors. For example, VIIRS continued to experience negative
cost variance trends due to unplanned efforts, which included
refurbishing and recertifying the VIIRS calibration chamber, completing
the testing of the engineering design unit, and resolving a problem
with the testing equipment needed to adjust VIIRS' temperature during a
key test.
Unplanned efforts for CrIS that attributed to the negative cost and
schedule variances included additional time required for testing and
material management. The schedule variances for VIIRS and CrIS were
mainly due to resources being pulled from other areas to support higher
priority tasks, extended testing and testing delays, management
changes, and improper material handling. Further, there is a high
likelihood that CrIS will continue to experience cost and schedule
variances against the fiscal year 2007 interim program plan until the
issues that caused its structural failure are addressed.
Program Office Is Monitoring Sensor Risks and Evaluating Options:
Program officials regularly track risks associated with various NPOESS
components and work to mitigate them. Having identified both VIIRS and
CrIS as high risk, OMPS as a moderate risk, and the other components as
low risk, the program office is working closely with the contractors
and subcontractors to resolve sensor problems.
Program officials have identified work-arounds that will allow them to
move forward in testing the VIIRS engineering unit and have approved
the flight unit to proceed to a technical readiness review milestone in
May 2007. Regarding CrIS, as of March 2007, a failure review board
identified root causes of its structural failure, identified plans for
resolving them, and initiated inspections of sensor modules and
subsystems for damage. An agency official reported that there is
sufficient funding in the fiscal year 2007 program office's and
contractor's management reserve funds to allow for troubleshooting both
VIIRS and CrIS problems. However, until the CrIS failure review board
fully determines the amount of rework that is necessary to fix the
problems, it is unknown if additional funds will be needed or if the
time frame for CrIS' delivery will be delayed. According to agency
officials, CrIS is not on the program schedule's critical path, and
there is sufficient schedule margin to absorb the time it will take to
conduct a thorough failure review process.
Managing the risks associated with the development of VIIRS and CrIS
are of particular importance because these are to be demonstrated on
the NPP satellite currently scheduled for launch in September 2009.
Additionally, any delay in the NPP launch date could affect the overall
NPOESS program because the success of the program depends on the
lessons learned in data processing and system integration from the NPP
satellite.
Ground Segment--Progress Has Been Made, but Work Remains:
Development of the ground segment--which includes the interface data
processing system, the ground stations that are to receive satellite
data, and the ground-based command, control, and communications system-
-is under way and on track. However, important work pertaining to
developing the algorithms that translate satellite data into weather
products within the integrated data processing segment remains to be
completed. Table 8 describes each of the components of the ground
segment and identifies the status of each. Additionally, appendix II
provides an overview of satellite data processing algorithms.
Table 8: Status of Ground Segment Components:
Ground segment component/description: Interface Data Processing System
(IDPS); A ground-based system that is to process the sensors' data so
that they are usable by the data processing centers and the broader
community of environmental data users. IDPS will be deployed at the
four weather data processing centers;
Risk level: Moderate;
Status: IDPS is being developed in a series of builds. Currently, IDPS
build 1.4 has been delivered for testing and recently passed two key
data transfer tests. Contractors are currently working to develop IDPS
build 1.5, which is expected to be the build that will be used with
NPP. However, work remains in three areas: system latency, algorithm
performance, and calibration and validation planning;
* Latency--IDPS must process volumes of data within 65 minutes to meet
NPP requirements. The contractor has made progress in reducing the
latency of the system's data handling from 93 minutes to 73 minutes and
is working to reduce it by 8 minutes more by resolving data management
issues, increasing the number of processors, and increasing algorithm
efficiency;
* Algorithm performance--IDPS algorithms are the mathematical functions
coded into the system software that transform raw data into data
products including sensor data records and environmental data records.
IDPS build 1.4 contains provisional algorithms, which are being refined
as the sensors complete various stages of testing. Because some sensors
are delayed, full characterization of those sensors in order to refine
the algorithms has also been delayed and may not be completed in time
for the delivery of IDPS build 1.5 in early 2009. If this occurs,
agency officials plan to improve the algorithms in build 1.5 during a
planned maintenance upgrade prior to NPP launch;
* Calibration/validation--Calibration/ validation is the process for
tweaking algorithms to provide more accurate observations. The
contractor has documented a detailed schedule for calibration and
validation during IDPS development and is developing a postlaunch task
list to drive prelaunch preparation efforts. However, much work and
uncertainty continue to exist in the calibration and validation area. A
program official noted that, while teams can do a lot of preparation
work, including building the infrastructure to allow sensor testing and
having a good understanding of the satellite, sensors, and available
data for calibration, many issues need to take place after launch.
Ground segment component/description: Ground stations for receiving
satellite data; 15 unmanned ground stations around the world (called
SafetyNet™) are to receive satellite data and send it to the four data
processing centers;
Risk level: Low;
Status: NOAA is working with domestic and foreign authorities to gain
approval to operate ground stations to receive satellite data.
According to agency officials, the full complement of ground stations
will not be in place in time for the C1 launch: however, the ground
stations will be phased in by the launch of C2. To date, the program
office has reached agreement with 4 of 15 ground station sites.
Ground segment component/description: Command, control, and
communications segment; Performs the day-to-day monitoring and command
of the spacecraft and sensors;
Risk level: Low;
Status: NOAA recently completed moving its satellite command, control,
and communications capabilities to a new office building. In addition,
the command, control, and communications segment acceptance testing for
NPP has been completed. The segment is expected to begin operation in
2008.
Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS Integrated Program Office data.
[End of table]
Ground Segment Cost and Schedule Are on Track; Work and Risks Remain:
Using contractor-provided data, our analysis indicates cost and
schedule performance on key elements of the NPOESS ground segment were
generally on track or positive against the fiscal year 2006 and 2007
interim program plans. For the IDPS component, the contractor completed
slightly less work than planned and finished slightly under budget.
This caused cost and schedule variances of less than 1 percent off of
expectations. (see fig. 11). For the command, control, and
communications component, the contractor was able to outperform its
planned targets by finishing under budget by $3 million (6.2 percent of
the budget for this time period) and by completing $31,000 (less than 1
percent) worth of work beyond what was planned (see fig. 12).
Figure 11: Cumulative Cost and Schedule Variance for the NPOESS IDPS
Development over a 13-Month Period:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis based on contractor data.
[End of figure]
Figure 12: Cumulative Cost and Schedule Variance for the NPOESS
Command, Control, and Communications Segment over a 13-Month Period:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis based on contractor data.
[End of figure]
Program Office Has Plans to Address IDPS Risks:
The NPOESS program office plans to continue to address risks facing
IDPS development. Specifically, the IDPS team is working to reduce data
processing delays by seeking to limit the number of data calls, improve
the efficiency of the data management system, increase the efficiency
of the algorithms, and increase the number of processors. The program
office also developed a resource center consisting of a logical
technical library, a data archive, and a set of analytical tools to
coordinate, communicate, and facilitate the work of algorithm subject
matter experts on algorithm development and calibration/validation
preparations. Managing the risks associated with the development of the
IDPS system is of particular importance because this system will be
needed to process NPP data.
Launch Segment--NPP Launch Preparation Has Begun, while NPOESS Launch
Planning Remains a Future Event:
Different agencies are responsible for launching NPP and NPOESS. NASA
is responsible for the NPP launch and began procuring the launch
vehicle for NPP in August 2006. Program officials expect to have it
delivered by July 2009, less than 2 months before the scheduled NPP
launch in September 2009.
The NPOESS Integrated Program Office is responsible for launching the
NPOESS satellites. According to program officials, the Air Force is to
procure launch services for the program through DOD's Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle contract. These services are to be procured
by January 2011, 2 years before the first scheduled launch.
Conclusions:
NPOESS restructuring is well under way, and the program has made
progress in establishing an effective management structure. However,
key steps remain in restructuring the acquisition, including completing
important acquisition documents such as the system engineering plan,
the acquisition program baseline, and the memorandum of agreement
documenting the three agencies' roles and responsibilities. Until these
key documents are finalized, the program is unable to finalize plans
for restructuring the program. Additionally, the program office
continues to have difficulty filling key positions and lacks a
programwide staffing process. Until the program establishes an
effective and repeatable staffing process, it will have difficulties in
identifying and filling its staffing needs in a timely manner. Having
insufficient staff in key positions impedes the program office's
ability to conduct important management and oversight activities,
including revising cost and schedule estimates, monitoring progress,
and managing technical risks. The program faces even further challenges
if DOD proceeds with plans to reassign the Program Executive Officer
this summer. Such a move would add unnecessary risk to an already risky
program.
In addition, the likelihood exists that there will be further cost
increases and schedule delays because of technical problems on key
sensors and pending contract negotiations. Major program segments--
including the space and ground segments--are making progress in their
development and testing. However, two critical sensors have experienced
problems and are considered high risk, and risks remain in developing
and implementing the ground-based data processing system. Given the
tight time frames for completing key sensors, integrating them, and
getting the ground-based data processing systems developed, tested, and
deployed, continued close oversight of milestones and risks is
essential to minimize potential cost increases and schedule delays.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Because of the importance of effectively managing the NPOESS program to
ensure that there are no gaps in the continuity of critical weather and
environmental observations, we are making recommendations to the
Secretaries of Defense and Commerce and to the Administrator of NASA to
ensure that the responsible executives within their respective
organizations approve key acquisition documents, including the
memorandum of agreement among the three agencies, the system
engineering plan, the test and evaluation master plan, and the
acquisition strategy, as quickly as possible but no later than April
30, 2007.
We are also recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Air
Force to delay reassigning the recently appointed Program Executive
Officer until all sensors have been delivered to the NPOESS Preparatory
Program; these deliveries are currently scheduled to occur by July
2008.
We are also making two additional recommendations to the Secretary of
Commerce. We recommend that the Secretary direct the Undersecretary of
Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere to ensure that NPOESS program
authorities develop and implement a written process for identifying and
addressing human capital needs and for streamlining how the program
handles the three different agencies' administrative procedures, and
establish a plan for immediately filling needed positions.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We received written comments on a draft of this report from the Deputy
Secretary of the Department of Commerce (see app. III), the Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Networks and Information Integration of the
Department of Defense (see app. IV), and the Deputy Administrator of
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (see app. V). All
three agencies agreed that it was important to finalize key acquisition
documents in a timely manner, and DOD proposed extending the due dates
for the documents to July 2, 2007. Because the NPOESS program office
intends to complete contract negotiations by July 4, 2007, we remain
concerned that any further delays in approving the documents could
delay contract negotiations and thus increase the risk to the program.
In addition, the Department of Commerce agreed with our recommendation
to develop and implement a written process for identifying and
addressing human capital needs and to streamline how the program
handles the three different agencies' administrative procedures. The
department also agreed with our recommendation to plan to immediately
fill open positions at the NPOESS program office. Commerce noted that
NOAA identified the skill sets needed for the program and has
implemented an accelerated hiring model and schedule to fill all NOAA
positions in the NPOESS program. The department also stated that the
Program Director will begin presenting the detailed staffing
information at monthly program management reviews, including
identifying any barriers and recommended corrective actions. Commerce
also noted that NOAA has made NPOESS hiring a high priority and has
documented a strategy--including milestones--to ensure that all 20
needed positions are filled by June 2007.
DOD did not concur with our recommendation to delay reassigning the
Program Executive Officer, noting that the NPOESS System Program
Director responsible for executing the acquisition program would remain
in place for 4 years. The Department of Commerce also noted that the
Program Executive Officer position is planned to rotate between the Air
Force and NOAA. Commerce also stated that a selection would be made
prior to the departure of the current Program Executive Officer to
provide an overlap period to allow for knowledge transfer and ensure
continuity.
However, over the last few years, we and others (including an
independent review team and the Commerce Inspector General) have
reported that ineffective executive-level oversight helped foster the
NPOESS program's cost and schedule overruns. We remain concerned that
reassigning the Program Executive at a time when NPOESS is still facing
critical cost, schedule, and technical challenges will place the
program at further risk.
While it is important that the System Program Director remain in place
to ensure continuity in executing the acquisition, this position does
not ensure continuity in the functions of the Program Executive
Officer. The current Program Executive Officer is experienced in
providing oversight of the progress, issues, and challenges facing
NPOESS and coordinating with Executive Committee members, as well as
DOD authorities responsible for executing Nunn-McCurdy requirements.
Additionally, while the Program Executive Officer position is planned
to rotate between agencies, the memorandum of agreement documenting
this arrangement is still in draft and should be flexible enough to
allow the current Program Executive Officer to remain until critical
risks have been addressed.
Further, while Commerce plans to allow a period of overlap between the
selection of a new Program Executive Officer and the departure of the
current one, time is running out. The current Program Executive Officer
is expected to depart in early July 2007 and, as of mid-April 2007, a
successor has not yet been named. NPOESS is an extremely complex
acquisition, involving three agencies, multiple contractors, and
advanced technologies. There is not sufficient time to transfer
knowledge and develop the sound professional working relationships that
the new Program Executive Officer will need to succeed in that role.
Thus, we remain convinced that given NPOESS's current challenges,
reassigning the current Program Executive Officer at this time would
not be appropriate.
All three agencies also provided technical comments, which we have
incorporated in this report as appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
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If you have any questions on matters discussed in this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-9286 or by e-mail at pownerd@gao.gov. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI.
Signed by:
David A. Powner:
Director, Information Technology Management Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Our objectives were to (1) evaluate the National Polar-orbiting
Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program office's
progress in restructuring the acquisition; (2) evaluate the program
office's progress in establishing an effective management structure;
(3) assess the reliability of the new life cycle cost estimate and
proposed schedule; and (4) identify the status and key risks facing the
program's major segments (the launch, space, data processing, and
ground control segments) and evaluate the adequacy of the program's
efforts to mitigate these risks.
To evaluate the NPOESS program office's progress in restructuring the
acquisition program, we reviewed the program's Nunn-McCurdy
certification decision memo and program documentation including status
briefings and milestone progress reports. We also interviewed program
office officials and attended conferences and senior-level management
program review meetings to obtain information on the program's
acquisition restructuring.
To evaluate the program office's progress in establishing an effective
management structure, we reviewed the Nunn-McCurdy decision memo for
the program, as well as program documentation and briefings. We
assessed the status of efforts to implement recommendations regarding
the program's management structure, including the work of the team
responsible for reviewing the management structure under the Nunn-
McCurdy review. We also analyzed the program office's organizational
charts and position vacancies. Finally, we interviewed officials
responsible for reviewing the management structure of the program under
Nunn-McCurdy, attended senior-level management review meetings to
obtain information related to the program's progress in establishing
and staffing the new management structure, and interviewed program
office officials responsible for human capital issues to obtain
clarification on plans and goals for the new management structure.
To assess the reliability of the new life cycle cost estimate and
proposed schedule, we analyzed the Office of the Secretary of Defense's
Cost Analysis Improvement Group's (cost analysis group) cost estimating
methodology and the assumptions used to develop its independent cost
estimate. Specifically, we assessed the cost estimating group's
methodology against 12 best practices recognized by cost-estimating
organizations within the federal government and industry for the
development of reliable cost estimates. These best practices are also
contained in a draft version of our cost guide, which is currently
being developed by GAO cost experts. We also assessed cost-and schedule-
related data, including the work breakdown structure and detailed
schedule risk analyses to determine the reasonableness of the cost
analysis group's assumptions. We also interviewed cost analysis group
officials to obtain clarification on cost and schedule estimates and
their underlying assumptions. Further, we interviewed program officials
to identify any assumptions that may have changed.
To identify the status and key risks facing the program's major
segments (the launch, space, data processing, and ground control
segments) and to evaluate the adequacy of the program's efforts to
mitigate these risks, we reviewed the program's Nunn-McCurdy
certification decision memo and other program documentation. We
analyzed briefings and monthly program management documents to
determine the status and risks of the key program segments. We also
analyzed earned value management data obtained from the contractor to
assess the contractor's performance to cost and schedule. We reviewed
cost reports and program risk management documents and interviewed
program officials to determine the program segments' risks that could
negatively affect the program's ability to maintain the current
schedule and cost estimates. We also interviewed agency officials from
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Department of
Defense (DOD), and the NPOESS program office to determine the status
and risks of the key program segments. Finally, we observed senior-
level management review meetings and attended conferences to obtain
information on the status of the NPOESS program.
We performed our work at the NPOESS Integrated Program Office and at
DOD, NASA, and NOAA offices in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area
between July 2006 and April 2007 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Overview of Satellite Data Processing Algorithms and the
Calibration and Validation Process:
Algorithms are sets of instructions, expressed mathematically, that
translate satellite sensor measurements into usable information. In the
NPOESS program, government contractors are responsible for algorithm
development; the program office is responsible for independently
validating the algorithms. Scientists develop these algorithms, which
are then written as computer code to be incorporated into the interface
data processing system (IDPS) operational system. The NPOESS ground
system uses three primary types of algorithms:
* Algorithms to develop raw data records "unpack" the digital packets
received by the antennas/IDPS (the ones and zeros) and sent from the
satellite, associate the data with the information about the
satellite's location and, finally, translate it back into the data it
was when it started at the sensor.
* Algorithms used to develop sensor and temperature data records allow
the on-ground users to understand what the sensor saw. It translates
the information from the sensor into a measure of the various forms of
energy (e.g., brightness, temperature, radiance).
* Algorithms used to produce the weather products called environmental
data records (EDR) are crosscutting. They combine various data records,
as well as other data, in order to produce measures useful to
scientists. Additionally, EDRs can be "chained"--that is, the output of
one EDR algorithm will become an input into the next EDR algorithm. To
illustrate, cloud detection/mask is an important "base" EDR because
many EDRs, like sea surface temperature, are only calculated when
clouds are not present. Figure 13 shows the flow of the data and
algorithms.
Figure 13: Satellite Data Processing Algorithms:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO (analysis), NASA (images).
[End of figure]
A corollary to algorithm development is the calibration and validation
process. According to a senior algorithm scientist, in this process,
once the satellite has been launched, scientists verify that the
sensors accurately report what ground conditions are. For example, one
EDR from the visible/infrared imager radiometer suite (VIIRS) is "ocean
color." Once the sensor is in orbit, scientists can compare the results
that the VIIRS sensor reports on ocean color with the known results
from sensors on ocean buoys that also measure ocean color in select
locations. Then, if the sensors do not accurately report the ground
conditions, scientists can calibrate, or "tweak," the algorithms used
to develop sensor, temperature, and environmental data records to
report on ground conditions more accurately.
According to an agency official, fully calibrating a simple sensor once
it has been launched can take approximately a year. A more complicated
sensor can take 18 months to 2 years (see fig. 14).
Figure 14: Describes the High-Level Calibration and Validation Process:
[See PDF for image]
Sources: GAO and Map Resources.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Commerce:
The Deputy Secretary Of Commerce:
Washington, D.C. 20230:
April 9, 2007:
Mr. David A. Powner:
Director:
Information Technology Management Issues:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Powner:
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the Government
Accountability Office's draft report entitled Polar-orbiting
Operational Environmental Satellites: Restructuring Is Under Way, but
Technical Challenges and Risks Remain (GAO-07-498). I enclose the
Department of Commerce's comments to the draft report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
David A. Sampson:
Enclosure:
Department of Commerce National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Comments on the Draft GAO Report Entitled "Polar-orbiting Operational
Environmental Satellites: Restructuring Is Under Way, but Technical
Challenges and Risks Remain" (GAO-07-498/April 2007):
General Comments:
The Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) appreciates the opportunity to review this draft
report. The report acknowledges that the National Polar-orbiting
Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program office has
made progress in restructuring the satellite acquisition, but cautions
that significant risks remain.
NOAA Response to GAO Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO report states, "We are making recommendations
to the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce and the Administrator of
NASA to ensure that the responsible executives within their respective
organizations approve key acquisition documents, including the
memorandum of agreement among the three agencies, the system
engineering plan, the test and evaluation master plan, and the
acquisition strategy, as quickly as possible, but no later than April
30, 2007."
NOAA Response: NOAA agrees the four documents identified by the GAO are
the key Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) documents. NOAA has
completed its initial review of these documents, concurred with them,
and is prepared to sign-off on the documents, pending final review by
the Air Force and NASA. NOAA will review any additional changes
proposed by the Air Force or NASA before EXCOM coordination. Following
completion of tri-agency coordination, the Program Executive Officer
(PEO) will submit the final documents to the EXCOM and then to the
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics)
after final Air Force and NASA clearance. Based on consultation with
the Air Force, NOAA anticipates these documents being fully executed by
July 2007. While later than GAO's recommended date of April 30, 2007,
approval of these documents by July 2007 will not adversely impact
program execution. The reason why these documents cannot be approved by
April 30, 2007, is the length of the Department of Defense process for
staffing such documents prior to submitting them for signature.
Recommendation 2: The GAO report states, "We are also recommending that
the Secretary of Defense direct the Air Force to delay reassigning the
recently appointed Program Executive Officer until all sensors have
been delivered to the NPOESS Preparatory Program; these deliveries are
currently scheduled to occur by July 2008."
NOAA Response: The NPOESS Program Executive Officer (PEO) position is
planned to rotate between the Air Force and NOAA. As part of this
planned rotation, the next NPOESS PEO will be a NOAA employee. A
selection will be made prior to the departure of the current PEO. The
selection of the new PEO is being timed to provide an overlap period
that will facilitate knowledge transfer and ensure continuity.
Recommendation 3: The GAO report states, "We recommend that the
Secretary [of Commerce] direct the Undersecretary of Commerce for
Oceans and Atmosphere to ensure that NPOESS program authorities develop
and implement a written process for identifying and addressing human
capital needs and for streamlining how the program handles the three
different agencies' administrative procedures."
NOAA Response: We agree. NOAA has identified the skill sets needed for
the NOAA positions and has implemented an accelerated hiring model and
corresponding schedule to fill all NOAA positions. To improve tri-
agency coordination, the NPOESS System Program Director (SPD) will
develop an Integrated Program Office Human Capital Plan that documents
the positions to be filled, the hiring strategy, and addresses other
program human capital needs.
Progress on filling the complete set of vacancies will be presented by
the SPD in an integrated monthly report at the Program Executive
Officer's monthly Program Management Reviews. As a part of the monthly
report, the SPD will identify barriers to accomplishing the plan and
recommend actions to be tasked to the appropriate individual/agency for
resolution. Actions agreed upon will be documented in the Program
Executive Office's Program Management Review action list and tracked
weekly until resolved. The SPD will report results of outstanding
actions at each monthly program review.
Recommendation 4: The GAO draft states, "We recommend that the
Secretary [of Commerce] direct the Undersecretary of Commerce for
Oceans and Atmosphere to ensure that NPOESS program authorities
establish a plan for immediately filling needed positions."
NOAA Response: We agree. We have established a documented strategy with
milestones to ensure that all 20 needed positions are filled by June
2007. Through April 9, 2007, six positions have been filled; one offer
is pending; four positions are in the interview phase; four positions
are posted on USAJOBS; three positions are to be announced within the
next two weeks; one position is in final clearance prior to
announcement; and one position is in development. NOAA reorganized the
Workforce Management Office (WFMO) internal priorities and resources to
focus on NPOESS staffing needs ahead of others within NOAA. NOAA's
National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service
(NESDIS) and WFMO are meeting on a weekly basis to ensure obstacles to
the hiring process are addressed immediately.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
6000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-6000:
Networks And Information Integration:
Apr 05 2007:
Mr. David A. Powner:
Director, Information Technology and Management Issues:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Powner,
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft
Report, GAO-07-498, 'Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental
Satellites: Restructuring is Under Way, but Technical Challenges and
Risks Remain,' dated March 12, 2007 (GAO Code 310821). The DoD
acknowledges receipt of this draft report but does not concur with all
of the GAO recommendations. Our formal comments are attached.
Signed by:
Dr. Ronald C. Jost:
DASD (C3, Space and Spectrum):
Enclosure:
As stated:
GAO Draft Report Dated March 12, 2007 GAO-07-498 (GAO Code 310821):
"Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Restructuring Is
Under Way, But Technical Challenges And Risks Remain"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations:
General Comments: The report recognizes the positive effects of the
restructured management for the program and also recognizes the
significant work ahead on the program. The draft GAO findings are
technically and programmatically consistent with the current NPOESS
program.
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
ensure that the responsible executives approve key acquisition
documents, including the memorandum of agreement among the three
agencies (Departments of Defense, Commerce, and Administration of the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration), the system engineering
plan, the test and evaluation master plan, and the acquisition strategy
to ensure that there are no gaps in the continuity of critical weather
and environmental observations. (p. 48/GAO Draft Report):
DOD Response: The DoD agrees with this recommendation to get key
acquisition documents complete as quickly as possible, however, based
on inputs from NOAA and NASA, the DoD is proposing that due dates for
the documents listed be changed to 2 July 2007. The three agencies have
been working closely to review, coordinate and approve the documents.
The primary driver for the delays is the extensive DoD coordination
required for the Tri-agency Memorandum of Agreement.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Air Force to delay reassigning the recently appointed
Program Executive Officer until all sensors have been delivered to the
National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
(NPOESS) Preparatory Program. (p. 48/GAO Draft Report):
DOD Response: The DoD non-concurs with this recommendation. The NPOESS
System Program Director (SPD) is responsible for NPOESS Preparatory
Project sensor deliveries. The SPD is currently on a four year
assignment that encompasses the desired period.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration:
National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
Office of the Administrator:
Washington, DC 20546-0001:
March 30, 2007:
Mr. David A. Powner:
Director, Information Technology Management Issues:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Powner:
NASA appreciates the opportunity to comment on your draft Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report, GAO-07-498, entitled "Polar-
orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites, Restructuring is Under
Way, but Technical Challenges and Risks Remain" which pertains to the
National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System.
In the draft report, GAO recommends that the Secretaries of Defense and
Commerce and the NASA Administrator take the following action.
Recommendation: Ensure that the responsible executives within their
respective organizations approve key acquisition documents, including
the memorandum of agreement among the three agencies, the system
engineering plan, the test and evaluation master plan, and the
acquisition strategy, as quickly as possible but no later than April
30, 2007.
Response: NASA concurs with this recommendation. The draft report noted
that the delay in signing these key acquisition documents was due to
the complexities of coordinating the documents among the three
agencies. These documents are now in final review prior to coordination
for signature by the Administrator.
Thank you for the opportunity to review this draft report. If you have
any questions or require additional information, please contact Andrew
Carson at (202) 358-1702.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Shana Dale:
Deputy Administrator:
[End of section]
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
David A. Powner, (202) 512-9286, or pownerd@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Colleen Phillips, Assistant
Director; Carol Cha; Neil Doherty; Nancy Glover; Kathleen S. Lovett;
Karen Richey; and Teresa Smith made key contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Cost
Increases Trigger Review and Place Program's Direction on Hold, GAO-06-
573T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2006); GAO, Polar-orbiting Operational
Environmental Satellites: Technical Problems, Cost Increases, and
Schedule Delays Trigger Need for Difficult Trade-off Decisions, GAO-06-
249T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 2005); GAO, Polar- orbiting
Environmental Satellites: Information on Program Cost and Schedule
Changes, GAO-04-1054 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2004); GAO, Polar-
orbiting Environmental Satellites: Project Risks Could Affect Weather
Data Needed by Civilian and Military Users, GAO-03-987T (Washington,
D.C.: July 15, 2003); and GAO, Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites:
Status, Plans, and Future Data Management Challenges, GAO-02-684T
(Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2002).
[2] Three DMSP satellites and one POES satellite remain to be launched.
[3] Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-2, May 5, 1994.
[4] GAO-03-987T.
[5] GAO-04-1054.
[6] GAO-06-249T.
[7] GAO-06-573T.
[8] 10 U.S.C. § 2433 is commonly referred to as Nunn-McCurdy.
[9] 10 U.S.C. § 2433 (e)(2) has recently been amended by Pub. L. No.
109-163, § 802 (Jan. 6, 2006) and Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 213 (a) (Oct.
17, 2006).
[10] The European Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological
Satellite's MetOp program is a series of three polar-orbiting
satellites dedicated to operational meteorology. MetOp satellites are
planned to be launched sequentially over 14 years.
[11] According to program officials, although the Nunn-McCurdy
certification decision specifies NPP is to launch by January 2010, NASA
plans to launch it by September 2009 to reduce the possibility of a
climate data continuity gap.
[12] The NPOESS program office selected key milestones from a much
larger set of ongoing and planned milestones in order to track
progress.
[13] GAO-06-249T; U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of the Inspector
General, Poor Management Oversight and Ineffective Incentives Leave
NPOESS Program Well Over Budget and Behind Schedule, OIG-17794-6-0001/
2006 (Washington, D.C.: May 2006). In addition, two independent teams
reviewed the NPOESS program in 2005: A NASA-led Independent Review Team
investigated problems with the VIIRS sensor and the impact on NPP, and
a DOD-led Independent Program Assessment Team assessed the broader
NPOESS program. The teams briefed the NPOESS Executive Committee on
their findings in August 2005 and November 2005, respectively.
[14] GAO-06-249T.
[15] GAO, Space Acquisitions: Improvements Needed in Space Acquisitions
and Keys to Achieving Them, GAO-06-626T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6,
2006).
[16] The acquisition portion of the program includes satellite
development, production, and launch. It does not include operations and
support costs after launch.
[17] The cost analysis group determined that there was a 90 percent
confidence level that there would be no weather coverage gap.
[18] A 50 percent level of confidence indicates that NPOESS has a 50
percent chance that the restructured program (as defined in the Nunn-
McCurdy certification decision) will be delivered as planned at the
acquisition cost of $11.5 billion.
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