Environmental Satellite Acquisitions
Progress and Challenges Gao ID: GAO-07-1099T July 11, 2007Environmental satellites provide data and imagery that are used by weather forecasters, climatologists, and the military to map and monitor changes in weather (including severe weather such as hurricanes), climate, the oceans, and the environment. Two current acquisitions are the $12.5 billion National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program--which is to replace two existing polar-orbiting environmental satellite systems--and the planned $7 billion Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites-R (GOES-R) program, which is to replace the current series of satellites due to reach end of their useful lives in approximately 2012. GAO was asked to summarize its past work on the progress and challenges facing these key environmental satellite acquisitions.
Both the NPOESS and GOES-R satellite acquisitions are costly, technically complex, and critically important to weather forecasting and climate monitoring. NPOESS was originally estimated to cost about $6.5 billion over the 24-year life of the program, with its first satellite launch planned for April 2009. Over the last few years, NPOESS experienced escalating costs, schedule delays, and technical difficulties. These factors led to a June 2006 decision to restructure the program thereby decreasing the program's complexity by reducing the number of sensors and satellites, increasing its estimated cost to $12.5 billion, and delaying the launches of the first two satellites to 2013 and 2016. Since that time, the program office has made progress in restructuring the satellite acquisition and establishing an effective management structure; however, important tasks remain to be done and significant risks remain. The GOES-R acquisition, originally estimated to cost $6.2 billion and scheduled to have the first satellite ready for launch in 2012, is at a much earlier stage in its life cycle than NPOESS. In September 2006, GAO reported that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) had issued contracts for the preliminary design of the overall GOES-R system to three vendors and expected to award a contract to one of these vendors in August 2007 to develop the satellites. However, analyses of GOES-R cost--which in May 2006 was estimated to reach $11.4 billion--led the agency, in September 2006, to reduce the program's scope from four to two satellites and to discontinue one of the critical sensors. Program officials now report that they are reevaluating that decision and may further revise the scope and requirements of the program in coming months. GAO also reported that NOAA had taken steps to implement lessons learned from past satellite programs, but more remained to be done to ensure sound cost estimates and adequate system engineering capabilities. GAO currently has work under way to evaluate GOES-R risks and challenges.
GAO-07-1099T, Environmental Satellite Acquisitions: Progress and Challenges
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GAO:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Report to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation:
For release on delivery expected at:
10 a.m. EDT, Wednesday, July 11, 2007:
Environmental Satellite Acquisitions:
Progress and Challenges:
GAO-07-1099T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-1099T, a testimony before the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Why GAO Did This Study:
Environmental satellites provide data and imagery that are used by
weather forecasters, climatologists, and the military to map and
monitor changes in weather (including severe weather such as
hurricanes), climate, the oceans, and the environment. Two current
acquisitions are the $12.5 billion National Polar-orbiting Operational
Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program”which is to replace two
existing polar-orbiting environmental satellite systems”and the planned
$7 billion Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites-R (GOES-
R) program, which is to replace the current series of satellites due to
reach end of their useful lives in approximately 2012. GAO was asked to
summarize its past work on the progress and challenges facing these key
environmental satellite acquisitions.
What GAO Found:
Both the NPOESS and GOES-R satellite acquisitions are costly,
technically complex, and critically important to weather forecasting
and climate monitoring. NPOESS was originally estimated to cost about
$6.5 billion over the 24-year life of the program, with its first
satellite launch planned for April 2009. Over the last few years,
NPOESS experienced escalating costs, schedule delays, and technical
difficulties. These factors led to a June 2006 decision to restructure
the program thereby decreasing the program‘s complexity by reducing the
number of sensors and satellites, increasing its estimated cost to
$12.5 billion, and delaying the launches of the first two satellites to
2013 and 2016 (see table below). Since that time, the program office
has made progress in restructuring the satellite acquisition and
establishing an effective management structure; however, important
tasks remain to be done and significant risks remain.
The GOES-R acquisition, originally estimated to cost $6.2 billion and
scheduled to have the first satellite ready for launch in 2012, is at a
much earlier stage in its life cycle than NPOESS. In September 2006,
GAO reported that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) had issued contracts for the preliminary design of the overall
GOES-R system to three vendors and expected to award a contract to one
of these vendors in August 2007 to develop the satellites. However,
analyses of GOES-R cost”which in May 2006 was estimated to reach $11.4
billion”led the agency, in September 2006, to reduce the program‘s
scope from four to two satellites and to discontinue one of the
critical sensors. Program officials now report that they are
reevaluating that decision and may further revise the scope and
requirements of the program in coming months. GAO also reported that
NOAA had taken steps to implement lessons learned from past satellite
programs, but more remained to be done to ensure sound cost estimates
and adequate system engineering capabilities. GAO currently has work
under way to evaluate GOES-R risks and challenges.
Table: Summary of Changes to NPOESS Program:
Key area: Life cycle range;
Program before restructuring: 1995-2020;
Program after restructuring: 1995-2026.
Key area: Estimated life cycle cost;
Program before restructuring: $8.4 billion;
Program after restructuring: $12.5 billion.
Key area: Launch schedule;
Program before restructuring: First satellite by November 2009, Second
satellite by June 2011;
Program after restructuring: First satellite by January 2013, Second
satellite by January 2016.
Key area: Number of satellites;
Program before restructuring: 6 (in addition to NPP);
Program after restructuring: 4 (in addition to NPP).
Key area: Number of orbits;
Program before restructuring: 3(early morning, midmorning, and
afternoon);
Program after restructuring: 2 (early morning and afternoon; will rely
on European satellites for midmorning orbit data).
Key area: Number and complement of instruments;
Program before restructuring: 13 instruments (10 sensors and 3
subsystems);
Program after restructuring: 9 instruments (7 sensors and 2
subsystems); 4 of the sensors are to provide fewer capabilities.
Key area: Number of data records;
Program before restructuring: 55;
Program after restructuring: 39 (6 are to be degraded products).
Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS program office data.
[End of table]
What GAO Recommends:
In April 2007, GAO made recommendations to the NPOESS program to
complete important tasks and mitigate significant risks to the program.
In September 2006, GAO made recommendations to the GOES-R program to
improve its management capabilities. Implementation of these
recommendations should reduce risks for these critical acquisitions.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1099T].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact David A. Powner at (202)
512-9286 or pownerd@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
We appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to
discuss our work on two major operational environmental satellite
programs: the $12.5 billion National Polar-orbiting Operational
Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program and the planned $7
billion Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites-R (GOES-R)
program.
Operational environmental satellites provide data and imagery that are
used by weather forecasters, climatologists, and the military to map
and monitor changes in weather, climate, the oceans, and the
environment. NPOESS--a tri-agency program managed by the Department of
Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the
Department of Defense/US Air Force, and the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA)--is expected to be a state-of-the-art,
environment monitoring satellite system that will replace two existing
polar-orbiting environmental satellite systems. The GOES-R series,
managed by NOAA with assistance from NASA, is to replace the current
series of satellites which will likely begin to reach the end of their
useful lives in approximately 2012. This new series is expected to mark
the first major technological advance in GOES instrumentation since
1994. The NPOESS and GOES-R programs are considered critical to the
United States' ability to maintain the continuity of data required for
weather forecasting (including severe weather events such as
hurricanes) and global climate monitoring through the years 2026 and
2028 respectively.
At your request, we are summarizing the results of our previous work on
operational environmental satellite programs, including NPOESS and the
GOES-R program.[Footnote 1] In preparing this testimony, we relied on
the work supporting our prior reports. Those reports contain detailed
overviews of our scope and methodology. All of the work on which this
testimony is based was performed in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
NOAA is involved in two major satellite acquisition programs, NPOESS
and GOES-R, and both are costly, technically complex, and critically
important to weather forecasting and climate monitoring. NPOESS was
originally estimated to cost about $6.5 billion over the 24-year life
of the program, with its first satellite launch planned for April 2009.
Over the last few years, NPOESS experienced escalating costs, schedule
delays, and technical difficulties. These factors led to a June 2006
decision to restructure the program thereby decreasing the program's
complexity by reducing the number of sensors and satellites, increasing
its estimated cost to $12.5 billion, and delaying the launches of the
first two satellites to 2013 and 2016, respectively. Since that time,
the program office has made progress in restructuring the satellite
acquisition and establishing an effective management structure;
however, important tasks remain to be done and significant risks
remain. Specifically, key acquisition documents that were originally
due in September 2006 are still not completed, the program office is
not yet fully staffed, and the early July turnover of the program
executive officer increases the program's risk. Additionally, technical
risks remain in the development of key system sensors and the ground-
based data processing system. In April 2007, we made recommendations to
complete key acquisition documents, increase staffing at the program
office, and delay reassignment of the program executive. Implementation
of these recommendations should reduce risk on this critical
acquisition.
The GOES-R acquisition, originally estimated to cost $6.2 billion and
scheduled to have the first satellite ready for launch in 2012, is at a
much earlier stage in its life cycle than NPOESS. In September 2006, we
reported that NOAA had issued contracts for the preliminary design of
the overall GOES-R system to three vendors and expected to award a
contract to one of these vendors in August 2007 to develop the
satellites. However, analyses of GOES-R cost--which in May 2006 was
estimated to reach $11.4 billion--led the agency, in September 2006, to
reduce the program's scope from four to two satellites and to
discontinue one of the critical sensors. Program officials now report
that they are reevaluating that decision and may further revise the
scope and requirements of the program in coming months. We also
reported that NOAA had taken steps to implement lessons learned from
past satellite programs, but more remained to be done to ensure sound
cost estimates and adequate system engineering capabilities. We made
recommendations to the program to improve its capabilities for managing
this program and agency officials agreed with these recommendations and
initiated efforts to implement them. We currently have work under way
to evaluate GOES-R risks and challenges.
Background:
Since the 1960s, geostationary and polar-orbiting operational
environmental satellites have been used by the United States to provide
meteorological data for weather observation, research, and forecasting.
NOAA's National Environmental Satellite Data and Information Service
(NESDIS) is responsible for managing the existing civilian
geostationary and polar-orbiting satellite systems as two separate
programs, called the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
and the Polar Operational Environmental Satellites (POES),
respectively. The Air Force is responsible for operating a second polar-
orbiting environmental satellite system--the Defense Meteorological
Satellite Program (DMSP).
Polar-orbiting environmental satellites obtain environmental data that
are processed to provide graphical weather images and specialized
weather products. These satellite data are also the predominant input
to numerical weather prediction models, which are a primary tool for
forecasting weather 3 or more days in advance--including forecasting
the path and intensity of hurricanes. The weather products and models
are used to predict the potential impact of severe weather so that
communities and emergency managers can help prevent and mitigate their
effects. Polar satellites also provide data used to monitor
environmental phenomena, such as ozone depletion and drought
conditions, as well as data sets that are used by researchers for a
variety of studies such as climate monitoring. Figure 1 illustrates the
current operational polar satellite configuration consisting of two
POES and two DMSP satellites.
Figure 1: Configuration of Operational Polar Satellites:
[See PDF for image]
Source; GAO, based on NPOESS Integrated Program Office data.
[End of figure]
Unlike polar-orbiting satellites, which constantly circle the earth in
a relatively low polar orbit, geostationary satellites can maintain a
constant view of the earth from a high orbit of about 22,300 miles in
space. NOAA operates GOES as a two-satellite system that is primarily
focused on the United States (see fig. 2). These satellites are
uniquely positioned to provide timely environmental data to
meteorologists and their audiences on the earth's atmosphere, its
surface, cloud cover, and the space environment. They also observe the
development of hazardous weather, such as hurricanes and severe
thunderstorms, and track their movement and intensity to reduce or
avoid major losses of property and life. Furthermore, the satellites'
ability to provide broad, continuously updated coverage of atmospheric
conditions over land and oceans is important to NOAA's weather
forecasting operations.
Figure 2: Approximate GOES Geographic Coverage:
[See PDF for image]
Sources: NOAA (data), MapArt (map).
[End of figure]
Satellite Acquisition Programs Often Experience Technical Problems,
Cost Overruns, and Schedule Delays:
Satellite acquisition programs are often technically complex and risky
undertakings, and as a result, they often experience technical
problems, cost overruns, and schedule delays. We and others have
reported on a historical pattern of repeated missteps in the
procurement of major satellite systems, including NPOESS, the GOES I-M
series, the Air Force's Space Based Infrared System High Program (SBIRS-
High), and the Air Force's Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite
System (AEHF).[Footnote 2] Table 1 lists key problems experienced with
these programs. While each of the programs faced multiple problems, all
of them experienced insufficient maturity of technologies, overly
aggressive schedules, insufficient subcontract management, and
inadequate system engineering capabilities for overseeing contractors.
Table 1: Key Problems Experienced on Selected Major Space Systems:
Insufficient technical readiness prior to critical decision points.
Problem: Inadequate preliminary studies prior to the decision to award
a development contract;
NPOESS: X;
GOES I-M: X;
SBIRS-High: X;
AEHF: [Empty].
Problem: Insufficient technical maturity prior to the decision to move
to production;
NPOESS: X;
GOES I-M: X;
SBIRS-High: X;
AEHF: X.
Unrealistic cost and schedule estimates.
Optimistic assumptions including:
Problem: savings from heritage systems;
NPOESS: X;
GOES I-M: X;
SBIRS- High: X;
AEHF: [Empty].
Problem: readiness of technology maturity;
NPOESS: X;
GOES I-M: X;
SBIRS-High: X;
AEHF: X.
Problem: constant and available industrial base;
NPOESS: [Empty];
GOES I-M: [Empty];
SBIRS-High: X;
AEHF: [Empty].
Problem: no weight growth;
NPOESS: X;
GOES I-M: [Empty];
SBIRS-High: X;
AEHF: X.
Problem: no requirements growth;
NPOESS: [Empty];
GOES I-M: [Empty];
SBIRS-High: [Empty];
AEHF: X.
Problem: savings from lot buys versus single-unit purchase;
NPOESS: [Empty];
GOES I-M: [Empty];
SBIRS-High: X;
AEHF: [Empty].
Problem: overly aggressive schedule;
NPOESS: X;
GOES I-M: X;
SBIRS- High: X;
AEHF: X.
Poor program and contractor management.
Problem: Quality and subcontractor issues;
NPOESS: X;
GOES I-M: X;
SBIRS-High: X;
AEHF: X.
Problem: Inadequate systems engineering capabilities;
NPOESS: X;
GOES I-M: X;
SBIRS-High: X;
AEHF: X.
Problem: Inadequate earned value management capabilities;
NPOESS: X;
GOES I-M: [Empty];
SBIRS-High: X;
AEHF: X.
Problem: Insufficient management reserve;
NPOESS: X;
GOES I-M: [Empty];
SBIRS-High: [Empty];
AEHF: X.
Problem: Ineffective contract award fee structure;
NPOESS: X;
GOES I-M: X;
SBIRS-High: X;
AEHF: [Empty].
Poor senior executive level oversight.
Problem: Infrequent meetings;
NPOESS: X;
GOES I-M: [Empty];
SBIRS-High: [Empty];
AEHF: [Empty].
Problem: Inability to make timely decisions;
NPOESS: X;
GOES I-M: [Empty];
SBIRS-High: [Empty];
AEHF: [Empty].
Problem: Other;
NPOESS: [Empty];
GOES I-M: [Empty];
SBIRS-High: [Empty];
AEHF: [Empty].
Problem: Unstable funding stream;
NPOESS: X;
GOES I-M: [Empty];
SBIRS- High: X;
AEHF: X.
Problem: Unstable requirements;
NPOESS: [Empty];
GOES I-M: [Empty];
SBIRS-High: X;
AEHF: X.
Source: GAO analysis of NOAA and DOD data.
[End of table]
NPOESS: Overview, Issues, and Prior GAO Recommendations:
With the expectation that combining the POES and DMSP programs would
reduce duplication and result in sizable cost savings, a May 1994
Presidential Decision Directive required NOAA and DOD to converge the
two satellite programs into a single satellite program capable of
satisfying both civilian and military requirements.[Footnote 3] The
converged program, NPOESS, is considered critical to the United States'
ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather
forecasting and global climate monitoring through the year 2026. To
manage this program, DOD, NOAA, and NASA formed a tri-agency Integrated
Program Office, located within NOAA.
Within the program office, each agency has the lead on certain
activities: NOAA has overall program management responsibility for the
converged system and for satellite operations; DOD has the lead on the
acquisition; and NASA has primary responsibility for facilitating the
development and incorporation of new technologies into the converged
system. NOAA and DOD share the costs of funding NPOESS, while NASA
funds specific technology projects and studies. The NPOESS program
office is overseen by an Executive Committee, which is made up of the
Administrators of NOAA and NASA and the Under Secretary of the Air
Force.
NPOESS is a major system acquisition that was originally estimated to
cost about $6.5 billion over the 24-year life of the program from its
inception in 1995 through 2018. The program was to provide satellite
development, satellite launch and operation, and ground-based satellite
data processing. When the NPOESS engineering, manufacturing, and
development contract was awarded in August 2002, the estimated cost was
$7 billion. Acquisition plans called for the procurement and launch of
six satellites over the life of the program, as well as the integration
of 13 instruments--consisting of 10 environmental sensors and 3
subsystems (see table 2).
Table 2: Expected NPOESS Instruments as of August 31, 2004 (critical
sensors are in bold):
Instrument: Advanced technology microwave sounder (ATMS);
Description: Measures microwave energy released and scattered by the
atmosphere and is to be used with infrared sounding data from NPOESS's
cross-track infrared sounder to produce daily global atmospheric
temperature, humidity, and pressure profiles.
Instrument: Aerosol polarimetry sensor;
Description: Retrieves specific measurements of clouds and aerosols
(liquid droplets or solid particles suspended in the atmosphere, such
as sea spray, smog, and smoke).
Instrument: Conical-scanned microwave imager/sounder (CMIS);
Description: Collects microwave images and data needed to measure rain
rate, ocean surface wind speed and direction, amount of water in the
clouds, and soil moisture, as well as temperature and humidity at
different atmospheric levels.
Instrument: Cross-track infrared sounder (CrIS);
Description: Collects measurements of the earth's radiation to
determine the vertical distribution of temperature, moisture, and
pressure in the atmosphere.
Instrument: Data collection system;
Description: Collects environmental data from platforms around the
world and delivers them to users worldwide.
Instrument: Earth radiation budget sensor;
Description: Measures solar short-wave radiation and long-wave
radiation released by the earth back into space on a worldwide scale to
enhance long-term climate studies.
Instrument: Ozone mapper/profiler suite (OMPS);
Description: Collects data needed to measure the amount and
distribution of ozone in the earth's atmosphere.
Instrument: Radar altimeter;
Description: Measures variances in sea surface height/topography and
ocean surface roughness, which are used to determine sea surface
height, significant wave height, and ocean surface wind speed and to
provide critical inputs to ocean forecasting and climate prediction
models.
Instrument: Search and rescue satellite aided tracking system;
Description: Detects and locates aviators, mariners, and land-based
users in distress.
Instrument: Space environmental sensor suite;
Description: Collects data to identify, reduce, and predict the effects
of space weather on technological systems, including satellites and
radio links.
Instrument: Survivability sensor;
Description: Monitors for attacks on the satellite and notifies other
instruments in case of an attack.
Instrument: Total solar irradiance sensor;
Description: Monitors and captures total and spectral solar irradiance
data.
Instrument: Visible/infrared imager radiometer suite (VIIRS);
Description: Collects images and radiometric data used to provide
information on the earth's clouds, atmosphere, ocean, and land
surfaces.
Source: GAO, based on NPOESS program office data.
[End of table]
In addition, a demonstration satellite (called the NPOESS Preparatory
Project or NPP) was planned to be launched several years before the
first NPOESS satellite in order to reduce the risk associated with
launching new sensor technologies and to ensure continuity of climate
data with NASA's Earth Observing System satellites.
NPOESS Experienced Cost Increases, Schedule Delays, and Technical
Problems over Several Years:
Over the last few years, NPOESS experienced continued cost increases
and schedule delays, requiring difficult decisions to be made about the
program's direction and capabilities. In 2003, we reported that changes
in the NPOESS funding stream led the program to develop a new program
cost and schedule baseline.[Footnote 4] After this new baseline was
completed in 2004, we reported that the program office increased the
NPOESS cost estimate from about $7 billion to $8.1 billion, delaying
key milestones, including the launch of the first satellite, and
extending the life of the program until 2020.[Footnote 5] In mid-
November 2005, we reported that NPOESS continued to experience problems
in the development of a key sensor, resulting in schedule delays and
anticipated cost increases. This was due in part, to problems at
multiple levels of management--including subcontractor, contractor,
program office, and executive leadership. Recognizing that the budget
for the program was no longer executable, the NPOESS Executive
Committee planned to make a decision in December 2005 on the future
direction of the program--what would be delivered, at what cost, and by
when. This involved deciding among options involving increased costs,
delayed schedules, and reduced functionality. We noted that continued
oversight, strong leadership, and timely decision making were more
critical than ever, and we urged the committee to make a decision
quickly so that the program could proceed.
However, we subsequently reported that, in late November 2005, NPOESS
cost growth exceeded a legislatively mandated threshold that requires
DOD to certify the program to Congress.[Footnote 6] This placed any
decision about the future direction of the program on hold until the
certification took place in June 2006. In the meantime, the program
office implemented an interim program plan for fiscal year 2006 to
continue work on key sensors and other program elements using fiscal
year 2006 funding.
Nunn-McCurdy Process Led to a Decision to Restructure the NPOESS
Program:
The Nunn-McCurdy law requires DOD to take specific actions when a major
defense acquisition program exceeds certain cost increase
thresholds.[Footnote 7] The law requires the Secretary of Defense to
notify Congress when a major defense acquisition is expected to overrun
its project baseline by 15 percent or more and to certify the program
to Congress when it is expected to overrun its baseline by 25 percent
or more.[Footnote 8] In late November 2005, NPOESS exceeded the 25
percent threshold, and DOD was required to certify the program.
Certifying the program entailed providing a determination that (1) the
program is essential to national security, (2) there are no
alternatives to the program that will provide equal or greater military
capability at less cost, (3) the new estimates of the program's cost
are reasonable, and (4) the management structure for the program is
adequate to manage and control costs. DOD established tri-agency teams-
-made up of DOD, NOAA, and NASA experts--to work on each of the four
elements of the certification process.
In June 2006, DOD (with the agreement of both of its partner agencies)
certified a restructured NPOESS program, estimated to cost $12.5
billion through 2026.[Footnote 9] This decision approved a cost
increase of $4 billion over the prior approved baseline cost and
delayed the launch of NPP and the first two satellites by roughly 3 to
5 years. The new program also entailed establishing a stronger program
management structure, reducing the number of satellites to be produced
and launched from 6 to 4, and reducing the number of instruments on the
satellites from 13 to 9--consisting of 7 environmental sensors and 2
subsystems. It also entailed using NPOESS satellites in the early
morning and afternoon orbits and relying on European satellites for
midmorning orbit data.[Footnote 10] Table 3 summarizes the major
program changes made under the Nunn-McCurdy certification decision.
Table 3: Summary of Changes to the NPOESS Program:
Key area: Life cycle range;
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 1995-2020;
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 1995-2026.
Key area: Estimated life cycle cost;
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: $8.4 billion;
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: $12.5 billion.
Key area: Launch schedule;
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: NPP by October 2006; First
NPOESS by November 2009; Second NPOESS by June 2011;
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: NPP by January 2010; First
NPOESS by January 2013; Second NPOESS by January 2016.
Key area: Management structure;
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: System Program Director
reports to a tri-agency steering committee and the tri-agency Executive
Committee; Independent program reviews noted insufficient system
engineering and cost analysis staff;
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: System Program Director is
responsible for day-to-day program management and reports to the
Program Executive Officer; Program Executive Officer oversees program
and reports to the tri-agency Executive Committee.
Key area: Number of satellites;
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 6 (in addition to NPP);
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 4 (in addition to NPP).
Key area: Number of orbits;
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 3 (early morning, midmorning,
and afternoon);
Program after the Nunn- McCurdy decision: 2 (early morning and
afternoon; will rely on European satellites for midmorning orbit data).
Key area: Number and complement of instruments;
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 13 instruments (10 sensors
and 3 subsystems);
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 9 instruments (7 sensors and 2
subsystems); 4 of the sensors are to provide fewer capabilities.
Key area: Number of EDRs;
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 55;
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 39 (6 are to be degraded
products).
Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS program office data.
[End of table]
The Nunn-McCurdy certification decision established new milestones for
the delivery of key program elements, including launching NPP by
January 2010,[Footnote 11] launching the first NPOESS satellite (called
C1) by January 2013, and launching the second NPOESS satellite (called
C2) by January 2016. These revised milestones deviated from prior plans
to have the first NPOESS satellite available to back up the final POES
satellite should anything go wrong during that launch.
Delaying the launch of the first NPOESS satellite means that if the
final POES satellite fails on launch, satellite data users would need
to rely on the existing constellation of environmental satellites until
NPP data becomes available--almost 2 years later. Although NPP was not
intended to be an operational asset, NASA agreed to move it to a
different orbit so that its data would be available in the event of a
premature failure of the final POES satellite. However, NPP will not
provide all of the operational capability planned for the NPOESS
spacecraft. If the health of the existing constellation of satellites
diminishes--or if NPP data is not available, timely, and reliable--then
there could be a gap in environmental satellite data.
In order to reduce program complexity, the Nunn-McCurdy certification
decision decreased the number of NPOESS sensors from 13 to 9 and
reduced the functionality of 4 sensors. Specifically, of the 13
original sensors, 5 sensors remain unchanged, 3 were replaced with less
capable sensors, 1 was modified to provide less functionality, and 4
were cancelled. Table 4 shows the changes to NPOESS sensors, including
the 4 identified as critical sensors.
Table 4: Changes to NPOESS Instruments (critical sensors are in bold):
Instrument: ATMS;
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Unchanged;
Change description: Sensor is to be included on NPP and on the first
and third NPOESS satellites.
Instrument: Aerosol polarimetry sensor;
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Cancelled;
Change description: Sensor was cancelled, but could be reintegrated on
future NPOESS satellites should another party choose to fund it.[A].
Instrument: CMIS;
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Replaced;
Change description: CMIS sensor was cancelled, and the program office
is to procure a less complex Microwave imager/sounder for inclusion on
the second, third, and fourth NPOESS satellites.
Instrument: CrIS;
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Unchanged;
Change description: Sensor is to be included on NPP and on the first
and third NPOESS satellites.
Instrument: Data collection system;
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Unchanged;
Change description: Subsystem is to be included on all four NPOESS
satellites.
Instrument: Earth radiation budget sensor;
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Replaced;
Change description: Sensor was cancelled, and is to be replaced on the
first NPOESS satellite (and no others) by an existing sensor with fewer
capabilities called the Clouds and the Earth's Radiant Energy System.
Instrument: OMPS;
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Modified;
Change description: One part of the sensor, called OMPS (nadir), is to
be included on NPP and on the first and third NPOESS satellites; the
remaining part, called OMPS (limb), was cancelled on the NPOESS
satellites, but will be included on NPP[ A].
Instrument: Radar altimeter;
Status of instrument after the Nunn- McCurdy decision: Cancelled;
Change description: Sensor was cancelled, but could be reintegrated on
future NPOESS satellites should another party choose to fund it[.A].
Instrument: Search and rescue satellite aided tracking system;
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Unchanged;
Change description: Subsystem is to be included on all four NPOESS
satellites.
Instrument: Space environmental sensor suite;
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Replaced;
Change description: Sensor is to be replaced by a less capable, less
expensive, legacy sensor called the Space Environment Monitor on the
first and third NPOESS satellites.
Instrument: Survivability sensor;
Status of instrument after the Nunn- McCurdy decision: Cancelled;
Change description: Subsystem contract was cancelled, but could be
reintegrated on future NPOESS satellites should another party choose to
fund it[.A].
Instrument: Total solar irradiance sensor;
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Cancelled;
Change description: Sensor contract was cancelled, but could be
reintegrated on future NPOESS satellites should another party choose to
fund it[.A].
Instrument: VIIRS;
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Unchanged;
Change description: Sensor is to be included on NPP and on all four
NPOESS satellites.
Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS program office data.
[A] Although direct program funding for these instruments was
eliminated, the instruments could be reintegrated on NPOESS satellites
should other parties choose to fund them. The Nunn-McCurdy decision
requires the program office to allow sufficient space on the spacecraft
for these instruments and to provide the funding needed to integrate
them.
[End of table]
The changes in NPOESS sensors affected the number and quality of the
resulting weather and environmental products, called environmental data
records or EDRs. In selecting sensors for the restructured program, the
agencies placed the highest priority on continuing current operational
weather capabilities and a lower priority on obtaining selected
environmental and climate measuring capabilities. As a result, the
revised NPOESS system has significantly less capability for providing
global climate measures than was originally planned. Specifically, the
number of EDRs was decreased from 55 to 39, of which 6 are of a reduced
quality. The 39 EDRs that remain include cloud base height, land
surface temperature, precipitation type and rate, and sea surface
winds. The 16 EDRs that were removed include cloud particle size and
distribution, sea surface height, net solar radiation at the top of the
atmosphere, and products to depict the electric fields in the space
environment. The 6 EDRs that are of a reduced quality include ozone
profile, soil moisture, and multiple products depicting energy in the
space environment.
NPOESS Acquisition Restructuring Is Well Under Way, but Key Steps
Remain To Be Completed:
Since the June 2006 decision to revise the scope, cost, and schedule of
the NPOESS program, the program office has made progress in
restructuring the satellite acquisition; however, important tasks
remain to be done. Restructuring a major acquisition program like
NPOESS is a process that involves identifying time-critical and high-
priority work and keeping this work moving forward, while reassessing
development priorities, interdependencies, deliverables, risks, and
costs. It also involves revising important acquisition documents
including the memorandum of agreement on the roles and responsibilities
of the three agencies, the acquisition strategy, the system engineering
plan, the test and evaluation master plan, the integrated master
schedule defining what needs to happen by when, and the acquisition
program baseline. Specifically, the Nunn-McCurdy certification decision
required the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce and the Administrator
of NASA to sign a revised memorandum of agreement by August 6, 2006. It
also required that the program office, Program Executive Officer, and
the Executive Committee revise and approve key acquisition documents
including the acquisition strategy and system engineering plan by
September 1, 2006, in order to proceed with the restructuring. Once
these are completed, the program office can proceed to negotiate with
its prime contractor on a new program baseline defining what will be
delivered, by when, and at what cost.
The NPOESS program office has made progress in restructuring the
acquisition. Specifically, the program office has established interim
program plans guiding the contractor's work activities in 2006 and 2007
and has made progress in implementing these plans. The program office
and contractor also developed an integrated master schedule for the
remainder of the program--beyond fiscal year 2007. This integrated
master schedule details the steps leading up to launching NPP by
September 2009, launching the first NPOESS satellite in January 2013,
and launching the second NPOESS satellite in January 2016. Near-term
steps include completing and testing the VIIRS, CrIS, and OMPS sensors;
integrating these sensors with the NPP spacecraft and completing
integration testing; completing the data processing system and
integrating it with the command, control, and communications segment;
and performing advanced acceptance testing of the overall system of
systems for NPP.
However, key steps remain for the acquisition restructuring to be
completed. Although the program office made progress in revising key
acquisition documents, including the system engineering plan, the test
and evaluation master plan, and the acquisition strategy plan, it has
not yet obtained the approval of the Secretaries of Commerce and
Defense and the Administrator of NASA on the memorandum of agreement
among the three agencies, nor has it obtained the approval of the
NPOESS Executive Committee on the other key acquisition documents. As
of June 2007, these approvals are over 9 months past due. Agency
officials noted that the September 1, 2006, due date for the key
acquisition documents was not realistic given the complexity of
coordinating documents among three different agencies.
Finalizing these documents is critical to ensuring interagency
agreement and will allow the program office to move forward in
completing other activities related to restructuring the program. These
other activities include completing an integrated baseline review with
the contractor to reach agreement on the schedule and work activities,
and finalizing changes to the NPOESS development and production
contract. Program costs are also likely to be adjusted during upcoming
negotiations on contract changes--an event that the Program Director
expects to occur in July 2007. Completion of these activities will
allow the program office to lock down a new acquisition baseline cost
and schedule. Until key acquisition documents are finalized and
approved, the program faces increased risk that it will not be able to
complete important restructuring activities in time to move forward in
fiscal year 2008 with a new program baseline in place. This places the
NPOESS program at risk of continued delays and future cost increases.
Progress Has Been Made in Establishing an Effective NPOESS Management
Structure, but Executive Turnover Increases Risks and Staffing Problems
Remain:
The NPOESS program has made progress in establishing an effective
management structure, but--almost a year after this structure was
endorsed during the Nunn-McCurdy certification process--the Integrated
Program Office still faces staffing problems. Over the past few years,
we and others have raised concerns about management problems at all
levels of the NPOESS program, including subcontractor and contractor
management, program office management, and executive-level
management.[Footnote 12] Two independent review teams also noted a
shortage of skilled program staff, including budget analysts and system
engineers. Since that time, the NPOESS program has made progress in
establishing an effective management structure--including establishing
a new organizational framework with increased oversight by program
executives, instituting more frequent subcontractor, contractor, and
program reviews, and effectively managing risks and performance.
However, DOD's plans for reassigning the Program Executive Officer in
the summer of 2007 increase the program's risks. Additionally, the
program lacks a staffing process that clearly identifies staffing
needs, gaps, and plans for filling those gaps. As a result, the program
office has experienced delays in getting core management activities
under way and lacks the staff it needs to execute day-to-day management
activities.
NPOESS Program Has Made Progress in Establishing an Effective
Management Structure and Increasing Oversight Activities, but Executive
Turnover Will Increase Program Risks:
The NPOESS program has made progress in establishing an effective
management structure and increasing the frequency and intensity of its
oversight activities. Over the past few years, we and others have
raised concerns about management problems at all levels of management
on the NPOESS program, including subcontractor and contractor
management, program office management, and executive-level management.
In response to recommendations made by two different independent review
teams, the program office began exploring options in late 2005 and
early 2006 for revising its management structure.
In November 2005, the Executive Committee established and filled a
Program Executive Officer position, senior to the NPOESS Program
Director, to streamline decision making and to provide oversight to the
program. This Program Executive Officer reports directly to the
Executive Committee. Subsequently, the Program Executive Officer and
the Program Director proposed a revised organizational framework that
realigned division managers within the Integrated Program Office
responsible for overseeing key elements of the acquisition and
increased staffing in key areas. In June 2006, the Nunn-McCurdy
certification decision approved this new management structure and the
Integrated Program Office implemented it. Figure 3 provides an overview
of the relationships among the Integrated Program Office, the Program
Executive Office, and the Executive Committee, as well as key divisions
within the program office.
Figure 3: Overview of New NPOESS Management Structure:
[See PDF for image]
Source: NOAA.
[End of figure]
Operating under this new management structure, the program office
implemented more rigorous and frequent subcontractor, contractor, and
program reviews, improved visibility into risk management and
mitigation activities, and institutionalized the use of earned value
management techniques to monitor contractor performance. In addition to
these program office activities, the Program Executive Officer
implemented monthly program reviews and increased the frequency of
contacts with the Executive Committee. The Program Executive Officer
briefs the Executive Committee in monthly letters, apprising committee
members of the program's status, progress, risks, and earned value, and
the Executive Committee now meets on a quarterly basis--whereas in the
recent past, we reported that the Executive Committee had met only five
times in 2 years.[Footnote 13]
Although the NPOESS program has made progress in establishing an
effective management structure, this progress is currently at risk. We
recently reported that DOD space acquisitions are at increased risk due
in part to frequent turnover in leadership positions, and we suggested
that addressing this will require DOD to consider matching officials'
tenure with the development or delivery of a product.[Footnote 14] In
March 2007, NPOESS program officials stated that DOD is planning to
reassign the recently appointed Program Executive Officer in the summer
2007 as part of this executive's natural career progression. As of June
2007, the Program Executive Officer has held this position for 19
months. Given that the program is currently still being restructured,
and that there are significant challenges in being able to meet
critical deadlines to ensure satellite data continuity, such a move
adds unnecessary risk to an already risky program.
NPOESS Program Has Filled Key Vacancies but Lacks a Programwide
Staffing Process:
The NPOESS program office has filled key vacancies but lacks a staffing
process that identifies programwide staffing requirements and plans for
filling those needed positions. Sound human capital management calls
for establishing a process or plan for determining staffing
requirements, identifying any gaps in staffing, and planning to fill
critical staffing gaps. Program office staffing is especially important
for NPOESS, given the acknowledgment by multiple independent review
teams that staffing shortfalls contributed to past problems.
Specifically, these review teams noted shortages in the number of
system engineers needed to provide adequate oversight of subcontractor
and contractor engineering activities and in the number of budget and
cost analysts needed to assess contractor cost and earned value
reports. To rectify this situation, the June 2006 certification
decision directed the Program Director to take immediate actions to
fill vacant positions at the program office with the approval of the
Program Executive Officer.
Since the June 2006 decision to revise NPOESS management structure, the
program office has filled multiple critical positions, including a
budget officer, a chief system engineer, an algorithm division chief,
and a contracts director. In addition, on an ad hoc basis, individual
division managers have assessed their needs and initiated plans to hire
staff for key positions. However, the program office lacks a
programwide process for identifying and filling all needed positions.
As a result, division managers often wait months for critical positions
to be filled. For example, in February 2006, the NPOESS program
estimated that it needed to hire up to 10 new budget analysts. As of
September 2006, none of these positions had been filled. As of April
2007, program officials estimated that they still needed to fill 5
budget analyst positions, 5 systems engineering positions, and 10
technical manager positions. The majority of the vacancies--4 of the 5
budget positions, 4 of the 5 systems engineering positions, and 8 of
the 10 technical manager positions--are to be provided by NOAA. NOAA
officials noted that each of these positions is in some stage of being
filled--that is, recruitment packages are being developed or reviewed,
vacancies are being advertised, or candidates are being interviewed,
selected, and approved.
The program office attributes its staffing delays to not having the
right personnel in place to facilitate this process, and it did not
even begin to develop a staffing process until November 2006. Program
officials noted that the tri-agency nature of the program adds unusual
layers of complexity to the hiring and administrative functions because
each agency has its own hiring and performance management rules. In
November 2006, the program office brought in an administrative officer
who took the lead in pulling together the division managers' individual
assessments of needed staff and has been working with the division
managers to refine this list. This new administrative officer plans to
train division managers in how to assess their needs and to hire needed
staff, and to develop a process by which evolving needs are identified
and positions are filled. However, there is as yet no date set for
establishing this basic programwide staffing process. As a result of
the lack of a programwide staffing process, there has been an extended
delay in determining what staff is needed and in bringing those staff
on board; this has resulted in delays in performing core activities,
such as establishing the program office's cost estimate and bringing in
needed contracting expertise. Additionally, until a programwide
staffing process is in place, the program office risks not having the
staff it needs to execute day-to-day management activities.
In commenting on a draft of our report, Commerce stated that NOAA
implemented an accelerated hiring model. More recently, the NPOESS
program office reported that several critical positions were filled in
April and May 2007. However, we have not yet evaluated NOAA's
accelerated hiring model and, as of June 2007, about 10 key positions
remained to be filled.
Major Program Segments Are Under Development, but Significant Risks
Remain:
Major segments of the NPOESS program--the space segment and ground
systems segment--are under development; however, significant problems
have occurred and risks remain. The program office is aware of these
risks and is working to mitigate them, but continued problems could
affect the program's overall cost and schedule. Given the tight time
frames for completing key sensors, integrating them on the NPP
spacecraft, and developing, testing, and deploying the ground-based
data processing systems, it will be important for the NPOESS Integrated
Program Office, the Program Executive Office, and the Executive
Committee to continue to provide close oversight of milestones and
risks.
Space Segment--Progress Made, but Key Sensors Continue to Face Major
Risks:
The space segment includes the sensors and the spacecraft. Four sensors
are of critical importance--VIIRS, CrIS, OMPS, and ATMS--because they
are to be launched on the NPP satellite in September 2009. Initiating
work on another sensor, the Microwave imager/sounder, is also important
because this new sensor--replacing the cancelled CMIS sensor--will need
to be developed in time for the second NPOESS satellite launch. Over
the past year, the program made progress on each of the sensors and the
spacecraft. However, two sensors, VIIRS and CrIS, have experienced
major problems. The status of each of the components of the space
segment is described in table 5.
Table 5: Status of Selected Components of the Space Segment, as of
April 2007:
Space segment component: VIIRS;
Risk level: High;
Status: VIIRS development has continued in 2006 and in early 2007. In
December 2006, the contractor completed environmental tests of VIIRS's
engineering design unit (a prototype) and identified three problems.[A]
While these problems were being studied, the program office approved
the delivery of the engineering unit to the subcontractor responsible
for integration and testing on NPP. In late February 2007, program
officials determined that the contractor was able to mitigate all but
one of the problems, and they approved the flight unit to proceed to
system level integration with a goal of resolving the final problem
before a technical readiness review milestone. VIIRS flight unit is
scheduled to be delivered to NPP by July 2008.
Space segment component: CrIS;
Risk level: High;
Status: Development of CrIS was put on hold in October 2006 when the
flight unit designated to go on NPP experienced a major structural
failure during its vibration testing. As of March 2007, a failure
review board established by the contractors and the NPOESS program
office identified causes for failure and has planned an approach to
completing flight unit development and delivery for NPP. The review
board has also initiated inspections of all sensor modules and
subsystems for damage. The program office expects to restart acceptance
testing in July 2007, and the CrIS flight unit is expected to be
delivered to NPP by February 2008.
Space segment component: OMPS;
Risk level: Moderate;
Status: As part of the Nunn-McCurdy certification in June 2006, one
element of the OMPS sensor, called OMPS (limb), was removed from the
program. In February 2007, program officials agreed to reintegrate OMPS
(limb) on NPP if NOAA and NASA would fund it. This funding was approved
in early April 2007. OMPS is currently on schedule for delivery to NPP
by May 2008; however, there are concerns that the OMPS flight unit
delivery will be so late in the integration testing process that there
could be an insufficient schedule margin should a problem arise.
Space segment component: ATMS;
Risk level: Low;
Status: The ATMS flight unit for NPP was developed by a NASA contractor
and delivered to the program in October 2005. NASA integrated the
flight unit on the spacecraft and is awaiting delivery of the other
sensors in order to complete integration testing.
Space segment component: Microwave imager/ sounder;
Risk level: Not yet rated;
Status: A new microwave imager/sounder sensor is being planned to
replace the cancelled CMIS sensor. It is planned to be ready for the
launch on the second NPOESS satellite. In October 2006, the program
office issued a request for information seeking industry ideas for the
design of the new sensor. The program office anticipates awarding a
contract to develop the sensor by October 2008.
Space segment component: Spacecraft;
Risk level: Low;
Status: The development of the spacecrafts for NPP and NPOESS are on
track. The NPP spacecraft was completed in June 2005. Integration
testing will be conducted once the NPP sensors are delivered; Early
issues with the NPOESS spacecraft (including issues with antennas and a
data storage unit) have been resolved; however, risks remain that could
delay the completion of the spacecraft. A key risk involves delays in
the delivery of the solar array, which may arrive too late to be
included in some key testing. Other risks associated with the
electrical power subsystem are taking longer than anticipated to
resolve.
Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS Integrated Program Office data.
[A] The three problems are (1) band-to-band co-registration, an issue
in which band registration shifts with different temperatures; (2)
cross-talk, which involves information from sensor cells leaking into
other cells; and (3) line-spread function issues, in which the
instrument's focus changes with changes in temperature.
[End of table]
Managing the risks associated with the development of VIIRS and CrIS is
of particular importance because these components are to be
demonstrated on the NPP satellite, currently scheduled for launch in
September 2009. Any delay in the NPP launch date could affect the
overall NPOESS program, because the success of the program depends on
the lessons learned in data processing and system integration from the
NPP satellite. Additionally, continued sensor problems could lead to
higher final program costs.
Ground Segment--Progress Has Been Made, but Work Remains:
Development of the ground segment--which includes the interface data
processing system, the ground stations that are to receive satellite
data, and the ground-based command, control, and communications system-
-is under way and on track. However, important work pertaining to
developing the algorithms that translate satellite data into weather
products within the integrated data processing segment remains to be
completed. Table 6 describes each of the components of the ground
segment and identifies the status of each.
Table 6: Status of Ground Segment Components, as of April 2007:
Ground segment component/description: Interface Data Processing System
(IDPS): A ground-based system that is to process the sensors' data so
that they are usable by the data processing centers and the broader
community of environmental data users. IDPS will be deployed at the
four weather data processing centers;
Risk level: Moderate;
Status: IDPS is being developed in a series of builds. Currently, IDPS
build 1.4 has been delivered for testing and recently passed two key
data transfer tests. Contractors are currently working to develop IDPS
build 1.5, which is expected to be the build that will be used with
NPP. However, work remains in three areas: system latency, algorithm
performance, and calibration and validation planning; Latency--IDPS
must process volumes of data within 65 minutes to meet NPP
requirements. The contractor has made progress in reducing the latency
of the system's data handling from 93 minutes to 73 minutes and is
working to reduce it by 8 minutes more by resolving data management
issues, increasing the number of processors, and increasing algorithm
efficiency; Algorithm performance--IDPS algorithms are the mathematical
functions coded into the system software that transform raw data into
data products, including sensor data records and environmental data
records. IDPS build 1.4 contains provisional algorithms, which are
being refined as the sensors complete various stages of testing.
Because some sensors are delayed, full characterization of those
sensors in order to refine the algorithms has also been delayed and may
not be completed in time for the delivery of IDPS build 1.5 in early
2009. If this occurs, agency officials plan to improve the algorithms
in build 1.5 during a planned maintenance upgrade prior to NPP launch;
Calibration/validation--Calibration/ validation is the process for
tweaking algorithms to provide more accurate observations. The
contractor has documented a detailed schedule for calibration and
validation during IDPS development and is developing a postlaunch task
list to drive prelaunch preparation efforts. However, much work and
uncertainty continue to exist in the calibration and validation area. A
program official noted that, while teams can do a lot of preparation
work, including building the infrastructure to allow sensor testing and
having a good understanding of the satellite, sensors, and available
data for calibration, many issues need to take place after launch.
Ground segment component/description: Ground stations for receiving
satellite data: 15 unmanned ground stations around the world (called
SafetyNet™) are to receive satellite data and send these to the four
data processing centers;
Risk level: Low;
Status: NOAA is working with domestic and foreign authorities to gain
approval to operate ground stations to receive satellite data.
According to agency officials, the full complement of ground stations
will not be in place in time for the C1 launch: however, the ground
stations will be phased in by the launch of C2. To date, the program
office has reached agreement with 4 of 15 ground station sites.
Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS program office data.
[End of table]
Managing the risks associated with the development of the IDPS system
is of particular importance because this system will be needed to
process NPP data.
Implementation of GAO Recommendations Should Reduce Risk:
Because of the importance of effectively managing the NPOESS program to
ensure that there are no gaps in the continuity of critical weather and
environmental observations, in our April 2007 report,[Footnote 15] we
made recommendations to the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce and to
the Administrator of NASA to ensure that the responsible executives
within their respective organizations approve key acquisition
documents, including the memorandum of agreement among the three
agencies, the system engineering plan, the test and evaluation master
plan, and the acquisition strategy, as quickly as possible but no later
than April 30, 2007. We also recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Air Force to delay reassigning the recently appointed
Program Executive Officer until all sensors have been delivered to the
NPOESS Preparatory Program; these deliveries are currently scheduled to
occur by July 2008. We also made two additional recommendations to the
Secretary of Commerce to (1) develop and implement a written process
for identifying and addressing human capital needs and for streamlining
how the program handles the three different agencies' administrative
procedures and (2) establish a plan for immediately filling needed
positions.
In written comments, all three agencies agreed that it was important to
finalize key acquisition documents in a timely manner, and DOD proposed
extending the due dates for the documents to July 2, 2007. DOD
subsequently extended the due dates to September and October 2007 and
March 2008 in the case of the test and evaluation master plan. Because
the NPOESS program office intends to complete contract negotiations in
July 2007, we remain concerned that any further delays in approving the
documents could delay contract negotiations and thus increase the risk
to the program.
In addition, the Department of Commerce agreed with our recommendation
to develop and implement a written process for identifying and
addressing human capital needs and to streamline how the program
handles the three different agencies' administrative procedures. The
department also agreed with our recommendation to plan to immediately
fill open positions at the NPOESS program office. Commerce noted that
NOAA identified the skill sets needed for the program and has
implemented an accelerated hiring model and schedule to fill all NOAA
positions in the NPOESS program. Commerce also noted that NOAA has made
NPOESS hiring a high priority and has documented a strategy--including
milestones--to ensure that all NOAA positions are filled by June 2007.
DOD did not concur with our recommendation to delay reassigning the
Program Executive Officer, noting that the NPOESS System Program
Director responsible for executing the acquisition program would remain
in place for 4 years. The Department of Commerce also noted that the
Program Executive Officer position is planned to rotate between the Air
Force and NOAA. Commerce also stated that a selection would be made
before the departure of the current Program Executive Officer to
provide an overlap period to allow for knowledge transfer and ensure
continuity. However, over the last few years, we and others (including
an independent review team and the Commerce Inspector General) have
reported that ineffective executive-level oversight helped foster the
NPOESS program's cost and schedule overruns. We remain concerned that
reassigning the Program Executive at a time when NPOESS is still facing
critical cost, schedule, and technical challenges will place the
program at further risk.
In addition, while it is important that the System Program Director
remain in place to ensure continuity in executing the acquisition, this
position does not ensure continuity in the functions of the Program
Executive Officer. The current Program Executive Officer is experienced
in providing oversight of the progress, issues, and challenges facing
NPOESS and coordinating with Executive Committee members as well as the
Defense acquisition authorities. Additionally, while the Program
Executive Officer position is planned to rotate between agencies, the
memorandum of agreement documenting this arrangement is still in draft
and should be flexible enough to allow the current Program Executive
Officer to remain until critical risks have been addressed.
Further, while Commerce plans to allow a period of overlap between the
selection of a new Program Executive Officer and the departure of the
current one, time is running out. The current Program Executive Officer
is expected to depart in early July 2007, and as of early July 2007, a
successor has not yet been named. NPOESS is an extremely complex
acquisition, involving three agencies, multiple contractors, and
advanced technologies. There is not sufficient time to transfer
knowledge and develop the sound professional working relationships that
the new Program Executive Officer will need to succeed in that role.
Thus, we remain convinced that given NPOESS current challenges,
reassigning the current Program Executive Officer at this time is not
appropriate.
GOES-R: Overview, Issues, and Prior GAO Recommendations:
To provide continuous satellite coverage, NOAA acquires several
satellites at a time as part of a series and launches new satellites
every few years (see table 7). To date, NOAA has procured three series
of GOES satellites and is planning to acquire a fourth series, called
GOES-R.
Table 7: Summary of the Procurement History of GOES:
Series name: Original GOES[B];
Procurement duration[A]: 1970-1987;
Satellites: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7.
Series name: GOES I-M;
Procurement duration[A]: 1985-2001;
Satellites: 8, 9, 10, 11, 12.
Series name: GOES-N;
Procurement duration[A]: 1998-2011;
Satellites: 13, O, P, Q[C].
Series name: GOES-R;
Procurement duration[A]: 2007-2020;
Satellites: R, S, T, U[D].
Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data.
[A] Duration includes time from contract award to final satellite
launch.
[B] The procurement of these satellites consisted of four separate
contracts for (1) two early prototype satellites and GOES-1, (2) GOES-
2 and -3, (3) GOES-4 through -6, and (4) GOES-G (failed on launch) and
GOES-7.
[C] NOAA decided not to exercise the option for this satellite.
[D] NOAA recently decided to drop satellites T and U from this series,
but is now reconsidering that decision.
[End of table]
Original GOES Satellites:
In 1970, NOAA initiated its original GOES program based on experimental
geostationary satellites developed by NASA. While these satellites
operated effectively for many years, they had technical limitations.
For example, this series of satellites was "spin-stabilized," meaning
that the satellites slowly spun while in orbit to maintain a stable
position with respect to the earth. As a result, the satellite viewed
the earth only about 5 percent of the time and had to collect data very
slowly, capturing one narrow band of data each time its field-of-view
swung past the earth. A complete set of sounding data took 2 to 3 hours
to collect.
GOES I-M Series:
In 1985, NOAA and NASA began to procure a new generation of GOES,
called the GOES I-M series, based on a set of requirements developed by
NOAA's National Weather Service, NESDIS, and NASA, among others. GOES I-
M consisted of five satellites, GOES-8 through GOES-12, and was a
significant improvement in technology from the original GOES
satellites. For example, GOES I-M was "body-stabilized," meaning that
the satellite held a fixed position in orbit relative to the earth,
thereby allowing for continuous meteorological observations. Instead of
maintaining stability by spinning, the satellite would preserve its
fixed position by continuously making small adjustments in the rotation
of internal momentum wheels or by firing small thrusters to compensate
for drift. These and other enhancements meant that the GOES I-M
satellites would be able to collect significantly better quality data
more quickly than the older series of satellites.
GOES-N Series:
In 1998, NOAA began the procurement of satellites to follow GOES I-M,
called the GOES-N series. This series used existing technologies for
the instruments and added system upgrades, including an improved power
subsystem and enhanced satellite pointing accuracy. Furthermore, the
GOES-N satellites were designed to operate longer than its
predecessors. This series originally consisted of four satellites, GOES-
N through GOES-Q. However, the option for the GOES-Q satellite was
cancelled based on NOAA's assessment that it would not need the final
satellite to continue weather coverage. In particular, the agency found
that the GOES satellites already in operation were lasting longer than
expected and that the first satellite in the next series could be
available to back up the last of the GOES-N satellites. As noted
earlier, the first GOES-N series satellite--GOES-13--was launched in
May 2006. The GOES-O and GOES-P satellites are currently in production
and are expected to be launched in July 2008 and July 2011,
respectively.
Planned GOES-R Series:
NOAA is currently planning to procure the next series of GOES
satellites, called the GOES-R series. NOAA is planning for the GOES-R
program to improve on the technology of prior GOES series, both in
terms of system and instrument improvements. The system improvements
are expected to fulfill more demanding user requirements and to provide
more rapid information updates. Table 8 highlights key system-related
improvements that GOES-R is expected to make to the geostationary
satellite program.
Table 8: Summary of Key GOES-R System Improvements:
Key feature: Total products;
GOES-N (current): 41;
GOES-R: ~152.
Key feature: Downlink rate of raw data collected by instruments (from
satellite to ground stations);
GOES-N (current): 2.6 Mbps;
GOES-R: 132 Mbps.
Key feature: Broadcast rate of processed GOES data (from satellite to
users);
GOES-N (current): 2.1 Mbps;
GOES-R: 17-24 Mbps.
Key feature: Raw data storage (the length of time that raw data will be
stored at ground stations);
GOES-N (current): 0 days;
GOES-R: 30 days.
Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data.
[End of table]
The instruments on the GOES-R series are expected to increase the
clarity and precision of the observed environmental data. Originally,
NOAA planned to acquire 5 different instruments. The program office
considered two of the instruments--the Advanced Baseline Imager and the
Hyperspectral Environmental Suite--to be the most critical because they
would provide data for key weather products. Table 9 summarizes the
originally planned instruments and their expected capabilities.
Table 9: Expected GOES-R Series Instruments, as of June 2006:
Planned instrument: Advanced Baseline Imager;
Description: Expected to provide variable area imagery and radiometric
information of the earth's surface, atmosphere, and cloud cover. Key
features include:
* monitoring and tracking severe weather;
* providing images of clouds to support forecasts, and;
* providing higher resolution, faster coverage, and broader coverage
simultaneously.
Planned instrument: Hyperspectral Environmental Suite;
Description: Expected to provide information about the earth's surface
to aid in the prediction of weather and climate monitoring. Key
features include:
* providing atmospheric moisture and temperature profiles to support
forecasts and climate monitoring;
* monitoring coastal regions for ecosystem health, water quality,
coastal erosion, and harmful algal blooms, and;
* providing higher resolution and faster coverage.
Planned instrument: Space Environmental In-Situ Suite;
Description: Expected to provide information on space weather to aid in
the prediction of particle precipitation, which causes disturbance and
disruption of radio communications and navigation systems. Key features
include:
* measuring magnetic fields and charged particles;
* providing improved heavy ion detection, adding low energy electrons
and protons, and;
* enabling early warnings for satellite and power grid operation,
telecom services, astronauts, and airlines.
Planned instrument: Solar Imaging Suite;
Description: Expected to provide coverage of the entire dynamic range
of solar X-ray features, from coronal holes to X-class flares, as well
as estimate the measure of temperature and emissions. Key features
include:
* providing images of the sun and measuring solar output to monitor
solar storms and;
* providing improved imager capability.
Planned instrument: Geostationary Lightning Mapper;
Description: Expected to continuously monitor lightning activity over
the United States and provide a more complete dataset than previously
possible. Key features include:
* detecting lightning strikes as an indicator of severe storms and;
* providing a new capability to GOES that only previously existed on
polar satellites.
Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data.
[End of table]
After our report was issued, NOAA officials told us that the agency
decided to cancel its plans for the development of the Hyperspectral
Environmental Suite, but expected to explore options to ensure the
continuity of data provided by the current GOES series. Additionally,
NOAA reduced the number of satellites in the GOES-R series from four to
two satellites.
The GOES-R Series Procurement Activities Are Under Way, but System
Requirements and Cost Estimates May Change:
NOAA is nearing the end of the preliminary design phase of its GOES-R
system, which was initially estimated to cost $6.2 billion and
scheduled to have the first satellite ready for launch in 2012. At the
time of our most recent review in September 2006,[Footnote 16] NOAA had
issued contracts for the preliminary design of the overall GOES-R
system to three vendors and expected to award a contract to one of
these vendors in August 2007 to develop the satellites. In addition, to
reduce the risks associated with developing new instruments, NOAA
issued contracts for the early development of two instruments and for
the preliminary designs of three other instruments.
However, analyses of the GOES-R program cost--which in May 2006 the
program office estimated could reach $11.4 billion--led the agency to
consider reducing the scope of requirements for the satellite series.
In September 2006, NOAA officials reported that the agency had made a
decision to reduce the scope and complexity of the GOES-R program by
reducing the number of satellites from 4 to 2 and canceling a
technically complex instrument--called the Hyperspectral Environmental
Suite. As of July 2007, agency officials reported that they are
considering further changes to the scope of the program, which are
likely to affect the overall program cost. We have work under way to
evaluate these changes.
Steps Taken to Reduce GOES-R Risk, More Work Remains:
NOAA has taken steps to implement lessons learned from past satellite
programs, but more remains to be done. As outlined previously, key
lessons from these programs include the need to (1) establish realistic
cost and schedule estimates, (2) ensure sufficient technical readiness
of the system's components prior to key decisions, (3) provide
sufficient management at government and contractor levels, and (4)
perform adequate senior executive oversight to ensure mission success.
NOAA established plans to address these lessons by conducting
independent cost estimates, performing preliminary studies of key
technologies, placing resident government offices at key contractor
locations, and establishing a senior executive oversight committee.
However, many steps remain to fully address these lessons.
Specifically, at the time of our review, NOAA had not yet developed a
process to evaluate and reconcile the independent and government cost
estimates. In addition, NOAA had not yet determined how it will ensure
that a sufficient level of technical maturity will be achieved in time
for an upcoming decision milestone, nor had it determined the
appropriate level of resources it needs to adequately track and oversee
the program using earned value management.[Footnote 17] Until it
completes these activities, NOAA faces an increased risk that the GOES-
R program will repeat the increased cost, schedule delays, and
performance shortfalls that have plagued past procurements.
Implementation of GAO Recommendations Should Reduce GOES-R Acquisition
Risk:
To improve NOAA's ability to effectively manage the GOES-R procurement,
in our September 2006 report,[Footnote 18] we made recommendations to
the Secretary of Commerce to direct its NOAA Program Management Council
to establish a process for objectively evaluating and reconciling the
government and independent life cycle cost estimates once the program
requirements are finalized; to establish a team of system engineering
experts to perform a comprehensive review of the Advanced Baseline
Imager instrument to determine the level of technical maturity achieved
on the instrument before moving the instrument into production; and to
seek assistance in determining the appropriate levels of resources
needed at the program office to adequately track and oversee the
contractor's earned value management data. In written comments at that
time, the Department of Commerce agreed with our recommendations and
provided information on its plans to implement our recommendations.
In summary, both the NPOESS and GOES-R programs are critical to
developing weather forecasts, issuing severe weather warnings for
events such as hurricanes, and maintaining continuity in environmental
and climate monitoring. Over the last several years, the NPOESS program
experienced cost, schedule, and technical problems, but has now been
restructured and is making progress. Still, technical and programmatic
risks remain. The GOES-R program has incorporated lessons from other
satellite acquisitions, but still faces challenges in establishing the
management capabilities it needs and in determining the scope of the
program. We have work under way to evaluate the progress and risks of
both NPOESS and GOES-R in order to assist with congressional oversight
of these critical programs.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer
any questions that you or members of the committee may have at this
time.
If you have any questions on matters discussed in this testimony,
please contact me at (202) 512-9286 or by e-mail at pownerd@gao.gov.
Other key contributors to this testimony include Carol Cha, Kathleen S.
Lovett, and Colleen Phillips (Assistant Director).
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites:
Restructuring is Under Way, but Technical Challenges and Risks Remain,
GAO-07-498 (Washington, D.C. April 27, 2007); Polar-orbiting
Operational Environmental Satellites: Restructuring is Under Way, but
Challenges and Risks Remain, GAO-07-910T (Washington, D.C. June 7,
2007); Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: Steps Remain
in Incorporating Lessons Learned from Other Satellite Programs, GAO-06-
993 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006); and Geostationary Operational
Environmental Satellites: Additional Action Needed to Incorporate
Lessons Learned from Other Satellite Programs, GAO-06-1129T
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2006).
[2] GAO-07-498; GAO-06-993; GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Space System
Acquisition Risks and Keys to Addressing Them, GAO-06-776R (Washington,
D.C.: June 1, 2006); Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental
Satellites: Cost Increases Trigger Review and Place Program's Direction
on Hold, GAO-06-573T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2006); Polar-orbiting
Operational Environmental Satellites: Technical Problems, Cost
Increases, and Schedule Delays Trigger Need for Difficult Trade-off
Decisions, GAO-06-249T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 2005); Polar-
orbiting Environmental Satellites: Information on Program Cost and
Schedule Changes, GAO-04-1054 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2004);
Defense Acquisitions: Despite Restructuring, SBIRS High Program Remains
at Risk of Cost and Schedule Overruns, GAO-04-48 (Washington, D.C.:
Oct. 31, 2003); Military Space Operations: Common Problems and Their
Effects on Satellite and Related Acquisitions, GAO-03-825R (Washington,
D.C.: June 2, 2003); Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon
Programs, GAO-03-476 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003); Weather
Satellites: Action Needed to Resolve Status of the U.S. Geostationary
Satellite Program, GAO/NSIAD-91-252 (Washington, D.C.: July 24, 1991).
Defense Science Board/Air Force Scientific Advisory Board Joint Task
Force, Report on the Acquisition of National Security Space Programs
(May 2003).
[3] Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-2 (May 5, 1994).
[4] GAO; Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: Project Risks Could
Affect Weather Data Needed by Civilian and Military Users, GAO-03-987T
(Washington, D.C., July 15, 2003)
[5] GAO-04-1054
[6] GAO, Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Cost
Increases Trigger Review and Place Program's Direction on Hold, GAO-06-
573T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2006).
[7] 10 U.S.C § 2433 is commonly referred to as Nunn-McCurdy.
[8] 10 U.S.C. § 2433 (e)(2).
[9] DOD estimated that the acquisition portion of the certified program
would cost $11.5 billion. The acquisition portion includes satellite
development, production, and launch, but not operations and support
costs after launch. When combined with an estimated $1 billion for
operations and support after launch, this brings the program life cycle
cost to $12.5 billion.
[10] The European Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological
Satellites' MetOp program is a series of three polar-orbiting
satellites dedicated to operational meteorology. MetOp satellites are
planned to be launched sequentially over 14 years.
[11] According to program officials, although the Nunn-McCurdy
certification decision specifies NPP is to launch by January 2010, NASA
plans to launch it by September 2009 to reduce the possibility of a
climate data continuity gap.
[12] GAO-06-249T; U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of the Inspector
General, Poor Management Oversight and Ineffective Incentives Leave
NPOESS Program Well Over Budget and Behind Schedule, OIG-17794-6-0001/
2006 (Washington, D.C.: May 2006). In addition, two independent teams
reviewed the NPOESS program in 2005: A NASA-led Independent Review Team
investigated problems with the VIIRS sensor and the impact on NPP, and
a DOD-led Independent Program Assessment Team assessed the broader
NPOESS program. The teams briefed the NPOESS Executive Committee on
their findings in August 2005 and November 2005, respectively.
[13] GAO-06-249T
[14] GAO, Space Acquisitions: Improvements Needed in Space Acquisitions
and Keys to Achieving Them, GAO-06-626T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6,
2006).
[15] GAO-07-498
[16] GAO-06-993.
[17] Earned value management is a method that compares the value of
work accomplished during a given period with that of the work expected
in that period.
[18] GAO-06-993.
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