Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
Acquisition Is Under Way, but Improvements Needed in Management and Oversight Gao ID: GAO-09-323 April 2, 2009The Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), with the aid of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), plans to procure the next generation of geostationary operational environmental satellites, called the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R series (GOES-R). GOES-R is to replace the current series of satellites, which will likely begin to reach the end of their useful lives in approximately 2014. This series is considered critical to the United States' ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting through the year 2028. GAO was asked to (1) determine the status of the GOES-R program, (2) evaluate whether plans for the acquisition address problems experienced on similar programs, and (3) determine whether NOAA's plan will be adequate to support current data requirements. To do so, GAO analyzed contractor and program data and interviewed officials from NOAA and NASA.
NOAA has made progress on the GOES-R acquisition, but the program's cost, schedule, and scope have changed. The GOES-R program has moved into the development phase of its acquisition life cycle. It has awarded development contracts for the instruments and plans to award contracts for the spacecraft and ground segments by mid-2009. However, after reconciling program and independent cost estimates, the program established a new cost estimate of $7.67 billion--a $670 million increase from the prior $7 billion estimate. The program also reduced the number of products the satellites will produce from 81 to 34 and slowed the delivery of these products in order to reduce costs. More recently, the program also delayed key milestones, including the launch of the first satellite, which was delayed from December 2014 to April 2015. Such delays could lead to gaps in satellite coverage if NOAA experiences problems with its current operational satellites before a backup satellite is in orbit. GOES-R has taken steps to address lessons from other satellite programs, but important actions remain to be completed. NOAA has made progress in its efforts to address prior lessons by taking steps to ensure technical readiness on key components, using an acceptable cost estimating approach, implementing techniques to enhance contractor oversight, and regularly briefing agency executives. However, technical challenges remain on both the ground segment and the instruments. In addition, the program did not perform a comprehensive review after rebaselining a critical instrument, and it has not documented all of the reasons for cost overruns. Until these issues are addressed, NOAA faces an increased risk that the GOES-Rprogram will repeat the same mistakes that have plagued other satellite programs. NOAA has a plan to meet some, but not all, data requirements. An instrument that was originally planned as part of the GOES-R satellite was to meet requirements for 15 products that are currently produced, as well as 11 new, technically advanced, products. When NOAA removed this instrument from the GOES-R satellite program, it arranged to obtain the current products from another instrument. However, the agency has not developed plans or a timeline to address the requirements for the new products. Doing so would include justifying the funding for any new initiatives within the agency's investment decision process. Until a decision is made on whether and how to proceed in providing the advanced products, key system users, such as weather forecasters, will not be able to meet their goals for improving the accuracy of severe weather warnings. Further, climate research organizations will not obtain the data they need to enhance the science of climate, environmental, and oceanic observations.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-323, Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: Acquisition Is Under Way, but Improvements Needed in Management and Oversight
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
April 2009:
Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites:
Acquisition Is Under Way, but Improvements Needed in Management and
Oversight:
GAO-09-323:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-323, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Commerce‘s National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), with the aid of the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA), plans to procure the next generation of
geostationary operational environmental satellites, called the
Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R series (GOES-R).
GOES-R is to replace the current series of satellites, which will
likely begin to reach the end of their useful lives in approximately
2014. This series is considered critical to the United States‘ ability
to maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting
through the year 2028.
GAO was asked to (1) determine the status of the GOES-R program, (2)
evaluate whether plans for the acquisition address problems experienced
on similar programs, and (3) determine whether NOAA‘s plan will be
adequate to support current data requirements. To do so, GAO analyzed
contractor and program data and interviewed officials from NOAA and
NASA.
What GAO Found:
NOAA has made progress on the GOES-R acquisition, but the program‘s
cost, schedule, and scope have changed. The GOES-R program has moved
into the development phase of its acquisition life cycle. It has
awarded development contracts for the instruments and plans to award
contracts for the spacecraft and ground segments by mid-2009. However,
after reconciling program and independent cost estimates, the program
established a new cost estimate of $7.67 billion”a $670 million
increase from the prior $7 billion estimate. The program also reduced
the number of products the satellites will produce from 81 to 34 and
slowed the delivery of these products in order to reduce costs. More
recently, the program also delayed key milestones, including the launch
of the first satellite, which was delayed from December 2014 to April
2015. Such delays could lead to gaps in satellite coverage if NOAA
experiences problems with its current operational satellites before a
backup satellite is in orbit.
GOES-R has taken steps to address lessons from other satellite
programs, but important actions remain to be completed. NOAA has made
progress in its efforts to address prior lessons by taking steps to
ensure technical readiness on key components, using an acceptable cost
estimating approach, implementing techniques to enhance contractor
oversight, and regularly briefing agency executives. However, technical
challenges remain on both the ground segment and the instruments. In
addition, the program did not perform a comprehensive review after
rebaselining a critical instrument, and it has not documented all of
the reasons for cost overruns. Until these issues are addressed, NOAA
faces an increased risk that the GOES-R program will repeat the same
mistakes that have plagued other satellite programs.
NOAA has a plan to meet some, but not all, data requirements. An
instrument that was originally planned as part of the GOES-R satellite
was to meet requirements for 15 products that are currently produced,
as well as 11 new, technically advanced, products. When NOAA removed
this instrument from the GOES-R satellite program, it arranged to
obtain the current products from another instrument. However, the
agency has not developed plans or a timeline to address the
requirements for the new products. Doing so would include justifying
the funding for any new initiatives within the agency‘s investment
decision process. Until a decision is made on whether and how to
proceed in providing the advanced products, key system users, such as
weather forecasters, will not be able to meet their goals for improving
the accuracy of severe weather warnings. Further, climate research
organizations will not obtain the data they need to enhance the science
of climate, environmental, and oceanic observations.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending that the program take steps to improve management
and oversight and determine whether and how to recover certain
capabilities that were removed from the program. In commenting on a
draft of this report, the Acting Secretary of Commerce agreed with GAO‘
s recommendations and stated that the agency plans to implement them.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-323]. For more
information, contact David A. Powner, (202) 512-9286, pownerd@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
GOES-R Is in Development, but Costs Have Increased, Envisioned
Functionality Has Been Reduced, and Schedules Have Been Delayed:
The GOES-R Program Office Has Taken Steps to Address Lessons Learned
from Other Satellite Programs, but Important Actions Remain:
NOAA Plans to Address Requirements for Current Products but Has Not
Developed Plans for Meeting Requirements for Advanced Products:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Commerce:
Appendix III: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Summary of the Procurement History of GOES:
Table 2: Originally Planned GOES-R Series Instruments, as of August
2006:
Table 3: Key Changes to the GOES-R Program, as of September 2006:
Table 4: Description of Instrument Development Contracts, as of
November 2008:
Table 5: Status of GOES-R Instruments, as of February 2009:
Table 6: Recent Delays in Key GOES-R Milestones:
Table 7: Elements of a Sound Cost Estimating Methodology:
Table 8: Summary of the GOES-R Cost Estimation Process:
Table 9: Key Products from the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite
Instrument:
Table 10: Comparison of the Advanced Baseline Imager and the Legacy
Sounder Instrument:
Figures:
Figure 1: Approximate GOES Geographic Coverage:
Figure 2: Generic GOES Data Relay Pattern:
Figure 3: GOES-R Program Office Structure and Staffing:
Figure 4: Planned Schedule for GOES-R Program and Key Instruments:
Abbreviations:
GOES-R: Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R Series:
NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
April 2, 2009:
Congressional Requesters:
Operational geostationary environmental satellites play a critical role
in our nation's weather forecasting. These satellites--which are
managed by the Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)--provide critical information on
atmospheric, oceanic, climatic, and solar conditions that help
meteorologists observe and predict global and local weather events.
They also provide a means to identify severe storm conditions, such as
hurricanes and tornadoes, and to track the movement and intensity of
these storms once they develop.
NOAA, with the aid of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), is procuring the next generation of geostationary satellites,
called the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R (GOES-
R) series. The GOES-R series is to replace the current series of
satellites, which will likely begin to reach the end of their useful
lives in approximately 2014. This new series is expected to mark the
first major technological advance in GOES instrumentation since 1994.
It is also considered critical to the United States' ability to
maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting
through the year 2028.
This report responds to your request that we review NOAA's management
of the GOES-R program. Specifically, we were asked to (1) determine the
status of the program, (2) evaluate whether plans for the GOES-R
acquisition address problems experienced on similar programs, and (3)
determine whether NOAA's plan to address the capabilities that were
planned for the satellites, but then removed, will be adequate to
support current data requirements.
To determine GOES-R acquisition status, we evaluated program documents,
including cost and schedule estimates, contractor performance reports
on instrument development, and executive briefings. To evaluate whether
NOAA's acquisition plans address problems experienced on similar
programs, we identified lessons learned from other major space
acquisitions and compared them with relevant program and contractor
documents, including instrument technical reviews, and risk lists. We
assessed the GOES-R cost estimate by comparing the process used to
develop the estimate with best practices identified in our cost
estimating guide.[Footnote 1] To determine the adequacy of NOAA's plan
to support key data requirements, we compared original and revised data
requirements, determined whether the agency had developed plans for
addressing different types of requirements, and discussed agency plans
and options for addressing the requirements with key data users. For
all objectives, we interviewed the applicable agency and contractor
officials and consulted with GAO subject matter experts.
We performed our work at NOAA and NASA offices in the Washington, D.C.,
metropolitan area. We conducted this performance audit from May 2008 to
April 2009, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I
contains further details on our objectives, scope, and methodology.
Background:
Since the 1960s, geostationary and polar-orbiting environmental
satellites have been used by the United States to provide
meteorological data for weather observation, research, and forecasting.
NOAA's National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service
is responsible for managing the civilian operational geostationary and
polar-orbiting satellite systems as two separate programs, called GOES
and the Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites,
respectively.
Unlike polar-orbiting satellites, which constantly circle the earth in
a relatively low polar orbit, geostationary satellites can maintain a
constant view of the earth from a high orbit of about 22,300 miles in
space. NOAA operates GOES as a two-satellite system that is primarily
focused on the United States (see figure 1). These satellites are
uniquely positioned to provide timely environmental data about the
earth's atmosphere, its surface, cloud cover, and the space environment
to meteorologists and their audiences. They also observe the
development of hazardous weather, such as hurricanes and severe
thunderstorms, and track their movement and intensity to reduce or
avoid major losses of property and life. Furthermore, the satellites'
ability to provide broad, continuously updated coverage of atmospheric
conditions over land and oceans is important to NOAA's weather
forecasting operations.
Figure 1: Approximate GOES Geographic Coverage:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
This illustration depicts the approximate GOES geographic coverage for
GOES-11 and GOES-12.
Sources: NOAA (data); MapArt (map).
[End of figure]
To provide continuous satellite coverage, NOAA acquires several
satellites at a time as part of a series and launches new satellites
every few years (see table 1). NOAA's policy is to have two operational
satellites and one backup satellite in orbit at all times.
Table 1: Summary of the Procurement History of GOES:
Series name: Original GOES[B];
Procurement duration[A]: 1970-1987;
Satellites: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7.
Series name: GOES I-M;
Procurement duration[A]: 1985-2001;
Satellites: 8, 9, 10, 11, 12.
Series name: GOES-N;
Procurement duration[A]: 1998-2010;
Satellites: 13, O, P, Q[C].
Series name: GOES-R;
Procurement duration[A]: 2008-2016;
Satellites: R, S.
Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data.
[A] Duration includes time from contract award to final satellite
launch.
[B] The procurement of these satellites consisted of four separate
contracts for (1) two early prototype satellites and GOES-1, (2) GOES-2
and -3, (3) GOES-4 through -6, and (4) GOES-G (failed on launch) and
GOES-7.
[C] NOAA decided not to exercise the option for this satellite.
[End of table]
Four GOES satellites--GOES-10, GOES-11, GOES-12, and GOES-13-
-are currently in orbit. Both GOES-11 and GOES-12 are operational
satellites, with GOES-12 covering the east and GOES-11 the west. GOES-
13 is currently in an on-orbit storage mode. It is a backup for the
other two satellites should they experience any degradation in service.
GOES-10 is at the end of its service life, but it is being used to
provide limited coverage of South America. The others in the series,
GOES-O and GOES-P, are planned for launch over the next 2 years.
[Footnote 2] NOAA is also planning the next generation of satellites,
known as the GOES-R series, which are planned for launch beginning in
2015.
Each of the operational geostationary satellites continuously transmits
raw environmental data to NOAA ground stations. The data are processed
at these ground stations and transmitted back to the satellite for
broadcast to primary weather services and the global research community
in the United States and abroad. Raw and processed data are also
distributed to users via ground stations through other communication
channels, such as dedicated private communication lines and the
Internet. Figure 2 depicts a generic data relay pattern from the
geostationary satellites to the ground stations and commercial
terminals.
Figure 2: Generic GOES Data Relay Pattern:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
GOES satellite:
Raw environmental data sent to ground station;
Processed environmental data sent back to GOES;
Processed environmental data broadcast from GOES satellite to users;
Communications link between ground station and users.
Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data.
[End of figure]
GOES-R Program: An Overview:
NOAA plans for the GOES-R program to improve on the technology of prior
series, in terms of both system and instrument improvements. The system
improvements are expected to fulfill more demanding user requirements
by updating the satellite data more often and providing satellite
products to users more quickly. The instrument improvements are
expected to significantly increase the clarity and precision of the
observed environmental data. NOAA originally planned to acquire six
different types of instruments. Furthermore, two of these instruments--
the Advanced Baseline Imager and the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite--
were considered to be the most critical because they would provide data
for key weather products. Table 2 summarizes the originally planned
instruments and their expected capabilities.
Table 2: Originally Planned GOES-R Series Instruments, as of August
2006:
Planned instrument: Advanced Baseline Imager;
Description: Expected to provide variable area imagery and radiometric
information about the earth's surface, atmosphere, and cloud cover. Key
features include:
* monitoring and tracking severe weather;
* providing images of clouds to support forecasts; and;
* providing higher resolution, faster coverage, and broader coverage
simultaneously.
Planned instrument: Hyperspectral Environmental Suite[A];
Description: Expected to provide information about the earth's surface
to aid in the prediction of weather and climate monitoring. Key
features include:
* providing atmospheric moisture and temperature profiles to support
forecasts and climate monitoring;
* monitoring coastal regions for ecosystem health, water quality,
coastal erosion, and harmful algal blooms; and;
* providing higher resolution and faster coverage.
Planned instrument: Geostationary Lightning Mapper;
Description: Expected to continuously monitor lightning activity over
the United States and adjacent oceans and to provide a more complete
dataset than previously possible. Key features include:
* detecting lightning strikes as an indicator of severe storms, and;
* providing a new capability to GOES that only previously existed on
NASA research satellites.
Planned instrument: Magnetometer;
Description: Expected to provide information on the general level of
geomagnetic activity, monitor current systems in space, and permit
detection of magnetopause crossings, sudden storm commencements, and
substorms.
Planned instrument: Space Environmental In-Situ Suite;
Description: Expected to provide information on space weather to aid in
the prediction of particle precipitation, which causes disturbance and
disruption of radio communications and navigation systems. Key features
include:
* measuring magnetic fields and charged particles;
* providing improved heavy ion detection, adding low-energy electrons
and protons; and;
* enabling early warnings for satellite and power grid operation,
telecom services, astronauts, and airlines.
Planned instrument: Solar Imaging Suite[B];
Description: Expected to provide coverage of the entire dynamic range
of solar X-ray features, from coronal holes to X-class flares, as well
as estimate the measure of temperature and emissions. Key features
include:
* providing images of the sun and measuring solar output to monitor
solar storms, and;
* providing improved imager capability.
Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data.
[A] The Hyperspectral Environmental Suite was canceled in September
2006.
[B] The Solar Imaging Suite was divided into two separate acquisitions,
the Solar Ultraviolet Imager and the Extreme Ultraviolet and X-Ray
Irradiance Suite.
[End of table]
In September 2006, however, NOAA decided to reduce the scope and
technical complexity of the GOES-R program because of expectations that
total costs, which were originally estimated to be $6.2 billion, could
reach $11.4 billion.[Footnote 3] Specifically, NOAA reduced the minimum
number of satellites from four to two, canceled plans for developing
the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite (which reduced the number of
planned satellite products from 81 to 68), and divided the Solar
Imaging Suite into two separate acquisitions. The agency estimated that
the revised program would cost $7 billion. Table 3 provides a summary
of the timeline and scope of these key changes.
Table 3: Key Changes to the GOES-R Program, as of September 2006:
Number of satellites;
Baseline program, as of August 2006: 4;
2 critical instruments and 4 noncritical instruments or instrument
suites;
Critical instruments:
1. Advanced Baseline Imager;
2. Hyperspectral Environmental Suite;
Noncritical instruments/suites:
3. Geostationary Lightning Mapper;
4. Magnetometer; Space Environmental In-Situ Suite;
5. Solar Imaging Suite (which included the Solar Ultraviolet Imager and
the Extreme Ultraviolet and X-Ray Irradiance Suite);
Revised program, as of September 2006: 2;
1 critical instrument and 5 noncritical instruments or instrument
suites;
Critical instrument:
1. Advanced Baseline Imager;
Noncritical instruments/suites:
2. Geostationary Lightning Mapper;
3. Magnetometer;
4. Space Environmental In-Situ Suite;
5. Solar Ultraviolet Imager (formerly a component of the Solar Imaging
Suite);
6. Extreme Ultraviolet and X-Ray Irradiance Suite (formerly a component
of the Solar Imaging Suite).
Number of satellite products;
Baseline program, as of August 2006: 81;
Revised program, as of September 2006: 68.
Life-cycle cost estimate (in then year dollars);
Baseline program, as of August 2006: $6.2-11.4 billion;
Revised program, as of September 2006: $7 billion.
End of operations and maintenance;
Baseline program, as of August 2006: 2034;
Revised program, as of September 2006: 2028[A].
Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data.
[A] All satellites are expected to have a 15-year life span (5 years in
on-orbit storage plus 10 years in operation).
[End of table]
Acquisition Strategy:
NOAA's acquisition strategy was to award contracts for the preliminary
design of the GOES-R system to several vendors who would subsequently
compete to be the single prime contractor responsible for overall
system development and production. In keeping with this strategy, NOAA
awarded contracts for the preliminary design of the overall GOES-R
system to three vendors in October 2005. However, in March 2007, NOAA
revised its acquisition strategy for the development contract. In
response to recommendations by independent advisors, the agency decided
to separate the overall system development and production contract into
two separate contracts--the spacecraft segment and the ground segment.
In addition, to reduce the risks associated with developing technically
advanced instruments, NASA awarded contracts for the preliminary
designs for five of the planned instruments. NASA subsequently awarded
development contracts for these instruments and, upon completion, plans
to turn them over to the prime contractor responsible for the
spacecraft segment of the GOES-R program. The sixth instrument, the
Magnetometer, is to be developed as part of the spacecraft contract.
Program Office Structure:
NOAA is solely responsible for GOES-R program funding and overall
mission success. However, since it relies on NASA's acquisition
experience and technical expertise to help ensure the success of its
programs, NOAA implemented an integrated program management structure
with NASA for the GOES-R program (see figure 3). NOAA also located the
program office at NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center. Within the
program office, there are two project offices that manage key
components of the GOES-R system. These are called the flight and ground
segment project offices. The flight project office, managed by NASA, is
responsible for awarding and managing the spacecraft contract and
delivering flight-ready instruments to the spacecraft. The ground
segment project office, managed by NOAA, oversees the ground contract,
satellite data product development and distribution, and on-orbit
operations of the satellites.
Figure 3: GOES-R Program Office Structure and Staffing:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Top level:
* Commerce;
* NASA.
Second level:
* NOAA (reports to Commerce);
* National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service
(reports to NOAA);
* NOAA Program Management Council (communicates with NOAA and National
Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service);
* Goddard Space Flight Center Management Council (reports to NASA;
communicates with National Environmental Satellite, Data, and
Information Service and GOES-R Program).
Third level:
* GOES-R Program:
System Program Director: NOAA;
Deputy System Program Director: NOAA;
Assistant System Program Director: NASA; (reports to National
Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service; communicates
with Program Scientist: NOAA and Goddard Space Flight Center Management
Council).
* Program Scientist: NOAA (reports to National Environmental Satellite,
Data, and Information Service; communicates with GOES-R Program).
Fourth level (all report to GOES-R Program):
Program Control Lead: NOAA;
Program Mission Assurance Lead: NASA;
Flight Project Project Manager: NASA; Deputy: NOAA;
Program Systems Engineering Lead: NASA;
Contracts Lead: NOAA;
Ground Project; Project Manager: NOAA; Deputy: NASA.
Source: NOAA.
[End of figure]
Prior Report Noted the Likelihood of Continued Cost Growth and
Recommended Steps to Mitigate Program Risks:
In October 2007, we reported that NOAA had completed preliminary design
studies of GOES-R, but that program costs were likely to grow and
schedules were likely to be delayed.[Footnote 4] At that time, GOES-R
was estimated to cost $7 billion and scheduled to have the first
satellite ready for launch in 2014. However, independent studies showed
that the program could cost about $2 billion more than the program's
cost estimate, and the first satellite launch could be delayed by 2
years. NOAA officials stated that they were working to reconcile the
two different cost and schedule estimates.
We also reported that while the program had implemented a risk
management program, it had multiple risk lists that were not always
consistent, and key risks were missing from the risk watch lists--
including risks associated with unfilled executive positions,
insufficient reserve funds for unexpected costs, and limitations in
NOAA's insight into NASA's deliverables. Specifically, we noted that in
past GOES procurements, NOAA did not have the ability to make quick
decisions on problems because it lacked insight into the portions of
the procurement that were managed by NASA. We recommended that the GOES-
R program office manage risks using a program-level risk list and
address the additional risks we identified. Over the past year, the
program office has improved the integration of its risk management
process and taken steps to mitigate the risks we identified.
GOES-R Is in Development, but Costs Have Increased, Envisioned
Functionality Has Been Reduced, and Schedules Have Been Delayed:
The GOES-R program has moved from the preliminary design and definition
phase to the development phase of its acquisition life cycle. Program
officials have awarded contracts for the five instruments, and they
plan to award contracts for the spacecraft[Footnote 5] and ground
segments later this year. However, the program's cost, scope, and
schedule have changed.
Progress Has Been Made on GOES-R Procurement Activities:
NOAA and NASA have made progress on the GOES-R program. In January
2008, NOAA approved a key decision milestone that allowed the program
to move from the preliminary design and definition phase to the
development phase of the acquisition life cycle. This approval also
gave the program the authority to issue the requests for proposals for
the spacecraft and ground segment projects--which it did in January
2008 and May 2008, respectively. The program office plans to award the
prime contract for the spacecraft in May 2009 and the contract for the
ground segment in June 2009.
In addition, between September 2004 and December 2007, the GOES-R
program awarded contracts for the development of five key instruments.
[Footnote 6] Table 4 briefly describes each of these instruments, their
contract award dates, and their cost and schedule estimates, while
figure 4 depicts the schedule for both the program and key instruments.
Table 4: Description of Instrument Development Contracts, as of
November 2008 (Dollars in millions):
Planned instrument: Advanced Baseline Imager;
Description: Expected to provide variable area imagery and radiometric
information of the earth's surface, atmosphere, and cloud cover;
Contract award date: Sept. 2004;
Scheduled completion date: June 2012;
Baseline cost[A]: $358.
Planned instrument: Space Environmental In-Situ Suite;
Description: Expected to provide information on space weather to aid in
the prediction of disturbances and disruptions of radio communications
and navigation systems;
Contract award date: Aug. 2006;
Scheduled completion date: June 2012;
Baseline cost[A]: $67.
Planned instrument: Extreme Ultraviolet/X-Ray Irradiance Sensor;
Description: Expected to provide real time measurement of solar
activity in the Extreme Ultraviolet and X-ray spectrum;
Contract award date: Aug. 2007;
Scheduled completion date: June 2012; Baseline cost[A]: $55.
Planned instrument: Solar Ultraviolet Imager;
Description: Expected to observe the sun's ultraviolet emissions and
provide early detection and location of flares and coronal mass
ejections;
Contract award date: Sept. 2007;
Scheduled completion date: Oct. 2012; Baseline cost[A]: $113.
Planned instrument: Geostationary Lightning Mapper;
Description: Expected to continuously monitor lightning activity over
the United States;
Contract award date: Dec. 2007;
Scheduled completion date: June 2012; Baseline cost[A]: $58.
Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data.
[A] These costs reflect the contractor's baseline cost estimates. In
some cases, the program office's cost estimate is higher than the
contractor's cost estimate.
[End of table]
Figure 4: Planned Schedule for GOES-R Program and Key Instruments:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated schedule]
Program start: 2003;
Contract award and completion dates for the development of five key
instruments:
Advanced Baseline Imager:
Award: Mid-2004;
Completion: Mid-2012.
Space Environmental In-Situ Suite:
Award: Mid-2006;
Completion: Mid-2012.
Extreme Ultraviolet/X-Ray Irradiance Sensor:
Award: Mid-2007;
Completion: Mid-2012.
Solar Ultraviolet Imager:
Award: Mid-2007;
Completion: Late-2012.
Geostationary Lightning Mapper:
Award: Late-2007
Completion: Mid-2012.
Development phase begins: 2008;
Space contract award: 2009.
Ground contract award: 2009.
Key instruments complete: 2012.
GOES-R launch: 2015.
GOES-S launch: 2018.
Program end: 2028.
Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data.
[End of figure]
The five key instruments are currently in varying stages of
development. One instrument, the Advanced Baseline Imager, has
experienced technical issues leading to cost overruns and schedule
delays. The program office rebaselined the cost and schedule of the
program in February 2007 and then rebaselined the schedule again in
March 2008. Since February 2007, the contractor incurred a cost overrun
of approximately $30 million and, since March 2008, the contractor has
delayed $11 million worth of work. Program officials reported that they
have sufficient management reserves to address the overruns experienced
to date. The other instruments are still very early in development.
Table 5 describes the status and risk level of each instrument.
Table 5: Status of GOES-R Instruments, as of February 2009:
Planned instrument: Advanced Baseline Imager;
Status: In development since 2004, this instrument has experienced
technical issues that led to the need to rebaseline the cost and
schedule. A prototype of the unit is under development, and testing is
scheduled to begin in May 2009;
Program-identified risk level: Cost: high; Schedule: low; Technical:
low.
Planned instrument: Space Environmental In-Situ Suite;
Status: This instrument successfully completed a preliminary design
review in December 2008 and is on track for a critical design review in
May 2010. It is to be delivered for integration on the GOES-R satellite
by June 2012;
Program-identified risk level: Cost: low; Schedule: low; Technical:
low.
Planned instrument: Extreme Ultraviolet/X-Ray Irradiance Sensor;
Status: This instrument completed a preliminary design review in
November 2008 and is on track for its critical design review in
November 2009. Even though the instrument is still relatively early in
its development, it is currently at its limit for mass. The contractor
has developed a plan to reduce the instrument's mass. This instrument
is to be delivered for integration on the GOES-R satellite by June
2012;
Program-identified risk level: Cost: low; Schedule: low; Technical:
low.
Planned instrument: Solar Ultraviolet Imager;
Status: This instrument completed a preliminary design review in
October 2008 and is scheduled for a critical design review in December
2009. It is to be delivered for integration on the GOES-R satellite by
October 2012;
Program-identified risk level: Cost: low; Schedule: low; Technical:
low.
Planned instrument: Geostationary Lightning Mapper;
Status: This preliminary design review for this instrument was delayed
from January to March 2009 to complete risk reduction activities. In
addition, the delivery of the prototype was delayed from July 2010 till
February 2011. The instrument has recently experienced cost and
schedule variances due to delays in completing key activities, the need
for increased coordination with a subcontractor, and additional
activities in the design of a component of the prototype;
Program-identified risk level: Cost: high; Schedule: high; Technical:
low.
Sources: NOAA and NASA data.
[End of table]
GOES-R Cost Estimate Has Increased, Envisioned Functionality Has Been
Reduced, and Key Milestones Have Slipped:
NOAA has made several important decisions about the cost, scope, and
schedule of the GOES-R program. After reconciling the program office's
cost estimate of $7 billion with the independent cost estimate of about
$9 billion, the agency established a new program cost estimate of $7.67
billion. This is an increase of $670 million from the previous
estimate. Program officials plan to revisit this cost estimate after
the spacecraft and ground segment contracts are awarded. However,
agency officials, including NOAA's Chief Financial Officer and NOAA's
National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service
Assistant Administrator, stated that this estimate was developed with a
relatively high level of confidence and that they believe that any
adjustments would be well within the $7.67 billion program budget.
To mitigate the risk that costs would rise, program officials decided
to remove selected program requirements from the baseline program and
treat them as options that could be exercised if funds allow. These
requirements include the number of products to be distributed, the time
to deliver the remaining products (product latency), and how often
these products are updated with new satellite data (refresh rate).
Specifically, program officials eliminated the requirement to develop
and distribute 34 of the 68 envisioned products, including aircraft
icing threat, turbulence, and visibility. Program officials explained
that these products are not currently being produced by legacy GOES
satellites; they are new products that could be produced from the
advanced GOES-R instruments. In addition, the program slowed planned
product latency on the remaining products by as much as 10 minutes for
hurricane intensity and 6 minutes for volcanic ash detection and
height. It also reduced the refresh rates on these products by as much
as 55 minutes for sea surface temperatures, cloud top observations, and
vertical moisture profiles in the atmosphere. Program officials
included the restoration of the products, latency, and refresh rates as
options in the ground segment contract--items that could be acquired at
a later time.
NOAA also delayed GOES-R program milestones, including the dates for
issuing the requests for proposals and awarding the contracts for the
spacecraft and ground segments. The dates when the satellites would be
available for launch have also slipped by 4 months, with the first
satellite launch now scheduled for April 2015. Program officials
attributed these delays to providing more stringent oversight before
releasing the requests for proposals, additional time needed to
evaluate the contract proposals, and funding reductions in fiscal year
2008. Table 6 identifies delays in key GOES-R milestones.
Table 6: Recent Delays in Key GOES-R Milestones:
Event: Request for proposals--spacecraft segment;
Scheduled milestones (as of September 2007): Sept. 2007;
Actual or current milestones (as of March 2009): Jan. 2008;
Change: 4 months.
Event: Request for proposals--ground segment;
Scheduled milestones (as of September 2007): Nov. 2007;
Actual or current milestones (as of March 2009): May 2008;
Change: 6 months.
Event: Contract award--spacecraft segment;
Scheduled milestones (as of September 2007): May 2008;
Actual or current milestones (as of March 2009): May 2009;
Change: 12 months.
Event: Contract award--ground segment;
Scheduled milestones (as of September 2007): Aug. 2008;
Actual or current milestones (as of March 2009): June 2009;
Change: 10 months.
Event: First satellite launch (GOES-R);
Scheduled milestones (as of September 2007): Dec. 2014;
Actual or current milestones (as of March 2009): Apr. 2015;
Change: 4 months.
Event: Second satellite launch (GOES-S);
Scheduled milestones (as of September 2007): Apr. 2016;
Actual or current milestones (as of March 2009): Aug. 2016;
Change: 4 months.
Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data.
[End of table]
Further delays in the launch of the first GOES-R satellite would run
counter to NOAA's policy of having a backup satellite in orbit at all
times and could lead to gaps in satellite coverage. Specifically, in
2015, NOAA expects to have two operational satellites in orbit, but it
will not have a backup satellite in place until GOES-R is launched. If
NOAA experiences a problem with either of its operational satellites
before a backup satellite is in orbit, it will need to rely on older
decommissioned satellites that may not be fully functional.
The GOES-R Program Office Has Taken Steps to Address Lessons Learned
from Other Satellite Programs, but Important Actions Remain:
GOES-R has taken steps to address lessons from other satellite
programs, but important actions remain to be completed. Satellite
programs are often technically complex and risky undertakings and, as a
result, they often experience technical problems, cost overruns, and
schedule delays. We and others have reported on repeated missteps in
the acquisition of major satellite systems, including the National
Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System, the GOES I-
M series, the Space Based Infrared System High Program, and the
Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite System.[Footnote 7] Key
lessons learned from these other satellite programs include the
importance of (1) ensuring sufficient technical readiness of the
system's components prior to key decisions, (2) establishing realistic
cost and schedule estimates, (3) providing sufficient management at the
program and contractor levels, and (4) performing adequate senior
executive oversight to ensure mission success.
NOAA Has Taken Steps to Ensure Technical Readiness, but Key Risks
Remain:
Space programs often experience unforeseen technical problems in the
development of critical components as a result of having insufficient
knowledge of the components and their supporting technologies prior to
key decision points. One key decision point is when an agency decides
whether the component is sufficiently ready to proceed from a
preliminary study phase into a development phase; this decision point
results in the award of the development contract. Another key decision
point occurs during the development phase when an agency decides
whether the component is ready to proceed from design into production
(also called the critical design review). Without sufficient technical
readiness at these milestones, agencies could proceed into development
contracts for components that are not well understood and enter into
the production phase of development with technologies that are not yet
mature.
Since the late 1990s, NOAA has taken a series of steps to help mitigate
technical readiness issues on GOES-R. Specifically, the agency:
* conducted preliminary studies on the technologies to be used on the
GOES-R instruments;
* awarded contracts for the preliminary design of the planned
instruments and the overall GOES-R system;
* awarded instrument development contracts that include provisions to
develop prototypes or engineering models before the flight units for
each instrument are developed;
* conducted a major review of the Advanced Baseline Imager before the
next major milestone;[Footnote 8]
* certified that the technology for the spacecraft and ground segments
was mature before awarding the contracts;[Footnote 9]
* removed the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite from the GOES-R series
after preliminary studies showed that it was technically complex;
* established independent review teams responsible for assessing the
program's technical, programmatic, and management risks on an annual
basis to ensure sufficient technical readiness prior to the critical
design review milestone; and:
* established processes for reviewing the maturity and readiness of
algorithms for each of the products.
However, key technology risks remain--affecting both the ground segment
and the instruments. Specifically, while the hardware that is to be
used for the ground segment is mature, key components have not
previously been integrated. Consequently, if the components do not work
together, the program might have to procure separate antennas, which
would impact the program's cost and schedule. The ground segment
project office utilizes an integrated product team to manage and
mitigate this risk and released a request for information to industry
in January 2009.
In addition to the ground segment risks, technical risks remain on the
development of the instruments. For example, the contractor responsible
for developing the Advanced Baseline Imager estimates that the
instrument is over 50 percent complete and reports that it has
experienced technical issues, including problems with the quality of
components in the focal plane module, mirrors, and telescope. As of
November 2008, the contractor incurred a cost overrun of approximately
$30 million and delayed $11 million worth of work. The other
instruments are earlier in their development. Since none has yet been
demonstrated in a lab or test environment, the risk remains that the
technologies are not sufficiently mature. The program plans to continue
efforts to demonstrate technologies before key decision milestones on
each instrument.
Program Estimates Were Developed Using an Acceptable Methodology, but
an Underlying Assumption Is Overly Optimistic:
In 2007, we reported that cost-estimating organizations throughout the
federal government and industry use 12 key practices--related to
planning, conducting, and reporting the estimate--to ensure a sound
estimate.[Footnote 10] Table 7 lists these practices.
Table 7: Elements of a Sound Cost Estimating Methodology:
Activity area: Planning the estimate;
Key practice: Define the estimate's purpose;
Description: The estimate should define the purpose, describe the level
of detail required, and identify the recipient of the estimate and the
overall scope.
Activity area: Planning the estimate;
Key practice: Define the program or system characteristics;
Description: The estimate should have a technical baseline description
document with, among other things, the program's system and performance
characteristics.
Activity area: Planning the estimate;
Key practice: Identify ground rules and assumptions;
Description: The estimate should define what is included and excluded
from the estimate and identify global and program-specific assumptions
such as the estimate's base year and budget constraints.
Activity area: Planning the estimate;
Key practice: Determine the estimating approach;
Description: The estimate should include a work breakdown structure,
the estimating method, and a cost estimating checklist.
Activity area: Planning the estimate;
Key practice: Develop the estimating plan;
Description: The estimate should identify the team, outline the
approach, develop an estimate timeline, and identify who will do the
independent cost estimate.
Activity area: Conducting the estimate;
Key practice: Obtain the data;
Description: The estimate should include a data collection plan with
emphasis on collecting current and relevant technical, programmatic,
and risk data. The data sources should be investigated, and data should
be normalized for inflation and stored for future estimates.
Activity area: Conducting the estimate;
Key practice: Perform the estimate;
Description: The estimate should be developed in accordance with the
identified methodology, ground rules, and assumptions; express costs in
constant year dollars; and be validated.
Activity area: Conducting the estimate;
Key practice: Conduct a risk and uncertainty analysis;
Description: The estimate should identify the risks and uncertainties
associated with the project's cost, schedule, and technology. There
should also be a confidence interval associated with the point
estimate.
Activity area: Conducting the estimate;
Key practice: Conduct a sensitivity analysis;
Description: The estimate should test the sensitivity of cost elements
to changes in input values and key assumptions and identify the effects
of changing the program schedule on the estimate.
Activity area: Reporting the estimate;
Key practice: Document the estimate;
Description: The estimate should document all steps used to develop the
estimate so that it can be recreated.
Activity area: Reporting the estimate;
Key practice: Review and provide results or presentation;
Description: The estimate should be presented to management for
approval. The presentation should include an explanation of the
technical and programmatic uncertainties and comparisons of other cost
estimates.
Activity area: Reporting the estimate;
Key practice: Update the estimate with actual costs and document
lessons learned;
Description: The estimate should be updated to reflect changes in
assumptions and new project phases and milestones.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
The GOES-R program's cost estimate fully implemented 11 and partially
implemented 1 of the 12 best practices for developing a credible cost
estimate (see table 8). The practices that were fully implemented
include clearly defining the purpose of the estimate and the program's
characteristics, establishing and implementing a sound estimating
approach, and appropriately assessing the risk and sensitivity of its
estimate. The practice that was partially implemented involved ground
rules and assumptions. The program defined and documented all of the
ground rules and assumptions used in the estimate. However, an
independent review team found that the assumed inflation rates used for
the ground segment were overly optimistic and could lead to a shortfall
of hundreds of millions of dollars. Specifically, the agency used the
Department of Defense's inflation rates rather than NASA's historical
experiences, which are more conservative. Program officials responded
that the agency's long experience in developing ground systems would
balance the optimistic inflation rates and that they could adjust the
inflation rates, if warranted, in later years.
Table 8: Summary of the GOES-R Cost Estimation Process:
Best practice:
1. Define the estimate's purpose; Fully met.
Best practice:
2. Define the program or system characteristics; Fully met.
Best practice:
3. Identify ground rules and assumptions; Partially met.
Best practice:
4. Determine the estimating approach; Fully met.
Best practice:
5. Develop the estimating plan; Fully met.
Best practice:
6. Obtain the data; Fully met.
Best practice:
7. Perform the estimate; Fully met.
Best practice:
8. Conduct a risk and uncertainty analysis; Fully met.
Best practice:
9. Conduct a sensitivity analysis; Fully met.
Best practice:
10. Document the estimate; Fully met.
Best practice:
11. Review and provide results or presentation; Fully met.
Best practice:
12. Update the estimate with actual costs and document lessons learned;
Fully met.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
NOAA Has Improved Program Management, but Work Remains on Key Program
Controls:
In the past, we have reported on poor performance in program
management.[Footnote 11] The key drivers of poor management often
include ineffective risk management, insufficient staff to implement
earned value management, and inadequate levels of management reserve.
In 2006 and 2007, we reported that, while NOAA had taken steps to
restructure its management approach on the GOES-R procurement in an
effort to improve performance and to avoid past mistakes, key program
management areas needed additional attention. We recommended that NOAA
improve the consistency of its risk management process, assess and
obtain the resources it needed for overseeing the earned value of its
contracts, and provide sufficient management reserves to address
unexpected issues in instrument development. NOAA subsequently
implemented these recommendations by streamlining its risk management
processes, supplementing oversight resources, and reassessing its
management reserves. Since we last reported on this issue, the program
office has made additional progress in earned value management, but
more remains to be done.
Program's Approach to Earned Value Management Has Shortfalls:
Earned value management[Footnote 12] provides a proven means for
measuring progress against cost and schedule commitments and thereby
identifying potential cost overruns and schedule delays early, when the
impact can be minimized. Two key aspects of this process are conducting
comprehensive integrated baseline reviews and using monthly variance
reports to manage the program. An integrated baseline review is a
process used by stakeholders to obtain agreement on the value of
planned work and to validate the baseline against which the variances
are calculated. These reviews assess the technical scope of the work,
key schedule milestones, the adequacy of resources, task and technical
planning, and management processes; they are completed whenever a new
baseline is established. Once an integrated baseline review has been
completed and the project management baseline has been validated,
monthly variance reports provide information on the contract status,
the reasons for any deviations from cost or schedule plans, and any
actions taken to address these deviations.
To its credit, the GOES-R program office is using earned value
management to oversee the key instrument contracts and plans to use it
on the spacecraft and ground segment contracts. To date, the program
office has performed integrated baseline reviews on the instruments and
obtains and reviews variance reports for each of the instruments.
However, there are shortfalls in the program's approach. The program's
integrated baseline review for the Advanced Baseline Imager did not
include a review of schedule milestones, the adequacy of how tasks are
measured, and the contractor's management processes. Further, the
variance reports for two instruments--the Advanced Baseline Imager and
the Geostationary Lightning Mapper--do not describe all of the
significant variances. The imager's reports only describe the five
largest cost and schedule variances and do not include variances
associated with overhead. For example, the reasons for cost and
schedule variances exceeding $1 million were not disclosed in October
and November 2008 cost reports.[Footnote 13] Moreover, while the
reports identified problems that resulted in cost growth and schedule
slippage for the five largest variances, the reports did not identify
the actions taken to address them. The mapper's reports also did not
disclose the reasons for selected variances, including a $197,000 cost
overrun in August 2008 and a $141,000 cost overrun in October 2008.
Program officials explained that they meet with the contractor on a
monthly basis to discuss all of the variances, but they were unable to
provide documentation of these discussions or the reasons, impact of,
or mitigation plans for the variances. As a result of these shortfalls,
the program office has less assurance that key instruments will be
delivered on time and within budget, and it is more difficult for
program managers to identify risks and take corrective actions.
Executive-Level Involvement Is Occurring:
Executive-level involvement is a key aspect of program success, and it
is occurring on the GOES-R program. The Office of Management and Budget
guidance calls for agencies to establish executive-level oversight
boards to regularly track the progress of major system acquisitions.
[Footnote 14] In addition, in 2007, NOAA and NASA signed both an
interagency agreement and a management control plan that defined the
agencies' respective roles and responsibilities. Among other things,
the agreements called for the program to provide monthly status review
briefings for executives on NOAA's Program Management Council and
NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center Management Council.
Since these agreements were approved, the program has consistently
briefed senior management at monthly meetings and has effectively
communicated the program's status and key risks. Additionally, key
representatives of NOAA's Program Management Council attend the NASA
council's meeting, and senior NASA executives attend NOAA's council
meetings.
NOAA Plans to Address Requirements for Current Products but Has Not
Developed Plans for Meeting Requirements for Advanced Products:
The Hyperspectral Environmental Suite instrument was originally planned
as part of the GOES-R satellite to meet requirements for products that
are currently produced by GOES satellites (such as temperature and
moisture profiles at different atmospheric levels), as well as new
technically-advanced products (such as moisture fluctuations and ocean
color) that are not currently produced by GOES satellites. Table 9
lists the current and new products that were originally planned to be
provided by the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite.
Table 9: Key Products from the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite
Instrument:
Current sounding products:
* GOES variable data stream format sounder data;
* Channel brightness temperature;
* Cloud top pressure;
* Cloud top temperature;
* Effective cloud amount;
* Automated Surface Observing System categorical cloud height;
* Automated Surface Observing System categorical cloud amount;
* Total precipitable water;
* Layer precipitable water;
* Lifted index (a derived product image);
* Surface skin temperature;
* Vertical moisture profiles;
* Vertical temperature profiles;
* Geopotential height;
* Water vapor winds;
New sounding products:
* Dust/aerosol: loading;
* Cloud base height;
* Capping inversion information;
* Moisture flux;
* Pressure profile;
* Carbon monoxide concentration;
* Ozone layers;
* Microburst windspeed potential;
* Improved temperature and moisture profiles;
New coastal waters imaging products:
* Ocean color (turbidity/chlorophyll/reflectance);
* Ocean turbidity (turbidity/visibility);
* Optical properties (particulate absorption, backscatter,
fluorescence).
Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data.
Note: In addition to the products listed here, selected products were
to have been jointly produced by the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite
and the Advanced Baseline Imager. While these products are expected to
be produced by the Advanced Baseline Imager, some will experience a
degradation in quality and timeliness from what was originally
anticipated.
[End of table]
NOAA still considers these requirements to be valid. According to
National Weather Service meteorologists, users depend on the products
that they currently receive from GOES satellites in orbit for hourly
and daily weather observations. In addition, NOAA and the science
community still have a need for the advanced products. NOAA had planned
to use the new sounding products to improve its performance goals, such
as helping to increase the lead times associated with severe
thunderstorm warnings from an average of 18 minutes in 2000 to as much
as 2 hours by 2025, and helping to increase the lead times associated
with tornado warnings from an average of 13 minutes in 2007 to as much
as 1 hour by 2025.[Footnote 15] In addition, NOAA had planned to use
the new coastal waters imaging products to provide more accurate and
quantitative understanding of areas along the U.S. East Coast (within
50 miles of the shore) and 130 estuaries throughout the United States-
-areas for which NOAA has management responsibilities.[Footnote 16]
Similarly, the environmental science communities have continued to
express a need for the advanced products. In 2007, the National
Research Council recommended that NOAA develop a strategy to restore
the planned geostationary advanced sounding capability that was removed
from the GOES-R program in order to allow high-temporal and high-
vertical resolution measurements of temperature and water vapor.
[Footnote 17] As part of that strategy, the report recommended that
NOAA work with NASA to complete a demonstration satellite in the near
term.
NOAA Plans to Fulfill Requirements for Current Products:
In light of the cancellation of the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite,
NOAA decided to use the planned Advanced Baseline Imager to develop the
products that are currently produced by the GOES satellite sounders now
in orbit. In mid-2006, NOAA compared the imager's anticipated
capabilities with the legacy GOES sounder instrument and reported that
the advanced imager would be able to produce the necessary data 20
times faster than the legacy sounder and with comparable or better
spatial resolution. However, NOAA also reported that the advanced
imager will be less accurate than the legacy sounder for four of the
seven product groups. Table 10 compares the capabilities of the
Advanced Baseline Imager with the legacy sounder in seven product
groups.
Table 10: Comparison of the Advanced Baseline Imager and the Legacy
Sounder Instrument:
Product groups: Radiances;
Temporal/latency (refresh rates): Imager is approximately 20 times
faster than the legacy sounder[B];
Spatial (resolution): Imager is comparable to the legacy sounder[A][C];
Accuracy: Imager is comparable to the legacy sounder[C].
Product groups: Total precipitable water;
Temporal/latency (refresh rates): Imager is approximately 20 times
faster than the legacy sounder[B];
Spatial (resolution): Imager is comparable to the legacy sounder[A][C];
Accuracy: Imager is less precise than the legacy sounder[D].
Product groups: Lifted index (atmospheric stability measurement);
Temporal/latency (refresh rates): Imager is approximately 20 times
faster than the legacy sounder[B];
Spatial (resolution): Imager is comparable to the legacy sounder[A][C];
Accuracy: Imager is less precise than the legacy sounder[D].
Product groups: Skin (land surface) temperature;
Temporal/latency (refresh rates): Imager is approximately 20 times
faster than the legacy sounder[B];
Spatial (resolution): Imager is comparable to the legacy sounder[A][C];
Accuracy: Imager is comparable to the legacy sounder[C].
Product groups: Profiles (vertical moisture/temperature readings);
Temporal/latency (refresh rates): Imager is approximately 20 times
faster than the legacy sounder[B];
Spatial (resolution): Imager is comparable to the legacy sounder[A][C];
Accuracy: Imager is less precise than the legacy sounder[D].
Product groups: Clouds;
Temporal/latency (refresh rates): Imager is approximately 20 times
faster than the legacy sounder[B];
Spatial (resolution): Imager has a finer resolution than the legacy
sounder[B];
Accuracy: Imager is less precise than the legacy sounder[D].
Product groups: Moisture winds;
Temporal/latency (refresh rates): Imager is approximately 20 times
faster than the legacy sounder[B];
Spatial (resolution): Imager has a finer resolution than the legacy
sounder[B];
Accuracy: Imager is comparable to the legacy sounder[C].
Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data.
[A] The Advanced Baseline Imager is planned to produce these products
at a spatial resolution that is finer than that of the legacy sounder.
However, in order to maintain continuity with existing products, the
finer resolution data from the advanced baseline imager will need to be
averaged to produce products with the resolution of the legacy sounder.
[B] Improved = the imager is expected to improve this capability.
[C] Comparable = the imager is expected to provide comparable
capability.
[D] Degraded = the imager is expected to degrade this capability.
[End of table]
In an effort to obtain consensus from the GOES user community, NOAA
briefed sounding experts on the Advanced Baseline Imager's ability to
develop products currently produced by the legacy GOES sounder. These
experts included representatives from the National Weather Service; the
National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Services; the
Department of Defense's satellite data processing centers; academia;
and attendees at a weather-related conference.[Footnote 18] NOAA
reported that users accepted this plan as a suitable alternative until
an advanced sounder could be flown on the GOES series. NOAA noted that
users were pleased with the anticipated improvements in refresh rates.
While satellite data users were eager to obtain faster refresh rates,
recent contract changes have since reduced these expected rates. As
previously reported, when the program office reconciled its cost
estimate with the independent estimate, the program removed or reduced
selected capabilities from the ground segment project. One of the
reduced capabilities was the refresh rates for most of the products.
Instead of refresh rates that are 20 times faster, current plans call
for refresh rates that are only 2 to 4 times faster than current
products. The faster refresh rates are now options in the contract.
NOAA Assessed Alternatives for Addressing Requirements for Advanced
Products but Has Not Yet Defined Its Plans:
In addition to efforts to address the requirements for existing
products that were removed with the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite,
NOAA, NASA, and the Department of Defense assessed alternatives for
obtaining advanced sounding and coastal waters imaging products from a
geostationary orbit. The options include placing an advanced instrument
on a stand-alone satellite or on later GOES satellites. The results of
the analysis recommended that NOAA work with NASA to develop a
demonstration sounder to fly on an as-yet undetermined satellite in
order to build a foundation for an eventual operational advanced
sounder on a future GOES satellite. For coastal waters imaging, the
analysis recommended that, in the near-term, NOAA evaluate a
hyperspectral imager that is planned to be included on the
International Space Station and that NOAA and NASA coordinate to
identify and evaluate other options for the future. NOAA plans to
assess the technical feasibility of various options and to have the
National Research Council make recommendations on long-term options for
coastal waters imaging.
However, NOAA has not defined plans or a timeline for implementing any
of the options or for addressing the requirements for advanced
products. Further, agency officials were unable to estimate when they
would establish plans to fulfill the requirements. Doing so would
include justifying the funding for any new initiatives within the
agency's investment decision process. Until a decision is made on
whether and how to proceed in providing the advanced products, key
system users such as the National Weather Service will not be able to
meet their goals for improving the lead times or accuracy of severe
weather warnings, including warnings for tornadoes and hurricanes.
Further, climate research organizations will not obtain the data they
need to enhance the science of climate, coastal, environmental, and
oceanic observations.
Conclusions:
The GOES-R satellite series is now in development, but program costs
have increased, schedules have been delayed, and the scope of the
program has been reduced. Unless the program exercises contract
options, key benefits in terms of new products and faster data updates
will not be realized. In addition, recent events make it likely that
schedules will continue to slip. Any delays in the launch of the first
satellite in the GOES-R program increase the risk of gaps in satellite
coverage.
The program office has made repeated and continuing efforts to learn
from problems experienced on other satellite programs, but more can be
done in selected areas. Specifically, the program has improved the
technical readiness of key components, adopted many sound estimating
practices, implemented an earned value management process for
overseeing contracts, and is obtaining executive-level oversight.
However, the program's approach to earned value management has
shortfalls. The program did not perform a comprehensive review after
rebaselining a critical instrument--the Advanced Baseline Imager--and
has not documented the reasons for all cost overruns. Until these
issues are addressed, NOAA faces an increased risk that the GOES-R
program will repeat the cost increases, schedule delays, and
performance shortfalls that have plagued other satellite programs.
In addition, while the GOES-R program office plans to recover existing
product capabilities that were lost when a critical sensor was removed
from the satellites, NOAA has not yet developed a plan or a timeline
for recovering the advanced capabilities that were removed. Doing so
would include justifying whether and how to proceed in fulfilling the
advanced requirements. Until such decisions and plans are made, the
geostationary satellite user community may not be able to make
significant improvements in their severe weather forecasts.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve NOAA's ability to effectively manage the GOES-R program, we
recommend that the Secretary of Commerce direct the NOAA Administrator
to ensure that the following three actions are taken:
* As part of any effort to rebaseline the cost and schedule of the
Advanced Baseline Imager, perform an integrated baseline review and
ensure that the review includes an assessment of key schedule
milestones, the adequacy of resources, task and technical planning, and
management processes.
* Improve the agency's ability to oversee contractor performance by
ensuring that the reasons for cost and schedule variances are fully
disclosed and documented.
* If feasible and justified, develop a plan and timeline for recovering
the advanced capabilities that were removed from the program when the
Hyperspectral Environmental Suite was canceled.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of
Commerce's Acting Secretary stated that the report did a fair and
thorough job of assessing the status of the GOES-R program and NOAA's
efforts to leverage lessons learned from similar programs. The
department agreed with our findings and recommendations and outlined
steps it is taking to implement them. For example, the department
stated that NOAA will perform an integrated baseline review on the
Advanced Baseline Imager, as part of any effort to rebaseline its cost
and schedule, and that the GOES-R program office will ensure full
disclosure of cost and schedule variances. The department also provided
technical comments on the report, which we incorporated as appropriate.
The department's comments are provided in appendix II.
In addition, NASA's Associate Administrator for the Science Mission
Directorate provided written comments on a draft of this report. In
those comments, the Associate Administrator stated that the report is
complete and accurate in its assessment of NASA's participation in the
GOES-R program. The department's comments are provided in appendix III.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to interested
congressional committees, the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator
of NASA, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and other
interested parties. The report also will be available at no charge on
the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you have any questions on matters discussed in this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-9286 or by e-mail at pownerd@gao.gov. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
David A. Powner:
Director, Information Technology Management Issues:
List of Requesters:
The Honorable Brian Baird:
Chairman:
The Honorable Bob Inglis:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment:
Committee on Science and Technology:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Brad Miller:
Chairman:
The Honorable Paul Broun, Jr.
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight:
Committee on Science and Technology:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Our objectives were to (1) determine the status of the Geostationary
Operational Environmental Satellite-R series (GOES-R) program, (2)
evaluate whether the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's
(NOAA) plans for the GOES-R acquisition address problems experienced on
similar programs, and (3) determine whether NOAA's plan to address the
capabilities that were planned for the satellites, but then removed,
will be adequate to support current data requirements.
To determine the program's status, we evaluated various programmatic
and technical plans, management reports, and other program
documentation. We reviewed the spacecraft and ground segment requests
for proposals, cost and schedule estimates, contractor performance
reports on instrument development, planned system requirements, and
monthly executive-level management briefings. We also interviewed NOAA
and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) officials from
the GOES-R program office.
To evaluate whether NOAA's acquisition plans address problems
experienced on similar programs, we identified lessons learned from
other major space acquisitions by reviewing prior GAO reports and
interviewing space acquisition experts. We compared these lessons
learned with relevant program and contractor documents and risk lists.
Key lessons were related to technical readiness, cost and schedule
estimates, program management, and executive-level involvement.
Specific steps in each of these areas are as follows:
* Technical readiness: We reviewed program, flight project, and ground
segment risks, and instrument technical reviews.
* Cost and schedule estimates: We identified the process used to
develop NOAA's cost estimate by reviewing the program cost estimate,
the Cost Analysis Requirements Document, and program cost estimate
briefings. We then compared NOAA's process with the 12 steps of a high-
quality cost estimating process identified in our cost estimating
guide.[Footnote 19] For each step, we assessed whether the GOES-R
estimate fully met, partially met, or did not meet the practices
associated with a sound cost estimate. We also interviewed government
and contractor cost estimating officials.
* Program management: We analyzed the program's risk management plan,
risk lists, cost performance reports, and integrated baseline reviews.
* Executive-level involvement: We analyzed the program's management
control plan, attended NOAA and NASA executive council meetings and
reviewed the program's briefings to executives at both agencies. We
also discussed these topics with appropriate agency officials.
To determine the adequacy of NOAA's plans to address the capabilities
that were removed from the program, we identified the requirements for
existing and advanced products that were associated with the canceled
Hyperspectral Environmental Suite instrument. We reviewed agency plans
to fulfill requirements for the existing products and the analysis
supporting this decision. We compared this analysis with an external
scientific publication[Footnote 20] and interviewed satellite data
users about the implications of plans to use the Advanced Baseline
Imager to provide legacy products. To assess NOAA's plans to fulfill
requirements for advanced products, we reviewed NOAA's analysis of
options for addressing the advanced products, as well as National
Research Council reports on priorities in satellite observation.
[Footnote 21] We also interviewed satellite data users, including
forecasters and modelers from the National Weather Service, and
satellite data processing experts from the National Environmental
Satellite, Data, and Information Service.
We performed our work at NOAA and NASA offices in the Washington, D.C.,
metropolitan area. We conducted this performance audit from May 2008 to
April 2009, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Commerce:
United States Department Of Commerce:
The Secretary of Commerce:
Washington, D.C. 20230:
March 16, 2009:
Mr. David A. Powner:
Director, Information Technology Management Issues:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Powner:
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the Government
Accountability Office's draft report entitled Geostationary Operational
Environmental Satellites: Acquisition Is Under Way, but Improvements
Needed in Management and Contractor Oversight (GAO-09-323). On behalf
of the Department of Commerce, I enclose the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration's programmatic comments on the draft report.
Sincerely,
Otto J. Wolff:
Acting Secretary:
Enclosure:
[End of letter]
Department of Commerce:
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration:
Comments on the Draft GAO Report Entitled "Geostationary Operational
Environmental Satellites: Acquisition Is Under Way, but Improvements
Needed in Management and Contractor Oversight" (GAO-09-323/April 2009):
General Comments:
The Department of Commerce (DOC) appreciates the opportunity to review
this report on Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites,
specifically the R-Series (GOES-R). The report does a fair and thorough
job assessing the status of the GOES-R program and National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) efforts to leverage lessons learned
from similar programs.
NOAA Response to GAO Recommendations:
The draft GAO report states, "To improve NOAA's ability to effectively
manage the GOES-R program, we recommend the Secretary of Commerce
direct the NOAA Administrator to ensure the following three actions are
taken:"
Recommendation 1: "As part of any effort to rebaseline the cost and
schedule of the Advanced Baseline Imager, perform an integrated
baseline review and ensure the review includes an assessment of key
schedule milestones, the adequacy of resources, task and technical
planning, and management processes."
NOAA Response: NOAA agrees with this recommendation. NOAA will perform
an integrated baseline review on the Advanced Baseline Imager as part
of any effort to rebaseline its cost and schedule. The integrated
baseline review will include assessment of the technical scope of the
work, key schedule milestones, the adequacy of resources, task and
technical planning, and management processes.
Recommendation 2: "Improve the agency's ability to oversee contractor
performance by ensuring the reasons for cost and schedule variances are
fully disclosed and documented."
NOAA Response: NOAA agrees with this recommendation. GOES-R contractors
submit monthly Cost Performance Reports with itemization of all
variances. The GOES-R program office will ensure these cost and
schedule variances reported by the contractor are elaborated upon as
needed for full understanding and disclosure. Also, the GOES-R program
office will fully document the actions taken to address significant
cost and schedule variances, along with the reasons for and impact of
those actions.
Recommendation 3: "If feasible and justified, develop a plan and
timeline of recovering the advanced capabilities that were removed from
the program when the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite was canceled."
NOAA Response: NOAA agrees with this recommendation. NOAA will identify
and validate user requirements, evaluate the feasibility and priority
of addressing those requirements, and determine the most appropriate
methods to meet the requirements.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration:
National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
Headquarters:
Washington, DC 20546-0001:
March 16, 2009:
Reply to Attention of: Science Mission Directorate:
Mr. David A. Powner:
Director:
Information Technology Management Issues:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Powner:
Thank you for the opportunity to review your draft report entitled
"Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites (GOES-R):
Acquisition is Under Way, but Improvements Needed in Management and
Contractor Oversight," (GAO-09-323). We believe the subject report is
complete and accurate in its assessment of the GOES-R program insomuch
as it involves NASA's participation in the activities. As the report
contains no recommendations to NASA, we do not have any formal
comments.
We will continue to work closely with the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration to improve the areas of concern detailed in
your report.
If you have any questions or require additional information, please
contact Ron Hooker at (202) 358-4508 or Stephen Volz on (202) 358-0364.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Edward J. Weiler:
Associate Administrator for Science Mission Directorate:
cc:
Science Mission Directorate/C. Gay; M. Freilich; R. Hooker; S. Volz.
GSFC/G. Morrow; D. Scheve; M. Brumfield; M. Donnelly.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
David A. Powner, (202) 512-9286, or pownerd@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Colleen M. Phillips,
Assistant Director; Carol Cha; William Carrigg; Neil Doherty; Franklin
Jackson; Kaelin Kuhn; Lee McCracken; Adam Vodraska; and Eric Winter
made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, Cost Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Estimating and
Managing Program Costs, Exposure Draft, GAO-07-1134SP (Washington,
D.C.: July 2, 2007).
[2] Satellites in a series are identified by letters of the alphabet
when they are on the ground and by numbers once they are in orbit.
[3] GAO, Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: Additional
Action Needed to Incorporate Lessons Learned from Other Satellite
Programs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-1129T]
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2006) and Geostationary Operational
Environmental Satellites: Steps Remain in Incorporating Lessons Learned
from Other Satellite Programs, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-993] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6,
2006).
[4] GAO, Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: Progress
Has Been Made, but Improvements Are Needed to Effectively Manage Risks,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-18] (Washington, D.C.:
Oct. 23, 2007).
[5] NASA awarded the spacecraft segment contract in December 2008.
However, after a bid protest was filed, NASA decided, in February 2009,
to re-evaluate its selection. Based on NASA's decision, the protest was
dismissed.
[6] A sixth instrument, the Magnetometer, is to be developed as part of
the spacecraft segment contract.
[7] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Space System Acquisition Risks and Keys
to Addressing Them, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-776R] (Washington, D.C.: June 1,
2006); Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Cost
Increases Trigger Review and Place Program's Direction on Hold,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-573T] (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 30, 2006); Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites:
Technical Problems, Cost Increases, and Schedule Delays Trigger Need
for Difficult Trade-off Decisions, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-249T] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16,
2005); Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: Information on Program
Cost and Schedule Changes, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-1054] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30,
2004); Defense Acquisitions: Despite Restructuring, SBIRS High Program
Remains at Risk of Cost and Schedule Overruns, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-48] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31,
2003); Military Space Operations: Common Problems and Their Effects on
Satellite and Related Acquisitions, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-825R] (Washington, D.C.: June 2,
2003); Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-476] (Washington, D.C.:
May 15, 2003); Weather Satellites: Action Needed to Resolve Status of
the U.S. Geostationary Satellite Program, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-91-252] (Washington, D.C.: July
24, 1991). Department of Defense, Defense Science Board/Air Force
Scientific Advisory Board Joint Task Force, Report on the Acquisition
of National Security Space Programs (May 2003).
[8] In [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-993], we
recommended that NOAA use system engineering experts to perform a
comprehensive review of the Advanced Baseline Imager to determine the
level of technical maturity before moving the instrument into
production. In February 2007, consistent with our recommendation, an
integrated independent review team performed a review on the imager.
[9] The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 requires NOAA to
determine, among other provisions, that key component technologies have
been demonstrated in a laboratory or test environment prior to
contracting for the development of a major program such as GOES-R. 33
U.S.C. § 878a(b)(1).
[10] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1134SP].
[11] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-573T], [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-249T], and GAO, Defense
Acquisitions: DOD Has Paid Billions in Award and Incentive Fees
Regardless of Acquisition Outcomes, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-66] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 19,
2005).
[12] Earned value management is a project management approach that, if
implemented appropriately, provides objective reports of project
status, produces early warning signs of impending schedule delays and
cost overruns, and provides unbiased estimates of a program's total
costs.
[13] In October 2008, cost overruns totaling $1,083,298 and schedule
deviations valued at $1,001,436 were not explained. In November 2008,
cost overruns totaling $1,193,559 and schedule deviations valued at
$329,091 were not explained.
[14] Office of Management and Budget, Supplement to Circular A-11, part
7 (Washington, D.C.: July 1997). Also see, GAO, Information Technology
Investment Management: A Framework for Assessing and Improving Process
Maturity, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-394G]
(Washington, D.C.: March 2004).
[15] In addition to advanced sounding, other activities such as
improvements in radar technologies are expected to help improve lead
times.
[16] While current and future satellite systems provide selected
coastal waters images, they lack the resolution, sampling frequency,
and spectral information (field of vision) needed to monitor coastal
areas and estuaries.
[17] Committee on Earth Science and Applications from Space: A
Community Assessment and Strategy for the Future, Earth Science and
Applications from Space: National Imperatives for the Next Decade and
Beyond (Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2007).
[18] Representatives from the following organizations were also briefed
on NOAA's plans: NASA, the University of Wisconsin's Cooperative
Institute for Meteorological Satellite Studies, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, Hampton University, Utah State University, and the
University of Maryland Baltimore County.
[19] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1134SP].
[20] Schmidt, Timothy J., et al., "The GOES-R Advanced Baseline Imager
and the Continuation of Current Sounder Products," Journal of Applied
Meteorology and Climatology, Vol. 47 (Oct. 2008).
[21] Committee on Earth Science and Applications from Space: A
Community Assessment and Strategy for the Future, Earth Science and
Applications from Space: National Imperatives for the Next Decade and
Beyond (Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2007); and
Committee on a Strategy to Mitigate the Impact of Sensor Descopes and
Demanifests on the NPOESS and GOES-R Spacecraft, Ensuring the Climate
Record from the NPOESS and GOES-R Spacecraft (Washington, D.C.: The
National Academies Press, 2008).
[End of section]
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