Polar-Orbiting Satellites
With Costs Increasing and Data Continuity at Risk, Improvements Needed in Tri-agency Decision Making Gao ID: GAO-09-772T June 17, 2009The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS)--a tri-agency acquisition managed by the Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)--is considered critical to the United States' ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting (including severe weather events such as hurricanes) and global climate monitoring. Since its inception, NPOESS has experienced escalating costs, schedule delays, and technical difficulties. As the often-delayed launch of its demonstration satellite (called the NPOESS Preparatory Project--NPP) draws closer, these problems continue. GAO was asked to summarize its report being released today that (1) identifies the status and risks of key program components, (2) assesses the NPOESS Executive Committee's ability to fulfill its responsibilities, and (3) evaluates efforts to identify an alternative system integrator for later NPOESS satellites.
The NPOESS program's approved cost and schedule baseline is not achievable and problems with two critical sensors continue to drive the program's cost and schedule. Costs are expected to grow by about $1 billion from the current $13.95 billion cost estimate, and the schedules for NPP and the first two NPOESS satellites are expected to be delayed by 7, 14, and 5 months, respectively. These delays endanger the continuity of weather and climate satellite data because there will not be a satellite available as a backup should a satellite fail on launch or in orbit--loss of a Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) satellite, an NPOESS satellite, or NPP could result in a 3 to 5 year gap in data continuity. Program officials reported that they are assessing alternatives for mitigating risks, and that they plan to propose a new cost and schedule baseline by the end of June 2009. However, the Executive Committee does not have an estimate for when it will make critical decisions on cost, schedule, and risk mitigation. While the NPOESS Executive Committee has made improvements over the last several years in response to prior recommendations, it has not effectively fulfilled its responsibilities and does not have the membership and leadership it needs to effectively or efficiently oversee and direct the NPOESS program. Until its shortfalls are addressed, the Committee will be unable to effectively oversee the NPOESS program--and important issues involving cost growth, schedule delays, and satellite continuity will likely remain unresolved. The NPOESS program has conducted two successive studies of alternatives to using the existing system integrator for the last two NPOESS satellites, but neither identified a viable alternative to the current contractor. Program officials plan to conduct a final study prior to the June 2010 decision on whether to proceed with the existing prime contractor.
GAO-09-772T, Polar-Orbiting Satellites: With Costs Increasing and Data Continuity at Risk, Improvements Needed in Tri-agency Decision Making
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on
Science and Technology, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT:
Wednesday, June 17, 2009:
Polar-Orbiting Satellites:
With Costs Increasing and Data Continuity at Risk, Improvements Needed
in Tri-agency Decision Making:
Statement of David A. Powner, Director:
Information Technology Management Issues:
GAO-09-772T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-772T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science and Technology,
House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
(NPOESS)”-a tri-agency acquisition managed by the Department of
Commerce‘s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the
Department of Defense (DOD), and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA)”-is considered critical to the United States‘
ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather
forecasting (including severe weather events such as hurricanes) and
global climate monitoring. Since its inception, NPOESS has experienced
escalating costs, schedule delays, and technical difficulties. As the
often-delayed launch of its demonstration satellite (called the NPOESS
Preparatory Project”NPP) draws closer, these problems continue.
GAO was asked to summarize its report being released today that (1)
identifies the status and risks of key program components, (2) assesses
the NPOESS Executive Committee‘s ability to fulfill its
responsibilities, and (3) evaluates efforts to identify an alternative
system integrator for later NPOESS satellites.
What GAO Found:
The NPOESS program‘s approved cost and schedule baseline is not
achievable and problems with two critical sensors continue to drive the
program‘s cost and schedule. Costs are expected to grow by about $1
billion from the current $13.95 billion cost estimate, and the
schedules for NPP and the first two NPOESS satellites are expected to
be delayed by 7, 14, and 5 months, respectively. These delays endanger
the continuity of weather and climate satellite data because there will
not be a satellite available as a backup should a satellite fail on
launch or in orbit”loss of a Defense Meteorological Satellite Program
(DMSP) satellite, an NPOESS satellite, or NPP could result in a 3 to 5
year gap in data continuity (see figure below). Program officials
reported that they are assessing alternatives for mitigating risks, and
that they plan to propose a new cost and schedule baseline by the end
of June 2009. However, the Executive Committee does not have an
estimate for when it will make critical decisions on cost, schedule,
and risk mitigation.
Figure: Potential Gaps in Data Continuity:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated timeline]
Satellite name: DMSP F-17 (early morning orbit);
Initial satellite testing: [Empty];
Planned spacecraft operations: previous to 2009 through late 2010;
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite fails on launch or in
orbit: [Empty];
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite does not live beyond its
expected life: late 2010 through late 2012.
Satellite name: DMSP F-19 (early morning orbit);
Initial satellite testing: late 2012 through late 2017;
Planned spacecraft operations: [Empty];
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite fails on launch or in
orbit: late 2012 through late 2017;
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite does not live beyond its
expected life: [Empty].
Satellite name: NPOESS C-2 (early morning orbit);
Initial satellite testing: mid-2016 through late 2017;
Planned spacecraft operations: mid-2020 through mid-2023;
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite fails on launch or in
orbit: late 2017 through mid-2020;
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite does not live beyond its
expected life: [Empty].
Satellite name: NPOESS C-4 (early morning orbit);
Initial satellite testing: early 2020 through mid-2020;
Planned spacecraft operations: mid-2020 through 2026;
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite fails on launch or in
orbit: [Empty];
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite does not live beyond its
expected life: [Empty].
Satellite name: NOAA-19 (afternoon orbit);
Initial satellite testing:
Planned spacecraft operations: 2009 through late 2012;
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite fails on launch or in
orbit: [Empty];
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite does not live beyond its
expected life: [Empty].
Satellite name: NPP (afternoon orbit);
Initial satellite testing: 2011 through late 2012;
Planned spacecraft operations: late 2012 through late 2015;
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite fails on launch or in
orbit: late 2012 through late 2014;
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite does not live beyond its
expected life: [Empty].
Satellite name: NPOESS C-1 (afternoon orbit);
Initial satellite testing: mid-2014;
Planned spacecraft operations: mid-2014 through early 2021;
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite fails on launch or in
orbit: 2016 through mid-2018;
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite does not live beyond its
expected life: [Empty].
Satellite name: NPOESS C-3 (afternoon orbit);
Initial satellite testing: early 2018 through mid-2018;
Planned spacecraft operations: mid-2018 through 2024;
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite fails on launch or in
orbit: [Empty];
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite does not live beyond its
expected life: [Empty].
Source: GAO analysis of DOD, NOAA, and NPOESS Integrated Program Office
data.
[End of figure]
While the NPOESS Executive Committee has made improvements over the
last several years in response to prior recommendations, it has not
effectively fulfilled its responsibilities and does not have the
membership and leadership it needs to effectively or efficiently
oversee and direct the NPOESS program. Until its shortfalls are
addressed, the Committee will be unable to effectively oversee the
NPOESS program”and important issues involving cost growth, schedule
delays, and satellite continuity will likely remain unresolved. The
NPOESS program has conducted two successive studies of alternatives to
using the existing system integrator for the last two NPOESS
satellites, but neither identified a viable alternative to the current
contractor. Program officials plan to conduct a final study prior to
the June 2010 decision on whether to proceed with the existing prime
contractor.
What GAO Recommends:
In its report, GAO recommended steps to improve the effectiveness of
the Executive Committee. NASA and Commerce officials concurred with the
recommendations; DOD concurred with one and partially concurred with
the other recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-772T] or key
components. For more information, contact David A. Powner at (202) 512-
9286 or pownerd@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to participate in today's hearing on the
National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
(NPOESS). NPOESS is expected to be a state-of-the-art satellite system
that will replace two existing satellite systems. It is considered
critical to the United States' ability to maintain the continuity of
data required for weather forecasting (including severe weather events
such as hurricanes) and global climate monitoring. Three agencies share
responsibility for NPOESS: the Department of Commerce's National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Department of
Defense (DOD)/United States Air Force, and the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA). As requested, this statement summarizes
our report being released today that (1) identifies the status and
risks of key program components, (2) assesses the NPOESS Executive
Committee's ability to fulfill its responsibilities, and (3) evaluates
efforts to identify an alternative system integrator for later NPOESS
satellites.[Footnote 1]
In preparing this testimony, we relied on our work supporting the
accompanying report. That report contains a detailed overview of our
scope and methodology. All of our work for this report was performed in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
Polar-orbiting satellites provide data and imagery that are used by
weather forecasters, climatologists, and the military to map and
monitor changes in weather, climate, the oceans, and the environment.
Since the 1960s, the United States has operated two separate
operational polar-orbiting meteorological satellite systems: the Polar-
orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) series, which is
managed by NOAA, and the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program
(DMSP), which is managed by the Air Force. Currently, there is one
operational POES satellite and two operational DMSP satellites that are
positioned so that they can observe the earth in early morning,
midmorning, and early afternoon polar orbits. In addition, the
government is also relying on a European satellite, called
Meteorological Operational, or MetOp, in the midmorning orbit.
With the expectation that combining the POES and DMSP programs would
reduce duplication and result in sizable cost savings, a May 1994
Presidential Decision Directive required NOAA and DOD to converge the
two satellite programs into a single satellite program capable of
satisfying both civilian and military requirements.[Footnote 2] The
converged program, NPOESS, is considered critical to the United States'
ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather
forecasting and global climate monitoring. To manage this program, DOD,
NOAA, and NASA formed the tri-agency Integrated Program Office, located
within NOAA. Within the program office, each agency has the lead on
certain activities: NOAA has overall program management responsibility
for the converged system and for satellite operations; the Air Force
has the lead on the acquisition; and NASA has primary responsibility
for facilitating the development and incorporation of new technologies
into the converged system. NOAA and DOD share the cost of funding
NPOESS, while NASA funds specific technology projects and studies. In
addition, an Executive Committee--made up of the administrators of NOAA
and NASA and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics--is responsible for providing policy
guidance, ensuring agency support and funding, and exercising oversight
authority.[Footnote 3] The Executive Committee manages the program
through a Program Executive Officer who oversees the NPOESS program
office.
Since the program's its inception, NPOESS costs have grown to $13.95
billion, and launch schedules have been delayed by up to five years.
[Footnote 4] In addition, as a result of a 2006 restructuring of the
program, the agencies reduced the program's functionality by removing 2
of 6 originally planned satellites and one of the orbits. The
restructuring also decreased the number of instruments from 13 (10
sensors and 3 subsystems) to 9 (7 sensors and 2 subsystems), with 4 of
the sensors providing fewer capabilities. The restructuring also led
agency executives to mitigate potential data gaps by deciding to use a
planned demonstration satellite, called the NPOESS Preparatory Project
(NPP) satellite, as an operational satellite providing climate and
weather data. However, even after this restructuring, the program is
still encountering technical issues, schedule delays, and the
likelihood of further cost increases.
Progress Made, but Continued Instrument Problems Are Driving Costs
Upward, Forcing Launch Delays, and Endangering Satellite Continuity:
Over the past year, selected components of the NPOESS program have made
progress. Specifically, three of the five instruments slated for NPP
have been delivered and integrated on the spacecraft; the ground-based
satellite data processing system has been installed and tested at both
of the locations that are to receive NPP data; and the satellites'
command, control, and communications system has passed acceptance
testing. However, problems with two critical sensors continue to drive
the program's cost and schedule. Specifically, challenges with a key
sensor's (the Visible/infrared imager radiometer suite (VIIRS))
development, design, and workmanship have led to additional cost
overruns and delayed the instrument's delivery to NPP. In addition,
problems discovered during environmental testing on another key sensor
(called the Cross-track infrared sounder (CrIS)) led the contractor to
further delay its delivery to NPP and added further unanticipated costs
to the program. To address these issues, the program office halted or
delayed activities on other components (including the development of a
sensor planned for the first NPOESS satellite, called C1) and
redirected those funds to fixing VIIRS and CrIS. As a result, those
other activities now face cost increases and schedule delays.
Program officials acknowledge that NPOESS will cost more than the
$13.95 billion previously estimated, but they have not yet adopted a
new cost estimate. Program officials estimated that program costs will
grow by about $370 million due to recent technical issues experienced
on the sensors and the costs associated with halting and then
restarting work on other components of the program. In addition, the
costs associated with adding new information security requirements to
the program could reach $200 million.[Footnote 5] This estimate also
does not include approximately $410 million for operations and support
costs for the last two years of the program's life cycle (2025 and
2026). Thus, we anticipate that the overall cost of the program could
grow by about $1 billion from the current $13.95 billion estimate--
especially given the fact that difficult integration and testing of the
sensors on the NPP and C1 spacecrafts has not yet occurred.[Footnote 6]
Program officials reported that they plan to revise the program's cost
estimate over the next few weeks and to submit it for executive-level
approval by the end of June 2009.
As for the program's schedule, program officials estimate that the
delivery of VIIRS to the NPP contractor will be delayed, resulting in a
further delay in the launch of the NPP satellite to January 2011, a
year later than the date estimated during the program restructuring--
and seven months later than the June 2010 date that was established
last year. In addition, program officials estimated that the first and
second NPOESS satellites would be delayed by 14 and 5 months,
respectively, because selected development activities were halted or
slowed to address VIIRS and CrIS problems. The program's current plans
are to launch C1 in March 2014 and the second NPOESS satellite, called
C2, in May 2016. Program officials notified the Executive Committee and
DOD's acquisition authority of the schedule delays, and under DOD
acquisition rules, are required to submit a new schedule baseline by
June 2009.
These launch delays have endangered our nation's ability to ensure the
continuity of polar-orbiting satellite data. The final POES satellite,
called NOAA-19, is in an afternoon orbit and is expected to have a 5-
year lifespan. Both NPP and C1 are planned to support the afternoon
orbit. Should the NOAA-19 satellite fail before NPP is launched,
calibrated, and operational, there would be a gap in satellite data in
that orbit. Further, the delays in C1 mean that NPP will not be the
research and risk reduction satellite it was originally intended to be.
Instead, it will have to function as an operational satellite until C1
is in orbit and operational--and if C1 fails on launch or in early
operations, NPP will be needed to function until C3 is available,
currently planned for 2018. The delay in the C2 satellite launch
affects the early morning orbit. There are three more DMSP satellites
to be launched in the early and midmorning orbits, and DOD is
revisiting the launch schedules for these satellites to try to extend
them as long as possible. However, an independent review team,
established to assess key program risks, recently reported that the
constellation of satellites is extremely fragile and that a single
launch failure of a DMSP, NPOESS, or the NPP satellite could result in
a gap in satellite coverage from 3 to 5 years.
Although the program's approved cost and schedule baseline is not
achievable and the polar satellite constellation is at risk, the
Executive Committee has not yet made a decision on how to proceed with
the program. Program officials plan to propose new cost and schedule
baselines in June 2009 and have reported that they are addressing
immediate funding constraints by deferring selected activities to later
fiscal years in order to pay for VIIRS and CrIS problems; delaying the
launches of NPP, C1, and C2; and assessing alternatives for mitigating
the risk that VIIRS will continue to experience problems. Without an
executive-level decision on how to proceed, the program is proceeding
on a course that is deferring cost growth, delaying launches, and
risking its underlying mission of providing operational weather
continuity to the civil and military communities.
Executive Committee Has Not Effectively Fulfilled Its Responsibilities:
While the NPOESS Executive Committee has made improvements over the
last several years in response to prior recommendations, it has not
effectively fulfilled its responsibilities and does not have the
membership and leadership it needs to effectively or efficiently
oversee and direct the NPOESS program. Specifically, the DOD Executive
Committee member with acquisition authority does not attend Committee
meetings--and sometimes contradicts the Committee's decisions, the
Committee does not aggressively manage risks, and many of the
Committee's decisions do not achieve desired outcomes. Independent
reviewers, as well as program officials, explained that the tri-agency
structure of the program makes it very difficult to effectively manage
the program. Until these shortfalls are addressed, the Committee is
unable to effectively oversee the NPOESS program--and important issues
involving cost growth, schedule delays, and satellite continuity will
likely remain unresolved.
Executive Committee Has Responded to Past Recommendations:
We and others, including the Department of Commerce's Inspector General
in a 2006 report, have reported that the Committee was not
accomplishing its job effectively. However, since then, the Committee
has met regularly on a quarterly basis and held interim teleconferences
as needed. The Committee has also sought and reacted to advice from
external advisors by, among other actions, authorizing a government
program manager to reside onsite at the VIIRS contractor's facility to
improve oversight of the sensor's development on a day-to-day basis.
More recently, the Executive Committee sponsored a broad-based
independent review of the NPOESS program and is beginning to respond to
its recommendations.
Key Acquisition Executive Does Not Attend Executive Committee Meetings:
As established by the 1995 and 2008 memorandums of agreement signed by
all three agencies, the members of the NPOESS Executive Committee are
(1) the Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere; (2) the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics;
and (3) the NASA Administrator.[Footnote 7] Because DOD has the lead
responsibility for the NPOESS acquisition, the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics was also designated
as the milestone decision authority--the individual with the authority
to approve a major acquisition program's progression in the acquisition
process, as well as any changes to the cost, schedule, and
functionality of the acquisition.[Footnote 8] The intent of the tri-
agency memorandums was that acquisition decisions would be agreed to by
the Executive Committee before a final acquisition decision is made by
the milestone decision authority.[Footnote 9]
However, DOD's acquisition authority has never attended an Executive
Committee meeting. This individual delegated the responsibility for
attending the meetings--but not the authority to make acquisition
decisions--to the Under Secretary of the Air Force. Therefore, none of
the individuals who attend the Executive Committee meetings for the
three agencies have the authority to approve the acquisition program
baseline or major changes to the baseline. As a result, agreements
between Committee members have been overturned by the acquisition
authority, leading to significant delays.
Committee Does Not Aggressively Manage Risks:
To provide the oversight recommended by best practices,[Footnote 10]
including reviewing data and calling for corrective actions at the
first sign of cost, schedule, and performance problems and ensuring
that actions are executed and tracked to completion, the Executive
Committee holds quarterly meetings during which the program's progress
is reviewed using metrics that provide an early warning of cost,
schedule, and technical risks. However, the Committee does not
routinely document action items or track those items to closure. Some
action items were not discussed in later meetings, and in cases where
an item was discussed, it was not always clear what action was taken,
whether it was effective, and whether the item was closed.
According to the Program Executive Officer, the closing of an action
item is not always explicitly tracked because it typically involve
gathering information that is presented during later Committee
meetings. Nonetheless, by not rigorously documenting action items--
including identifying the party responsible for the action, the desired
outcome, and the time frame for completion--and then tracking the
action items to closure, the Executive Committee is not able to ensure
that its actions have achieved their intended results and to determine
whether additional changes or modifications are still needed. This
impedes the Committee's ability to effectively oversee the program,
direct risk mitigation activities, and obtain feedback on the results
of its actions.
Committee Decisions Do Not Achieve Desired Outcomes:
Best practices call for oversight boards to take corrective actions at
the first sign of cost, schedule, and performance slippages in order to
mitigate risks and achieve successful outcomes.[Footnote 11] The NPOESS
Executive Committee generally took immediate action to mitigate the
risks that were brought before them; however, a majority of these
actions were not effective--that is, they did not fully resolve the
underlying issues or result in a successful outcome. The Committee's
actions on the sensor development risks accomplished interim successes
by improving the government's oversight of a subcontractor's activities
and guiding next steps in addressing technical issues--but even with
Committee actions, the sensors' performance has continued to falter and
affect the rest of the program. Independent reviewers reported that the
tri-agency structure of the program complicated the resolution of
sensor risks because any decision could be revisited by another agency.
Program officials explained that interagency disagreements and
differing priorities make it difficult to effectively resolve issues.
Program Has Assessed Alternatives, but Has Not Yet Identified a Viable
Alternative for Acquiring the Last Two NPOESS Satellites:
When NPOESS was restructured in June 2006, the program included two
satellites (C1 and C2) and an option to have the prime contractor
produce the next two satellites (C3 and C4). In approving the
restructured program, DOD's decision authority noted that he reserved
the right to use a different satellite integrator for the final two
satellites, and that a decision on whether to exercise the option was
to be made in June 2010. To prepare for this decision, DOD required a
tri-agency assessment of alternative management strategies. This
assessment was to examine the feasibility of an alternative satellite
integrator, to estimate the cost and schedule implications of moving to
an alternative integrator, and within one year, to provide a viable
alternative to the NPOESS Executive Committee.
To address DOD's requirement, the NPOESS Program Executive Officer
sponsored two successive alternative management studies; however,
neither of the studies identified a viable alternative to the existing
satellite integrator. The Program Executive Officer plans to conduct a
final assessment of alternatives prior to the June 2010 decision on
whether to exercise the option to have the current system integrator
produce the next two NPOESS satellites. Program officials explained
that the program's evolving costs, schedules, and risks could mean that
an alternative that was not viable in the past would become viable. For
example, if the prime contractor's performance no longer meets basic
requirements, an alternative that was previously too costly to be
considered viable might become so.
Implementation of Recommendations Could Improve Management and
Oversight:
In the report being released today, we are making recommendations to
improve the timeliness and effectiveness of acquisition decision-making
on the NPOESS program. Specifically, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics to attend and participate in NPOESS Executive
Committee meetings. In addition, we are recommending that the
Secretaries of Defense and Commerce and the Administrator of NASA
direct the NPOESS Executive Committee to take the following five
actions: (1) establish a realistic time frame for revising the
program's cost and schedule baselines; (2) develop plans to mitigate
the risk of gaps in satellite continuity; (3) track the Committee's
action items from inception to closure; (4) improve the Committee's
ability to achieve successful outcomes by identifying the desired
outcome associated with each of the Committee actions, as well as time
frames and responsible parties, when new action items are established;
and (5) improve the Committee's efficiency by establishing time frames
for escalating risks to the Committee for action so that they do not
linger unresolved at the program executive level.
In written comments on a draft of our report, NASA and NOAA agreed with
our findings and recommendations and identified plans to implement
them. DOD concurred with one and partially concurred with our other
recommendations. For example, regarding our recommendation to have the
appropriate official attend Executive Committee meetings, the agency
partially concurred and noted that the Under Secretary for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics would evaluate the necessity of attending
future Executive Committee meetings. DOD also reiterated that the Under
Secretary of the Air Force was delegated authority to attend the
meetings. While we acknowledge that the Under Secretary delegated
responsibility for attending these meetings, it is an inefficient way
to make decisions and achieve outcomes in this situation. In the past,
agreements between Executive Committee members have been overturned by
the Under Secretary, leading to significant delays in key decisions.
The full text of the three agencies' comments and our evaluation of
those comments are provided in the accompanying report.
In summary, continued problems in the development of critical NPOESS
sensors have contributed to growing costs and schedule delays. Costs
are now expected to grow by as much as $1 billion over the prior life
cycle cost estimate of $13.95 billion, and problems in delivering key
sensors have led to delays in launching NPP and the first two NPOESS
satellites--by a year or more for NPP and the first NPOESS satellite.
These launch delays have endangered our nation's ability to ensure the
continuity of polar-orbiting satellite data. Specifically, if any
planned satellites fail on launch or in orbit, there would be a gap in
satellite data until the next NPOESS satellite is launched and
operational--a gap that could last for 3 to 5 years.
The NPOESS Executive Committee responsible for making cost and schedule
decisions and addressing the many and continuing risks facing the
program has not yet made important decisions on program costs,
schedules, and risks--or identified when it will do so. In addition,
the Committee has not been effective or efficient in carrying out its
oversight responsibilities. Specifically, the individual with the
authority to make acquisition decisions does not attend Committee
meetings, the Committee does not aggressively manage risks, and many of
the Committee's decisions do not achieve desired outcomes. Until the
Committee's shortfalls are addressed, important decisions may not be
effective and issues involving cost increases growth, schedule delays,
and satellite continuity may remain unresolved.
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, this concludes our
statement. We would be pleased to respond to any questions that you or
other members of the Subcommittee may have at this time.
Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
If you have any questions on matters discussed in this testimony,
please contact David A. Powner at (202) 512-9286 or at pownerd@gao.gov.
Other key contributors to this testimony include Colleen M. Phillips,
Assistant Director; Kate Agatone; Neil Doherty; Kathleen S. Lovett; Lee
McCracken; and China R. Williams.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: With Costs Increasing
and Data Continuity at Risk, Improvements Needed in Tri-agency Decision
Making, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-564]
(Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2009).
[2] Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-2, May 5, 1994.
[3] The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics delegated the responsibility for attending the meetings--but
not the authority to make acquisition decisions--to the Under Secretary
of the Air Force.
[4] Compared to original program plans, a demonstration satellite has
been delayed by approximately four and a half years, while the first
two NPOESS satellites have each been delayed by approximately five
years.
[5] These estimates are subject to further refinement because the
Executive Committee has not agreed on a cost estimating methodology and
the agencies have not yet agreed to new information security
requirements.
[6] This cost estimate includes launch vehicle costs of approximately
$329 million, which are funded outside the program's baseline.
[7] The 1995 agreement specified that the NASA member would be the
Deputy Administrator. Responsibility was subsequently taken over by the
Administrator of NASA.
[8] According to DOD, the milestone decision authority is the
designated individual who has overall responsibility for an investment.
This person has the authority to approve a major acquisition program's
progression in the acquisition process and is responsible for reporting
cost, schedule, and performance results.
[9] The 1995 and 2008 memorandums of agreement differ slightly in this
regard. The first agreement stated that DOD's milestone decision
authority will make acquisition decisions with concurrence of the other
Executive Committee members, while the second agreement states that the
DOD authority must consider Committee decisions. The second agreement
takes precedence in the case of a conflict.
[10] GAO, Information Technology Investment Management: A Framework for
Assessing and Improving Process Maturity, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-394G] (Washington, D.C.: March
2004).
[11] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-394G].
[End of section]
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