U.S. Tsunami Preparedness
NOAA Has Expanded Its Tsunami Programs, but Improved Planning Could Enhance Effectiveness Gao ID: GAO-10-490 April 28, 2010In June 2006, GAO reported a number of concerns about the level of U.S. tsunami preparedness. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) leads U.S. efforts through three key programs: the Tsunami Program, which focuses on detection and warning activities; the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP), which is a partnership with federal and state agencies focusing on hazard assessment and mitigation; and TsunamiReady, which is a partnership with at-risk communities focusing on education and emergency planning. The Tsunami Warning and Education Act of 2006 directed improvements in NOAA's warning and mitigation efforts and mandated GAO to report on its progress. This report addresses (1) the extent to which NOAA developed effective strategic plans for its tsunami programs and (2) the status of NOAA's efforts to strengthen and expand the programs and move tsunami research to application. GAO analyzed NOAA documents and interviewed federal, state, and local officials responsible for tsunami planning and preparedness efforts.
NOAA adopted strategic plans for the Tsunami Program in 2008 and NTHMP in 2009, which it developed by following key planning practices and including most of the critical components of strategic plans identified by leading organizations, but some components have not been fully developed. GAO found that NOAA's planning process followed practices critical to creating effective strategic plans, such as involving stakeholders. Both plans also include most of the components of effective strategic plans--such as mission statements and long-term goals--but other necessary components were missing or incomplete. For example, in the Tsunami Program's strategic plan, NOAA identified nine long-term goals but did not identify strategies and performance measures for three of them. Similarly, in the strategic plan for NTHMP, NOAA identified eight long-term goals but did not identify performance measures, milestones, or who is responsible for achieving one of the goals. Although the strategic plan for NTHMP includes a goal for the TsunamiReady program, it does not identify strategies for achieving the goal. Since 2005, NOAA has made progress in expanding and strengthening its tsunami warning and mitigation capabilities but faces challenges in both areas, as well as in moving its tsunami research to application. To enhance its warning capabilities, NOAA has, among other actions, deployed 39 tsunami detection buoys. Operating and maintaining the buoys, however, has been difficult and costly, consuming about 28 percent of the fiscal year 2009 Tsunami Program budget. NOAA is exploring ways to reduce maintenance costs by improving buoy reliability. To enhance its tsunami hazard mitigation efforts, NOAA expanded NTHMP membership from the 5 Pacific Coast states to all 29 at-risk coastal U.S. states and territories, changed how it funds mitigation projects in states and territories, and restructured NTHMP to better meet its program goals. NOAA's efforts to mitigate tsunami impacts through its TsunamiReady program, however, have been hampered by limited community participation. Although the number of TsunamiReady communities has increased from 27 in 2006 to 74 as of February 2010, overall participation in this voluntary program remains relatively low among the more than 760 communities identified as at risk for a tsunami. In this regard, GAO recommended in 2006 that NOAA conduct an assessment to identify potential barriers to program participation. Although NOAA has not yet conducted this assessment, GAO continues to believe that such an assessment is needed to help inform the agency's strategic planning efforts. Finally, NOAA has not complied with the Tsunami Warning and Education Act's requirement to develop and execute a plan for the transfer of technology from research into the Tsunami Program. Furthermore, NOAA's initial failure to follow its agencywide research transition policy contributed to a 2-year delay in moving the new tsunami forecasting system from research to application in its tsunami warning centers. Only after NOAA developed a transition plan in 2009 that was consistent with the agencywide policy did the transition of the system begin to move forward more efficiently.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Anu K. Mittal Team: Government Accountability Office: Natural Resources and Environment Phone: (202) 512-9846GAO-10-490, U.S. Tsunami Preparedness: NOAA Has Expanded Its Tsunami Programs, but Improved Planning Could Enhance Effectiveness
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
April 2010:
U.S. Tsunami Preparedness:
NOAA Has Expanded Its Tsunami Programs, but Improved Planning Could
Enhance Effectiveness:
GAO-10-490:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-490, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
In June 2006, GAO reported a number of concerns about the level of
U.S. tsunami preparedness. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) leads U.S. efforts through three key programs:
the Tsunami Program, which focuses on detection and warning
activities; the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP),
which is a partnership with federal and state agencies focusing on
hazard assessment and mitigation; and TsunamiReady, which is a
partnership with at-risk communities focusing on education and
emergency planning. The Tsunami Warning and Education Act of 2006
directed improvements in NOAA‘s warning and mitigation efforts and
mandated GAO to report on its progress. This report addresses (1) the
extent to which NOAA developed effective strategic plans for its
tsunami programs and (2) the status of NOAA‘s efforts to strengthen
and expand the programs and move tsunami research to application. GAO
analyzed NOAA documents and interviewed federal, state, and local
officials responsible for tsunami planning and preparedness efforts.
What GAO Found:
NOAA adopted strategic plans for the Tsunami Program in 2008 and NTHMP
in 2009, which it developed by following key planning practices and
including most of the critical components of strategic plans
identified by leading organizations, but some components have not been
fully developed. GAO found that NOAA‘s planning process followed
practices critical to creating effective strategic plans, such as
involving stakeholders. Both plans also include most of the components
of effective strategic plans”such as mission statements and long-term
goals”but other necessary components were missing or incomplete. For
example, in the Tsunami Program‘s strategic plan, NOAA identified nine
long-term goals but did not identify strategies and performance
measures for three of them. Similarly, in the strategic plan for
NTHMP, NOAA identified eight long-term goals but did not identify
performance measures, milestones, or who is responsible for achieving
one of the goals. Although the strategic plan for NTHMP includes a
goal for the TsunamiReady program, it does not identify strategies for
achieving the goal.
Since 2005, NOAA has made progress in expanding and strengthening its
tsunami warning and mitigation capabilities but faces challenges in
both areas, as well as in moving its tsunami research to application.
To enhance its warning capabilities, NOAA has, among other actions,
deployed 39 tsunami detection buoys. Operating and maintaining the
buoys, however, has been difficult and costly, consuming about 28
percent of the fiscal year 2009 Tsunami Program budget. NOAA is
exploring ways to reduce maintenance costs by improving buoy
reliability. To enhance its tsunami hazard mitigation efforts, NOAA
expanded NTHMP membership from the 5 Pacific Coast states to all 29 at-
risk coastal U.S. states and territories, changed how it funds
mitigation projects in states and territories, and restructured NTHMP
to better meet its program goals. NOAA‘s efforts to mitigate tsunami
impacts through its TsunamiReady program, however, have been hampered
by limited community participation. Although the number of
TsunamiReady communities has increased from 27 in 2006 to 74 as of
February 2010, overall participation in this voluntary program remains
relatively low among the more than 760 communities identified as at
risk for a tsunami. In this regard, GAO recommended in 2006 that NOAA
conduct an assessment to identify potential barriers to program
participation. Although NOAA has not yet conducted this assessment,
GAO continues to believe that such an assessment is needed to help
inform the agency‘s strategic planning efforts. Finally, NOAA has not
complied with the Tsunami Warning and Education Act‘s requirement to
develop and execute a plan for the transfer of technology from
research into the Tsunami Program. Furthermore, NOAA‘s initial failure
to follow its agencywide research transition policy contributed to a 2-
year delay in moving the new tsunami forecasting system from research
to application in its tsunami warning centers. Only after NOAA
developed a transition plan in 2009 that was consistent with the
agencywide policy did the transition of the system begin to move
forward more efficiently.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that NOAA revise its tsunami strategic plans to ensure
that all plan components are complete and develop a transition plan
specifically for tsunami research. NOAA reviewed a draft of this
report and agreed with its recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-490] or key
components. For more information, contact Anu Mittal at (202) 512-
3841or mittala@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
NOAA Followed Key Planning Practices and Generally Included Critical
Components in Developing Its Tsunami Programs' Strategic Plans:
NOAA Has Expanded and Strengthened Its Tsunami Programs, but Some
Challenges Remain:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Commerce:
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Status of NOAA's Strategic Plans for the Tsunami Program and
NTHMP:
Table 2: Number of TsunamiReady Communities and At-Risk Communities as
of February 2010:
Figures:
Figure 1: Configuration of DART Detection Buoy System:
Figure 2: Tsunami Program Funding by Activity, Fiscal Years 1997
through 2009:
Figure 3: Tsunami Program Funding Priorities, Fiscal Years 1997
through 2009:
Figure 4: Areas of Responsibility of U.S. Tsunami Warning Centers:
Figure 5: U.S. DART Detection Buoy Locations:
Figure 6: NOAA's Process for Moving Research to Application:
Abbreviations:
DART: Deep-ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis:
NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration:
NTHMP: National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program:
PMEL: Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory:
SIFT: Short-term Inundation Forecasting for Tsunamis:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
April 28, 2010:
The Honorable Maria Cantwell:
Chairman:
The Honorable Olympia J. Snowe:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard:
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Brian Baird:
Chairman:
The Honorable Bob Inglis:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment:
Committee on Science and Technology:
House of Representatives:
On September 29, 2009, the U.S. territory of American Samoa was struck
by a tsunami that hit the island within 20 minutes after a strong
underwater earthquake, destroying coastal infrastructure and killing
over 190 people in the region. Although such damaging tsunamis are
relatively rare,[Footnote 1] the destruction caused by this event--as
well as by the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the February
2010 tsunami that struck Chilean shores after a magnitude 8.8
earthquake--has shown the importance of having a robust system to
detect, issue warnings for, and mitigate the impacts of tsunamis.
According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), the Pacific Coast states of Alaska, California, Hawaii,
Oregon, and Washington, as well as Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin
Islands in the Caribbean Sea, face the greatest tsunami hazard in the
United States and its territories. In comparison, the U.S. East and
Gulf Coasts are relatively low-hazard areas.
Federal, state, and local government agencies are all involved in
efforts to reduce the potential impacts of tsunamis. NOAA's Tsunami
Program is primarily responsible for federal tsunami detection and
warning activities. Under this program, NOAA's National Weather
Service operates two tsunami warning centers, which monitor data from
seismic networks operated by NOAA, the U.S. Geological Survey, states,
and universities, and issue warnings when tsunamis are likely.
[Footnote 2] NOAA's Tsunami Program also provides leadership and
funding for the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP).
This program, begun in 1996, is a partnership among NOAA, the U.S.
Geological Survey, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and
coastal state emergency management and geological agencies to assess
tsunami hazards, improve and coordinate tsunami warning systems, and
develop state and local hazard mitigation programs. In addition, NTHMP
has taken a lead role in overseeing and making recommendations for
improving the TsunamiReady preparedness program. TsunamiReady is a
voluntary program that encourages local communities to educate
citizens on tsunami hazards, develop tsunami mitigation plans, and
establish local warning systems; the program also confers TsunamiReady
recognition on communities that meet its guidelines.
In June 2006, we reported that NOAA faced significant challenges in
reducing the potential impacts of tsunamis on U.S. coastal
communities.[Footnote 3] Specifically, we reported that NOAA was
significantly expanding its tsunami warning, mitigation, and research
efforts in the wake of the Indian Ocean event, but the Tsunami Program
and NTHMP lacked long-range strategic plans. We also reported that
although the two tsunami warning centers could quickly detect and warn
of potential tsunamis, false alarms called into question the accuracy
and reliability of the warnings. Further, the efforts of at-risk
communities to mitigate potential tsunami impacts varied widely, and
few communities had chosen to participate in the TsunamiReady
preparedness program. We recommended that NOAA take actions to help
communities determine the potential impact of tsunamis, reduce the
number of false alarms, improve testing of the warning system,
identify barriers to participation in TsunamiReady, evaluate the NTHMP
to assist in strategic planning, and develop comprehensive strategic
plans for the Tsunami Program and NTHMP.
Subsequently, in December 2006, Congress passed the Tsunami Warning
and Education Act to improve the Tsunami Program's warning,
mitigation, and research efforts nationwide.[Footnote 4] The acts'
purposes include enhancing and modernizing the existing detection and
warning system for the Pacific Ocean and expanding this system to
include other vulnerable states and territories in the Atlantic Ocean,
Caribbean Sea, and Gulf of Mexico. The act also requires NOAA's
National Weather Service to develop and execute a transition plan for
moving technology from its research efforts into application within
the forecasting and warning program. In addition, the act mandates
that we evaluate and report to relevant congressional committees by
January 31, 2010, the status of NOAA's efforts. We reported our
preliminary findings in a briefing to the staff of the Senate
Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard, of the
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and to the staff
of the House Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, of the Committee
on Science and Technology, on December 11, 2009. We are following up
with this report, which provides more detail on the topics covered in
the briefing. This report addresses (1) the extent to which NOAA
developed effective strategic plans for the Tsunami Program and NTHMP
and (2) the status of NOAA's efforts since 2005 to strengthen and
expand the programs and move tsunami research to application.
To assess the extent to which NOAA developed effective strategic plans
for the Tsunami Program and NTHMP, we reviewed the practices NOAA used
to develop the programs' strategic plans and compared them with key
practices used by leading organizations we had previously identified.
[Footnote 5] We also compared the strategic plans' components with
critical components that should be included in strategic plans as
identified by leading organizations and our prior work.[Footnote 6] In
addition, we reviewed agency documents and interviewed NOAA officials
about the processes and components of each plan. To describe the
status of efforts since 2005 to improve the tsunami programs and move
tsunami research to application, we reviewed program requirements in
the Tsunami Warning and Education Act and analyzed NOAA documents to
help determine the extent to which the agency has implemented efforts
to strengthen the programs' warning and mitigation components. We
visited NOAA's tsunami warning centers in Alaska and Hawaii and met
with the centers' directors and staff to discuss their tsunami
detection and warning efforts. We discussed the status of NOAA's
tsunami warning and mitigation efforts with federal, state, and local
officials, including NTHMP participants and officials from Alabama,
Alaska, California, Hawaii, Maryland, Oregon, and Washington to
determine the extent to which services have changed. We also analyzed
NOAA's policy and implementation procedures for the transition of
research to application and interviewed NOAA officials about how such
transitions in the Tsunami Program have been implemented, focusing on
the ongoing effort to move tsunami forecasting research to application
in the tsunami warning centers. We assessed the reliability of the
NOAA data that we used, by reviewing agency documentation and
interviewing agency officials about the data's sources and uses, and
found them to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
We conducted this performance audit from May 2009 to April 2010, in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
A tsunami is a series of ocean waves typically generated by an
underwater earthquake.[Footnote 7] The size of the resulting tsunami
depends on a complex set of factors, including the earthquake's
magnitude, its depth below the ocean floor, depth of the overlying
water, type and amount of seafloor movement, and energy released. A
tsunami wave may be very small in the deep ocean, but as it approaches
land, it can increase to tens of feet in height and reach shore as a
fast-moving wall of turbulent water. Tsunamis can be classified as
local or distant. A tsunami generated by an earthquake off the coast
of Alaska would be considered a local tsunami for that state's coastal
areas, striking within minutes of the event, while the same event
would be considered a distant tsunami for the coast of Washington,
which would not likely be hit until 3 or more hours later. Both types
of tsunami pose an inundation threat to low-lying coastal communities
from multiple destructive waves that can penetrate far inland. Local
tsunamis pose particular emergency preparedness challenges because
there may not be enough time to sound a warning. In this situation,
public education and outreach can save lives by teaching the community
to recognize the emergency and move immediately to higher ground.
The process that the tsunami warning centers use to detect potential
tsunamis and issue warnings involves several steps. The warning
centers first monitor and evaluate data from seismic networks, and if
a tsunami is likely, they transmit a tsunami warning message to NOAA's
weather-forecasting offices and state emergency management centers,
among others. The warning centers also monitor coastal water-level
data, as well as data from NOAA's network of Deep-ocean Assessment and
Reporting of Tsunamis (DART) detection buoys, to determine if a
tsunami has actually been generated and, if not, to cancel any warning
(see figure 1). NOAA's Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory (PMEL)
conducted the research and developed the DART buoys and conducts other
research in support of the Tsunami Program, such as the development of
tsunami inundation forecast models for at-risk locations. Tsunami
forecast models are used by scientists at the warning centers and the
research laboratory to help estimate the size of the expected waves
and their potential impact on coastal areas. For example, after a
massive magnitude 8.8 earthquake off the coast of Chile in February
2010, NOAA scientists initially warned that tsunami waves of about 8
feet could strike Hawaii, but as the tsunami moved across the Pacific,
the forecast models helped to more accurately predict the
approximately 3-foot tsunami waves that actually struck the islands
more than 12 hours after the earthquake.
Figure 1: Configuration of DART Detection Buoy System:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Depicted in the illustration are the following:
Satellite: Two-way communication with:
Tsunami warning center;
Surface Buoy (anchored by Mooring line).
Surface Buoy: Two-way communication with:
DART detection buoy (Recording device):
Consists of an anchored recording device on the seafloor and a
companion buoy moored at the surface. The seafloor device can detect
changes in water pressure and seafloor movement and transmits the
information to the surface buoy; the surface buoy transmits the data
to NOAA via satellite.
Source: GAO and PMEL.
[End of figure]
NOAA allocates its annual appropriations and other funds to three main
categories of activities in its Tsunami Program:
* warning: including activities pertaining to tsunami warning centers,
DART buoys, seismic and sea-level monitoring networks, and tsunami
data management;
* mitigation: including activities pertaining to NTHMP, TsunamiReady,
and the International Tsunami Information Center;[Footnote 8] and:
* research: including activities conducted by PMEL and the National
Data Buoy Center.[Footnote 9]
From fiscal year 1997 through fiscal year 2004, NOAA's allocations to
fund tsunami activities remained fairly constant, ranging from about
$5 million to $10 million. After the Indian Ocean tsunami, funding
increased significantly, from about $27 million in fiscal year 2005 to
$42 million in fiscal year 2009 (see figure 2).
Figure 2: Tsunami Program Funding by Activity, Fiscal Years 1997
through 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Annual funding:
Fiscal year: 1997;
Warning: $2 million;
Mitigation: $3 million;
Research: $1 million.
Fiscal year: 1998;
Warning: $2 million;
Mitigation: $3 million;
Research: $1 million.
Fiscal year: 1999;
Warning: $2 million;
Mitigation: $3 million;
Research: $1 million.
Fiscal year: 2000;
Warning: $2 million;
Mitigation: $2 million;
Research: $1 million.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Warning: $3 million;
Mitigation: $4 million;
Research: $1 million.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Warning: $3 million;
Mitigation: $4 million;
Research: $1 million.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Warning: $3 million;
Mitigation: $3 million;
Research: $1 million.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Warning: $5 million;
Mitigation: $5 million;
Research: $1 million.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Warning: $17 million;
Mitigation: $9 million;
Research: $2 million.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Warning: $12 million;
Mitigation: $5 million;
Research: $1 million.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Warning: $19 million;
Mitigation: $6 million;
Research: $2 million.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Warning: $18 million;
Mitigation: $8 million;
Research: $2 million.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Warning: $27 million;
Mitigation: $12 million;
Research: $3 million.
Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data.
[End of figure]
While funding levels generally increased from fiscal year 1997 through
fiscal year 2009 for all three categories of tsunami-related
activities, according to NOAA officials, the proportion allocated to
warning increased from about 40 percent from fiscal year 1997 through
fiscal year 2004 to approximately 70 percent of total program funding
from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2009 (see figure 3). In
comparison, the proportion allocated to mitigation decreased from
about 50 percent from fiscal year 1997 through fiscal year 2004 to
approximately 30 percent of total funding from fiscal year 2005
through fiscal year 2009, and the proportion of research funding
remained relatively constant, at about 6 to 10 percent of the total.
Figure 3: Tsunami Program Funding Priorities, Fiscal Years 1997
through 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph]
Percentage of tsunami funding:
Fiscal year: 1997;
Research: 11%;
Mitigation: 47%;
Warning: 42%.
Fiscal year: 1998;
Research: 12%;
Mitigation: 46%;
Warning: 43%.
Fiscal year: 1999;
Research: 12%;
Mitigation: 45%;
Warning: 43%.
Fiscal year: 2000;
Research: 12%;
Mitigation: 43%;
Warning: 45%.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Research: 10%;
Mitigation: 52%;
Warning: 37%.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Research: 10%;
Mitigation: 52%;
Warning: 38%.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Research: 12%;
Mitigation: 43%;
Warning: 44%.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Research: 7%;
Mitigation: 46%;
Warning: 47%.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Research: 6%;
Mitigation: 33%;
Warning: 61%.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Research: 7%;
Mitigation: 27%;
Warning: 66%.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Research: 6%;
Mitigation: 22%;
Warning: 72%.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Research: 8%;
Mitigation: 28%;
Warning: 64%.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Research: 8%;
Mitigation: 28%;
Warning: 64%.
Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data.
[End of figure]
Starting in fiscal year 2009, funding for the Tsunami Program--
including all three categories of tsunami-related activity--received a
significant boost from the proceeds of the Federal Communication
Commission's auctioning of the broadcast frequency spectrum previously
devoted to carrying analog television signals. The auction proceeds
are to provide a total of about $50 million to the program through
fiscal year 2012, when this funding will expire. In fiscal year 2009,
spectrum auction funding provided $13.7 million, which amounted to 32
percent of the $42 million of total Tsunami Program funding for the
year. The program also benefits from significant in-kind support and
resources, such as data from seismic and water-level monitors operated
by other agencies or nations; NOAA has not estimated the monetary
value of this support.
NOAA Followed Key Planning Practices and Generally Included Critical
Components in Developing Its Tsunami Programs' Strategic Plans:
The planning processes NOAA used to develop its Tsunami Program and
NTHMP strategic plans followed the three key practices leading
organizations use to create effective strategic plans. The plans also
generally include the critical components of effective plans--such as
mission statements and long-term goals--and are closely linked through
their goals and strategies, but some components of the plans have not
been fully developed.
NOAA Followed Key Planning Practices to Develop Its Strategic Plans:
In our prior work, we identified three key practices that were
critical for leading organizations to follow in the creation of
effective strategic plans:[Footnote 10]
* Involving stakeholders, such as federal agencies, state governments,
or others, in defining the mission and desired outcomes helps ensure
that their expectations and interests are met and that resources and
efforts are targeted at the program's highest priorities.
* Assessing external and internal forces helps managers anticipate
future challenges and make adjustments before potential problems
become crises. For example, external forces--such as emerging
technological trends and new statutory requirements--and internal
forces--such as culture, management practices, and business processes--
may influence the program's ability to achieve its goals.
* Aligning program activities to support mission-related outcomes
helps ensure that programs effectively and efficiently produce
services that meet customers' needs and stakeholders' interests.
Assessing the extent to which a program's activities, processes, and
resources contribute to meeting its mission and desired outcomes can
identify inadequate or obsolete organizational structures that need to
be changed.
NOAA adopted strategic plans in 2008 for the Tsunami Program and in
2009 for NTHMP. We found that NOAA's planning process for developing
these plans included the three key practices. Specifically, to develop
the Tsunami Program's strategic plan, NOAA assembled a planning
committee of relevant agency officials, who drafted the plan, and then
involved stakeholders, including NTHMP members, by giving them the
opportunity to review and comment on the draft plan. The planning
committee assessed the external and internal forces relevant to the
program by analyzing the program's strengths, weaknesses,
opportunities, and threats. For example, the planning committee
determined that the tsunami warning centers were issuing confusing
information statements during events, an internal weakness that
threatened its warning mission. In addition, as the planning committee
developed the Tsunami Program's strategic plan, NOAA officials aligned
the program's structure to meet the purpose of the program as provided
in the Tsunami Warning and Education Act and to ensure that its
activities supported this mission. For example, the plan identifies
four areas of responsibility in the Tsunami Program that align with
the main sections of the act: (1) tsunami forecasting and warning, (2)
National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program, (3) tsunami research, and
(4) global tsunami warning and mitigation.
Likewise, when developing the NTHMP's strategic plan, NOAA assembled a
planning committee of stakeholders and then shared a draft of the
strategic plan with all NTHMP members to incorporate their comments,
helping to ensure that their interests and expectations were met.
According to NOAA officials, the planning committee assessed the
external and internal forces potentially affecting the NTHMP, as was
done for the Tsunami Program. For example, the analysis identified
certain NTHMP goals that depended on external forces, such as state
and local agencies, and were therefore beyond the program's full
control. Finally, NTHMP's strategic plan was organized to align its
goals and strategies with key components of the program as identified
in the Tsunami Warning and Education Act, specifically, to coordinate
warning activities, promote and improve community education and
mitigation, and improve the quality and extent of inundation modeling
and mapping.[Footnote 11]
NOAA's Tsunami Strategic Plans Generally Include Critical Components,
but Some Are Missing or Incomplete:
Our past work has shown that effective strategic plans should include
six critical components:[Footnote 12]
* A comprehensive mission statement that explains why a program exists
and tells what it does.
* Long-term goals and objectives that specify how an agency will carry
out its mission and explain what results are expected from the program.
* Strategies to achieve the goals and objectives that are specific
enough to allow an assessment of whether they will help achieve those
goals. For example, strategies may describe the processes, skills,
technologies, and resources needed to achieve a program's goals and
objectives.
* A description of how performance measures will be used to assess
progress toward long-term goals, including (1) the specific activities
within the program that will be assessed for performance and (2) the
target level of performance to be achieved for each measure.
* The identification of external factors that could significantly
affect achievement of the strategic goals, such as economic trends or
actions by Congress, state and federal agencies, or other entities.
Assessing external factors helps agencies evaluate the likelihood of
achieving strategic goals that depend on the actions of others.
* A description of how program evaluations are to be used to establish
or revise strategic goals and a schedule of future planned evaluations.
We found that the Tsunami Program and NTHMP strategic plans generally
include most of the critical components of effective strategic plans.
Specifically, for the Tsunami Program's strategic plan, we found that
it identifies the program's mission, nine long-term goals for meeting
its mission, strategies to achieve most of the goals, activities to
implement the strategies, and some performance measures to assess
progress. Additionally, during the planning process, the Tsunami
Program's strategic planning team identified factors external to the
program that could significantly affect achievement of the strategic
goals. For example, the planning committee identified current support
from the U.S. Geological Survey, which provides seismic data, as one
external factor that, if changed, could affect the program's ability
to achieve its goals. Also, the planning committee reviewed relevant
program evaluations, such as our 2006 report, to incorporate these
findings and recommendations into the strategic plan.
Nevertheless, some key components of the Tsunami Program's strategic
plan are not fully developed. For example, although the plan
identifies nine long-term goals, it does not identify strategies,
performance measures, or the agency offices responsible for achieving
the strategies for three of the goals. These three goals are (1)
provide technical assistance, training, and capacity development both
at global and regional levels, supporting a fully operational tsunami
warning system; (2) integrate with other relevant national, regional,
and global ocean and coastal observation, warning, mitigation, and
risk management systems; and (3) develop effective networks to
disseminate tsunami information to the public through partnerships
with formal and informal education entities. Furthermore, while the
strategic plan lists performance measures for six goals that the
program aims to achieve from 2008 to 2017, some are vague or lack a
specific date for completion. For example, "reduce the cost for the
DART network operation and maintenance" is one of the performance
measures. This measure may not be a useful one, however, for the goal
of having timely and accurate tsunami forecast and warning products
because the measure lacks a specific target for cost reduction and a
date for achieving it. The Tsunami Program manager acknowledged these
limitations in the strategic plan but said that although the plan did
not contain strategies and performance measures for the three goals,
the planning committee had developed an action plan, separate from the
strategic plan, which identified specific tasks to complete each year
to help reach the goals. The program manager also told us that the
planning committee was hampered in its efforts to identify performance
measures for the three goals because they were very general, and no
performance data existed to provide a baseline against which to
measure progress.
Similarly, we found that NOAA also used a planning committee to create
a strategic plan for the NTHMP that includes nearly all the critical
components of an effective plan. For example, to achieve NTHMP's
mission "to reduce loss of life and property damage from tsunamis,"
the strategic plan identifies eight long-term goals. For most of these
goals, the plan identifies several strategies and performance
measures. For example, for the goal of having "tsunami inundation maps
that support informed decision making in tsunami-threatened
communities," the strategic plan lists several strategies designed to
help achieve the goal, one of which is to "develop guidelines for
tsunami inundation maps." The plan also names NTHMP's Mapping and
Modeling Subcommittee as responsible for executing the strategy. Next,
the plan identifies a performance measure for this strategy--that "new
NTHMP-funded maps...will meet established guidelines by 2012"--so that
program officials can assess progress toward implementation. The NTHMP
strategic planning committee also considered external factors and
reviewed program evaluations as it developed the program's strategic
plan, according to NOAA officials. For example, as it developed the
plan, the planning committee took into account the recommendations of
several reviews, including our 2006 report and a 2005 National Science
and Technology Council report on reducing tsunami risk in the United
States.[Footnote 13] We also found that the Tsunami Program and NTHMP
strategic plans are closely linked to each other in that some of the
Tsunami Program's goals and strategies are actually met through
NTHMP's actions. For example, the Tsunami Program identifies NTHMP as
one of five key strategies to achieve its own goals.
Nevertheless, as with the Tsunami Program's strategic plan, we found
that some of the components of NTHMP's strategic plan are missing or
not fully developed. For example, although the plan identifies eight
long-term goals, it does not identify performance measures,
milestones, or who is responsible for achieving the goal of developing
understandable and effective tsunami warning center communications,
such as tsunami warning messages for communities. According to the
Tsunami Program manager, the NTHMP planning committee did not
establish performance measures or milestones because achieving this
goal is actually the responsibility of the warning centers, with
guidance from NTHMP. In addition, the NTHMP strategic plan contains a
goal of establishing more tsunami-resilient communities and
establishes a performance measure of increasing the number of
TsunamiReady communities to 105 by 2013. The plan does not, however,
contain any specific strategies for increasing the number of
communities. The TsunamiReady program manager told us that the NTHMP
plans to develop goals, strategies, and performance measures for the
TsunamiReady program in 2013, after new program recognition guidelines
are issued.
Table 1 summarizes our analysis of the extent to which the Tsunami
Program and NTHMP plans include the critical components of strategic
plans.
Table 1: Status of NOAA's Strategic Plans for the Tsunami Program and
NTHMP:
Strategic plan components: Mission statement;
Tsunami Program strategic plan: included;
NTHMP strategic plan: included.
Strategic plan components: Long-term goals and objectives;
Tsunami Program strategic plan: included;
NTHMP strategic plan: included.
Strategic plan components: Strategies to achieve goals;
Tsunami Program strategic plan: partially included;
NTHMP strategic plan: partially included.
Strategic plan components: Performance measures;
Tsunami Program strategic plan: partially included;
NTHMP strategic plan: partially included.
Strategic plan components: External factors;
Tsunami Program strategic plan: included;
NTHMP strategic plan: included.
Strategic plan components: Evaluations;
Tsunami Program strategic plan: included;
NTHMP strategic plan: included.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of table]
NOAA Has Expanded and Strengthened Its Tsunami Programs, but Some
Challenges Remain:
Since our 2006 report, NOAA has made progress in expanding and
strengthening its tsunami warning and mitigation capabilities, but
maintaining a reliable DART detection buoy network and increasing
community participation in the TsunamiReady program have proven to be
challenging. In addition, NOAA's initial failure to follow its
agencywide research transition policy contributed to about a 2-year
delay in moving a new tsunami forecast system from research to
application in the warning centers, and NOAA has not complied with the
Tsunami Warning and Education Act's requirement that it develop and
execute a plan for the transfer of technology from ongoing research
into the tsunami forecasting and warning program.
NOAA Has Strengthened Its Tsunami Warning Capabilities While Efforts
to Improve Reliability and Reduce the Costs of Its DART Detection Buoy
Network Continue:
In 2006, NOAA strengthened its tsunami warning capabilities by
expanding the operating hours and geographic areas of responsibility
for both of its tsunami warning centers. Before the strengthening
effort, each of the warning centers operated with staff on site 8
hours a day, 5 days a week, with personnel on standby the remainder of
the time. NOAA has since increased staffing levels to operate the
warning centers with staff on site 24 hours, 7 days a week.
Additionally, NOAA expanded the geographic area for which each warning
center is responsible. As shown in figure 4, the West Coast/Alaska
Tsunami Warning Center is responsible for warning Alaska and coastal
states of the U.S. mainland, as well as Canada, Puerto Rico, and the
U.S. Virgin Islands. The Pacific Tsunami Warning Center is responsible
for warning Hawaii and U.S. territories in the Pacific Ocean, as well
as over 90 countries across the Pacific,[Footnote 14] Indian, and
Caribbean basins.[Footnote 15]
Figure 4: Areas of Responsibility of U.S. Tsunami Warning Centers:
[Refer to PDF for image: world map]
The following areas of responsibility are depicted on the map:
West Coast/Alaska Tsunami Warning Center (WC/ATWC);
Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC).
Source: NOAA.
[End of figure]
To improve its ability to detect tsunamis, NOAA upgraded and expanded
its observational networks for monitoring seismic activity and changes
in coastal water levels, and it deployed additional DART buoys to
detect deep-ocean tsunami waves far from shore. Since 2005, NOAA has
installed new seismic stations in Hawaii and Alaska and integrated its
stations with stations maintained by the U.S. Geological Survey, which
has installed new stations in the Caribbean. Additional enhancements
to other seismic monitoring stations operated by the U.S. Geological
Survey in partnership with the National Science Foundation were
completed to increase the number of stations capable of transmitting
seismic data during an event.[Footnote 16] In the Pacific Ocean and
Caribbean Sea, NOAA also added 16 new water-level monitoring stations
and upgraded 33 existing stations to support tsunami detection.
[Footnote 17] The new and upgraded water-level stations are now
capable of providing data on changes in water level to the warning
centers faster and more often to confirm whether a seismic event has
actually generated a tsunami. Additionally, in March 2008, NOAA
completed its 3-year project to expand the network of DART detection
buoys from 6 to 39 buoys. These buoys are strategically deployed
across the Pacific, Atlantic, and Caribbean basins, as shown in figure
5, in regions with a history of generating tsunamis.
Figure 5: U.S. DART Detection Buoy Locations:
[Refer to PDF for image: world map]
U.S. DART Detection Buoy locations are depicted on the map.
Source: NOAA.
[End of figure]
To enhance its tsunami forecasting capabilities, NOAA began
implementing in 2006 a new tsunami forecasting system developed by
PMEL, called the Short-term Inundation Forecasting for Tsunamis
(SIFT), which uses data from the DART detection buoys. NOAA's tsunami
warning centers have been relying on a model that uses location and
magnitude data from previous earthquakes in the Pacific Ocean to
predict whether a seismic event could generate a tsunami, the
potential wave heights, and possible impact areas.[Footnote 18] The
new forecast system will supplement the existing model by providing
estimates of additional tsunami characteristics, such as current
velocities and inundation levels, for 75 specific coastal locations.
[Footnote 19] Additionally, the SIFT system uses deep-ocean tsunami
wave measurements to produce, before the wave reaches shore, a more
precise forecast than the existing model's. DART buoys provide data
the SIFT system needs by detecting small changes in deep-ocean waves
and quickly transmitting these data to the warning centers. Although
warning center officials expressed concerns to us about SIFT's
complexity and the staff time needed to operate the system during an
event, they acknowledged that it provides a more accurate forecast
than the existing model. NOAA is currently testing the SIFT system for
use in the tsunami warning centers.
Collectively, NOAA's data indicate that its efforts have enhanced its
tsunami detection capabilities and contributed to more accurate and
timely warnings. For example, NOAA's data indicate that the tsunami
warning centers have a 100 percent detection rate for tsunamis
generated within their areas of responsibility since fiscal year 2005.
NOAA has also reduced the time needed after a seismic event for the
warning centers to issue a warning message. For example, the time
needed for the warning centers to issue a message for a distantly
generated tsunami has been reduced from an average of 24 minutes in
fiscal year 2005 to 15.7 minutes in fiscal year 2009,[Footnote 20] and
the time needed for a local event has been reduced from an average of
9.9 minutes in fiscal year 2005 to 5.8 minutes in fiscal year 2009.
The warning centers have likewise made progress reducing false alarms,
both in terms of reducing the extent of areas subject to a tsunami
warning, as well as shortening the time that areas remain under a
warning. For example, in fiscal year 2009, NOAA reduced the average
time from initial warning to cancellation to about 90 minutes,
surpassing its fiscal year 2013 goal of reducing the time that areas
remain under warning from 3 hours to less than 2 hours.
While NOAA has improved its tsunami warning capabilities, maintaining
the reliability of the DART detection buoys has been challenging and
costly. The Tsunami Warning and Education Act requires NOAA, through
the National Weather Service, to ensure that maintaining operational
tsunami detection equipment is the Tsunami Program's highest priority.
When DART buoys are out of service, they cannot detect tsunamis or
transmit data to the tsunami warning centers. According to NOAA
records on DART buoy performance from July 2006 to August 2009, data
were available from the buoys, on average, about 84 percent of the
time, and according to officials, about one or two buoy outages
occurred per month.[Footnote 21] In general, data availability goes
down and the number of buoy outages goes up during the winter months,
when maintenance is virtually impossible because of harsh ocean
conditions. The situation reverses during the spring and summer
months, when NOAA runs its scheduled buoy maintenance cruise.
According to data from NOAA's National Data Buoy Center, which
operates and maintains the DART buoy network, failure of mooring lines
accounted for almost 60 percent of DART buoy outages from December
2005 to November 2009. Center officials told us that mooring lines
fail for a variety of reasons, including ship collisions and vessels
that tie up to a buoy. NOAA officials told us they are working to
resolve these problems as part of the agency's goal of having data
from its three observational networks available at least 90 percent of
the time by fiscal year 2013.[Footnote 22] Meanwhile, the costs of
operating and maintaining the DART detection buoy network have been
significant. For example, in fiscal year 2009, NOAA allocated nearly
$12 million--about 28 percent of NOAA's total tsunami budget--to DART
operation and maintenance. NOAA's research program and the National
Data Buoy Center are exploring ways to reduce these costs by improving
DART buoy reliability--for example, by identifying more durable
materials for the mooring line and exploring alternative
configurations for anchoring the buoys. Moving some DART stations to
less hostile locations with reduced ocean currents and vessel traffic
is also being assessed in an effort to improve reliability.
NOAA Has Expanded and Reorganized Its Hazard Mitigation Program, but
Community Participation in TsunamiReady Remains Limited:
To improve its mitigation capabilities, NOAA significantly expanded
NTHMP's membership and reorganized the program to better focus its
activities toward achieving tsunami mitigation goals. In 2005, NOAA
expanded NTHMP membership from five Pacific Coast states into a
nationwide program including all 29 at-risk coastal U.S. states and
territories. NOAA then restructured the NTHMP in 2007 to better meet
the needs of the expanded program. As a result of the restructuring,
the program consists of an overarching coordinating committee, along
with a subcommittee to manage program efforts for key areas of
mitigation activity: warning coordination, mapping and modeling, and
mitigation and education. Comprising representatives from federal,
state, and territory agencies,[Footnote 23] the coordinating committee
assists NOAA in overall program implementation, including recommending
how funds are to be allocated and supporting periodic reviews to
assess the program's strengths and weaknesses. NOAA also changed the
previous annual contracting process for funding mitigation projects--
in which the original five member states decided among themselves how
to divide the money--to a competitive grant process in 2008. Under the
new process, NTHMP members seeking funding must submit proposals for
mitigation projects to a panel of subject-matter experts for
evaluation, according to an established set of criteria, before
recommending to NOAA which projects should be funded. Although the
original five member states were initially concerned that NTHMP
expansion could divert much-needed mitigation resources away from high-
risk areas in those states, officials we spoke with from these states
generally agreed that management of the program had improved and
available resources had increased for their states.
While NOAA has also taken steps to strengthen its TsunamiReady
program, increasing community participation in this voluntary program
has been challenging. The number of communities recognized as
TsunamiReady has increased from 27 (at the time of our 2006 report) to
74 communities located in 10 states, Puerto Rico, and the Pacific
territories, as of February 2010.[Footnote 24] Despite this progress,
overall community participation remains relatively low. For example,
the 74 communities that NOAA has recognized as TsunamiReady account
for less than 10 percent of the more than 760 communities identified
as at risk for a tsunami (see table 2).
Table 2: Number of TsunamiReady Communities and At-Risk Communities as
of February 2010:
State/territory: California;
TsunamiReady communities: 17;
At-risk communities: 158.
State/territory: Oregon;
TsunamiReady communities: 9;
At-risk communities: 50.
State/territory: Washington;
TsunamiReady communities: 9;
At-risk communities: 52.
State/territory: Puerto Rico;
TsunamiReady communities: 9;
At-risk communities: 44.
State/territory: Alaska;
TsunamiReady communities: 7;
At-risk communities: 75.
State/territory: South Carolina;
TsunamiReady communities: 6;
At-risk communities: 9.
State/territory: North Carolina;
TsunamiReady communities: 5;
At-risk communities: 11.
State/territory: Hawaii;
TsunamiReady communities: 4;
At-risk communities: 4.
State/territory: Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands;
TsunamiReady communities: 3;
At-risk communities: 3.
State/territory: Florida;
TsunamiReady communities: 2;
At-risk communities: 37.
State/territory: Virginia;
TsunamiReady communities: 1;
At-risk communities: 26.
State/territory: Georgia;
TsunamiReady communities: 1;
At-risk communities: 6.
State/territory: Guam;
TsunamiReady communities: 1;
At-risk communities: 1.
State/territory: American Samoa;
TsunamiReady communities: 0;
At-risk communities: 1.
State/territory: Texas;
TsunamiReady communities: 0;
At-risk communities: 11.
State/territory: Louisiana;
TsunamiReady communities: 0;
At-risk communities: 11.
State/territory: Mississippi;
TsunamiReady communities: 0;
At-risk communities: 3.
State/territory: Alabama;
TsunamiReady communities: 0;
At-risk communities: 2.
State/territory: Maryland;
TsunamiReady communities: 0;
At-risk communities: 17.
State/territory: Delaware;
TsunamiReady communities: 0;
At-risk communities: 3.
State/territory: New Jersey;
TsunamiReady communities: 0;
At-risk communities: 9.
State/territory: New York;
TsunamiReady communities: 0;
At-risk communities: 9.
State/territory: Connecticut;
TsunamiReady communities: 0;
At-risk communities: 24.
State/territory: Massachusetts;
TsunamiReady communities: 0;
At-risk communities: 64.
State/territory: Rhode Island;
TsunamiReady communities: 0;
At-risk communities: 21.
State/territory: New Hampshire;
TsunamiReady communities: 0;
At-risk communities: 8.
State/territory: Maine;
TsunamiReady communities: 0;
At-risk communities: 105.
State/territory: U.S. Virgin Islands;
TsunamiReady communities: 0;
At-risk communities: 3.
State/territory: Total;
TsunamiReady communities: 74;
At-risk communities: 767.
Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data.
[End of table]
Communities along the Pacific Coast and in the Caribbean, where
tsunami hazard is highest, have been the most active in seeking
TsunamiReady recognition, while those in other areas, such as the East
and Gulf Coasts, have been less active in participating in the
program.[Footnote 25] For example, only 2 of 64 at-risk Gulf Coast
communities and only 13 of 312 at-risk East Coast communities have
been recognized as TsunamiReady. NOAA program staff and state and
local emergency management officials offered a number of reasons for
this apparent lack of interest in TsunamiReady recognition by the East
and Gulf Coast communities, including limited information on the
extent of the tsunami hazard; competing priorities for time and
resources to plan for and respond to more common events, such as
hurricanes; and costs to meet the recognition requirements.
Additionally, some officials told us that some communities have been
reluctant to pursue the designation because they believe it might draw
undue attention to the tsunami hazard and potentially deter tourists
from visiting their communities.
NOAA has not conducted a formal assessment to identify barriers to or
possible incentives for participating in the TsunamiReady program, as
we recommended in 2006. Instead, in part on the basis of
recommendations from a 2007 NTHMP review of the program and feedback
from a series of NTHMP meetings and local community workshops, NOAA
decided to focus its efforts on revising the program's recognition
guidelines. Existing TsunamiReady guidelines have emphasized warning
and preparedness efforts. These guidelines require TsunamiReady
communities to establish a 24-hour warning point and emergency
operations center and have more than one means of receiving tsunami
warnings and alerting the public; to promote public readiness through
community education; and to develop a formal tsunami plan, including
plans for emergency exercises. According to a program official,
revised guidelines under development are intended to take a more
comprehensive approach and to address all aspects of emergency
management planning: mitigation, preparedness, warning, response, and
recovery. NOAA officials told us that over the next 2 years, they plan
to work with social scientists to conduct a survey to establish a
baseline of tsunami preparedness in at-risk coastal communities, to
conduct pilot projects in selected communities to obtain feedback on
and test implementation of the revised guidelines, and to conduct
internal and external reviews of the revised guidelines. NOAA then
plans to further revise the guidelines to address issues identified
through these efforts before submitting them to the NTHMP coordinating
committee for its approval. NOAA anticipates implementing the new
TsunamiReady recognition guidelines nationwide sometime in 2012.
Although developing new guidelines may help strengthen the
TsunamiReady program, we continue to believe that it does not
substitute for a comprehensive assessment to determine what potential
barriers may be inhibiting community participation and that NOAA
should conduct such an assessment.
NOAA's Failure to Follow Its Research Transition Policy Contributed to
Delays in Implementing a New Tsunami Forecasting System:
Since 2006, NOAA has been transitioning the SIFT tsunami forecasting
system from its developer, PMEL, to application at the tsunami warning
centers. In large part because the laboratory and Tsunami Program
officials did not follow NOAA's agencywide policy and implementation
procedures for the transition of new technologies from research to
application, numerous modifications were needed to make the system
usable by the warning centers, leading to about a 2-year delay in
implementation.[Footnote 26] The agency's policy and procedures
describe a four-step process for systematically reviewing all research
projects and, if appropriate, moving them to application. This process
includes checkpoints for NOAA officials to ensure that all activities
have been successfully completed before a research project can proceed
to the next step (see figure 6).
Figure 6: NOAA's Process for Moving Research to Application:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Step 1:
Identify new research or technology:
Checkpoint review.
Step 2:
Apply new technology to operational environment:
Checkpoint review.
Step 3:
Pre-operations testing:
Checkpoint review.
Step 4:
Transition to operations.
Source: NOAA.
[End of figure]
When PMEL began the SIFT transition, it prepared an initial transition
plan in 2006. This plan did not follow NOAA's transition policy,
however, and as a result, did not undergo checkpoint reviews or
contain all of the plan elements required by NOAA's policy and
implementation procedures. Tsunami Program and PMEL officials told us
they did not realize that this policy applied to the transition of
relatively small research efforts like the SIFT system, which the
officials said accounted for their failure to follow NOAA's transition
policy. Although a transition team consisting of officials from the
warning centers and PMEL was assembled, the warning center officials
were not actively involved in developing the transition plan, which
should identify requirements for the new technology and criteria it
must meet to be implemented, among other things. Thus, the 2006
transition plan did not identify requirements for the SIFT system or
performance measures to enable PMEL and the warning centers to test
and evaluate the system. These shortcomings left the warning centers
with no formal mechanism to provide input into the transition process
or to evaluate the SIFT system before accepting it for implementation.
As a result, numerous modifications to the system were needed to make
it practical for use after the warning centers received it.
In 2008, however, to revise the transition plan and accelerate the
system's implementation, NOAA's Tsunami Program manager collaborated
with staff from PMEL and the warning centers and established a SIFT
transition team with more involvement from the warning centers.
According to NOAA officials, the transition team completed a revised
plan in June 2009 that meets the requirements of NOAA's research
transition policy and implementation procedures, such as defining
system requirements and performance measures. Additionally, NOAA
officials performed a checkpoint review of the transition. As a result
of these changes, according to officials at PMEL and the warning
centers, communication between them has improved, and NOAA is closer
to implementing the SIFT system in the centers.
Moreover, NOAA has not complied with the Tsunami Warning and Education
Act's requirement that it, through the National Weather Service,
develop and execute a plan for the transfer of technology from ongoing
research into the tsunami forecasting and warning program.[Footnote
27] Although NOAA has developed a specific transition plan for the
SIFT system, this transition plan does not meet the act's requirement
because it does not generally address how other research should
undergo transition. In response, NOAA officials told us they believe
that NOAA's general transition policy and implementation procedures,
along with individual transition plans for selected projects,[Footnote
28] satisfy its planning obligations under the act. But when we first
asked program officials about the required tsunami research transition
plan, they told us they did not have one and that they were unfamiliar
with the act's requirement. Because NOAA's existing policy and
procedures, which predated the act, do not provide a plan specifically
for the transfer of tsunami research into the Tsunami Program, and
because NOAA has not created a separate plan for the transfer of
tsunami research, we believe that NOAA has not fully complied with the
act's requirement for a transition plan for tsunami research.
Conclusions:
NOAA and its partners have taken important initial steps toward
implementing effective, results-oriented management by creating
strategic plans for the Tsunami Program and NTHMP. By following the
key practices we and leading organizations have identified for
developing strategic plans and generally including the critical
components of effective plans--such as long-term goals and strategies
to achieve them--NOAA has established a solid foundation for managing
its programs. Nevertheless, because NOAA has not identified strategies
or performance measures for some goals, it is not clear how the agency
intends to pursue these goals or how it will measure its progress
toward achieving them. In this regard, identifying barriers to
participation, as we previously recommended, and developing strategies
for achieving the goal of expanding TsunamiReady program participation
could help address the low participation rate in this community
preparedness program. In addition, both the warning and mitigation
components of NOAA's programs can benefit greatly from the results of
tsunami-related research. As demonstrated by the transition of SIFT
from research to application in the warning centers, however, the
failure to plan properly can result in the need for multiple
modifications to a system to make it usable, leading to delays in
implementing a promising new technology. Until NOAA develops a plan
specifically for the transition of technology from research to
application in the Tsunami Program, it will not be in compliance with
the requirement of the Tsunami Warning and Education Act, and the
potential persists for delays like those experienced in the SIFT
transition.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve national tsunami preparedness and ensure that NOAA fulfills
its responsibilities under the Tsunami Warning and Education Act, we
are recommending that the Secretary of Commerce direct the
Administrator of NOAA to take the following two actions:
* Revise the Tsunami Program's and NTHMP's strategic plans to ensure
that all the components are fully developed, in particular, that they
include effective strategies and performance measures for all goals,
including those for the TsunamiReady program.
* Develop a transition plan for tsunami research, as required by the
Tsunami Warning and Education Act. The plan should incorporate lessons
learned from the transition of the SIFT tsunami forecasting system.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a copy of our draft report to the Department of Commerce
for review and comment. The Department provided us NOAA's comments on
the draft report, in which NOAA said that the report captures and
addresses the major elements of the Tsunami Program and acknowledges
the involvement and roles of all levels of government. NOAA also
agreed with our two recommendations. NOAA said that it will initiate
revisions to the Tsunami Program's and NTHMP's strategic plans upon
receipt of the National Academy of Sciences' report on the Tsunami
Program expected in the summer of 2010. NOAA also said that it will
initiate the development of a Tsunami Program transition plan for
tsunami research in the summer of 2010 in coordination with its
research partners. NOAA also provided technical comments that we
incorporated into the report as appropriate. NOAA's comments are
presented in appendix I.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees, Secretary of Commerce, Administrator of NOAA, and other
interested parties. In addition, this report will be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or mittala@gao.gov. Contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be
found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contributions to this report are listed in appendix II.
Signed by:
Anu K. Mittal:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Commerce:
United States Department Of Commerce:
The Secretary of Commerce:
Washington, D.C. 20230:
April 15, 2010:
Ms. Anu K. Mittal:
Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Mittal:
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the Government
Accountability Office's draft report entitled "U.S. Tsunami
Preparedness: NOAA Has Expanded Its Tsunami Programs, but Improved
Planning Could Enhance Effectiveness" (GA0-10-490). On behalf of the
Department of Commerce, I have enclosed the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration's programmatic comments on the draft report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Gary Locke:
Enclosure:
[End of letter]
Department of Commerce:
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Comments on the Draft
GAO Report Entitled:
"U.S. Tsunami Preparedness: NOAA Has Expanded Its Tsunami
Programs, but Improved Planning Could Enhance Effectiveness"
(GAO-10-490, April 2010):
General Comments:
The Department of Commerce and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) appreciate the opportunity to review this
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on tsunami preparedness.
The report captures and addresses the major elements of the tsunami
program and acknowledges the involvement and roles of all levels of
government.
NOAA Response to GAO Recommendations:
The draft GAO report states, "To improve national preparedness and
ensure that NOAA fulfills its responsibilities under the Tsunami
Warning and Education Act, we are recommending that the Secretary of
Commerce direct NOAA to take the following two actions:"
Recommendation 1: "Revise the Tsunami Program's and National Tsunami
Hazard Mitigation Program's (NTHMP) strategic plans to ensure that all
of the components are fully developed, in particular, that they
include effective strategies and performance measures for all goals,
including those for the TsunamiReady program."
NOAA Response: NOAA agrees with this recommendation. NOAA will
initiate the revisions to the Tsunami Program and NTHMP's strategic
plans upon receipt of the National Academy of Sciences Report on the
Tsunami Program. This report is expected in the summer of 2010 and
will provide additional recommendations for NOAA's Tsunami Program.
These recommendations will be addressed within the revised Tsunami
Program and NTHMP strategic plans.
Recommendation 2: "Develop a transition plan for tsunami research, as
required by the Tsunami Warning and Education Act. The plan should
incorporate lessons learned from the transition of the SIFT [Short-
term Inundation Forecasting for Tsunamis] tsunami forecasting system."
NOAA Response: NOAA agrees with this recommendation. NOAA will
initiate the development of a Tsunami Program Transition Plan for
Tsunami Research in the summer of 2010 in coordination with its
research partners.
[End of section]
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Anu K. Mittal (202) 512-3841 or mittala@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Stephen D. Secrist, Assistant
Director; Elizabeth R. Beardsley; Ellen W. Chu; Brad C. Dobbins; Wyatt
R. Hundrup; Katherine Killebrew; Michael J. Meleady; and Katherine M.
Raheb made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Before this event, according to National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration records, the last tsunami causing significant
destruction in the United States and its territories took place at
Skagway, Alaska, in November 1994, where a landslide and associated
wave killed one person and caused $25 million in damage.
[2] The two centers are the West Coast/Alaska Tsunami Warning Center,
located in Palmer, Alaska, and the Richard H. Hagemeyer Pacific
Tsunami Warning Center, located in Ewa Beach, Hawaii.
[3] GAO, U.S. Tsunami Preparedness: Federal and State Partners
Collaborate to Help Communities Reduce Potential Impacts, but
Significant Challenges Remain, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-519] (Washington2 D.C.: June 5,
2006).
[4] Pub. L. No. 109-424.
[5] GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government
Performance and Results Act, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118] (Washington, D.C.: June
1996).
[6] GAO, Agencies' Strategic Plans under GPRA: Key Questions to
Facilitate Congressional Review, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-10.l.16] (Washington, D.C.: May
1997), and Managing for Results: Critical Issues for Improving Federal
Agencies' Strategic Plans, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-97-180] (Washington, D.C.: Sept.
16, 1997).
[7] Landslides, volcanic activity, and meteor strikes are other known,
but less common, tsunami sources.
[8] The International Tsunami Information Center was established in
1965 by the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and is
funded primarily by NOAA. The center maintains and develops
relationships with scientific research and academic organizations,
civil defense agencies, and the general public to mitigate the hazards
associated with tsunamis by improving tsunami preparedness for all
Pacific Ocean nations and helping to develop and implement tsunami
warning and mitigation systems globally.
[9] The National Data Buoy Center designs, develops, operates, and
maintains a network of data-collecting buoys and coastal monitoring
stations.
[10] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-96-118].
[11] Inundation maps identify the expected extent of flooding from
tsunamis in specific coastal areas.
[12] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-96-118].
[13] National Science and Technology Council, Tsunami Risk Reduction
for the United States: A Framework for Action (Washington, D.C.: 2005).
[14] The center serves as the operational headquarters for the Pacific
Tsunami Warning and Mitigation System, which is part of an
international cooperative effort by tsunami-vulnerable countries from
across the Pacific ocean, working together to mitigate the potentially
destructive impacts of a tsunami.
[15] The center's responsibilities in the Indian Ocean and Caribbean
Sea are temporary, until regional tsunami warning centers are
developed for these areas.
[16] The U.S. Geological Survey also provides data from 15 regional
seismic networks that are part of the Advanced National Seismic
System. In addition, it operates the National Earthquake Information
Center in Golden, Colorado, which has been expanded to operate 24
hours a day, 7 days a week, to monitor seismic data and advise the
tsunami warning centers about whether a seismic event could generate a
tsunami.
[17] According to agency officials, NOAA also configured 163 water-
level stations in the National Water Level Observation Network to
support tsunami monitoring. The National Water Level Observation
Network is a component of the National Water Level Program, which is
managed by NOAA's National Ocean Services through its Center for
Operational Oceanographic Products and Services.
[18] The model was originally developed by the West Coast/Alaska
Tsunami Warning Center in 1996 and updated in 2002.
[19] NOAA decided to initially focus on developing site-specific
tsunami inundation models for 75 at-risk areas on the basis of
population, data availability and quality, and other considerations.
As of January 2010, NOAA had completed models for 43 of the selected
locations, with plans to develop models for the 32 remaining locations
by 2013.
[20] This improved warning capability was recently demonstrated by the
Pacific Tsunami Warning Center in its response to the September 2009
American Samoa tsunami, when it issued its initial warning bulletin
within 16 minutes of the tsunami-generating earthquake. Similarly, the
warning center issued its initial warning bulletin within 12 minutes
of the February 2010 Chilean tsunami. NOAA's 2009 fiscal year goal is
to issue an initial message within 20 minutes of such seismic events.
[21] NOAA defines a DART buoy outage as a buoy out of service, with
data reporting unavailable for more than 12 hours.
[22] This measure combines average data availability from the seismic,
water-level, and DART buoy networks. In fiscal year 2009, data
availability from these networks averaged 85 percent.
[23] The coordinating committee comprises two representatives each
from NOAA, the U.S. Geological Survey, and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, along with two representatives from each of the
following states or territories: Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon,
Washington, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The remaining
states and territories are grouped together for representation, with
two representatives each for the following regions: U.S. East Coast
states, U.S. Gulf Coast states, and Pacific Islands.
[24] The program's goal is to recognize 10 new TsunamiReady
communities per year and to reach a total of 105 recognized
communities by 2013. In fiscal year 2009, 11 new communities were
recognized in Alaska, California, Washington, the Northern Mariana
Islands, and Puerto Rico. For purposes of the TsunamiReady program, a
"community" can be a county, town, borough, small organized rural
population, military base, university, corporate complex, tribal
nation, or village.
[25] While NOAA has generally assessed the relative tsunami hazard
level for each coastal region, the list of at-risk communities is not
further prioritized by relative risk because the agency currently
lacks the information needed to conduct a comprehensive tsunami risk
assessment for each coastal community.
[26] NOAA first issued its Policy on Transition of Research to
Application (NAO 216-105) in May 2005 and the corresponding
implementation procedures in December 2005; the policy and
implementation procedures were updated in July 2008 and November 2008,
respectively.
[27] The Tsunami Warning and Education Act does not impose a deadline
for NOAA to create the plan. By December 2009, however, NOAA was
required to submit a report to Congress on how technology is being
transferred into the Tsunami Program. The report discusses various
research transitions but not the required plan.
[28] Since the passage of the Tsunami Warning and Education Act in
December 2006, NOAA has prepared a transition plan for only one
tsunami project--the SIFT system as described above.
[End of section]
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