Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites
Agencies Must Act Quickly to Address Risks That Jeopardize the Continuity of Weather and Climate Data Gao ID: GAO-10-558 May 27, 2010In the 8 years since a contract was awarded, the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS)--a tri-agency program managed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)--has experienced escalating costs, schedule delays, and ineffective interagency management. The launch date for a demonstration satellite has been delayed by over 5 years and the cost estimate for the program has more than doubled--to about $15 billion. In February 2010, a Presidential task force decided to disband NPOESS and, instead, have the agencies undertake separate acquisitions. GAO was asked to (1) assess efforts to establish separate satellite programs; (2) evaluate the status and risks of the NPOESS components still under development; and (3) evaluate the implications of using the demonstration satellite's data operationally. To do so, GAO analyzed program management and cost data, attended program reviews, and interviewed agency officials.
NOAA and DOD have begun planning to transition the NPOESS program to separate acquisitions, but neither has finalized its plans. NOAA has developed preliminary plans for its new program--called the Joint Polar Satellite Program--to meet the requirements of the afternoon NPOESS orbit. DOD expects to make decisions on the spacecraft and sensors by June and October 2010, respectively. Because neither agency has completed its plans, the impact of the decision to disband the program on expected costs, schedules, and promised capabilities has not been fully determined. Moving forward, the agencies face key risks in transitioning from NPOESS to their separate programs. These risks include the loss of key staff and capabilities, delays in negotiating contract changes and establishing new program offices, the loss of support for the other agency's requirements, and insufficient oversight of new program management. Until these risks are effectively mitigated, it is likely that the satellite programs' costs will continue to grow and launch dates will continue to be delayed, which could lead to gaps in the continuity of critical satellite data. While NOAA and DOD are establishing plans for their separate acquisitions, the development of key components of the NPOESS program is continuing. In recent months, a critical imaging sensor has been completed and integrated onto the spacecraft of a demonstration satellite, called the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP). In addition, the program continues to work on components of the first and second NPOESS satellites, which are to be transferred to NOAA and DOD to become part of their respective follow-on programs. However, the expected launch date of the NPP satellite has been delayed by 9 months due to technical issues in the development of a key sensor. Further, the program is slowing down and may need to stop work on key components because of potential contract liabilities and funding constraints, but has not developed a prioritized list on what to stop first. This may further delay NPP and the components of the first NOAA and DOD satellites under their new programs. Because the NPP demonstration satellite was designed as a risk-reduction mission, not as an operational asset, it has several limitations. These limitations include fewer ground-based data processing systems, fewer security controls, and a shorter satellite lifespan than exist for current or planned operational satellites. These design limitations mean that, in some cases, NPP's data will not be as timely, useful, and secure as other polar satellites and that there is a risk of a gap in the nation's climate and weather services should NPP fail before the next satellite is launched. Agency officials acknowledge these limitations and are assessing options to make NPP data more timely and secure. GAO is making recommendations to NOAA and DOD to address key risks in transitioning to their respective new programs. Both agencies agreed with GAO's recommendations and identified plans for addressing them. GAO is making recommendations to NOAA and DOD to address key risks in transitioning to their respective new programs. Both agencies agreed with GAO's recommendations and identified plans for addressing them.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: David A. Powner Team: Government Accountability Office: Information Technology Phone: No phone on recordGAO-10-558, Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: Agencies Must Act Quickly to Address Risks That Jeopardize the Continuity of Weather and Climate Data
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
May 2010:
Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites:
Agencies Must Act Quickly to Address Risks That Jeopardize the
Continuity of Weather and Climate Data:
GAO-10-558:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-558, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
In the 8 years since a contract was awarded, the National Polar-
orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS)”a tri-
agency program managed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)”has experienced
escalating costs, schedule delays, and ineffective interagency
management. The launch date for a demonstration satellite has been
delayed by over 5 years and the cost estimate for the program has more
than doubled”to about $15 billion. In February 2010, a Presidential
task force decided to disband NPOESS and, instead, have the agencies
undertake separate acquisitions.
GAO was asked to (1) assess efforts to establish separate satellite
programs; (2) evaluate the status and risks of the NPOESS components
still under development; and (3) evaluate the implications of using
the demonstration satellite‘s data operationally. To do so, GAO
analyzed program management and cost data, attended program reviews,
and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found:
NOAA and DOD have begun planning to transition the NPOESS program to
separate acquisitions, but neither has finalized its plans. NOAA has
developed preliminary plans for its new program”called the Joint Polar
Satellite Program”to meet the requirements of the afternoon NPOESS
orbit. DOD expects to make decisions on the spacecraft and sensors by
June and October 2010, respectively. Because neither agency has
completed its plans, the impact of the decision to disband the program
on expected costs, schedules, and promised capabilities has not been
fully determined. Moving forward, the agencies face key risks in
transitioning from NPOESS to their separate programs. These risks
include the loss of key staff and capabilities, delays in negotiating
contract changes and establishing new program offices, the loss of
support for the other agency‘s requirements, and insufficient
oversight of new program management. Until these risks are effectively
mitigated, it is likely that the satellite programs‘ costs will
continue to grow and launch dates will continue to be delayed, which
could lead to gaps in the continuity of critical satellite data.
While NOAA and DOD are establishing plans for their separate
acquisitions, the development of key components of the NPOESS program
is continuing. In recent months, a critical imaging sensor has been
completed and integrated onto the spacecraft of a demonstration
satellite, called the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP). In addition,
the program continues to work on components of the first and second
NPOESS satellites, which are to be transferred to NOAA and DOD to
become part of their respective follow-on programs. However, the
expected launch date of the NPP satellite has been delayed by 9 months
due to technical issues in the development of a key sensor. Further,
the program is slowing down and may need to stop work on key
components because of potential contract liabilities and funding
constraints, but has not developed a prioritized list on what to stop
first. This may further delay NPP and the components of the first NOAA
and DOD satellites under their new programs.
Because the NPP demonstration satellite was designed as a risk-
reduction mission, not as an operational asset, it has several
limitations. These limitations include fewer ground-based data
processing systems, fewer security controls, and a shorter satellite
lifespan than exist for current or planned operational satellites.
These design limitations mean that, in some cases, NPP‘s data will not
be as timely, useful, and secure as other polar satellites and that
there is a risk of a gap in the nation‘s climate and weather services
should NPP fail before the next satellite is launched. Agency
officials acknowledge these limitations and are assessing options to
make NPP data more timely and secure.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is making recommendations to NOAA and DOD to address key risks in
transitioning to their respective new programs. Both agencies agreed
with GAO‘s recommendations and identified plans for addressing them.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-558] or key
components. For more information, contact David A. Powner at (202) 512-
9286 or pownerd@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
Agencies Have Begun Planning for Separate Acquisitions, but the Impact
of This New Approach Is Not Fully Known and Key Transition Risks Exist:
NPOESS Development Continues, but Demonstration Satellite Has Been
Delayed and New Challenges Threaten Further Delays:
Limitations on the Demonstration Satellite May Adversely Affect the
Usefulness of Its Data:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Commerce:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration:
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Major Changes to the NPOESS Program by the Nunn-McCurdy
Certification Decision:
Table 2: Description of Expected NPP and NPOESS Sensors, as of May
2008:
Table 3: Configuration of Sensors Planned for NPP and NPOESS
Satellites, as of May 2008:
Table 4: Changes in NPOESS Life-Cycle Cost Estimates and Estimated
Satellite Launch:
Table 5: Configuration of Sensors Planned for NPP and JPSS Satellites,
as of March 2010:
Table 6: Comparison of NPOESS to the New NOAA and DOD Acquisitions:
Table 7: Status of Key Components of NPP and the First Two NPOESS
Satellites (C1 and C2), as of March 2010:
Figures:
Figure 1: Configuration of Operational Polar Satellites:
Figure 2: Stages of Satellite Data Processing:
Figure 3: Examples of Weather Products:
Figure 4: NPOESS Program Roles and Responsibilities:
Figure 5: Planned Launch Dates and Potential Gaps in Satellite Data:
Abbreviations:
CrIS: Cross-track Infrared Sounder:
DMSP: Defense Meteorological Satellite Program:
DOD: Department of Defense:
JPSS: Joint Polar Satellite System:
MetOp: Meteorological Operational (satellite):
NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration:
NPOESS: National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite
System:
NPP: NPOESS Preparatory Project:
OMPS: Ozone Mapping and Profiler Suite:
OSTP: Office of Science and Technology Policy:
POES: Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites:
VIIRS: Visible/Infrared Imager/Radiometer Suite:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
May 27, 2010:
The Honorable Bart Gordon:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ralph Hall:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Science and Technology:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Brad Miller:
Chairman:
The Honorable Paul Broun, Jr.
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight:
Committee on Science and Technology:
House of Representatives:
The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
(NPOESS) program was planned to be a state-of-the-art, environment-
monitoring satellite system that would replace two existing polar-
orbiting environmental satellite systems. Managed jointly by the
Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), the Department of Defense (DOD)/U.S. Air Force,
and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the
program was considered critical to the nation's ability to maintain
the continuity of data required for weather forecasting (including
severe weather events such as hurricanes) and global climate
monitoring through the year 2026.
However, in the 8 years since the NPOESS contract was awarded, the
cost estimate has more than doubled--to about $15 billion, launch
dates have been delayed by over 5 years, significant functionality has
been removed from the program, and the program's tri-agency management
structure has been ineffective. Importantly, delays in launching the
satellites put the program's mission at risk. To address these
challenges, a task force led by the White House's Office of Science
and Technology Policy (OSTP) reviewed the management and governance of
the NPOESS program. In February 2010, the OSTP Director announced his
decision to disband the NPOESS acquisition and, instead, to have NOAA
and DOD undertake separate acquisitions, with NOAA responsible for
satellites in the afternoon orbit and DOD responsible for satellites
in the early-morning orbit. While NOAA and DOD begin the transition to
separate acquisitions, the development of key components of the NPOESS
program is continuing--including the development of sensors and ground
systems supporting a demonstration satellite called the NPOESS
Preparatory Project (NPP).
This report responds to your request that we (1) assess efforts to
plan for separate satellite acquisitions, (2) evaluate the status and
risks of the key NPOESS components still under development, and (3)
evaluate the implications of using the demonstration satellite's data
operationally. To assess efforts to plan for separate satellite
acquisitions, we reviewed the task force's decision to disband the
NPOESS program and NOAA's preliminary plans for a replacement
satellite program, and we interviewed OSTP, NOAA, and DOD officials.
To evaluate the status and risks of key program components, we
reviewed program documentation including status briefings, monthly
program management documents, and cost reports. To evaluate plans for
and implications of using the demonstration satellite's data
operationally, we compared the agencies' plans for using NPP data to
the plans for using NPOESS data and interviewed relevant NOAA, NASA,
and DOD officials. In addition, this report builds on work we have
done on environmental satellites over the last several years.[Footnote
1]
We conducted this performance audit from August 2009 to May 2010 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Additional
details on our objectives, scope, and methodology are provided in
appendix I.
Background:
Since the 1960s, the United States has operated two separate
operational polar-orbiting meteorological satellite systems: the Polar-
orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) series, which is
managed by NOAA, and the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program
(DMSP), which is managed by the Air Force.[Footnote 2] These
satellites obtain environmental data that are processed to provide
graphical weather images and specialized weather products. These
satellite data are also the predominant input to numerical weather
prediction models, which are a primary tool for forecasting weather
days in advance--including forecasting the path and intensity of
hurricanes. The weather products and models are used to predict the
potential impact of severe weather so that communities and emergency
managers can help prevent and mitigate its effects. Polar satellites
also provide data used to monitor environmental phenomena, such as
ozone depletion and drought conditions, as well as data sets that are
used by researchers for a variety of studies such as climate
monitoring.
Unlike geostationary satellites, which maintain a fixed position
relative to the earth, polar-orbiting satellites constantly circle the
earth in an almost north-south orbit, providing global coverage of
conditions that affect the weather and climate. Each satellite makes
about 14 orbits a day. As the earth rotates beneath it, each satellite
views the entire earth's surface twice a day. Currently, there is one
operational POES satellite and two operational DMSP satellites that
are positioned so that they cross the equator in the early morning,
midmorning, and early afternoon. In addition, the government is also
relying on a European satellite, called the Meteorological Operational
(MetOp) satellite.[Footnote 3] Together, they ensure that, for any
region of the earth, the data provided to users are generally no more
than 6 hours old. Besides the four operational satellites, six older
satellites are in orbit that still collect some data and are available
to provide limited backup to the operational satellites should they
degrade or fail. The last POES satellite was launched in February 2009
and declared operational in early June 2009. The Air Force plans to
launch its two remaining DMSP satellites as needed. Figure 1
illustrates the current operational polar satellite configuration.
Figure 1: Configuration of Operational Polar Satellites:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Illustration depicts the world and the following information:
Notional local equatorial crossing times:
DMSP: 0530 hours;
DMSP: 0800 hours;
MetOp: 0930 hours;
POES: 1330 hours.
Sources: GAO, based on NPOESS Integrated Program Office and DOD data,
MapArt (globe).
[End of figure]
Polar Satellite Data and Products:
Polar satellites gather a broad range of data that are transformed
into a variety of products. Satellite sensors observe different bands
of radiation wavelengths, called channels, which are used for remotely
determining information about the earth's atmosphere, land surface,
oceans, and the space environment. When first received, satellite data
are considered raw data. To make them usable, processing centers
format the data so that they are time-sequenced and include earth
location and calibration information. After formatting, these data are
called raw data records. The centers further process these raw data
records into channel-specific data sets, called sensor data records
and temperature data records. These data records are then used to
derive weather and climate products called environmental data records.
These environmental data records include a wide range of atmospheric
products detailing cloud coverage, temperature, humidity, and ozone
distribution; land surface products showing snow cover, vegetation,
and land use; ocean products depicting sea surface temperatures, sea
ice, and wave height; and characterizations of the space environment.
Combinations of these data records (raw, sensor, temperature, and
environmental data records) are also used to derive more sophisticated
products, including outputs from numerical weather models and
assessments of climate trends. Figure 2 is a simplified depiction of
the various stages of satellite data processing, and figure 3 depicts
examples of two different weather products.
Figure 2: Stages of Satellite Data Processing:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
1) Raw data:
2) Raw data records: goes directly to 3 and 8.
3) Sensor data records and temperature data records: goes directly to
4, 5, and 8.
5) Calibration: goes directly to 7.
6) Environmental data records:
7) Climate data records:
8) Derived products and output from prediction models.
Sources: GAO analysis of NASA and NOAA information.
[End of figure]
Figure 3: Examples of Weather Products:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Note: The figure on the left is a POES Image of Hurricane Katrina in
2005, and the figure on the right is an analysis of ozone
concentration produced from POES satellite data.
Source: NOAA‘s National Environmental Satellite Data and Information
Service.
[End of figure]
NPOESS Overview: Inception, Management Structure, and Acquisition
Strategy:
With the expectation that combining the POES and DMSP programs would
reduce duplication and result in sizable cost savings, a May 1994
Presidential Decision Directive required NOAA and DOD to converge the
two satellite programs into a single satellite program capable of
satisfying both civilian and military requirements.[Footnote 4] The
converged program, NPOESS, was considered critical to the nation's
ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather
forecasting and global climate monitoring.
To manage this program, DOD, NOAA, and NASA formed a tri-agency
Integrated Program Office. Within the program office, each agency has
the lead on certain activities: NOAA has overall program management
responsibility for the converged system and for satellite operations;
the Air Force has the lead on the acquisition; and NASA has primary
responsibility for facilitating the development and incorporation of
new technologies into the converged system. NOAA and DOD share the
cost of funding NPOESS, while NASA funds specific technology projects
and studies. In addition, an Executive Committee--made up of the
administrators of NOAA and NASA and the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics--is responsible for providing
policy guidance, ensuring agency support and funding, and exercising
oversight authority. Figure 4 depicts the organizations that make up
the NPOESS program office and lists their responsibilities.
Figure 4: NPOESS Program Roles and Responsibilities:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
NPOESS Integrated Program Office:
Agency: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration;
Responsibility: Overall program management and satellite operations;
Funding: Shared funding for NPOESS with Air Force.
Agency: United States Air Force;
Responsibility: Acquisition;
Funding: Shared funding for NPOESS with NOAA.
Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration;
Responsibility: Technologies;
Funding: Specific technology projects and studies.
Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS program office data.
[End of figure]
NPOESS is a major system acquisition that was originally estimated to
cost about $6.5 billion over the 24-year life of the program from its
inception in 1995 through 2018. The program includes satellite
development, satellite launch and operation, and ground-based
satellite data processing. When the NPOESS engineering, manufacturing,
and development contract was awarded in August 2002, the cost estimate
was adjusted to $7 billion.
Acquisition plans called for the procurement and launch of six
satellites over the life of the program, as well as the integration of
13 instruments--consisting of 10 environmental sensors and 3
subsystems. Together, the sensors were to receive and transmit data on
atmospheric, cloud cover, environmental, climatic, oceanographic, and
solar-geophysical observations. The subsystems were to support non-
environmental search and rescue efforts, system survivability, and
environmental data collection activities.
In addition, a demonstration satellite, called the NPOESS Preparatory
Project (NPP), was planned to be launched several years before the
first NPOESS satellite in order to reduce the risk associated with
launching new sensor technologies and ensure continuity of climate
data with NASA's Earth Observing System satellites. NPP is a joint
mission between the NPOESS program office and NASA. NPP was to host
four NPOESS sensors and provide the program office and the processing
centers an early opportunity to work with the sensors, ground control,
and data processing systems.[Footnote 5]
When the NPOESS development contract was awarded in 2002, the schedule
for launching the satellites was driven by a requirement that the
NPOESS satellites be available to back up the final POES and DMSP
satellites should anything go wrong during the planned launches of
these satellites.[Footnote 6] Early program milestones included (1)
launching NPP by May 2006, (2) having the first NPOESS satellite
available to back up the final POES satellite launch then planned for
March 2008, and (3) having the second NPOESS satellite available to
back up the final DMSP satellite launch then planned for October 2009.
If the NPOESS satellites were not needed to back up the final
predecessor satellites, their anticipated launch dates would have been
April 2009 and June 2011, respectively.
Cost Increases, Schedule Delays, and Technical Problems Led to a
Decision to Restructure NPOESS in 2006:
Over several years, we reported that NPOESS had experienced continued
cost increases, schedule delays, and serious technical problems.
[Footnote 7] By November 2005, we estimated that the cost of the
program had grown from $7 billion to over $10 billion. In addition,
the program was experiencing major technical problems with a critical
imaging sensor that were expected to delay the launch date of the
first satellite by almost 2 years. These issues ultimately required
difficult decisions to be made about the program's direction and
capabilities.
The Nunn-McCurdy law requires DOD to take specific actions when a
major defense acquisition program's cost growth exceeds certain
thresholds.[Footnote 8] Where applicable, the law requires the
Secretary of Defense to certify the program to Congress when it is
expected to overrun its current baseline by 25 percent or more. In
November 2005, NPOESS breached the 25 percent threshold, and DOD was
required to certify the program for it to continue. The requirements
for certifying a program, as relevant here, involved a determination
that (1) the program is essential to national security, (2) there are
no alternatives to the program that will provide equal or greater
military capability at less cost, (3) the new estimates of the
program's cost are reasonable, and (4) the management structure for
the program is adequate to manage and control costs. DOD established
tri-agency teams--made up of DOD, NOAA, and NASA experts--to work on
each of the four elements of the certification process.
In June 2006, DOD (with the agreement of both of its partner agencies)
certified a restructured NPOESS program, estimated to cost $12.5
billion through 2024--an increase of $4 billion more than the prior
life-cycle cost estimate.[Footnote 9] This restructuring decision
delayed the launch of NPP and the first two satellites (called C1 and
C2) by roughly 3 to 5 years--a deviation from the requirement to have
NPOESS satellites available to back up the final POES and DMSP
satellites should anything go wrong during those launches. The
restructured program also reduced the number of satellites to be
produced by relying on European satellites for the midmorning orbit
and planning to use NPOESS satellites in the early-morning and
afternoon orbits. In addition, in order to reduce program complexity,
the Nunn-McCurdy certification decision decreased the number of NPOESS
instruments from 13 to 9 and reduced the functionality of 4 sensors.
Table 1 summarizes the major program changes made by the Nunn-McCurdy
certification decision and table 2 describes the sensors that were
planned for NPP and NPOESS after the Nunn-McCurdy certification.
Table 1: Major Changes to the NPOESS Program by the Nunn-McCurdy
Certification Decision:
Key area: Life-cycle range;
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 1995 through 2020;
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision (as of June 2006): 1995
through 2026.
Key area: Estimated life-cycle cost;
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: $8.4 billion;
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision (as of June 2006): $12.5
billion[A].
Key area: Launch schedule;
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: NPP by October 2006;
First NPOESS (C1) by November 2009;
Second NPOESS (C2) by June 2011;
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision (as of June 2006): NPP by
January 2010; C1 by January 2013; C2 by January 2016.
Key area: Management structure;
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: System Program Director
reports to a tri-agency steering committee and the tri-agency
Executive Committee; Independent program reviews noted insufficient
system engineering and cost analysis staff;
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision (as of June 2006): System
Program Director is responsible for day-to-day program management and
reports to the Program Executive Officer; Program Executive Officer
oversees program and reports to the tri-agency Executive Committee.
Key area: Number of satellites;
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 6 (in addition to NPP);
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision (as of June 2006): 4 (in
addition to NPP).
Key area: Number of orbits;
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 3 (early morning,
midmorning, and afternoon);
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision (as of June 2006): 2 (early
morning and afternoon; will rely on European satellites for midmorning
orbit data).
Key area: Number and complement of instruments;
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 13 instruments (10 sensors
and 3 subsystems);
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision (as of June 2006): 9
instruments (7 sensors and 2 subsystems); 4 of the sensors are to
provide fewer capabilities.
Key area: Number of environmental data records;
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 55;
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision (as of June 2006): 39 (6 are
to be degraded products).
Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS program office data.
[A] Although the program's life cycle was through 2026, the cost
estimate was only through 2024.
[End of table]
Table 2: Description of Expected NPP and NPOESS Sensors, as of May
2008:
Sensor: Advanced Technology Microwave Sounder;
Description: Measures microwave energy released and scattered by the
atmosphere and is to be used with infrared sounding data from the
Cross-track Infrared Sounder to produce daily global atmospheric
temperature, humidity, and pressure profiles.
Sensor: Microwave Imager/Sounder;
Description: Collects microwave images and data needed to determine
sea ice characterization and measure rain rate, ocean surface wind
speed and direction, amount of water in the clouds, and soil moisture,
as well as temperature and humidity at different atmospheric levels.
Sensor: Cross-track Infrared Sounder (CrIS);
Description: Collects measurements of the earth's radiation to
determine the vertical distribution of temperature, moisture, and
pressure in the atmosphere.
Sensor: Clouds and the Earth's Radiant Energy System sensor;
Description: Measures solar short-wave radiation and long-wave
radiation released by the earth back into space on a worldwide scale
to enhance long-term climate studies.
Sensor: Ozone Mapping and Profiler Suite (OMPS);
Description: Collects data needed to measure the amount and
distribution of ozone in the earth's atmosphere. Consists of two
components (limb and nadir) that can be provided separately.
Sensor: Space Environment Monitor;
Description: Collects data to identify, reduce, and predict the
effects of space weather on technological systems, including
satellites and radio links.
Sensor: Total and Spectral Solar Irradiance Sensor;
Description: Monitors and captures total and spectral solar irradiance
data.
Sensor: Visible/Infrared Imager/Radiometer Suite (VIIRS);
Description: Collects images and radiometric data used to provide
information on the earth's clouds, atmosphere, ocean, and land
surfaces.
Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS program office data.
[End of table]
The changes in NPOESS sensors affected the number and quality of the
resulting weather and environmental products. In selecting sensors for
the restructured program during the Nunn-McCurdy process, decision
makers placed the highest priority on continuing current operational
weather capabilities and a lower priority on obtaining selected
environmental and climate measuring capabilities. As a result, the
revised NPOESS system had significantly less capability for providing
global climate, ocean, and space environment measures than was
originally planned. Specifically, the number of environmental data
records was decreased from 55 to 39, of which 6 were of a reduced
quality. The 39 data records that remain include cloud base height,
land surface temperature, precipitation type and rate, and sea surface
winds. The 16 data records that were removed include cloud particle
size and distribution, sea surface height, net solar radiation at the
top of the atmosphere, and products to depict the electric fields in
the space environment. The six data records that are of a reduced
quality include ozone profile, soil moisture, and multiple products
depicting energy in the space environment.
After the 2006 Nunn-McCurdy decision, the NPOESS Executive Committee
decided to add selected sensors back to individual satellites in order
to address concerns from the climate community about the loss of key
climate data. In January 2008, the Committee approved plans to include
the Clouds and the Earth's Radiant Energy System sensor on the NPP
satellite. In addition, in May 2008, the Committee approved plans to
include a Total and Spectral Solar Irradiance Sensor on the C1
satellite. Table 3 shows which sensors were planned for NPP and the
four satellites of the NPOESS program, called C1, C2, C3, and C4, as
of May 2008. Program officials acknowledged that these configurations
could change if other parties decide to develop the sensors that were
canceled.
Table 3: Configuration of Sensors Planned for NPP and NPOESS
Satellites, as of May 2008:
Sensor: Advanced Technology Microwave Sounder;
NPP: Sensor is currently planned for this satellite;
NPOESS C1 (PM): Sensor is currently planned for this satellite;
NPOESS C2 (AM): Canceled during the Nunn-McCurdy certification, but
could be restored to this satellite;
NPOESS C3 (PM): Sensor is currently planned for this satellite;
NPOESS C4 (AM): Canceled during the Nunn-McCurdy certification, but
could be restored to this satellite.
Sensor: Microwave Imager/Sounder;
NPP: Not applicable--sensor was never planned for this satellite;
NPOESS C1 (PM): Not applicable--sensor was never planned for this
satellite;
NPOESS C2 (AM): Sensor is currently planned for this satellite;
NPOESS C3 (PM): Sensor is currently planned for this satellite;
NPOESS C4 (AM): Sensor is currently planned for this satellite.
Sensor: Cross-track Infrared Sounder (CrIS);
NPP: Sensor is currently planned for this satellite;
NPOESS C1 (PM): Sensor is currently planned for this satellite;
NPOESS C2 (AM): Canceled during the Nunn-McCurdy certification, but
could be restored to this satellite;
NPOESS C3 (PM): Sensor is currently planned for this satellite;
NPOESS C4 (AM): Canceled during the Nunn-McCurdy certification, but
could be restored to this satellite.
Sensor: Clouds and the Earth's Radiant Energy System sensor;
NPP: Sensor is currently planned for this satellite;
NPOESS C1 (PM): Sensor is currently planned for this satellite;
NPOESS C2 (AM): Not applicable--sensor was never planned for this
satellite;
NPOESS C3 (PM): Not applicable--sensor was never planned for this
satellite;
NPOESS C4 (AM): Not applicable--sensor was never planned for this
satellite.
Sensor: Ozone Mapping and Profiler Suite (OMPS) Nadir/Limb
components[A];
NPP: Sensor is currently planned for this satellite/Sensor is
currently planned for this satellite;
NPOESS C1 (PM): Sensor is currently planned for this
satellite/Canceled during the Nunn-McCurdy certification, but could be
restored to this satellite;
NPOESS C2 (AM): Not applicable--sensor was never planned for this
satellite;
NPOESS C3 (PM): Sensor is currently planned for this
satellite/Canceled during the Nunn-McCurdy certification, but could be
restored to this satellite;
NPOESS C4 (AM): Not applicable--sensor was never planned for this
satellite.
Sensor: Space Environment Monitor;
NPP: Not applicable--sensor was never planned for this satellite;
NPOESS C1 (PM): Sensor is currently planned for this satellite;
NPOESS C2 (AM): Not applicable--sensor was never planned for this
satellite;
NPOESS C3 (PM): Sensor is currently planned for this satellite;
NPOESS C4 (AM): Not applicable--sensor was never planned for this
satellite.
Sensor: Total and Spectral Solar Irradiance Sensor;
NPP: Not applicable--sensor was never planned for this satellite;
NPOESS C1 (PM): Sensor is currently planned for this satellite;
NPOESS C2 (AM): Canceled during the Nunn-McCurdy certification, but
could be restored to this satellite;
NPOESS C3 (PM): Not applicable--sensor was never planned for this
satellite;
NPOESS C4 (AM): Canceled during the Nunn-McCurdy certification, but
could be restored to this satellite.
Sensor: Visible/Infrared Imager/Radiometer Suite (VIIRS);
NPP: Sensor is currently planned for this satellite;
NPOESS C1 (PM): Sensor is currently planned for this satellite;
NPOESS C2 (AM): Sensor is currently planned for this satellite;
NPOESS C3 (PM): Sensor is currently planned for this satellite;
NPOESS C4 (AM): Sensor is currently planned for this satellite.
Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS program office data.
[A] The OMPS sensor consists of two components, called the nadir and
limb. During the 2006 restructuring, a decision was made to remove the
limb component from both C1 and C3 satellites.
[End of table]
NPOESS Continued to Experience Management Challenges, Cost Overruns,
and Schedule Delays after the 2006 Restructuring:
After the program was restructured, the NPOESS program continued to
experience cost growth, schedule delays, and management challenges. In
April 2007, we reported that DOD's plans to reassign the Program
Executive Officer would unnecessarily increase risks to an already
risky program.[Footnote 10] We also reported that, while the program
office had made progress in restructuring NPOESS after the June 2006
Nunn-McCurdy certification decision, important tasks leading up to
finalizing contract changes remained to be completed. Specifically,
executive approval of key acquisition documents was about 6 months
late at that time--due in part to the complexity of navigating three
agencies' approval processes. To address these issues, we recommended
that DOD delay the reassignment of the Program Executive Officer until
all sensors were delivered to NPP, and that the appropriate agency
executives finalize key acquisition documents by the end of April 2007.
In May 2008, we reported that DOD had reassigned the Program Executive
Officer and that key acquisition documents were more than a year late.
We reiterated our prior recommendation that the agencies immediately
complete the acquisition documents.[Footnote 11] In addition, we
reported that poor workmanship and testing delays caused an 8-month
slip to the expected delivery date of the Visible/Infrared Imager/
Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) sensor. This late delivery caused a
corresponding delay in the expected launch date of the NPP
demonstration satellite, moving it to June 2010.
In June 2008, we also reported that the program's life-cycle costs,
estimated at $12.5 billion, were expected to rise by approximately $1
billion because of problems experienced in the development of the
VIIRS and Cross-track Infrared Sounder (CrIS) sensors, the need to
revise outdated operations and support cost estimates, and the need to
modify information security requirements on ground systems.[Footnote
12] Program officials subsequently modified their life-cycle cost
estimate in December 2008 to $13.95 billion, which included about
$1.15 billion for revised pre-and post-launch operations and support
costs and about $300 million to address development issues. The
revised cost estimate did not include funds to modify information
security requirements.
In June 2009, we added to our previous concerns about the tri-agency
oversight of the NPOESS program.[Footnote 13] Specifically, we
reported that the Executive Committee was ineffective because the DOD
acquisition executive did not attend committee meetings; the committee
did not track its action items to closure; and many of the committee's
decisions did not achieve desired outcomes. We also reported that the
life-cycle cost estimate of $13.95 billion was expected to rise by
another $1 billion, and the schedules for NPP and the first two NPOESS
satellites were expected to be delayed by 7, 14, and 5 months,
respectively. (See table 4 for the history of cost and schedule
estimates for the program.) We recommended that the DOD Executive
Committee member attend and participate in Executive Committee
meetings, and that the Executive Committee better track and manage
risk and action items. Additionally, we recommended that the program
develop plans to mitigate the risk of gaps in satellite continuity and
establish a realistic time frame for revising the program's cost and
schedule baselines.
Table 4: Changes in NPOESS Life-Cycle Cost Estimates and Estimated
Satellite Launch:
As of: August 2002;
Life-cycle cost estimate: $7.0 billion;
NPP launch: May 2006;
C1 launch: April 2009;
C2 launch: June 2011.
As of: July 2003;
Life-cycle cost estimate: $7.0 billion;
NPP launch: October 2006;
C1 launch: November 2009;
C2 launch: June 2011.
As of: September 2004;
Life-cycle cost estimate: $8.1 billion;
NPP launch: October 2006;
C1 launch: November 2009;
C2 launch: June 2011.
As of: August 2005;
Life-cycle cost estimate: $8.1 billion;
NPP launch: April 2008;
C1 launch: December 2010;
C2 launch: December 2011.
As of: June 2006;
Life-cycle cost estimate: $12.5 billion;
NPP launch: January 2010;
C1 launch: January 2013;
C2 launch: January 2016.
As of: December 2008;
Life-cycle cost estimate: $13.95 billion;
NPP launch: January 2010;
C1 launch: January 2013;
C2 launch: January 2016.
As of: June 2009;
Life-cycle cost estimate: $14.95 billion[A];
NPP launch: January 2011;
C1 launch: March 2014;
C2 launch: May 2016.
Source: GAO analysis of program office and contractor data.
[A] This is a GAO estimate based on our analysis of contractor data.
[End of table]
To address risks and challenges, the NPOESS Executive Committee
sponsored a series of reviews of the program. Two of the reviews,
conducted in 2007 and 2008, examined the feasibility of alternative
management strategies. Both of these reviews recommended against
changing the prime contractor and made recommendations to improve
other aspects of program management--including the government's
executive and program management and the contractor's management. In
the fall of 2008, an independent review team assessed the program and
delivered its final report in June 2009. Among other things, the
independent review team found that the program had a low probability
of success, the continuity of data was at risk, and the priorities of
DOD and NOAA were not aligned. The team recommended using NPP data
operationally to mitigate potential gaps in coverage, co-locating the
program at an acquisition center, and involving the White House to
resolve priority differences. In March 2009, in response to a draft of
the review team's report, the NPOESS Executive Committee decided to
use NPP data operationally.
Executive Office Review Led to a Decision to Disband the NPOESS
Program:
In August 2009, the Executive Office of the President formed a task
force, led by the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), to
investigate the management and acquisition options that would improve
the NPOESS program.[Footnote 14] Specifically, the task force sought
to identify a governance structure that would address the problems in
schedule and budget, and the risk of a loss of satellite data due to
delays in launching the satellites. In performing its review, the task
force worked with NOAA, DOD, and NASA representatives and attended
Executive Committee meetings.
In February 2010, the Director of OSTP announced that NOAA and DOD
will no longer jointly procure the NPOESS satellite system; instead,
each agency would plan and acquire its own satellite system.
Specifically, NOAA is to be responsible for the afternoon orbit and
the observations planned for the first and third NPOESS satellites.
DOD is to be responsible for the morning orbit and the observations
planned for the second and fourth NPOESS satellites. The partnership
with the European satellite agencies for the midmorning orbit is to
continue as planned. In addition, the task force explained that
partnerships between DOD, NOAA, and NASA should continue and
encouraged the agencies to continue joint efforts in the areas that
have been successful in the past, such as the command and control of
the satellites. Moving forward, while NOAA and DOD develop plans for
separate acquisitions, the development of key components of the NPOESS
program is continuing. Specifically, the program is continuing to
develop the instruments and ground systems supporting NPP and selected
components of the first two NPOESS satellites, which will likely be
needed by the NOAA and DOD follow-on programs.
Agencies Have Begun Planning for Separate Acquisitions, but the Impact
of This New Approach Is Not Fully Known and Key Transition Risks Exist:
NOAA and DOD have begun planning to transition the NPOESS program to
separate acquisitions, but the agencies are at different stages in
planning and neither has finalized its plans. NOAA has developed
preliminary plans for a new program to fulfill the requirements of the
afternoon NPOESS orbit. DOD has just begun planning how it will meet
the requirements of the morning orbit, and expects to have initial
decisions on how it will proceed in acquiring the spacecraft and
sensors by June 2010 and October 2010, respectively. Because neither
agency has completed its plans, the impact of the decision to disband
the program on expected costs, schedules, and promised capabilities
has not yet been fully determined. However, it is likely that the
decision will further delay the first satellite's launch schedule, add
to the overall cost, and remove selected capabilities. Moving forward,
the agencies face key risks in transitioning from NPOESS to two
separate programs. These risks include the loss of key staff and
capabilities, added delays in negotiating contract changes and
establishing new program offices, the loss of support for the other
agency's requirements, and insufficient oversight of new program
management. Until these risks are effectively mitigated, it is likely
that the satellite programs' costs will continue to grow and launch
dates will continue to be delayed. Further delays are likely to
jeopardize the availability and continuity of weather and climate data.
NOAA and DOD Have Begun Planning for Their Separate Acquisitions, but
the Impact on Cost, Schedule, and Capabilities Is Not Fully Known:
NOAA and DOD have begun planning to transition the NPOESS program to
separate acquisitions, but the two agencies are at different stages in
planning. NOAA has developed preliminary plans for its new satellite
acquisition program--called the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS).
Specifically, NOAA developed plans for two satellites to fly in the
afternoon orbit. NOAA plans to have the first JPSS satellite, formerly
NPOESS C1, available for launch in 2015, and the second JPSS
satellite, formerly NPOESS C3, available for launch in 2018.[Footnote
15] NOAA will also provide the ground systems for both the JPSS and
DOD programs. Current plans estimate that the life-cycle cost of the
JPSS program will be approximately $11.9 billion, which includes $2.9
billion in NOAA funds spent on NPOESS through fiscal year 2010.
[Footnote 16]
NOAA is also considering technical changes to the program that involve
the size of the spacecraft and the sensors to be included on each of
the satellites. Specifically, NOAA is considering using a smaller
spacecraft than the one planned for NPOESS. NOAA is also considering
removing sensors that were planned for the NPOESS C1 and C3 satellites
and obtaining those data from other sources, including international
satellites.[Footnote 17] Table 5 includes preliminary plans for which
sensors will be accommodated on the JPSS satellites.
Table 5: Configuration of Sensors Planned for NPP and JPSS Satellites,
as of March 2010:
Sensor: Advanced Technology Microwave Sounder;
NPP: Sensor is currently planned for this satellite;
JPSS-1 (C1 equivalent): Sensor is currently planned for this satellite;
JPSS-2 (C3 equivalent): Sensor is currently planned for this satellite.
Sensor: Microwave Imager/Sounder;
NPP: Not applicable--sensor was never planned for this satellite;
JPSS-1 (C1 equivalent): Not applicable--sensor was never planned for
this satellite;
JPSS-2 (C3 equivalent): Sensor was planned for the NPOESS satellite,
but NOAA currently does not plan to include it on the JPSS satellite.
Sensor: Cross-track Infrared Sounder (CrIS);
NPP: Sensor is currently planned for this satellite;
JPSS-1 (C1 equivalent): Sensor is currently planned for this satellite;
JPSS-2 (C3 equivalent): Sensor is currently planned for this satellite.
Sensor: Clouds and the Earth's Radiant Energy System/Earth Radiation
Budget Sensor[A];
NPP: Sensor is currently planned for this satellite;
JPSS-1 (C1 equivalent): Sensor is currently planned for this satellite;
JPSS-2 (C3 equivalent): Sensor is currently planned for this satellite.
Sensor: Ozone Mapping and Profiler Suite (OMPS) Nadir/Limb
components[B];
NPP: Sensor is currently planned for this satellite/Sensor is
currently planned for this satellite;
JPSS-1 (C1 equivalent): Sensor is currently planned for this
satellite/A decision has not been made as to whether it will be on
this satellite;
JPSS-2 (C3 equivalent): Sensor is currently planned for this
satellite/Sensor is currently planned for this satellite.
Sensor: Space Environment Monitor;
NPP: Not applicable--sensor was never planned for this satellite;
JPSS-1 (C1 equivalent): Sensor was planned for the NPOESS satellite,
but NOAA currently does not plan to include it on the JPSS satellite;
JPSS-2 (C3 equivalent): Sensor was planned for the NPOESS satellite,
but NOAA currently does not plan to include it on the JPSS satellite.
Sensor: Total and Spectral Solar Irradiance Sensor[C];
NPP: Not applicable--sensor was never planned for this satellite;
JPSS-1 (C1 equivalent): A decision has not been made as to whether it
will be on this satellite;
JPSS-2 (C3 equivalent): A decision has not been made as to whether it
will be on this satellite.
Sensor: Visible/Infrared Imager/Radiometer Suite (VIIRS);
NPP: Sensor is currently planned for this satellite;
JPSS-1 (C1 equivalent): Sensor is currently planned for this satellite;
JPSS-2 (C3 equivalent): Sensor is currently planned for this satellite.
Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS program office data.
[A] The Clouds and the Earth's Radiant Energy System sensor is to be
included on NPP and JPSS-1. The Earth Radiation Budget Sensor--a
follow-on sensor--is to be included on JPSS-2.
[B] The OMPS sensor consists of two components, called the nadir and
limb. During the 2006 restructuring, a decision was made to remove the
limb component from both C1 and C3 satellites. NOAA plans for OMPS
limb to be included on JPSS-2, but may move it to JPSS-1 if the
schedule allows.
[C] Although NOAA plans to develop the Total and Spectral Solar
Irradiance Sensor, it has not determined whether the sensor will be
included on JPSS-1, JPSS-2, or a different accommodation.
[End of table]
The management of the JPSS satellites will also change from that of
the NPOESS satellites. NOAA plans to transfer the management of
acquisition from the NPOESS program office to NASA's Goddard Space
Flight Center, so that it can be co-located at a space system
acquisition center as advocated by the NPOESS independent review team.
According to NOAA officials, the agency will provide direction,
requirements, and budget to NASA. NOAA will also provide staff,
including a program director and program scientist. A NASA employee
will function as program manager. In addition, NOAA has developed a
team to lead the transition from NPOESS to JPSS and has included
representatives from NOAA, NASA, and DOD. Because this team has just
been formed, they have not yet fully developed plans to guide the
transition. NOAA officials plan to begin transitioning in July, and
complete the transition plan--including cost and schedule estimates--
by the end of September.
DOD is at an earlier stage in its planning process, in part because it
has more time before the first satellite in the morning orbit is
needed. DOD officials are currently reviewing requirements for the
morning orbit and plan to define how to proceed by the end of June
2010. After this review is completed, DOD plans to analyze
alternatives for meeting the requirements and to develop a plan for
the chosen alternative. DOD anticipates making a decision on whether
to use the NPOESS spacecraft by June 2010 and to make a decision on
which sensors it will include--including the Space Environment Monitor
and the Microwave Imager/Sounder--by October 2010. DOD acquisition
officials expect to begin the program in fiscal year 2013.
Table 6 compares key attributes of the NPOESS program when it was
restructured in 2006 to the NPOESS program at the time of the task
force decision in 2010 and to preliminary plans for the separate NOAA
and DOD acquisitions.
Table 6: Comparison of NPOESS to the New NOAA and DOD Acquisitions:
Key area: Life-cycle range;
NPOESS program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision (as of June 2006): 1995-
2026;
NPOESS program (as of February 2010): 1995-2026;
NOAA and DOD acquisition plans (as of February 2010): JPSS: 1995-2024;
DOD program: unknown.
Key area: Estimated life-cycle cost[A];
NPOESS program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision (as of June 2006):
$12.5 billion;
NPOESS program (as of February 2010): $13.95+ billion[B];
NOAA and DOD acquisition plans (as of February 2010): JPSS: $11.9
billion (which includes about $2.9 billion in NOAA funds spent through
fiscal year 2010 on NPOESS);
DOD program: unknown; DOD's initial estimates include costs of about
$5 billion through fiscal year 2015 (which includes about $2.9 billion
in DOD funds spent through fiscal year 2010 on NPOESS).
Key area: Launch schedule;
NPOESS program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision (as of June 2006): NPP
by January 2010; C1 by January 2013; C2 by January 2016; C3 by January
2018; C4 by January 2020;
NPOESS program (as of February 2010): NPP no earlier than September
2011; C1 by March 2014[C]; C2 by May 2016; C3 by January 2018; C4 by
January 2020;
NOAA and DOD acquisition plans (as of February 2010): NPP no earlier
than September 2011; JPSS-1 (C1 equivalent) available in 2015; JPSS-2
(C3 equivalent) available in 2018; DOD program: unknown.
Key area: Number of sensors;
NPOESS program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision (as of June 2006): NPP:
4 sensors; C1: 6 sensors; C2: 2 sensors; C3: 6 sensors; C4: 2 sensors;
NPOESS program (as of February 2010): NPP: 5 sensors; C1: 7 sensors[D];
C2: 2 sensors; C3: 6 sensors; C4: 2 sensors;
NOAA and DOD acquisition plans (as of February 2010): NPP: 5 sensors;
JPSS-1 and 2: Although NOAA has not determined the exact complement of
sensors, it will have at least 5 of the original NPOESS sensors[E];
DOD program: unknown.
Source: GAO analysis of NOAA, DOD, and task force data.
[A] Although the life-cycle ranges for NPOESS are through 2026, the
cost estimates for both NPOESS and JPSS are only through 2024.
[B] Although the program baseline is currently $13.95 billion, we
estimated in June 2009 that this cost could grow by about $1 billion.
In addition, officials from the Executive Office of the President
stated that they reviewed life-cycle cost estimates from DOD and the
NPOESS program office of $15.1 billion and $16.45 billion,
respectively.
[C] Officials from the Executive Office of the President noted that
the expected launch date of C1 had slipped to late 2014 by the time of
their decision.
[D] In May 2008, the NPOESS Executive Committee approved an additional
sensor--the Total and Spectral Solar Irradiance Sensor--for the C1
satellite.
[E] These five sensors are: VIIRS, CrIS, OMPS-nadir, the Advanced
Technology Microwave Sounder, and the Clouds and the Earth's Radiant
Energy System/Earth Radiation Budget Sensor.
[End of table]
Because neither agency has finalized plans for its acquisition, the
full impact of the task force decision on the expected cost, schedule,
and capabilities is unknown. However, it appears likely that the
combined cost of the separate acquisitions could be higher than the
last NPOESS estimate, the schedule for the first satellite's launch
will be later than the last NPOESS estimate, and selected capabilities
will be removed from the program.
* Cost: NOAA anticipates that the JPSS program will cost approximately
$11.9 billion to complete through 2024.[Footnote 18] Although this
estimated cost is less than the baselined cost of the NPOESS program,
DOD will still need to fund and develop satellites to meet the
requirements for the early morning orbit. DOD's initial estimates are
for its new program to cost almost $5 billion through fiscal year
2015.[Footnote 19] Thus, it is likely that the cost of the two
acquisitions will exceed the baselined life-cycle cost of the NPOESS
program.
* Schedule: Neither NOAA nor DOD have finalized plans that show the
full impact of the restructuring on the schedule for satellite
development. We have previously reported that restructuring a program
like NPOESS could take significant time to accomplish, due in part to
the time taken revising, renegotiating, or developing important
acquisition documents, including contracts and interagency
agreements.[Footnote 20] With important decisions and negotiations
still pending, it is likely that the expected launch date of the first
JPSS satellite will be delayed.
* Capabilities: Neither agency has made final decisions on the full
set of sensors--or which satellites will accommodate them--for their
respective satellite programs. Until those decisions are made, it will
not be possible to determine the capabilities that these satellites
will and will not provide.
Timely decisions on cost, schedule, and capabilities would allow both
acquisitions to move forward and satellite data users to start
planning for any data shortfalls they may experience. Until DOD and
NOAA finalize their plans, it is not clear whether the new
acquisitions will meet the requirements of both civilian and military
users.
NOAA and DOD Face Key Transition Risks That Threaten Satellite
Continuity:
Moving forward, the agencies face key risks in transitioning from
NPOESS to their new programs. These risks include the loss of key
staff and capabilities, delays resulting from negotiating contract
changes and establishing new program offices, the loss of support for
both agencies' requirements, and insufficient oversight of new program
management.
* Loss of key staff and capabilities--The NPOESS program office is
composed of NOAA, NASA, Air Force, and contractor staff with knowledge
and experience in spacecraft procurement and integration, ground
systems, sensors, data products, systems engineering, budgeting, and
cost analysis. These individuals have knowledge and experience in the
status, risks, and lessons learned from the NPOESS program. This
knowledge will be critical to moving the program forward both during
and after the transition period. However, program office staff have
already begun leaving--or looking for other employment--due to the
uncertainties about the future of the program office. Unless NOAA is
proactive in retaining these staff, the new program may waste valuable
time if staff must relearn program details and may repeat mistakes
made and lose lessons learned by prior program staff.
* Delays in negotiating contract changes and establishing new
programs--We have previously reported that restructuring a program
like NPOESS could take significant time to accomplish, due in part to
the time taken revising, renegotiating, or developing important
acquisition documents, including contracts and interagency agreements.
[Footnote 21] According to NOAA officials, the plan for JPSS may
require negotiations with contractors and between contractors and
their subcontractors. In addition, both NOAA and DOD will need to
establish and fully staff program offices to facilitate and manage the
transition and new programs. However, these contract and program
changes have not yet occurred and it is not clear when they will
occur. These changes could take significant time to complete.
Meanwhile, the NPOESS program office continues to support--and fund--
development activities that may not be used in the new programs,
because neither NOAA nor DOD have made key decisions on the
technologies, such as the spacecraft and sensors, that will be
included on the new programs. Until decisions are made on how the
program is to proceed with contract changes and terminations, the
contractors and program office cannot implement the chosen solution
and some decisions, such as the ability to hold schedule slips to a
minimum, could become much more difficult.
* Failure to support the other agency's requirements--As a joint
program, NPOESS was expected to fulfill many military, civilian, and
research requirements for environmental data. The task force decision
to restructure NPOESS noted that decisions on future satellite
programs should ensure the continuity of critical satellite data.
However, because the requirements of NOAA and DOD are different, the
agencies may develop programs that meet their own needs but not the
other's. DOD, NOAA, and NASA will still need to work together to
ensure that requirements are known, agreed upon, and managed, and that
changes in their respective program's capabilities do not degrade the
continuity requirements. For example, NOAA officials reported that
they do not plan to include the Microwave Imager/Sounder in their
follow-on program and will instead procure data from a different
sensor on an international satellite. However, it is not clear that
NOAA's plans will meet the needs of all of DOD's users, including the
Navy and Army. Similarly, it is not clear that DOD will continue to
support the climate community's requirements for highly calibrated and
accurate measurements. If the agencies cannot find a way to build a
partnership that facilitates both efficient and effective decision-
making on data continuity needs, the data continuity needs of both
agencies may not be adequately incorporated into the new programs.
* Insufficient oversight of new program management--Under its new JPSS
program, NOAA plans to transfer parts of the NPOESS program to NASA,
but it has not yet defined how it will oversee NASA's efforts.
Transferring the program to NASA will not necessarily resolve existing
cost, schedule, and subcontractor management issues. We recently
reported that the acquisition challenges faced in major NASA
acquisitions are similar to the ones faced by DOD acquisitions,
including NPOESS.[Footnote 22] Specifically, we reported that NASA has
consistently underestimated time and cost and has not adequately
managed risk factors such as contractor performance. Because of these
issues, we listed NASA's acquisition management as a high-risk area in
1990, and it remains a high-risk area today.[Footnote 23] In addition,
our work on the GOES I-M satellite series found that NOAA did not have
the ability to make quick decisions on problems because portions of
the procurement were managed by NASA.[Footnote 24] Specifically, this
management approach limited NOAA's insight and management involvement
in the procurement of major elements of the system. NOAA officials
reported that they are developing a management control plan with NASA
and intend to perform an independent review of this plan when it is
completed. They could not provide a time frame for its completion.
Without strong NOAA oversight of NASA's management of program
components, JPSS may continue to face the same cost, schedule, and
contract management challenges as the NPOESS program.
While NOAA, NASA, and DOD acknowledge that there are risks associated
with the transition to new programs, they have not yet established
plans to mitigate these risks. Until these risks are effectively
mitigated, it is likely that the satellite programs' costs will
continue to grow and launch dates will continue to be delayed. Further
launch delays are likely to jeopardize the availability and continuity
of weather and climate data. For example, the POES satellite currently
in the afternoon orbit is expected to reach the end of its lifespan at
the end of 2012. If NPP is delayed, there could be a gap in polar
satellite observations in the afternoon orbit. Similarly, a delay in
the launch of the first JPSS satellite may lead to a gap in satellite
data after NPP reaches the end of its lifespan.
Data continuity gaps pose different implications for DOD and NOAA. For
both agencies, a loss of satellite data represents a reduction in
weather forecasting capabilities. Within the military, satellite data
and products allow military planners and tactical users to focus on
anticipating and exploiting atmospheric and space environmental
conditions. For example, accurate wind and temperature forecasts are
critical to any decision to launch an aircraft that will need mid-
flight refueling. For NOAA, satellite data and products are provided
to weather forecasters for use in issuing weather forecasts and
warnings to the public and to support our nation's aviation,
agriculture, and maritime communities. NOAA also faces risks in losing
longer-term climate observations. Maintaining the continuity of
climate and space data over decades is important to identify long-term
environmental cycles (such as the 11-year solar cycle and multiyear
ocean cycles, including the El Niño effect) and their impacts, and to
detect trends in global warming. Figure 5 shows the current and
planned satellites and highlights gaps where the constellation is at
risk.
Figure 5: Planned Launch Dates and Potential Gaps in Satellite Data:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated timelines]
Orbit: Early morning;
Satellite: DMSP F-17;
Planned spacecraft operations: through late 2010;
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite does not live beyond its
expected life: late 2010 through late 2012.
Orbit: Early morning;
Satellite: DMSP F-19;
Planned spacecraft operations: late 2012 through late 2017;
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite fails on launch or in
orbit: late 2012 through late 2017.
Orbit: Mid-morning;
Satellite: DMSP F-18;
Planned spacecraft operations: late 2009 through late 2013;
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite does not live beyond its
expected life: late 2013 through mid-2014.
Orbit: Mid-morning;
Satellite: DMSP F-20;
Planned spacecraft operations: mid-2014 through mid-2019.
Orbit: Mid-morning;
Satellite: MetOp-A;
Planned spacecraft operations: through late 2011.
Orbit: Mid-morning;
Satellite: MetOp-B;
Planned spacecraft operations: mid-2012 through early 2017.
Orbit: Mid-morning;
Satellite: MetOp-C;
Planned spacecraft operations: late 2017 through late 2022.
Orbit: Afternoon;
Satellite: NOAA-19;
Planned spacecraft operations: early 2009 through late 2012.
Orbit: Afternoon;
Satellite: NPP;
On-orbit accuracy check: late 2011 through early 2012;
Planned spacecraft operations: early 2013 through late 2016;
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite fails on launch or in
orbit: late 2012 through late 2015.
Orbit: Afternoon;
Satellite: JPSS-1;
On-orbit accuracy check: early 2015 through early 2016;
Planned spacecraft operations: early 2016 through early 2022;
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite fails on launch or in
orbit: late 2016 through mid-2019.
Orbit: Afternoon;
Satellite: JPSS-2;
On-orbit accuracy check: early 2018 through mid-2019;
Planned spacecraft operations: mid-2019 through early 2025.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD, NOAA, and NPOESS Integrated Program
Office data.
Note: DOD is currently evaluating its options for the early morning
orbit, including moving the DMSP F-20 satellite to the early morning
orbit or acquiring additional satellites. Launch dates and gaps for
the early morning orbit will remain uncertain until these decisions
are made.
[End of figure]
NPOESS Development Continues, but Demonstration Satellite Has Been
Delayed and New Challenges Threaten Further Delays:
While NOAA and DOD are establishing plans for separate acquisitions,
the development of key NPOESS components is continuing. In recent
months, the critical VIIRS sensor has been completed and integrated
onto the NPP spacecraft. In addition, the program continues to work on
components of the first and second NPOESS satellites, including
sensors and ground systems. These components may be transferred to
NOAA and DOD to become part of their respective follow-on programs.
However, the expected launch date of the NPP satellite has been
delayed by 9 months due to technical issues in the development of a
key sensor, and the development of the VIIRS sensor for the first
NPOESS satellite is experiencing cost overruns. In addition, the
program is slowing down and may stop work on key components in order
to address potential contract liabilities and funding constraints.
This would further delay the launches of the NPP satellite and the
first NOAA and DOD satellites under their new programs.
NPOESS Components Making Progress, but Technical Issues Have Delayed
NPP Launch:
In recent months, selected components of the NPOESS program have made
progress. Specifically, the program completed the development of the
critical VIIRS sensor and delivered it to NASA for integration onto
the NPP satellite. Four of the five sensors intended for NPP are now
on the spacecraft. In addition, the program has continued to develop
key sensors intended for the first NPOESS satellite (VIIRS, CrIS,
OMPS, and the Advanced Technology Microwave Sounder sensors), and a
key sensor for the second NPOESS satellite (the Microwave
Imager/Sounder). These components may be transferred to NOAA and DOD
to become part of their respective follow-on programs.
However, the program experienced technical issues on the Cross-track
Infrared Sounder (CrIS) sensor intended for the NPP satellite.
Specifically, in January 2009 after the CrIS sensor completed its
thermal vacuum tests, an anomaly was discovered on a circuit card that
then led to the discovery of unrelated design flaws on two additional
circuit cards. During final testing of new parts in August 2009,
components intended for CrIS were damaged after the subcontractor
failed to adhere to proper test processes. After investigating the
problem and possible solutions for several months, the program decided
to replace damaged parts and send the instrument through a limited
thermal vacuum test. In total, this testing error resulted in an 11-
month delay in the delivery of CrIS and a 9-month delay to the NPP
satellite launch date (bringing it to September 2011, at the
earliest). In addition, the program continues to face technical
challenges and cost overruns in developing the VIIRS sensor for the
first NPOESS satellite. Details on the status of key components for
NPP and the first two NPOESS satellites are provided in table 7.
Table 7: Status of Key Components of NPP and the First Two NPOESS
Satellites (C1 and C2), as of March 2010:
Satellite: NPP;
Component: Advanced Technology Microwave Sounder;
Program-identified risk level[A]: Low;
Status: The sensor was integrated on the spacecraft in December 2006
and is awaiting delivery of the other sensors in order to complete
integration testing.
Satellite: NPP;
Component: Satellite: Clouds and the Earth's Radiant Energy System;
Program-identified risk level[A]: Satellite: Low;
Status: Satellite: The sensor was integrated on the spacecraft in
November 2008.
Satellite: NPP;
Component: Satellite: Cross-track Infrared Sounder (CrIS);
Program-identified risk level[A]: Satellite: Medium;
Status: Satellite: Technical, process, and testing errors have delayed
the expected shipment of the CrIS sensor from July 2009 to June 2010,
and it is driving the NPP schedule. The program office is preparing
for a final review of the sensor.
Satellite: NPP;
Component: Satellite: Ozone Mapping and Profiler Suite (OMPS);
Program-identified risk level[A]: Satellite: Medium;
Status: Satellite: OMPS has been integrated onto the spacecraft, but
has had continued technical issues. After analysis of the issues, the
program decided not to modify this sensor.
Satellite: NPP;
Component: Satellite: Visible/Infrared Imager/Radiometer Suite (VIIRS);
Program-identified risk level[A]: Satellite: Low;
Status: Satellite: The sensor was shipped to integration facilities in
January 2010 and was integrated onto the NPP spacecraft.
Satellite: NPP;
Component: Spacecraft;
Program-identified risk level[A]: Low;
Status: The spacecraft has been completed and four of five sensors
have been integrated on it.
Satellite: NPOESS C1:
Component: Ground processing segment;
Program-identified risk level[A]: Medium;
Status: An NPP compatibility test is planned for the fall of 2010, but
it requires all sensors to be integrated onto the spacecraft. NASA
officials reported that the ground system is still risky for NPP, and
they plan to remain vigilant to fix issues.
Satellite: NPOESS C1;
Component: Advanced Technology Microwave Sounder;
Program-identified risk level[A]: Low;
Status: The sensor is currently being built by the prime contractor.
Although the effort is low risk and over 80 percent complete, the
effort is taking more time than expected.
Satellite: NPOESS C1;
Component: Satellite: Clouds and the Earth's Radiant Energy System;
Program-identified risk level[A]: Satellite: Low;
Status: Satellite: A contract for this sensor's development was
awarded in May 2009;
delivery is expected in July 2012.
Satellite: NPOESS C1;
Component: Satellite: Cross-track Infrared Sounder (CrIS);
Program-identified risk level[A]: Satellite: Medium;
Status: Satellite: Because the program needed to delay activities on
this sensor in 2009, delivery of the sensor could be delayed by a full
year.
Satellite: NPOESS C1;
Component: Satellite: Ozone Mapping and Profiler Suite (OMPS);
Program-identified risk level[A]: Satellite: High;
Status: Satellite: This sensor is about 45 percent complete, according
to program officials;
however, the contractor recently found contamination on the sensor
during testing. Inspection and re-testing are expected to delay the
OMPS schedule by about 2 months.
Satellite: NPOESS C1;
Component: Satellite: Space Environment Monitor;
Program-identified risk level[A]: Satellite: High;
Status: Satellite: The program office was late in awarding the
contract for the second phase of this sensor;
this will likely delay the sensor's development by a few months. DOD
is currently evaluating whether to include this sensor on its follow-
on program;
a decision is to be made by October 2010.
Satellite: NPOESS C1;
Component: Satellite: Total and Spectral Solar Irradiance Sensor;
Program-identified risk level[A]: Satellite: Low;
Status: Satellite: The sensor development contract was awarded in July
2009.
Satellite: NPOESS C1;
Component: Satellite: Visible/Infrared Imager/Radiometer Suite (VIIRS);
Program-identified risk level[A]: Satellite: High;
Status: Satellite: According to program officials, this sensor is
about 60 percent complete;
however, it has continued to experience significant cost overruns.
Satellite: NPOESS C1;
Component: Satellite: Spacecraft;
Program-identified risk level[A]: Satellite: Medium;
Status: Satellite: The spacecraft is on the critical path for NPOESS
C1, which means that any delays in the spacecraft could delay the
launch date. DOD and NOAA are currently evaluating whether they will
use this or another spacecraft for their follow-on programs.
Satellite: NPOESS C1;
Component: Ground processing segment;
Program-identified risk level[A]: Low;
Status: Hardware for the final two central data processing centers is
expected to be delivered by the end of 2013.
Satellite: NPOESS C2;
Component: Microwave Imager/Sounder;
Program-identified risk level[A]: Low;
Status: Development for this sensor is continuing;
a final decision on whether DOD will continue development will be made
by the end of this fiscal year.
Source: GAO analysis of program office data.
[A] Although the NPOESS program office has determined these risk
levels for program components, NOAA and NASA officials felt that the
risk levels for the NPOESS VIIRS and Microwave Imager/Sounder sensors,
spacecraft, and ground systems are too low and that the risk level of
the NPOESS OMPS sensor is too high.
[End of table]
New Challenges Threaten Further Delays:
In the months leading up to an official transition from the NPOESS
program to the successor NOAA and DOD programs, NPOESS officials face
key challenges that further threaten environmental satellite
continuity. Specifically, the NPOESS program is slowing down and may
stop work on key components in order to address potential contract
liabilities and funding constraints. According to agency officials,
the prime contract includes a clause requiring termination liability
be funded in the current year's budget. This means that if NPOESS
development were to continue according to schedule, the program would
need to stop all development work in August 2010 in order to fund the
approximately $84 million in potential termination liability for this
year. To mitigate this risk, in April 2010, the prime contractor was
directed to slow down work on all development activities so that work
could continue through the end of the fiscal year.
In addition, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2010 placed limitations on the amount of DOD funding available to the
program until certain requirements were met.[Footnote 25] Although the
program met those requirements in March 2010, agency officials noted
that DOD funding could be rescinded if not obligated quickly.
According to program officials, if these funds are rescinded, DOD may
have to terminate the NPOESS contract by the end of the fiscal year.
Slowing or stopping work under either scenario could further delay the
launches of the NPP satellite and the first NOAA and DOD satellites
under their new programs. However, officials have not established
detailed priorities among different components to guide any work
stoppages. Unless selected components are able to continue scheduled
development, the launches of NPP and the first few satellites could be
further delayed.
Limitations on the Demonstration Satellite May Adversely Affect the
Usefulness of Its Data:
As originally designed, NPP was planned to reduce the risk associated
with launching new sensor technologies in the NPOESS program and to
ensure continuity of climate data with NASA's Earth Observing System
satellites. Therefore, NPP was not expected to be an operational
satellite used for weather forecasting. However, in March 2009, delays
in the expected launch of the first NPOESS satellite led the Executive
Committee to decide to use NPP data operationally. Because the NPP
demonstration satellite was not designed as an operational asset, it
has several limitations. These limitations include fewer ground-based
data processing systems, fewer security controls, and a shorter
satellite lifespan than current or planned operational satellites.
These design limitations mean that in some cases, NPP's data will not
be as timely and useful as current polar satellites or as secure as
planned satellites. In addition, there is a risk of a gap in the
nation's climate and weather data should the NPP satellite or its
sensors fail before the next satellite is launched. Agency officials
acknowledge these limitations and are assessing options to make NPP
data more timely and secure.
NPP Will Have Fewer Ground-Based Data Processing Systems than NPOESS:
While NOAA, NASA, and DOD plan to have a ground-based data processing
system in each of four central data processing centers when NPOESS (or
its successors') satellites are in operation, the data processing
system will be in only two of the centers for the NPP demonstration
satellite.[Footnote 26] This arrangement means that the two centers
that do not have the data processing systems will experience a lag in
obtaining NPP data. Specifically, under current operations, the four
satellite data processing centers receive polar satellite data within
about 100 to 150 minutes. NPP's data will be available to the two
centers with the data processing system within approximately 140
minutes; it will be available to the two other centers within about
170 minutes. This presents a delay of 20 to 70 minutes from current
operations for the two centers without the data processing system.
Because of this delay, NPP data will not be as useful to DOD as the
data from legacy DMSP and POES satellites. DOD officials reported that
they plan to incorporate NPP data when and where they can to
supplement data from the legacy satellites. However, DOD's centers
will not be able to incorporate NPP data into all of their operational
products, due to the time delay. For example, officials from one data
processing center reported that the delay in obtaining NPP data could
adversely affect their atmospheric and oceanographic numerical weather
prediction capabilities. This situation would be exacerbated if POES
or DMSP satellites fail in orbit before the first NPOESS/JPSS
satellite is launched because the DOD centers may not be able to use
NPP data to make up for the data loss. According to DOD officials, the
three DOD centers are currently investigating options to shorten the
time it will take for the data to go from the one center with the data
processing system to the other two that lack the system, but do not
have a timeline for making decisions on how to proceed. NASA officials
reported that there are other options for shortening the time lag. For
example, JPSS officials are considering accelerating the development
of the data processing systems in their new program. This could allow
all four centers to have a processing system shortly after NPP is
launched and would eliminate the additional time lag for two of the
centers.
NPP Was Designed Using Information Security Guidelines That Are Now
Outdated:
When originally designed, the NPP ground systems included information
security controls that were based on the DOD security requirements
that existed at that time. However, these standards--approved in 1998--
do not include all of the security controls applicable to newer
systems. According to NOAA officials, the limitations in NPP's
security controls relate primarily to the risk of data loss, denial-of-
service, and continuity of operations, rather than a risk to the
command and control of the satellite.
In 2008, program officials evaluated the security requirements of the
NPOESS program. Specifically, they evaluated whether to increase the
security controls before the NPP launch, before the first NPOESS
satellite launch, or before the second NPOESS satellite launch. They
decided against updating the NPP security requirements, because it
would cost the program up to $280 million to make such a change, and
could risk NPP's scheduled launch date. According to NOAA officials,
they recently evaluated the impact of the weaknesses in NPP's security
controls and made decisions on a majority of security controls in
April 2010.
NPP's Expected Life Span Is Shorter than That of NPOESS:
The NPP satellite was only designed to support a 5-year mission life,
unlike the 7-year mission life of the NPOESS satellites. Because NPP's
design life is only 5 years, it has the potential to fail before the
next satellite is launched. If NPP launches as planned in October
2011, the satellite, based on current design, may remain functional
until 2016. Thus, data from the next polar-orbiting satellite may be
needed as early as 2016.
Although the first JPSS satellite launch is planned for 2015, it may
need a year or more to perform an on-orbit accuracy check.[Footnote
27] Thus, it is very likely that there will be gaps in climate and
weather data if NPP cannot survive beyond its design life. Further
delays in the development and launch of the next satellite will
increase the risk of a gap. NOAA officials acknowledge this limitation
and are evaluating ways to mitigate the risk of a gap. NASA officials
reported that the NPP spacecraft is based on a legacy design; thus,
they estimate that the spacecraft will likely last for 7 years or
more. However, they questioned the reliability of key sensors--
particularly VIIRS, CrIS, and OMPS--on NPP, due to poor workmanship
and mission assurance weaknesses during development.
Conclusions:
At the end of this fiscal year, the federal government will have spent
16 years and over $5 billion to combine two legacy satellite programs
into one, yet will not have launched a single satellite. Faced with
expected cost growth exceeding $8 billion, schedule delays of over 5
years, and continuing tri-agency management challenges, a task force
led by the President's Office of Science and Technology Policy decided
to disband NPOESS so that NOAA and DOD could pursue separate satellite
acquisitions. While the two agencies are scrambling to develop plans
for their respective programs, it is not yet clear what the programs
will deliver, when, and at what cost. Timely decisions on cost,
schedule, and capabilities are needed to allow both acquisitions to
move forward. As the agencies develop plans for their respective
satellite programs, they face risks associated with the loss of
critical staff with knowledge and experience, delays in negotiating
contract changes and setting up new program offices, the two agencies
not fulfilling each other's core requirements, and insufficient
program oversight. Neither agency has developed plans to mitigate
these risks.
Until the transition is completed, the NPOESS program is continuing to
develop components of the NPP satellite and components of the first
two satellites. However, program officials reported that they have
slowed all development work, and may need to stop work on these
deliverables because of potential contract liabilities and funding
constraints. Slowing or stopping work could further delay the
satellites' launches, and the program has not developed a prioritized
list of what to stop first to mitigate impacts on satellite launches.
Until it does so, there may be an increased risk of gaps in satellite
data.
Because NPP was built to be a demonstration satellite, its data may
not be as timely and useful as current polar satellites and not as
secure as planned satellites. In addition, the limited lifespan of NPP
further increases the risk of gaps in climate and weather data. Agency
officials acknowledge these limitations and are assessing options to
make NPP data more timely, but do not have time frames for deciding
among alternative options.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
In order to ensure that the transition from NPOESS to its successor
programs is efficiently and effectively managed, we recommend that the
Secretaries of Defense and Commerce take the following four actions:
* direct their respective NPOESS follow-on programs to expedite
decisions on the expected cost, schedule, and capabilities of their
planned programs;
* direct their respective NPOESS follow-on programs to develop plans
to address key transition risks, including the loss of skilled staff,
delays in contract negotiations and setting up new program offices,
loss of support for the other agency's requirements, and oversight of
new program management;
* direct the NPOESS program office to develop priorities for work
slowdown and stoppage to allow the activities that are most important
to maintaining launch schedules to continue; and:
* direct NOAA and DOD officials to develop time frames for making key
decisions on--or accepting the risks related to--the timeliness of
NPP's data.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We received written comments on a draft of this report from the
Secretary of Commerce, who transmitted NOAA's comments (see app. II),
the Director of Space and Intelligence within DOD (see app. III), and
the Associate Administrator for the Science Mission Directorate of
NASA (see app. IV). In addition, a senior policy analyst from the
Office of Science and Technology Policy/Executive Office of the
President provided technical comments on a draft of this report via
email, which we incorporated as appropriate.
In their comments, both NOAA and DOD agreed with our recommendations
and identified plans to implement them. For example, NOAA plans to
work with NASA to develop requirements and acquisition plans, identify
the organization and staffing, and establish a cost and schedule
baseline for JPSS. In addition, DOD officials reported that the agency
plans to make decisions on capability, cost, and schedule following a
series of meetings taking place in June 2010.
In addition, regarding the potential need to slow down or stop work on
the NPOESS program to deal with potential contract liabilities and
funding constraints, NOAA, NASA, and DOD reported that the NPOESS
program office has identified priorities for work stoppage so that key
activities could continue. At the end of March 2010, the program
executive officer provided high-level guidance on the priorities of
the program, such as ensuring that NPP development continues and
ensuring that key sensor development is transferred to the JPSS
program. Subsequently, program officials stated that the contractor
agreed to slow all of its development work through the end of the
fiscal year to avoid a work stoppage. However, slowing all work
activities does not reflect a prioritization of the most important
activities. Unless the key activities that are on the critical path
are able to continue scheduled development, the launches of NPP and
the first few satellites could be further delayed.
NASA also commented on our finding that NOAA would need to provide
enhanced oversight of NASA's management of the JPSS program. We called
for enhanced oversight based, in part, on NASA's history of poor
performance in managing major acquisitions. NASA officials asserted
that the proper basis for comparison should not be their leading edge
research missions, but, instead, should be the operational
environmental satellite missions it has developed for NOAA in the
past. NASA noted that its role in JPSS will be structured similar to
the Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) and
Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES) programs,
where NOAA and NASA have a long and effective partnership. However, we
believe that enhanced oversight is warranted. The JPSS program differs
from the recent POES and GOES programs in that it includes leading
edge sensor technologies. The complexity of these sensor technologies
has been a key reason for the cost growth and schedule delays
experienced to date on the NPOESS program. In addition, the program
continues to discover technical problems on the sensors currently
being developed for the follow-on programs. Thus, it will be important
for both NOAA and NASA to ensure that the subcontractors are
adequately managed so that technical, cost, and schedule issues are
minimized or mitigated.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30
days from the date of this letter. We are sending copies of this
report to interested congressional committees, the Secretary of
Commerce, the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of NASA, the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and other interested
parties. In addition, this report will be available on the GAO Web
site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at
(202) 512-9286 or at pownerd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this
report are listed in appendix V.
Signed by:
David A. Powner:
Director, Information Technology Management Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Our objectives were to (1) assess efforts to plan for separate
satellite acquisitions; (2) evaluate the status and risks of key
program components still under development; and (3) evaluate
implications of using the demonstration satellite's data operationally.
To assess efforts to plan for separate satellite acquisitions, we
reviewed the presidential directive that established the National
Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) as
well as materials related to the program restructuring in 2006. We
also reviewed the White House task force's terms of reference and
final decision to disband the NPOESS program. We reviewed preliminary
plans for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA)
new program to replace two of the NPOESS satellites. We compared the
strategy and plans to best practices for program planning and
requirements management and met with members of the task force
responsible for the final restructuring decision. We also interviewed
agency officials from the Department of Defense (DOD), the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and NOAA, as well as
members of the NPOESS task force and the NPOESS program office.
To evaluate the status and risks of key program components, we
reviewed briefings, weekly updates, and monthly program management
reports. We reviewed cost reports and program risk management
documents and interviewed program officials to determine program and
program segment risks that could negatively affect the program's
ability to maintain the current schedule and cost estimates. We also
interviewed agency officials from DOD, NASA, and NOAA and the NPOESS
program office to determine the status and risks of the key program
segments. We also observed senior-level management review meetings to
obtain information on the status of the NPOESS program.
To evaluate plans for and implications of using the demonstration
satellite's data operationally, we reviewed program documentation for
using the demonstration satellite's data and compared them to plans
for using the NPOESS satellite data. Additionally, we interviewed
program office, NOAA, NASA, and DOD officials about plans for using
the data.
We primarily performed our work at the NPOESS Integrated Program
Office and at DOD, NASA, and NOAA offices in the Washington, D.C.,
metropolitan area. In addition, we conducted work at the Fleet
Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography Center in Monterey, California;
the Naval Oceanographic Office in Bay St. Louis, Mississippi; and the
Air Force Weather Agency in Omaha, Nebraska.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2009 to May 2010 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Commerce:
United States Department Of Commerce:
The Secretary of Commerce:
Washington, D.C. 20230:
May 13, 2010:
Mr. David A. Powner:
Director:
Information Technology Management Issues:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Powner:
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the Government
Accountability Office's draft report entitled "Polar-orbiting
Environmental Satellites: Agencies Must Act Quickly to Address Risks
that Jeopardize the Continuity of Weather and Climate Data" (GA0-10-
558).
On behalf of the Department of Commerce, I have enclosed the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's programmatic comments to the
draft report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Gary Locke:
Enclosure:
[End of letter]
Department of Commerce:
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Comments to the Draft
GAO Report Entitled "Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: Agencies
Must Act Quickly to Address Risks that Jeopardize the Continuity of
Weather and Climate Data" (GAO-10-558/May 2010):
General Comments:
The Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) appreciates the opportunity to review the
Government Accountability Office's (GAO) report on polar-orbiting
environmental satellites. The following is NOAA's response to
recommendations found in the draft report, as well as recommended
changes for factual/technical information.
NOAA Response to GAO Recommendations:
The draft GAO report states, "In order to ensure that the transition
from [the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite
System (NPOESS)] to its successor programs is efficiently and
effectively managed, we recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and
Commerce take the following four actions:"
Recommendation 1: "Direct their respective NPOESS follow-on programs
expedite decisions on the expected cost, schedule, and capabilities of
their planned programs."
NOAA Response: NOAA agrees with this recommendation. A transition team
has been formed to manage.the activities of transitioning the NPOESS
activities to the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) program. This
team includes representatives from NOAA, the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) and the Department of Defense (DoD). DoD
issued an Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) on March 17, 2010,
which directs the NPOESS Program Executive Officer to transition the
NPOESS activities to JPSS and DOD (U.S. Air Force). These activities
are underway. NOAA and NASA have signed a memorandum of understanding
(MOU) to begin transition activities, which will focus on the cost,
schedule and performance capabilities of the JPSS program.
Recommendation 2: "Direct their respective NPOESS follow-on programs
to develop plans to address key transition risks, including the loss
of skilled staff, delays in contract negotiations and setting up new
program offices, loss of support for the other agency's requirements,
and oversight of new program management."
NOAA Response: NOAA agrees with this recommendation. Under the NOAA
NASA Transition MOU, the agencies will define the system concept for
JPSS, set the level-1 requirements, establish the acquisition plans,
determine the organization and staffing needed to tun the program, and
establish a schedule and cost baseline. Each of these will be subject
to internal program management councils and to external independent
review teams.
Recommendation 3: "Direct the NPOESS program office to develop
priorities for work stoppage to allow the activities that are most
important to maintaining launch schedules to continue."
NOAA Response: NOAA agrees with this recommendation. On March 17,
2010, DoD signed the Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM), "National
Polar-orbiting Operational Satellite System (NPOESS) Program
Restructure." In turn, the Program Executive Officer (PEO) provided
ADM implementation guidance to the NPOESS System Program Director
(SPD) on March 26, 2010. This guidance outlines priorities for work
stoppage and provides transition guidance for those activities most
important to maintaining launch schedules. Subsequently, the PEO and
SPD have worked to refine the specifics of implementing the ADM.
Recommendation 4: "Direct NOAA and DOD officials to develop timeframes
for making key decisions on”or accepting the risks related to”the
timeliness of [NPOESS Preparatory Project's (NPP's)] data."
NOAA Response: NOAA agrees with this recommendation. The NPP data will
be collected once per orbit and provided to users with timeliness
comparable to the data from the current Polar-orbiting Operational
Environmental Satellites (POES) and Metop satellites. NOAA continues
its preparation to use NPP data on an operational basis. NOAA is also
working to increase the number of products that will be available to
users within the first 18 months from launch from 19 products to 54.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000:
May 24, 2010:
Mr. David A. Powner:
Director, Information Technology and Management Issues:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Powner,
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO-10-558, "Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: Agencies
Must Act Quickly To Address Risks That Jeopardize The Continuity Of
Weather And Climate Data" dated May 1, 2010 (GAO Code 311214).
DoD acknowledges receipt of the DRAFT report and concurs with the
recommendations. Our complete response is attached.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Mr. Gil I. Klinger:
Director (Space & Intelligence):
Enclosure:
DoD Response to GA0-10-558:
Distribution:
DoD IG:
ASD(NII) DASD (C31, Space and Spectrum):
SAF/USA:
[End of letter]
GAO Draft Report Dated April 13, 2010:
GAO-10-558 (GAO Code 311214):
"Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: Agencies Must Act Quickly To
Address Risks That Jeopardize The Continuity Of Weather And Climate
Data"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the DoD National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental
Satellite System (NPOESS) follow-on program expedite decisions on the
expected cost, schedule, and capabilities of their planned programs
(p. 38/GAO Draft Report)
DoD Response: Concur. The DoD agrees that expedited decisions are
necessary to ensure FY10 funds are applied where most needed.
Decisions on the DoD early morning orbit program will be executed per
established acquisition guidelines. USD(AT&L) issued Acquisition
Decision Memorandums on 17 March and 10 May 2010. Decisions on
capability, cost, and schedule will be made following the next round
of critical decision meetings in mid June.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the DoD NPOESS follow-on program to develop plans to address
key transition risks, including the loss of skilled staff, delays in
contract negotiations and setting up a new program office, loss of
support for the other agency's requirements, and oversight of new
program management. (p. 38/GAO Draft Report)
DoD Response: Concur. The DoD is assessing numerous risks associated
with the transition. The DoD will ensure personnel for this effort
have the requisite experience and skills (e.g. contracting, program
management, systems engineering) to effectively manage the program.
The DoD will continue to work with NOAA to ensure that common areas
(such as the NPOESS ground, C2, and IDPS) capabilities are arranged as
necessary to support other agency needs.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the NPOESS program office to develop priorities for work
stoppage to allow the activities that are most important to
maintaining launch schedules to continue. (p. 38/GAO Draft Report)
DoD Response: Concur. On 17 March, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics signed the "Acquisition Decision
Memorandum (ADM), National Polar-orbiting Operational Satellite System
(NPOESS) Program Restructure." In turn, the Acting Program Executive
Officer for Environmental Satellites (PEO/ES), provided ADM
implementation guidance to the NPOESS System Program Director (SPD) on
26 March 2010. This guidance outlines priorities for work stoppage and
provides transition guidance for those activities most important to
maintaining launch schedules. Subsequently, the PEO and SPD have
worked to refine the specifics of implementing the ADM.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct DoD officials to develop timeframes for making key decisions
on - or accepting the risks related to - the timeliness of NPP's data
(p. 38/GAO Draft Report)
DoD Response: Concur. DoD has accepted the current limitations on the
timeliness of NPP data. We will continue to work with our agency
partners to make sure the NPOESS follow-on data is made available in
as timely a manner to support warfighter missions.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration:
National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
Headquarters:
Washington, DC 20546-0001:
May 14, 2010:
Reply to the attention of:
SMD/Strategic Integration and Management Division:
Mr. David A. Powner:
Director, Information Technology Management Issues:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Powner:
NASA appreciates the opportunity to comment on your draft report
entitled, "Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: Agencies Must Act
Quickly to Address Risks that Jeopardize the Continuity of Weather and
Climate Data" (GA0-10-558). While no recommendations in the report
were directed to NASA, the report contains a few points that require
clarification.
With regard to the "Insufficient Oversight of New Program Management,"
section on page 28, the proper basis for comparison is not NASA's
leading edge research missions, but the operational environmental
satellite missions it has developed for NOAA in the past. NASA's role
in the restructured program will be modeled after the procurement
structure of the successful Polar Operational Environmental Satellite
(POES) and Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES)
programs, where NASA and NOAA have a long and effective partnership.
NOAA personnel will be integrated into the management structure and
will co-chair the Program Management Councils that will govern the
program. NOAA has identified and assigned a NOAA Program Director who
works within the NASA Joint Agency Satellite Division to ensure timely
and effective NOAA oversight.
With regard to the termination liability issue discussed on page 33,
the Integrated Program Office (IPO), in consultation with NASA, NOAA,
and DoD, provided direction to the prime contractor in early April
that allows effort to continue through the end of the fiscal year.
This plan stays within the allotted NOAA and DoD funding and maintains
the termination liability funds, eliminating the necessity for a stop
work order. It is critical that the sensor and ground system work
continue without impact to the NPP mission environmental testing and
planned launch in 2011.
Thank you again for the opportunity to review and comment on this
draft report. We look forward to your final report to Congress.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Edward J. Weiler:
Associate Administrator for Science Mission Directorate:
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
David A. Powner (202) 512-9286 or pownerd@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Colleen Phillips, Assistant
Director; Kate Agatone; Neil Doherty; Franklin Jackson; Lee McCracken;
and Matthew Strain made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: With Costs
Increasing and Data Continuity at Risk, Improvements Needed in Tri-
agency Decision Making, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-772T] (Washington, D.C.: June 17,
2009); Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: With Costs Increasing
and Data Continuity at Risk, Improvements Needed in Tri-agency
Decision Making, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-564]
(Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2009); Environmental Satellites: Polar-
orbiting Satellite Acquisition Faces Delays; Decisions Needed on
Whether and How to Ensure Climate Data Continuity, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-899T] (Washington, D.C.: June 19,
2008); Environmental Satellites: Polar-orbiting Satellite Acquisition
Faces Delays; Decisions Needed on Whether and How to Ensure Climate
Data Continuity, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-518]
(Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2008); Environmental Satellite
Acquisitions: Progress and Challenges, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1099T] (Washington, D.C.: July 11,
2007); Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites:
Restructuring Is Under Way, but Challenges and Risks Remain,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-910T] (Washington,
D.C.: June 7, 2007); Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental
Satellites: Restructuring Is Under Way, but Technical Challenges and
Risks Remain, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-498]
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 27, 2007); Polar-orbiting Operational
Environmental Satellites: Cost Increases Trigger Review and Place
Program's Direction on Hold, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-573T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30,
2006); Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Technical
Problems, Cost Increases, and Schedule Delays Trigger Need for
Difficult Trade-off Decisions, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-249T] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16,
2005); Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: Information on Program
Cost and Schedule Changes, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-1054] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30,
2004); Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: Project Risks Could
Affect Weather Data Needed by Civilian and Military Users, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-987T] (Washington, D.C.: July 15,
2003); and Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: Status, Plans, and
Future Data Management Challenges, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-684T] (Washington, D.C.: July 24,
2002).
[2] NOAA provides command and control for both the POES and DMSP
satellites after they are in orbit.
[3] The European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological
Satellite's MetOp program is a series of three polar-orbiting
satellites dedicated to operational meteorology. MetOp satellites are
planned to be launched sequentially over 14 years. The first of these
satellites was launched in 2006 and is currently operational.
[4] Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-2, May 5, 1994.
[5] The four original sensors on NPP were the Visible/Infrared Imager/
Radiometer Suite, the Cross-track Infrared Sounder, the Advanced
Technology Microwave Sounder, and the Ozone Mapping and Profiler
Suite. In January 2008, the NPOESS Executive Committee agreed to add
the Clouds and the Earth's Radiant Energy System sensor to NPP.
[6] The contract was awarded to TRW in August 2002. Shortly after the
contract was awarded, Northrop Grumman Space Technology purchased TRW
and became the prime contractor on the NPOESS project.
[7] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-573T], [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-249T], [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-1054], [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-987T], and [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-684T].
[8] 10 U.S.C. § 2433 (Supp. V 2005). For the current provisions of
Nunn-McCurdy that are reflected herein see 10 U.S.C. §§ 2433 and 2433a
(Supp. III 2009).
[9] DOD estimated that the acquisition portion of the certified
program would cost $11.5 billion. The acquisition portion includes
satellite development, production, and launch, but not operations and
support costs after launch. When combined with an estimated $1 billion
for operations and support after launch, this brings the program life-
cycle cost to $12.5 billion.
[10] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-498].
[11] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-518].
[12] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-899T].
[13] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-564].
[14] The NPOESS task force consisted of participants from OSTP, the
Office of Management and Budget, and the National Security Council.
[15] NOAA officials noted that these dates could change as transition
plans are developed.
[16] This estimate does not include approximately $2.9 billion that
DOD has spent through fiscal year 2010 on NPOESS.
[17] NOAA officials are currently revisiting plans for the Space
Environment Monitor and the Microwave Imager/Sounder. Although they
plan to launch the Total and Spectral Solar Irradiance Suite, NOAA
officials have not yet made a decision on which satellite will host
the sensor.
[18] NOAA officials reported that the JPSS cost estimate is at a
higher confidence level than the previous NPOESS life-cycle cost
estimates.
[19] This estimate is not a life-cycle cost estimate and could change
as DOD completes its requirements review and analysis of alternatives
for their new program. DOD has not yet developed a life-cycle cost
estimate.
[20] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-573T].
[21] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-573T].
[22] GAO, NASA: Projects Need More Disciplined Oversight and
Management to Address Key Challenges, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-436T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 5,
2009).
[23] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271] (Washington, D.C.: January
2009).
[24] GAO, Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: Steps
Remain in Incorporating Lessons Learned from Other Satellite Programs,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-993] (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 6, 2006).
[25] Pub. L. No. 111-84 § 913 (Oct. 28, 2009). This act directs the
President to develop a strategy for the management and funding of the
NPOESS program that would include a funding profile for each year of
the program by department or agency. The President is also required to
develop an implementing plan to carry out the management and funding
strategy. The act prohibits the Air Force from spending more than 50
percent of the funds available to it for NPOESS until the management
and funding strategy is submitted to the relevant congressional
committees. When the strategy is submitted, the Air Force is
prohibited from spending more than 75 percent of the funds available
to it for NPOESS until the implementation plan is submitted to the
relevant congressional committees.
[26] The four central data processing centers are NOAA's National
Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service, the Air Force
Weather Agency, the Naval Oceanographic Office, and the Fleet
Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography Center. The two centers that
will have a ground-based data processing system when NPP is in orbit
are NOAA's National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information
Service and the Air Force Weather Agency.
[27] After a satellite has been launched, scientists perform an on-
orbit accuracy check, called calibration and validation, to verify
that the sensors accurately report ground and atmospheric conditions.
While this process can take 6 months to 2 years, users may be able to
use the satellite data before calibration and validation has been
completed.
[End of section]
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