2010 Census
Preliminary Lessons Learned Highlight the Need for Fundamental Reforms Gao ID: GAO-11-496T April 6, 2011GAO added the 2010 Census to its list of high-risk programs in 2008 in part because of (1) long-standing weaknesses in the Census Bureau's (Bureau) information technology (IT) acquisition and contract management function, (2) difficulties in developing reliable life-cycle cost estimates, and (3) key operations that were not tested under operational conditions. These issues jeopardized the Bureau's readiness for the count. Moreover, societal trends, such as concerns over privacy, have made a cost-effective census an increasingly difficult challenge. At about $13 billion, 2010 was the costliest U.S. Census in history. As requested, this testimony focuses on lessons learned from the 2010 Census, and initiatives that show promise for producing a more cost-effective population count in 2020. This testimony is based on completed and ongoing work, including an analysis of Bureau documents, interviews with Bureau officials, and field observations of census operations in urban and rural locations across the country.
In February 2011, GAO removed the 2010 Census from its High-Risk List because the Bureau generally completed its peak enumeration activities and released congressional apportionment and redistricting data consistent with its operational plans. The Bureau improved its readiness for the census by strengthening its risk management activities, enhancing systems testing, and meeting regularly with executives from its parent agency, the Department of Commerce. Strong congressional oversight was also critical. Still, the 2010 Census required an unprecedented commitment of resources, and the cost of enumerating each housing unit has escalated from around $16 in 1970, to around $98 in 2010, in constant 2010 dollars. Based on the results of the 2010 and prior censuses, the following four early lessons learned could help secure a more cost-effective enumeration in 2020: 1. Reexamine the Nation's Approach to Taking the Census: The Bureau has used a similar approach to count most of the population since 1970. However, the approach has not kept pace with changes to society. Moving forward, it will be important for the Bureau to rethink its approach to planning, testing, implementing, and monitoring the census to address long-standing challenges. 2. Assess and Refine Existing Operations Focusing on Tailoring Them to Specific Locations and Population Groups: The Bureau plans to complete over 70 studies of the 2010 Census covering such topics as the Bureau's publicity efforts and field operations. As this research is completed, it will be important for it to assess the value-added of a particular operation in order for it to determine how best to allocate its resources for 2020. 3. Institutionalize Efforts to Address High-Risk Areas: Focus areas include incorporating best practices for IT acquisition management; developing reliable cost estimates; and ensuring key operations are fully tested, in part by developing clearly stated research objectives, a thoroughly documented data collection strategy, and methods for determining the extent to which specific activities contributed to controlling costs and enhancing quality. 4. Ensure that the Bureau's Management, Culture, and Business Practices Align with a Cost-Effective Enumeration: The Bureau will need to ensure that its organizational culture and structure, as well as its approach to strategic planning, human capital management, collaboration, and other internal functions are focused on delivering more cost-effective outcomes. The Bureau has launched an ambitious planning program for 2020. As these actions gain momentum, it will be important that they enhance the Bureau's capacity to control costs, ensure quality, and adapt to future technological and societal changes. GAO is not making new recommendations in this testimony, but past reports recommended that the Bureau strengthen its testing of key IT systems, better document and update its cost estimates, and develop an operational plan that integrates performance, budget, and other information. The Bureau generally agreed with GAO's findings and recommendations and is taking steps to implement them.
GAO-11-496T, 2010 Census: Preliminary Lessons Learned Highlight the Need for Fundamental Reforms
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Testimony before the Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management,
Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security,
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 1:30 p.m. EDT:
Wednesday, April 6, 2011:
2010 Census:
Preliminary Lessons Learned Highlight the Need for Fundamental Reforms:
Statement of Robert Goldenkoff:
Director:
Strategic Issues:
GAO-11-496T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-496T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal
Services, and International Security, Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
GAO added the 2010 Census to its list of high-risk programs in 2008 in
part because of (1) long-standing weaknesses in the Census Bureau‘s
(Bureau) information technology (IT) acquisition and contract
management function, (2) difficulties in developing reliable life-
cycle cost estimates, and (3) key operations that were not tested
under operational conditions. These issues jeopardized the Bureau‘s
readiness for the count. Moreover, societal trends, such as concerns
over privacy, have made a cost-effective census an increasingly
difficult challenge. At about $13 billion, 2010 was the costliest U.S.
Census in history. As requested, this testimony focuses on lessons
learned from the 2010 Census, and initiatives that show promise for
producing a more cost-effective population count in 2020. This
testimony is based on completed and ongoing work, including an
analysis of Bureau documents, interviews with Bureau officials, and
field observations of census operations in urban and rural locations
across the country.
What GAO Found:
In February 2011, GAO removed the 2010 Census from its High-Risk List
because the Bureau generally completed its peak enumeration activities
and released congressional apportionment and redistricting data
consistent with its operational plans. The Bureau improved its
readiness for the census by strengthening its risk management
activities, enhancing systems testing, and meeting regularly with
executives from its parent agency, the Department of Commerce. Strong
congressional oversight was also critical. Still, the 2010 Census
required an unprecedented commitment of resources, and the cost of
enumerating each housing unit has escalated from around $16 in 1970,
to around $98 in 2010, in constant 2010 dollars. Based on the results
of the 2010 and prior censuses, the following four early lessons
learned could help secure a more cost-effective enumeration in 2020:
1. Reexamine the Nation‘s Approach to Taking the Census: The Bureau
has used a similar approach to count most of the population since
1970. However, the approach has not kept pace with changes to society.
Moving forward, it will be important for the Bureau to rethink its
approach to planning, testing, implementing, and monitoring the census
to address long-standing challenges.
2. Assess and Refine Existing Operations Focusing on Tailoring Them to
Specific Locations and Population Groups: The Bureau plans to complete
over 70 studies of the 2010 Census covering such topics as the Bureau‘
s publicity efforts and field operations. As this research is
completed, it will be important for it to assess the value-added of a
particular operation in order for it to determine how best to allocate
its resources for 2020.
3. Institutionalize Efforts to Address High-Risk Areas: Focus areas
include incorporating best practices for IT acquisition management;
developing reliable cost estimates; and ensuring key operations are
fully tested, in part by developing clearly stated research
objectives, a thoroughly documented data collection strategy, and
methods for determining the extent to which specific activities
contributed to controlling costs and enhancing quality.
4. Ensure that the Bureau‘s Management, Culture, and Business
Practices Align with a Cost-Effective Enumeration: The Bureau will
need to ensure that its organizational culture and structure, as well
as its approach to strategic planning, human capital management,
collaboration, and other internal functions are focused on delivering
more cost-effective outcomes.
The Bureau has launched an ambitious planning program for 2020. As
these actions gain momentum, it will be important that they enhance
the Bureau‘s capacity to control costs, ensure quality, and adapt to
future technological and societal changes.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is not making new recommendations in this testimony, but past
reports recommended that the Bureau strengthen its testing of key IT
systems, better document and update its cost estimates, and develop an
operational plan that integrates performance, budget, and other
information. The Bureau generally agreed with GAO‘s findings and
recommendations and is taking steps to implement them.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-496T] or key
components. For more information, contact Robert Goldenkoff at (202)
512-2757 or goldenkoffr@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Chairman Carper, Ranking Member Brown, and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss planning efforts for the 2020
Census. The next enumeration might seem far over the horizon, but our
reviews of the 1990, 2000, and now 2010 Censuses have shown that early
planning and strong congressional oversight can help reduce the costs
and risks of the national headcount. As you know, because of societal
trends, including an increasingly diverse population and concerns over
personal privacy, a cost-effective census has become inherently
difficult. Going forward, the singular challenge facing the U.S.
Census Bureau (Bureau) is how best to control the cost of future
enumerations while maintaining their accuracy.
This afternoon's hearing is especially timely. Just one year after
Census Day 2010, and with Census Day 2020 still 9 years down the road,
today's session provides an early and important opportunity to look
back on the lessons learned from the recent enumeration while
simultaneously kicking off the congressional oversight necessary to
help ensure the reforms needed for the next enumeration proceed on
track. Indeed, past experience has shown that strong and continuing
congressional involvement--especially while there is still time to
make decisions and influence the direction of the census--is essential
to the decennial's ultimate success.
Moreover, the fundamental design of the enumeration--mail out and mail
back of the census form with in-person follow-up for nonrespondents--
has been in use since 1970, and suffers from declining response rates.
In short, this approach is no longer capable of cost-effectively
counting a population that is growing steadily larger, more diverse,
increasingly difficult to find, and reluctant to participate in the
census. Much like going up a down escalator, over the past 40 years,
the Bureau has been investing substantially more resources each decade
in an effort to keep pace with key results from prior enumerations.
The 2010 Census, at around $13 billion, was the most expensive
headcount in our nation's history. Meanwhile, the cost of conducting
the census has, on average, nearly doubled each decade since 1970 in
constant 2010 dollars. If that growth rate continues unchecked, we
could be looking at spending more than $25 billion on the 2020 Census.
Early and focused attention is also needed because the census--a
constitutionally mandated effort--is critical to our nation, as the
results are used to apportion seats in Congress, redraw congressional
districts, help allocate more than $400 billion in federal aid to
state and local governments each year, and remake local political
boundaries. Census data are also used for investment decisions by the
public and private sectors. Unfortunately, the Bureau's planning
efforts for the last 3 decennials fell short, which resulted in
operational challenges that jeopardized a successful census. The
magnitude of these problems led us to add the 2000 and 2010 Censuses
to our list of high-risk federal programs in 1997 and 2008.[Footnote 1]
In 2008, for example, we designated the 2010 Census a GAO high-risk
area because (1) long-standing weaknesses in the Bureau's information
technology (IT) acquisition and contract management function, (2)
difficulties in developing reliable life-cycle cost estimates, and (3)
key operations that were not tested under operational conditions, all
jeopardized a cost-effective enumeration.[Footnote 2]
In February 2011, we removed the 2010 Census from the High-Risk List
because the Bureau generally completed its peak census data collection
activities consistent with its operational plans; released the state
population counts used to apportion Congress on December 21, 2010,
several days ahead of the legally mandated end-of-year deadline; and
remaining activities appeared to be on track. More recently, on March
24, 2011, the Bureau announced it had completed the release of data
that states use to redraw federal, state, and local legislative
districts.
In removing the 2010 Census from our High-Risk List we noted that the
Bureau improved its readiness for the census by taking such steps as
strengthening its risk management activities, enhancing systems
testing, bringing in experienced personnel to key positions,
implementing our prior recommendations, and meeting regularly with
executives from its parent agency, the Department of Commerce.
[Footnote 3] Importantly, we removed the high-risk designation because
of the Bureau's strong commitment to and top leadership support for
addressing problems; boosting its capacity to address shortcomings;
and developing a corrective action plan, among other actions, and not
simply because the census was coming to a close. Moreover, active
congressional oversight--including 12 hearings convened by the House
and Senate since we first named the 2010 Census a high-risk area--
helped ensure the Bureau effectively designed and managed operations
and kept the enumeration on schedule. The operational success of the
2010 Census is also a tremendous credit to the hundreds of thousands
of career and temporary Bureau employees who diligently implemented a
vast array of census-taking activities, often under difficult
circumstances; and to the public, private, tribal, and nonprofit
organizations of all sizes that voluntarily partnered with the Bureau
and raised awareness of the census.
Going forward, while 2020 might seem distant, several issues suggest
that it is not too early for stakeholders to start considering the
improvements necessary to make the next national headcount as cost-
effective as possible. These issues include: (1) the scope of the
reforms needed, (2) the amount of taxpayer dollars at stake, (3) the
criticality of a successful count, and (4) the Bureau's past planning
difficulties. As requested, my remarks today will focus on lessons
learned from the 2010 Census, and initiatives that show promise for
producing an accurate and cost-effective population count in 2020.
In summary, while still assessing its conduct of the 2010 Census, as
the Bureau continues its planning efforts for 2020, it will be
essential for it to address the following four lessons learned:
* reexamine and perhaps fundamentally transform the way the Bureau
plans, tests, implements, monitors, and evaluates future enumerations;
* assess and refine existing census-taking operations with an eye
toward tailoring them to specific geographic areas and population
groups;
* continue to address those shortcomings that led us to designate the
2010 Census a high-risk area including following key practices
important for managing IT and strengthening its ability to develop
reliable life-cycle cost estimates; and:
* ensure that the Bureau's management, culture, business practices,
and automated systems are all aligned with a cost-effective
enumeration.
While the Bureau needs to do all of this and more, an additional
lesson learned is that the Bureau cannot achieve a successful census
on its own. Rather, the enumeration is a shared national undertaking
where federal agencies, state, local, and tribal governments,
nonprofit and private organizations, and ultimately the public at
large, all have vital roles to play. Congress too, has an essential
responsibility. As was underscored by the 2010 experience, House and
Senate involvement was essential for obtaining regular updates on the
Bureau's progress in addressing the operational challenges it was
facing, helping to hold the agency accountable for results, and
providing the Bureau with resources needed to conduct a successful
population count. Today's hearing, Mr. Chairman, builds on these past
efforts, and will help ensure that lessons learned are documented and
acted upon in the years ahead, raises Congress's confidence that the
Bureau has learned from 2010, and that the journey toward 2020
continues in the right direction.
My testimony today is based on our completed work related to key 2010
operations and the Bureau's planning efforts for 2020,[Footnote 4] as
well as, ongoing work that is focused on 2010 Census cost drivers and
the 2020 life-cycle cost estimate. For both completed and ongoing work
we analyzed key documents such as budgets, plans, procedures, and
guidance for the selected activities; and interviewed cognizant Bureau
officials at headquarters and local census offices. In addition, for
our completed work, we made on-site observations of key census-taking
activities across the country including such urban locations as Los
Angeles, California; Atlanta, Georgia; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania;
Brooklyn, New York; New Orleans, Louisiana; and Washington, D.C., as
well as such less populated areas as Meridian, Mississippi, and New
Castle, Delaware. We selected these locations because of their
geographic and demographic diversity, among other factors. To obtain
information on various management and organizational reforms that
could help the Bureau become more accountable and results oriented, we
reviewed our prior work on governmentwide reexamination, as well as
leading practices and attributes in the areas of IT management,
organizational performance, collaboration, stewardship, and human
capital.[Footnote 5] More detail on our scope and methodology is
provided in each issued product.
On March 18, 2011, we provided the Bureau with a statement of facts
related to the information included in this statement, and Bureau
officials provided technical comments, which we included as
appropriate. We conducted our work in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that
we plan and perform the audits to obtain sufficient, appropriate
evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
In conducting the 2010 Census, the Bureau encountered two sets of
challenges: internal management challenges that affected the Bureau's
overall readiness and led us to designate the 2010 Census as a high-
risk area, as well as external sociodemographic challenges such as
more non-English speakers and people residing in makeshift and other
nontraditional living arrangements. As shown in figure 1, the cost of
enumerating each housing unit has escalated from around $16 in 1970,
to around $98 in 2010, in constant 2010 dollars (an increase of over
500 percent). At the same time, the mail response rate--a key
indicator of a cost-effective census--has declined from 78 percent in
1970 to 63 percent in 2010. In many ways, the Bureau has been
investing substantially more resources each decade just to try and
match the results of prior enumerations.
Figure 1: The Average Cost of Counting Each Housing Unit (in Constant
2010 Dollars) Has Escalated Each Decade, While Mail Response Rates
Have Declined:
[Refer to PDF for image: combination line and vertical bar graph]
Year: 1970;
Average cost per housing unit (in constant 2010 dollars): $16;
Mail response rate: 78%.
Year: 1980;
Average cost per housing unit (in constant 2010 dollars): $30;
Mail response rate: 75%.
Year: 1990;
Average cost per housing unit (in constant 2010 dollars): $39;
Mail response rate: 66%.
Year: 2000;
Average cost per housing unit (in constant 2010 dollars): $70;
Mail response rate: 66%.
Year: 2010;
Average cost per housing unit (in constant 2010 dollars): $98;
Mail response rate: 63%.
Source: GAO analysis of Census Bureau data.
Note: In the 2010 Census the Bureau used only a short-form
questionnaire. For this statement, we use the 1990 and 2000 Census
short-form mail response rate when comparing 1990, 2000, and 2010 mail-
back response rates. Census short-form mail response rates are
unavailable for 1970 and 1980, so we use the overall response rate.
[End of figure]
Beginning in 1990, we reported that rising costs, difficulties in
securing public participation, and other long-standing challenges
required a revised census methodology--a view that was shared by other
stakeholders.[Footnote 6] Achieving acceptable results using these
conventional methods has required an increasingly larger investment of
fiscal resources, which in the coming years will likely become scarcer.
Indeed, the 2010 Census required an unprecedented commitment of
resources, including recruiting more than 3.8 million total
applicants--roughly equivalent to the entire population of Oklahoma--
for its temporary workforce; and rose in cost from an initial estimate
of $11.3 billion in 2001 to around $13 billion. According to the
Bureau, several factors were largely behind the escalating costs of
the 2010 Census including (1) a flawed acquisition strategy, (2) the
need to hire a large number of field staff to enumerate people who did
not mail back their census forms, and (3) substantial investments in
updating the Bureau's address list just prior to the start of the
enumeration.
Lesson Learned #1: Reexamine the Nation's Approach to Taking the
Census:
The results of prior enumerations underscore the fact that simply
refining current methods--some of which have been in place for
decades--will not bring about the reforms needed to control costs
while maintaining accuracy given ongoing and newly emerging societal
trends. Since 1970, the Bureau has used a similar approach to count
the vast majority of the population. For example, the Bureau develops
an address list of the nation's housing units and mails census forms
to each one for occupants to complete and send back. Over time,
because of demographic and attitudinal trends, securing an acceptable
response rate has become an increasing challenge. Our concerns about
the rising cost and diminishing returns of the census are not new. In
the mid-1990s, for example, we and others concluded that the
established approach for taking the census had exhausted its potential
for counting the population cost-effectively and that fundamental
design changes were needed to reduce census costs and improve the
quality of data collected.[Footnote 7]
A fundamental reexamination of the nation's approach to the census
will require the Bureau to rethink its approach to planning, testing,
implementing, monitoring, and evaluating the census, and addressing
such questions as: Why was a certain program initiated? What was the
intended goal? Have significant changes occurred that affect its
purpose? Does it use prevailing leading practices?
Our December 2010 report noted potential focus areas for such a
reexamination. These include better leveraging of innovations in
technology and social media to more fully engage census stakeholders
and the general public on census issues; and reaching agreement on a
set of criteria that could be used to weigh the trade-offs associated
with the need for high levels of accuracy on the one hand, and the
increasing cost of achieving that accuracy on the other hand.[Footnote
8]
One of the areas that the Bureau would like to leverage for the 2020
Census is the use of an Internet response option. The Bureau provided
the opportunity for respondents to complete the 2000 Census short
forms on the Internet--protected by a 22-digit identification number.
According to Bureau officials, for the 2000 Census, about 60,000 short
forms were completed via the Internet. The Bureau originally planned
to include the Internet in the 2010 Census, but then decided not to,
because the benefits gained through processing less paper, as well as
improvements to the quality of data, were outweighed by the cost of
developing the Internet response option and the risks associated with
the security of census data. To examine its use for the 2020 decennial
census, the Bureau will need to review many of those same issues and
address the following questions:
* To what extent could an Internet response option lower data
collection costs for the Bureau?
* To what extent could an Internet response option increase the
quality of data collected?
* To what extent does the use of an Internet response option pose a
risk to the confidentiality of census data?
Moreover, given that the research, development, and testing efforts
for 2020 will play out over the decade-long census life-cycle, what is
the optimal way to ensure continuity and accountability for an
enterprise that takes years to complete and extends beyond the tenure
of many elected political leaders? The Director of the Census Bureau
can, in concept, provide a measure of continuity, but of the 11 census
directors who have served since July 1969 (not including the current
director), the average tenure was around 3 years, and only 1 director
has served more than 5 years. Further, in the decade leading up to the
2010 Census, the Bureau was led by 4 different directors and several
acting directors. The turnover in the Bureau's chief executive officer
position makes it difficult to develop and sustain efforts that foster
change, produce results, mitigate risks, and control costs over the
long term.
The heads of a number of executive agencies serve fixed appointments,
based on Presidential nomination and Senate confirmation, including
the Director of the Office of Personnel Management (4 years), the
Commissioner of Labor Statistics (4 years), and the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue (5 years). We believe that the continuity resulting
from a fixed-term appointment could provide the following benefits to
the Bureau:
* Strategic vision. The director needs to build a long-term vision for
the Bureau that extends beyond the current decennial census. Strategic
planning, human-capital succession planning, and life-cycle cost
estimates for the Bureau all span the decade.
* Sustaining stakeholder relationships. The director needs to
continually expand and develop working relationships and partnerships
with governmental, political, and other professional officials in both
the public and private sectors to obtain their input, support, and
participation in the Bureau's activities.
* Accountability. The life-cycle cost for a decennial census spans a
decade, and decisions made early in the decade about the next
decennial census guide the research, investments, and tests carried
out throughout the entire 10-year period. Institutionalizing
accountability over an extended period may help long-term decennial
initiatives provide meaningful and sustainable results.
Lesson Learned #2: Assess and Refine Existing Operations Focusing on
Opportunities to Tailor Census-Taking Activities to Specific Locations
and Population Groups:
As noted earlier, a key indicator of a cost-effective census is the
mail response rate, which is the percentage of all housing units in
the mail-back universe, including those that are later found to be
nonexistent or unoccupied. High response rates are essential because
they save taxpayer dollars and ensure a more accurate enumeration.
According to the Bureau, for every percentage point increase in mail
response in 2010, the Bureau saved $85 million that would otherwise
have been spent on in-person follow-up efforts. Also, according to the
Bureau, it costs 42 cents to mail back each census form in a postage-
paid envelope, compared with an average estimate of $57 for field
activities necessary to enumerate each home in person. Moreover, mail
returns tend to have better quality data, in part because as time goes
on after Census Day (April 1), people move, or may have difficulty
recalling who was residing with them.
For the 2010 Census, the Bureau expected a response rate of 59 percent
to 65 percent. The actual mail response rate on April 19 when the
Bureau initially determined the universe of houses to visit for
nonresponse follow-up (NRFU)[Footnote 9] was just over 63 percent,
well within the Bureau's range of estimates. Achieving this response
rate was an important accomplishment given the nation's increasing
diversity.
As illustrated in figure 2, the Bureau met its expected response rate
in all but 11 states. The highest response rate (71.7 percent) was in
Minnesota, while the lowest response rate (51 percent) was in Alaska.
At the same time, response rates in all but 2 states--Hawaii and South
Carolina--as well as the District of Columbia, declined anywhere from
0.8 to 8.2 percentage points when compared to 2000, thus underscoring
the difficulty the Bureau will face in the future in trying to sustain
response rates.[Footnote 10]
Key factors aimed at improving the mail response rate included the
mailing of an advance letter and a reminder postcard, and an
aggressive marketing and outreach program. In addition, this was the
first census the Bureau sent a second or "replacement" questionnaire
to households. Replacement questionnaires were sent to around 25
million households in census tracts that had the lowest response rates
in the 2000 Census, and 10 million replacement questionnaires were
sent to nonresponding households in other census tracts that had low-
to-moderate response rates in 2000.
Figure 2: The Bureau Met Its Minimum Mail Response Rate Goal of 59
Percent in All but 11 States, but Rates Generally Declined Compared to
2000:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated U.S. map]
2010 mail response rates:
Met Bureau minimum mail response rate goal:
Arkansas: 59.5% (-5.2);
California: 64.6% (-4.3);
Colorado: 64.6% (-4.9);
Connecticut: 66.1% (-2.8);
Delaware: 60.4% (-2.2);
District of Columbia: 60.4% (1.5);
Florida: 59.1% (-3.6);
Georgia: 59.2% (-5);
Hawaii: 60.1% (1);
Idaho: 74.7% (-2.2);
Illinois: 67.3% (-0.8);
Indiana: 67% (-1.9);
Iowa: 71.3% (-3.4);
Kansas: 67.4% (-2.3);
Kentucky: 62.6% (-2.6);
Maryland: 66.1% (-1.7);
Massachusetts: 65% (-3.5);
Michigan: 65.4% (-5.8);
Minnesota: 71.7% (-2.8);
Missouri: 65.5% (-3.2);
Montana: 63% (-5.4);
Nebraska: 69.1% (-5.1);
New Hampshire: 61.8% (-5.0);
New Jersey: 64.1% (-3.2);
New York: 60.4% (-2.2);
North Carolina: 61.5% (-0.9);
North Dakota: 67.1% (-4.7);
Ohio: 66.2% (-5.0);
Oregon: 63.9% (-2.5);
Pennsylvania: 67.6% (-2.1);
Rhode Island: 62.4% (-3.7);
South Carolina: 60.7% (2.7);
South Dakota: 65.4% (-8.2);
Tennessee: 63.4% (-0.8);
Texas: 60% (-3.1);
Utah: 65.3% (-1.8);
Virginia: 66.2% (-4.1);
Washington: 63.4% (-1.7);
Wisconsin: 71.4% (-4.3);
Wyoming: 61.3% (-3.8).
Did not meet Bureau minimum mail response rate goal:
Alabama: 58.6% (-2.1);
Alaska: 51% (-4.8);
Arizona: 58.2% (-4.5);
Louisiana: 57.4% (-2.3);
Maine: 55.2% (-6.2);
Mississippi: 57.5% (-4.1);
Nevada: 58.4% (-6.5);
New Mexico: 56.7% (-4.0);
Oklahoma: 58.8% (-5.2);
Vermont: 57.9% (-4.2);
West Virginia: 56.9% (-6.7).
Source: GAO analysis of preliminary Census Bureau data; Map Resources
(map).
Note: Number in bold reflects the 2010 response rate as of April 19,
2010. Number in parentheses reflects the percentage change in response
rate from 2000 to 2010. The 2000 Census response rate is as of April
18, 2000.
[End of figure]
To determine if these and other census-taking activities were
effective, the Bureau plans to complete over 70 studies covering such
topics as marketing and publicity, field operations, privacy and
confidentiality, and language barriers. Moreover, in July 2010, the
Bureau developed a database for cataloging all recommendations from
these 2010 studies, as well as recommendations from our office, the
Department of Commerce Inspector General's Office, and the National
Academy of Sciences, among others. According to a Bureau official,
this database will allow the Bureau to link 2010 recommendations to
2020 research and testing, in an attempt to ensure that all
recommendations coming out of 2010 are incorporated into 2020 research.
These studies of the 2010 Census are extremely important for informing
decisions on the design of the 2020 Census. However, some will not be
completed by fiscal year 2012, when the Bureau plans to start research
and testing for the 2020 Census. Bureau officials said they will give
priority to studies that align with the 2020 Census strategic plan.
[Footnote 11] In moving forward, it will be important for the Bureau
to complete 2010 Census studies and stay on track to ensure that study
results, where appropriate, are incorporated into 2020 research. As
such, until all studies from the 2010 Census are finished, the Bureau
will not have a complete picture of what worked well, or know what
improvements are needed for 2020.
Moreover, in several of the programs we reviewed, assessments were not
always focused on the value-added of a particular operation, such as
the extent to which it reduced costs and/or enhanced data quality.
This information would be useful for improving operations, identifying
possible duplicative efforts, and identifying potential cost savings
for 2020.
As one illustration, a complete and accurate address list, along with
precise maps are the fundamental building blocks of a successful
census. If the Bureau's address list, known as the Master Address File
(MAF) and maps are inaccurate, people can be missed, counted more than
once, or included in the wrong location. To build an accurate address
list and maps, the Bureau conducted a number of operations throughout
the decade, some of which were extremely labor-intensive. For example,
the Bureau partnered with the U.S. Postal Service and other federal
agencies; state, local, and tribal governments; local planning
organizations; the private sector; and nongovernmental entities.
Moreover, the Bureau employed thousands of temporary census workers to
walk every street in the country to locate and verify places where
people could live, in an operation called address canvassing. Three
additional activities were aimed at properly identifying and locating
dormitories, nursing homes, prisons, and other group living
arrangements known as "group quarters."
In a 2009 testimony, we noted that with the cost of counting each
housing unit growing at a staggering rate, it is important for the
Bureau to determine which of its multiple MAF-building operations
provide the best return on investment in terms of contributing to
accuracy and coverage.[Footnote 12] A number of operations might be
needed to help locate people residing in different types of living
arrangements, as well as to ensure housing units missed in one
operation get included in a subsequent operation. However, the extent
to which each individual operation contributes to the overall accuracy
of the MAF is uncertain. This in turn makes it difficult for the
Bureau to fully assess the extent to which potential reforms such as
reducing or consolidating the number of address-building operations,
might affect the quality of the address list. As one example, while
the Bureau plans study options for targeted address canvassing as an
alternative to canvassing every street in the country, the Bureau's
evaluation plan does not specify whether the Bureau will look across
MAF-building activities and compare how each individual operation
contributes to the overall accuracy and completeness of the address
list and at what cost.
Leveraging such data as local response rates, census sociodemographic
information, as well as other data sources and empirical evidence,
might also help control costs and improve accuracy by providing
information on ways the Bureau could more efficiently allocate its
resources. For example, some neighborhoods might require a greater
level of effort to achieve acceptable results, while in other areas,
those same results might be accomplished with fewer resources.
To the extent the Bureau targeted various activities during the 2010
Census, initial indications suggest that those efforts went well. For
example, the Bureau developed job aids to address location-specific
training challenges. In one example, partly in response to our
recommendations, to help ensure the Bureau would develop an accurate
address list in those areas affected by Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and
Ike, the Bureau developed supplemental training materials for natural
disaster areas to help census workers identify less conventional
places where people might be living such as homes marked for
demolition, converted buses and recreational vehicles, and
nonresidential space such as storage areas above restaurants.[Footnote
13]
As another example, the Bureau budgeted around $297 million on paid
media to raise awareness and encourage public participation in the
census, about $57 million (24 percent) more than in 2000 in constant
2010 dollars. To determine where paid media efforts might have the
greatest impact, the Bureau developed predictive models based on 2000
Census data and the evaluations of other efforts used for 2000. By
better targeting paid media buys by area and message, the Bureau
expected to more effectively reach those who have historically been
the hardest to count. However, according to the Bureau, this modeling
could have been more robust had the data from 2000 done a better job
of isolating the impact of paid media from other components of the
Bureau's outreach efforts, among other factors.
Simply put, the Bureau made important progress in using data to
determine where to spend its resources. It will be important for the
Bureau to expand on those efforts in 2020, as well as to develop
information on the return on investment of key census operations.
Lesson #3: Institutionalize Efforts to Address High-Risk Areas:
A key priority for the Bureau will be to fully address those areas
that led us to designate the 2010 Census a high-risk program. The
problems the Bureau encountered in managing its IT systems, developing
reliable life-cycle cost estimates, and testing key operations under
census-like conditions were cross-cutting in that they affected a
number of different activities, and thus threatened the Bureau's
readiness for the census. The Bureau has taken steps to address these
vulnerabilities. In the years ahead, it will be important for the
Bureau to continue the progress it has made to date and ensure that
any changes are fully integrated into its basic business practices.
Incorporate Best Practices for IT Acquisition Management:
IT is critical to a successful census because it helps support the
Bureau's data collection, analysis, and dissemination activities.
However, the Bureau has had long-standing difficulties with the
development and acquisition of automated systems. For example, during
the 2000 Census, the Bureau had to grapple with untimely and
inaccurate management information, a lack of mature and effective
software and systems development processes, inadequate testing of key
systems, inadequate security controls, and an insufficient number of
experienced staff to manage expensive and complex system projects.
Both we and the Department of Commerce Inspector General made a series
of recommendations to address these issues, and the Bureau took steps
to implement them. Still, problems reemerged during the run-up to the
2010 Census. For example, while the Bureau planned to use automation
and technology to improve the coverage, accuracy, and efficiency of
the 2010 Census, in June 2005, we noted that the Bureau had not fully
implemented key practices important to managing IT, including
investment management, system development and management, and
enterprise architecture[Footnote 14] management.[Footnote 15] As a
result, we concluded that the Bureau's IT investments were at
increased risk of mismanagement, and were more likely to experience
cost and schedule overruns and performance shortfalls.
As development of the IT systems progressed, these problems were
realized. For example, the Field Data Collection Automation program,
which included the development of handheld computers to collect
information for address canvassing and NRFU, experienced substantial
schedule delays and cost increases.[Footnote 16] As a result, the
Bureau later decided to abandon the planned use of handheld data-
collection devices for NRFU and reverted to paper questionnaires.
According to the Bureau, this change added between $2.2 and $3 billion
to the total cost of the census.
The Bureau developed a new automated system to manage the paper-based
approach, but the system experienced outages, slow performance, and
problems generating and maintaining timely progress reports.
Workarounds ultimately enabled the Bureau to successfully implement
NRFU. However, the Bureau was still limited in its ability to
effectively monitor productivity or implement quality-assurance
procedures as documented in its operational plans.
Therefore, as the Bureau prepares for 2020, among other actions it
will be important for it to continue to improve its ability to manage
its IT investments. Leading up to the 2010 Census, we made numerous
recommendations to the Bureau to improve its IT management procedures
by implementing best practices in risk management, requirements
development, and testing.[Footnote 17] The Bureau implemented many of
our recommendations, but not our broader recommendation to
institutionalize these practices at the organizational level. The
challenges experienced by the Bureau in acquiring and developing IT
systems during the 2010 Census further demonstrate the importance of
establishing and enforcing a rigorous IT acquisition management policy
Bureau-wide. In addition, it will be important for the Bureau to
improve its ability to consistently perform key IT management
practices, such as IT investment management, system development and
management, and enterprise architecture management. The effective use
of these practices can better ensure that future IT investments will
be pursued in a way that optimizes mission performance.
Develop More Reliable Life-Cycle Cost Estimates:
Accurate cost estimates are essential for a successful census because
they help ensure that the Bureau has adequate funds and that Congress,
the Administration, and the Bureau itself can have reliable
information on which to base decisions. However, we noted in our 2008
report that the Bureau's cost estimate for the 2010 Census lacked
detailed documentation on data sources and significant assumptions,
and was not comprehensive because it did not include all
costs.[Footnote 18] We noted that the Bureau had insufficient policies
and procedures, and inadequately trained staff for conducting high-
quality cost estimation for the decennial census, and therefore
recommended that the Bureau take a variety of steps to improve the
credibility and accuracy of its cost estimates. Moreover, following
best practices from our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, such as
defining necessary resources and tasks, could have helped the Bureau
generate more reliable cost estimates.[Footnote 19]
Partly as a result of these issues, some operations had substantial
variances between their initial cost estimates and their actual costs.
For example, the Bureau initially estimated that NRFU would cost
around $2.25 billion. However, by the end of the operation, the Bureau
reported using approximately $1.59 billion, which was 29 percent lower
than budgeted. At the same time, another operation--address
canvassing--was around $88 million (25 percent) more than its initial
budget of $356 million, according to a preliminary Bureau estimate.
Moving forward, it will be important for the Bureau to ensure the
reliability of the 2020 cost estimate, and the Bureau has already
taken several actions in that regard. For example, based on
recommendations from our June 2008 report, Bureau officials have
stated that some of their budget staff have been trained and certified
in cost estimation. The Bureau also has started using the Decennial
Budget Integration Tool (DBiT). According to the Bureau, once it has
completed entering all needed budget data, DBiT will consolidate
budget information and enable the Bureau to better document its cost
estimates.
Further, as a part of its planning for 2020, Bureau officials said
that they have developed and provided to the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) for its review a rough order of magnitude estimate for
the 2020 Census--based on information at this early stage of 2020
planning. In addition, the Bureau plans to develop a range of full
life-cycle cost estimates in fiscal year 2013. As noted in our cost
estimating guide, a life-cycle cost estimate can be thought of as a
"cradle to grave" approach to managing a program throughout its useful
life. Life-cycle costing enhances decision making, especially in early
planning and concept formulation. Therefore, as the Bureau develops
its estimates for 2020, it will be important for the Bureau to
identify all cost elements that pertain to the program from initial
concept all the way through operations and support.
Providing reliable cost estimates that are developed early in a
project's life-cycle and accompanied by sound justification will be
important in order for Congress to make informed decisions about the
levels at which to fund future decennial censuses. More specifically,
greater fiscal transparency, before committing to a final design and a
particular level of spending, could help inform deliberations on the
extent to which (1) the cost of the census is reasonable, (2) trade-
offs will need to be made with competing national priorities, and (3)
additional dollars spent on the census yield better results.
Ensure Key Census-Taking Activities Are Fully Tested:
The census can be seen as a large, complex, yet inherently fragile
machine comprised of thousands of moving parts, all of which must
function in concert with one another in order to secure a cost-
effective count. In short, while the census is under way, the
tolerance for any breakdowns is quite small. Given this difficult
operating environment, rigorous testing is a critical risk mitigation
strategy because it provides information on the feasibility and
performance of individual census-taking activities, their potential
for achieving desired results, and the extent to which they are able
to function together under full operational conditions.
As the Bureau geared up for 2010, we expressed our concern about the
testing of key IT systems and other census-taking activities. For
example, partly because of the performance problems with the handheld
computers noted earlier, the Bureau decided not to include two census
operations (NRFU and Vacant/Delete Check) in the full dress rehearsal
for the census that was scheduled for 2008.[Footnote 20] In lieu of a
full dress rehearsal, the Bureau tested individual components of the
census in isolation. However, without a full dress rehearsal, the
Bureau was unable to demonstrate that various enumeration activities
could function under near-census-like conditions. Although the Bureau
had performed many of these activities in previous censuses, some
operations--such as mailing a second questionnaire to households that
did not complete their census forms by a certain date, the removal of
late mail returns, and fingerprinting hundreds of thousands of
temporary census workers--were new for 2010 and introduced new
operational risks. While the actual enumeration generally proceeded
according to expectations, some operations, most notably the automated
system that the Bureau developed to manage the paper-based NRFU
operation noted earlier, were unable to function under operational
loads in part because of a compressed testing schedule.
Moving forward, as the Bureau refines and implements its testing
plans, our past work on census testing has shown that it will be
important for its strategy to include, but not be limited to, these
key components of a sound study:
* clearly stated objectives with accompanying performance measures;
* research questions linked to test objectives and, as appropriate, a
clear rationale for why sites were selected for field tests;
* a thoroughly documented data collection strategy;
* input from stakeholders and lessons learned considered in developing
test objectives; and:
* a data analysis plan including, as appropriate, methods for
determining the extent to which specific activities contribute to
controlling costs and enhancing quality.[Footnote 21]
While the Bureau does not plan to conduct its first major census test
until April 2014, as part of its research and testing for 2020 the
Bureau plans to conduct 26 tests in support of six different design
alternatives between fiscal years 2012 and 2014. These design
alternatives include, for example, improving the existing 2010 design,
using administrative records for nonresponse follow-up, or increasing
the number of available response options such as the Internet or cell
phones. Key elements of the Bureau's research and testing strategy
include:
* performing many small focused field tests in lieu of a few large
field tests as was the case for the 2010 Census;
* setting up a virtual Local Census Office at Census Bureau
headquarters to test new census methods; and:
* using the American Community Survey--an ongoing Bureau survey of
population and housing characteristics that is administered throughout
the decade--as a vehicle to test specific census methods.
These tests will be important for determining the feasibility of
different design alternatives. We believe that given the number of
tests and design alternatives that the Bureau plans to evaluate, it
will be important to have a management structure in place for
essential functions such as coordinating the tests; determining
priorities; tracking the results; assessing their implications;
weighing cost, accuracy, and other trade-offs; and ensuring that
findings and recommendations are funneled to appropriate senior Bureau
leadership for action.
Lesson Learned #4: Ensure That the Bureau's Management, Culture, and
Business Practices Are Aligned with a Cost-Effective Enumeration:
On the basis of our earlier work on high-performing organizations,
fundamental reforms will mean ensuring that the Bureau's
organizational culture and structure, as well as its approach to
strategic planning, human-capital management, internal collaboration,
knowledge sharing, capital decision making, risk and change
management, and other internal functions are aligned toward delivering
more cost-effective outcomes.[Footnote 22] Indeed, some of the
operational problems that occurred during the 2010 and prior censuses
are symptomatic of deeper organizational issues. For example, the lack
of staff skilled in cost estimation during the 2010 Census points to
inadequate human-capital planning, while, as noted above, IT problems
stemmed from not fully and consistently performing certain functions
including IT investment management.
Moreover, the Bureau's own assessment of its organization found that
it has a number of strengths including a culture that is committed to
accuracy, precision, objectivity, and the overall mission of the
census, as well as a workforce that understands decennial operations,
procedures, and critical subject matter. At the same time, the
Bureau's assessment noted there were several areas for improvement.
For example:
* the Bureau is an insular organization and does not always embrace
open communications, transparency, innovation, and change;
* there were difficulties in drawing on assets and methods from across
the agency;
* the organizational structure makes it difficult to oversee a large
program and hampers accountability, succession planning, and personal
development, among other factors; and:
* staff with core skills and experience were lacking in such areas as
management of large programs and projects; cost estimating; and
sophisticated technology, systems, and development.
While reforms will be needed along a number of fronts, our recent work
on governmentwide strategic human capital management highlights some
key steps--some of which the Bureau is already taking--to help ensure
it identifies and closes current and emerging skill gaps to ensure the
Bureau has the workforce needed to effectively and efficiently design
and execute a successful census. These steps include:
* developing workforce plans that fully support the Bureau's need for
highly skilled talent, including defining the root causes of skills
gaps, identifying effective solutions to any shortages, and taking
action to implement those solutions;
* ensuring recruitment, hiring, and development strategies are
responsive to changing applicant and workforce needs; and:
* evaluating the performance of initiatives to address critical skill
gaps and make appropriate adjustments.[Footnote 23]
The Bureau Has Launched an Ambitious Planning Program for 2020:
The Bureau, recognizing that it cannot afford to continue operating
the way it does unless it fundamentally changes its method of doing
business, has already taken some important first steps in addressing
these questions, as well as other areas. For example, the Bureau is
looking to reform certain aspects of its IT systems planning, in part
to ensure that the technical infrastructure needed for 2020 will be
tested many times before operations begin. The Bureau also is
rebuilding its research directorate to lead early planning efforts,
and has plans to assess and monitor the skills and competencies needed
for the 2020 headcount.
Further, the Bureau already has developed a strategic plan for 2020
and other related documents that, among other things, lay out the
structure of planning efforts; outline the mission and goals for 2020;
and describe the research and testing phase of the next enumeration.
For example, to address major cost drivers such as field
infrastructure, labor, and IT systems, as well as, the quality of data
collected, the Bureau has identified the following four research
tracks that focus on an:
* Expanded, Automated, and Tailored Response, which attempts to reduce
paper, make it easier for the population to be counted, and tailor
response options, such as the Internet.
* Reengineered Field Structure, including a Bureau-wide integrated IT
infrastructure that, for example, will allow for a real-time, Web-
based system to manage data collection in the field.
* Continual Address Frame Updating and Targeting, which, for example,
expands the sources of data, to include commercial databases and
administrative records, in the Master Address File so that a full
address canvassing may not be required at the end of the decade.
* Using Administrative Records for Nonresponse, which includes a major
study to determine to what extent administrative records can be used
for nonrespondents.
The Bureau's early planning efforts are noteworthy given the Bureau's
long-standing challenges in this area. For example, in 1988, just
prior to the 1990 Census, we noted that the Bureau's past planning
efforts generally started late, experienced delays, were incomplete,
and failed to fully explore innovative approaches.[Footnote 24]
Planning for the 2000 Census also had its shortcomings, including, as
we noted in our 2004 report, a persistent lack of priority-setting,
coupled with minimal research, testing, and evaluation documentation
to promote informed and timely decision making.[Footnote 25] And,
while the planning process for the 2010 Census was initially more
rigorous than for past decennials, in 2004 we reported that the
Bureau's efforts lacked a substantial amount of supporting analysis,
budgetary transparency, and other information, making it difficult for
us, Congress, and other stakeholders to properly assess the
feasibility of the Bureau's design and the extent to which it could
lead to greater cost-effectiveness compared to alternative approaches.
As a result, in 2004, we recommended that the Bureau develop an
operational plan for 2010 that consolidated budget, methodological,
and other relevant information into a single, comprehensive document.
The Bureau later developed specific performance targets and an
integrated project schedule for 2010. However, the other elements we
recommended were only issued piecemeal, if available at all, and were
never provided in a single, comprehensive document. Because this
information was critical for facilitating a thorough, independent
review of the Bureau's plans, as well as for demonstrating to Congress
and other stakeholders that the Bureau could effectively design and
manage operations and control costs, we believe that had it been
available, it could have helped stave off, or at least reduce, the IT
and other risks that confronted the Bureau as Census Day drew closer.
The Bureau's strategic plan for 2020, first issued in 2009, is a
"living" document that will be updated as planning efforts progress.
As the approach for 2020 takes shape, it will be important for the
Bureau to avoid some of the problems it had in documenting the
planning process for the 2010 Census, and pull all the planning
elements together into a tactical plan or road map. This will help
ensure the Bureau's reform initiatives stay on track, do not lose
momentum, and coalesce into a viable path toward a more cost-effective
2020 Census. On the basis of our work on planning for the 2010 Census,
a road map for 2020 could include, but not be limited to, the
following elements that could be updated on a regular basis:
* specific, measurable performance goals, how the Bureau's efforts,
procedures, and projects would contribute to those goals, and what
performance measures would be used;
* descriptions of how the Bureau's approaches to human-capital
management, organizational structure, IT acquisitions, and other
internal functions are aligned with the performance goals;
* an assessment of the risks associated with each significant
decennial operation, including the interrelationships between the
operations and a description of relevant mitigation plans;
* detailed milestone estimates for each significant decennial
operation, including estimated testing dates, and justification for
any changes to milestone estimates;
* detailed life-cycle cost estimates of the decennial census that are
credible, comprehensive, accurate, and well-documented as stipulated
by OMB and GAO guidance; and:
* a detailed description of all significant contracts the Bureau plans
to enter into and a risk management plan for those contracts.
A comprehensive road map could generate several important benefits.
For example, it could help ensure a measure of transparency and
facilitate a more collaborative approach to planning the next census.
Specifically, an operational plan could function as a template for
2020 giving stakeholders a common framework to assess and comment on
the design of the census and its supporting infrastructure, the
resources needed to execute the design, and the extent to which it
could lead to greater cost-effectiveness compared to alternative
approaches. Further, it could be used to monitor the Bureau's progress
in implementing its approach, and hold the agency accountable for
results. Importantly, to the extent the plan--or aspects of it--are
made available using social media tools, it could prompt greater and
perhaps more constructive civic engagement on the census, by fostering
an ongoing dialog involving individuals and communities of
stakeholders throughout the decade.
Concluding Observations:
The Bureau goes to great lengths each decade to improve specific
census-taking activities, but these incremental modifications have not
kept pace with societal changes that make the population increasingly
difficult to locate and count cost-effectively. The Bureau is fully
aware of this problem and has wasted no time in turning the corner on
the 2010 Census and launching the planning efforts needed for a more
cost-effective enumeration come 2020.
Many components are already in place, and a number of assessment and
planning activities are already occurring. At the same time, the
Bureau has also been responsive to the recommendations we have made in
our past work. As these actions gather momentum in the years ahead, it
will be important that they put the Bureau on a trajectory that boosts
its capacity to conduct an accurate count, control costs, manage
risks, and be more nimble in adapting to social, demographic,
technological, and other changes that can be expected in the future.
It will also be important for Congress to continue its strong
oversight of the census to help ensure the progress the Bureau has
made thus far continues going forward. We look forward to supporting
the Subcommittee in its decision making and oversight of the decennial
census.
Chairman Carper, Ranking Member Brown, and Members of the
Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
to respond to any questions that you might have at this time.
GAO Contacts:
If you have any questions on matters discussed in this statement,
please contact Robert Goldenkoff at (202) 512-2757 or by e-mail at
goldenkoffr@gao.gov. Other key contributors to this testimony include
Benjamin Crawford, Vijay D'Souza, Dewi Djunaidy, Ronald Fecso, Robert
Gebhart, Richard Hung, Signora May, Lisa Pearson, Jonathan Ticehurst,
and Timothy Wexler.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
High-Risk Series: An Update. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-278]. Washington, D.C.: February
2011.
2010 Census: Data Collection Operations Were Generally Completed as
Planned, but Long-standing Challenges Suggest Need for Fundamental
Reforms. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-193].
Washington, D.C.: December 14, 2010.
2010 Census: Key Efforts to Include Hard-to-Count Populations Went
Generally as Planned; Improvements Could Make the Efforts More
Effective for Next Census. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-45]. Washington, D.C.: December 14,
2010.
2010 Census: Follow-up Should Reduce Coverage Errors, but Effects on
Demographic Groups Need to Be Determined. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-154]. Washington, D.C.: December
14, 2010.
2010 Census: Plans for Census Coverage Measurement Are on Track, but
Additional Steps Will Improve Its Usefulness. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-324]. Washington, D.C.: April 23,
2010.
2010 Census: Data Collection Is Under Way, but Reliability of Key
Information Technology Systems Remains a Risk. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-567T]. Washington, D.C.: March 25,
2010.
2010 Census: Key Enumeration Activities Are Moving Forward, but
Information Technology Systems Remain a Concern. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-430T]. Washington, D.C.: February
23, 2010.
2010 Census: Census Bureau Continues to Make Progress in Mitigating
Risks to a Successful Enumeration, but Still Faces Various Challenges.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-132T]. Washington,
D.C.: October 7, 2009.
2010 Census: Census Bureau Should Take Action to Improve the
Credibility and Accuracy of Its Cost Estimate for the Decennial
Census. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-554].
Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2008.
2010 Census: Census at Critical Juncture for Implementing Risk
Reduction Strategies. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-659T]. Washington, D.C.: April 9,
2008.
Information Technology: Significant Problems of Critical Automation
Program Contribute to Risks Facing 2010 Census. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-550T]. Washington, D.C.: March 5,
2008.
Information Technology: Census Bureau Needs to Improve Its Risk
Management of Decennial Systems. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-259T]. Washington, D.C.: December
11, 2007.
2010 Census: Census Bureau Has Improved the Local Update of Census
Addresses Program, but Challenges Remain. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-736]. Washington, D.C.: June 14,
2007.
Information Technology Management: Census Bureau Has Implemented Many
Key Practices, but Additional Actions Are Needed. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-661]. Washington, D.C.: June 16,
2005.
21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal
Government. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-325SP].
Washington, D.C.: February 1, 2005.
Information Technology Investment Management: A Framework for
Assessing and Improving Process Maturity. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-394G]. Washington, D.C.: March 1,
2004.
Comptroller General's Forum, High-Performing Organizations: Metrics,
Means, and Mechanisms for Achieving High Performance in the 21st
Century Public Management Environment. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-343SP]. Washington, D.C.: February
13, 2004.
Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce
Planning. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-39].
Washington, D.C.: December 11, 2003.
2010 Census: Cost and Design Issues Need to Be Addressed Soon.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-37]. Washington, D.C.:
January 15, 2004.
2000 Census: Lessons Learned for Planning a More Cost-Effective 2010
Census. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-40].
Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2002.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, High Risk Series: Quick Reference Guide, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/HR-97-2] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1,
1997), and GAO, Information Technology: Significant Problems of
Critical Automation Program Contribute to Risks Facing 2010 Census,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-550T] (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 5, 2008).
[2] High-risk areas are areas GAO has called special attention to
because of their vulnerability to mismanagement or their broad need
for reform. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-550T].
[3] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-278] (Washington, D.C.: February
2011).
[4] See related GAO products at the end of this statement.
[5] See for example: GAO, Information Technology Investment
Management: A Framework for Assessing and Improving Process Maturity,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-394G] (Washington,
D.C.: March 2004); Comptroller General's Forum, High-Performing
Organizations: Metrics, Means, and Mechanisms for Achieving High
Performance in the 21st Century Public Management Environment,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-343SP] (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 13, 2004); Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can
Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15], (Washington, D.C.:
Oct. 21, 2005); 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the
Federal Government, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-325SP] (Washington, D.C.: February
2005); and Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic
Workforce Planning, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-39]
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 2003).
[6] See for example, GAO, Decennial Census: Preliminary 1990 Lessons
Learned Indicate Need to Rethink Census Approach, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-GGD-90-18] (Washington, D.C.: Aug.
8, 1990); and 2000 Census: Progress Made on Design, but Risks Remain,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-97-142] (Washington,
D.C.: July 14, 1997).
[7] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-97-142].
[8] GAO, 2010 Census: Data Collection Operations Were Generally
Completed as Planned, but Long-standing Challenges Suggest Need for
Fundamental Reforms, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-193] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 14,
2010).
[9] NRFU is the largest and most costly census field operation, where
the Bureau sends enumerators to collect data from households that did
not mail back their census forms.
[10] In the 2000 Census, the Bureau used both long-and short-form
questionnaires. The short-form questionnaire had a higher response
rate because it had fewer questions. For the 2010 Census, the Bureau
used only a short-form questionnaire. For this report we use the 2000
Census short-form mail response rate when comparing 2000 and 2010 mail-
back response rates.
[11] The strategic plan for the 2020 Census defines the Census
Bureau's mission and vision for 2020 and discusses the goals the
Bureau will need to accomplish its mission.
[12] GAO, 2010 Census: Efforts to Build an Accurate Address List Are
Making Progress, but Face Software and Other Challenges, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-140T] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21,
2009).
[13] GAO, 2010 Census: Census Bureau Has Improved the Local Update of
Census Addresses Program, but Challenges Remain, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-736] (Washington, D.C.: June 14,
2007).
[14] A well-defined enterprise architecture provides a clear and
comprehensive picture of an entity, whether it is an organization
(e.g., a federal department) or a functional or mission area that cuts
across more than one organization (e.g., personnel management). This
picture consists of snapshots of both the enterprise's current or "As
Is" environment and its target or "To Be" environment, as well as a
capital-investment road map for transitioning from the current to the
target environment.
[15] GAO, Information Technology Management: Census Bureau Has
Implemented Many Key Practices, but Additional Actions Are Needed,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-661] (Washington, D.C.:
June 16, 2005).
[16] GAO, Census 2010: Census at Critical Juncture for Implementing
Risk Reduction Strategies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-659T] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 9,
2008); Information Technology: Census Bureau Needs to Improve Its Risk
Management of Decennial Systems, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-259T] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11,
2007); and [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-550T].
[17] See, for example, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-661]; GAO, Census Bureau: Important
Activities for Improving Management of Key 2010 Decennial Acquisitions
Remain to be Done, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-
444T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 2006); Information Technology: Census
Bureau Needs to Improve Its Risk Management of Decennial Systems,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-79] (Washington, D.C.:
Oct. 5, 2007); and Information Technology: Census Bureau Testing of
2010 Decennial Systems Can Be Strengthened, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-262] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 5,
2009).
[18] GAO, 2010 Census: Census Bureau Should Take Action to Improve the
Credibility and Accuracy of Its Cost Estimate for the Decennial
Census, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-554]
(Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2008).
[19] GAO, GAO Cost Estimating And Assessment Guide: Best Practices for
Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP] (Washington, D.C.: March 2009).
[20] Vacant/Delete Check is an operation the Bureau conducts to verify
the status of housing units flagged earlier in the census as being
unoccupied or nonexistent.
[21] GAO, 2010 Census: Basic Design has Potential, but Remaining
Challenges Need Prompt Resolution, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-9] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 12,
2005).
[22] See for example: [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-394G], [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-39], [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-343SP], [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-325SP], and [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15].
[23] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-278].
[24] GAO, Transition Series: Commerce Issues, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/OCG-89-11TR] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1,
1988).
[25] GAO, 2010 Census: Cost and Design Issues Need to Be Addressed
Soon, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-37] (Washington,
D.C.: Jan. 15, 2004).
[End of section]
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