Large-Scale Production of the M1 Tank Should Be Delayed Until Its Power Train Is Made More Durable

GAO reviewed the M1 tank acquisition program after it had reached the purchasing stage. The M1 system represents the Army's most costly new weapons system; the course the Army follows in acquiring the M1 will have a significant effect on its budget. The M1 has recorded numerous difficulties during its planning and testing phases resulting in production delays; generally, problems were related to the engine and the transmission. A panel of experts convened by the Department of Defense, just prior to the purchasing phase, believes the M1 will show substantial improvement provided certain modifications to the functional operations of the tank are incorporated.

GAO believes that, regardless of the nature of these modifications, serious questions still remain concerning the reliability of the M1 tank. The latest series of tests has again confirmed that the M1 has met nearly all of its major combat requirements: firepower, armor protection, and mobility. Despite this fine showing, a problem of great concern was disclosed in the testing. The M1 power train failed to meet the Army's durability goal. The Army reported that the power train had demonstrated a 37-percent probability of meeting the requirement to achieve 4,000 miles without a need to replace a major component compared to the 50-percent probability required. Because of congressional concerns over the turbine engine's durability, the Army began developing a backup diesel engine. This engine is currently scheduled for completion in December 1982. To take full advantage of the M1 tank's excellent inherent capability, an improvement in the tank's power train durability is necessary. Until the durability requirement is met, it appears unwise to produce large numbers of tanks. To do so before an improvement is effected will create a large inventory of tanks hampered by engines requiring frequent replacement and expensive maintenance. The Army plans to continue improving the turbine engine and is also testing the alternative diesel engine. Thus, the Army has the opportunity to compare the performance of both engines so that ultimately the more cost-effective of the two engines will be selected. Prudence dictates that this opportunity should not be overlooked.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

Director: Donald E. Day Team: General Accounting Office: Mission Analysis and Systems Acquisition Division Phone: (202) 275-3468