The Navy's Strategic Home-Porting Plan
Gao ID: 129595 April 11, 1986Testimony was given concerning the Navy's strategic home-porting plan, specifically: (1) the basis for increasing the number of home ports; (2) the capacity of existing home ports to accommodate the ships assigned to the new ports; and (3) the cost of home-porting naval ships in existing ports versus the cost of developing new home ports. GAO found that: (1) the Navy did not analyze how the benefits of five strategic principles would be achieved at each port; (2) although the dispersal of ships to more ports will improve the U.S. defense posture and survivability of the fleet, the decision to disperse the fleet was not based on a formal threat/survivability analysis; (3) under the plan, some of the ships would not be ported in battlegroup configurations at the new home ports; and (4) home-porting ships near locations with existing industrial capability will permit the Navy to take advantage of the capability, train and operate in a variety of environments, and reduce the response time to potential conflict areas. GAO also found that: (1) although the strategic home-porting plan will provide more diverse training opportunities and some reduced response times, the impact will not be significant; (2) the logistical suitability of existing home ports was not studied during the selection process for new home ports; (3) under the plan, the infrastructure of the existing home ports will be used at a level which is considerably less than their maximum capacity; (4) although some existing ports have the capacity to accommodate the ships included in the plan, waterfront construction would be required to accommodate the ships in battlegroup configurations; (5) the Navy only considered the comparative construction costs of home-porting in existing ports versus the costs of developing new home ports and did not consider the implications of operating and maintaining the new home ports; and (6) the Navy needs to demonstrate the strategic benefits of new home ports and prepare more definitive and complete cost estimates so that Congress will be in a better position to consider the increased costs of construction, operation, and maintenance in light of the Navy's strategic goals.