Ammunition And Explosives

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO: (1) evaluated the effectiveness of Camp Pendleton's controls over ammunition and explosives (A&E) and combat gear; and (2) compared Camp Pendleton's A&E controls with those at Fort Bragg.

GAO found that, while Camp Pendleton recently strengthened A&E inventory controls in response to recent thefts: (1) its ordnance office did not maintain accurate A&E accounting records for its training exercises or reduce account balances when it approved requisitions; (2) it did not use its inspection results to enforce compliance with A&E policies and procedures; (3) it did not conduct routine or thorough inspections of training areas or personnel after exercises; (4) its ammunition supply point (ASP) did not always obtain legible signatures for the delegation-of-authority cards which personnel used to obtain A&E; and (5) it did not sufficiently emphasize A&E control procedures and responsibilities in its range safety officer certification course. GAO also found that Fort Bragg: (1) improved several A&E inventory control problems identified in 1986; (2) discouraged return of A&E through a time-consuming, easily circumvented, infrequently operated ammunition reconciliation process; (3) prolonged unit possession of A&E by operating a holding area for temporary A&E storage; (4) recovered some A&E through its amnesty program, which allowed personnel to turn in A&E without reprisal; (5) increased its number of compliance inspections, although its noncompliance rate remained constant; and (6) did not use the results of its quality assurance specialists and ammunition surveillance inspection reports to enforce compliance with A&E policies and procedures.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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