Lessons Learned During GAO's Reviews That Can Be Applied to the Restructuring and Training of U.S. Forces

Gao ID: T-NSIAD-90-13 April 4, 1990

GAO discussed the Department of Defense's (DOD) plans for restructuring and training of U.S. military forces. GAO found that: (1) despite plans for reconstruction, the Army failed to uphold its plans for validating force structure savings or productivity gains before converting units to their new designs; (2) the Army had no assurance that the converted units could accomplish their missions with their reduced manpower; (3) helicopter battalions were understaffed by about 28 percent, primarily in maintenance support; (4) the Army's full-time support program had inadequate direction and management, unsound justification for the program's personnel requirements, and the Army lacked guidance in choosing and utilizing the most cost-effective mix of full-time support personnel; (5) insufficient instruction and equipment and the ineffective use of training time and exercises resources hampered training; (6) the Army acquired additional training land for some installations without assessing its needs, examining alternatives, or establishing acquisition priorities; (7) reduced Army training funds were inhibiting full use of land the Army owned; and (8) there was no coordinated effort between the many DOD organizations building simulations, particularly from a joint war-fighting perspective.



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