Industrial Base

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) dependency on foreign sources for critical components of its weapon systems, focusing on the M1 Abrams tank and the F/A-18 Hornet fighter aircraft.

GAO found that: (1) DOD did not know the overall extent of foreign sourcing or dependency and their significance for national security; (2) DOD had limited information on foreign supply sources at the lower tiers of the supply base; (3) there were no criteria for determining the appropriate maximum tolerance levels for foreign dependency and DOD actions to reduce the associated risks; (4) DOD had little awareness of the extent of foreign sourcing or dependency beyond the prime contractors and their immediate subcontractors; (5) DOD program officials were not required, and took no special action, to track foreign sourcing or dependency; (6) several Abrams tank components continued to be foreign dependent, and DOD did not award contracts or subcontracts to domestic sources because of availability, quality, and cost considerations; (7) even if DOD were willing to pay the higher prices of domestic suppliers, they would be unable to satisfy DOD total requirements due to production capacity constraints; (8) DOD planned to develop a second domestic source for the F/A-18 aircraft's foreign-dependent ejection seat; (9) such policy goals as the standardization and interoperability of weapon systems and equipment with North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies and the desire to minimize the cost of weapon systems limited DOD use of Buy American restrictions; and (10) DOD had ongoing efforts to improve its information on the U.S. defense industrial base and revise acquisition directives and procedures.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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