Reserves and Readiness

Appraising the Total Force Policy Gao ID: 145026 January 1, 1991

This article, which appeared in the GAO Journal, No. 13, Summer/Fall 1991, discusses the Total Force Policy which is intended to maintain a minimal active peacetime force by placing greater reliance on reserve forces, focusing on: (1) why the Army was reluctant to call on its combat reserves to serve in the Persian Gulf during Operation Desert Storm; (2) the Army's attempts to better achieve the policy's aims, by either lowering its expectations for reserves or by improving its implementation of the policy; and (3) whether the Army adequately trained its reservists to perform required missions.



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