Chemical Weapons

Congress has directed the Defense Department to destroy the U.S. stockpile of chemical weapons by September 30, 1994. However, continuing problems in the Army's disposal program suggest that increased costs and more time will be needed to accomplish that task. Since the issuance of its 1988 estimates to Congress, the Army has experienced additional program requirements; material costs and wages have risen; and technical and programmatic problems have caused delays. Although the Army revised its estimates in an April 1991 report to Congress, saying that the disposal program would cost $6.5 billion and would not be completed until July 1999, this completion date relies on an overly optimistic projection of the number of chemical weapons and agents to be destroyed per hour. The projection almost doubles what the Army has been able to achieve during its initial test phase at the Johnston Atoll. In addition, the July 1999 date does not reflect the recent six-month shutdown of the Johnston facility while possible construction defects were being investigated. Nor does the overall destruction schedule allow for time to resolve additional unforeseen problems. The Army has been investigating other disposal technologies, which should help it determine whether faster and less costly alternatives exist for disposing of the chemical stockpile. On a related matter, the Army's annual report to Congress lacks detailed analyses of the program's estimated costs, destruction schedules, and factors that could affect the reliability of the estimates. Without such information, Congress cannot fully assess the progress of the Army's efforts to destroy the stockpile.

GAO found that: (1) in April 1991, the Army reported that the estimated life-cycle cost had increased from $3.1 billion to $6.5 billion and program completion had slipped from April 1987 to July 1999; (2) the disposal program's cost growth and schedule slippages were due to rising material costs and wages, additional program requirements, and technical and programmatic problems; (3) although the Army has taken various actions to correct technical and mechanical problems with the disposal process, it has not completed operational testing to ensure that those problems have been fixed; (4) the Army has not reexamined other, potentially faster and less costly alternatives to its current disposal program; (5) although the Army complied with the legislative requirement to send an annual report on the disposal program to Congress, the reports did not include detailed analysis of the program's estimated costs, destruction schedules, or factors that could affect the reliability of its estimates; and (6) without such information, Congress can not fully assess the progress of the Army's efforts to destroy the stockpile.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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