Desert Shield/Storm Logistics

Observations by U.S. Military Personnel Gao ID: NSIAD-92-26 November 13, 1991

The Defense Department's ability to move massive amounts of troops and materiel for Desert Shield/Storm was a significant achievement. As might be expected of such an enormous undertaking, however, not all went smoothly. GAO interviewed U.S. military officials involved in Desert Shield/Storm. This report describes lessons that could be applied to avoid future logistical problems and replicate the management practices and ingenuity U.S. military personnel used to overcome many of these problems.

GAO observed that: (1) Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm personnel were able to obtain needed parts and maintain high readiness rates; (2) despite prescribed plans, problems included a lack of available repair parts for some newly fielded systems, a lack of information on repair parts with the units, and transportation delays; and (3) the DOD supply system and Saudi Arabia adequately provided food for the troops, but Army and Marine Corps personnel noted problems with food variety and uniforms, boots, and chemical equipment sizing problems; and (4) the Marine Corps' Maritime Prepositioning Force and the Air Force's Harvest Falcon prepositioning program were both successful in expediting the deployment of supplies and support equipment to Saudi Arabia.



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