Operation Desert Storm

Through a combination of host nation water sources and the use of Osmosis water purification equipment, the Army provided troops deployed in Operation Desert Storm with adequate water supplies. The Army did not, however, monitor the actual water production of the water purification equipment or collect and analyze data on the equipment's performance during Operation Desert Storm. Consequently, the Army has no way of knowing how much water the equipment actually supplied or how well it performed. GAO notes that the Army's projections of the equipment's water production relied on several questionable assumptions. Because the Army believed that it had solved the technical problems with the 3,000-gallon-per-hour Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit, it expedited production. It did so even though testing was not completed. The Army plans to complete required testing by September 1991, at which point the contractor will have 42 units ready for delivery. The Army is considering waiving the requirement that the 3,000-gallon-per-hour unit be capable of undergoing nuclear, biological, and chemical decontamination because the system will likely fail to meet this requirement. The Army has no specific plans to compensate for this shortcoming.

GAO found that: (1) by mid-January 1991, the Army had deployed and set up sufficient ROWPU equipment to supply most of its water needs in Operation Desert Storm; (2) although the Army has a material conditions status reporting system available for reporting such data, it did not monitor the actual water production output of ROWPU equipment or collect and analyze data on the ROWPU equipment's performance during Operation Desert Storm; (3) without ROWPU performance data, the Army lacked important information it could have used to quickly detect and resolve any potential problems with ROWPU performance, production or parts availability; (4) the Army's projection of the ROWPU equipment's capability to produce water was based on assumptions that some ROWPU equipment would be operated at levels higher than the rated capacity of the unit, operational readiness would be maintained at a level unsupported by experience with the equipment, all required spare parts would be readily available, and trained and qualified Army personnel would be available to operate the equipment; (5) because the Army believed it had solved the technical problems with 3,000-gph ROWPU, it expedited production even though required testing was not completed; and (6) the Army is considering waiving the requirement that 3,000-gph ROWPU be capable of undergoing nuclear, biological, chemical decontamination because the system will not likely meet this requirement.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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