Defense Acquisition

The Special Operations Forces Aircrew Training System is intended to integrate classroom, simulator, and in-flight aircraft training for seven different kinds of aircraft. Even though the Air Force has tried to ensure that the program is run effectively, the contractor is experiencing cost growth and a schedule delay. To minimize risk, the Air Force used a two-phased acquisition approach involving contractor competition and also retained key personnel to build program continuity. In addition, the program office obtained coordination and cooperation commitments from key agencies within and outside the Air Force at the beginning stages of the contract. As of July 1991, however, the contractor had a cumulative overrun of 29 percent (about $6 million) above the $20.5 million it had estimated spending to that point and was about two months behind schedule on a preliminary software design review. According to the program office, if the overrun continues, costs for the first two options could rise to $94 million, or a $22 million increase above the originally estimated cost of $72 million. Also, the prime contractor rather than an outside firm is doing independent verification and validation of software. Independent verification and validation is intended to provide greater assurance that the software will work. In the past, GAO has stated that true independence requires that this effort not be done by the same contractor that develops the software; DOD's Inspector General has taken a similar position.

GAO found that: (1) to minimize risks, the Air Force used a two-phased acquisition approach, used a contract incentive to enhance contractor performance and cooperation, retained key Air Force personnel to build program continuity, and involved ATS end-users to make certain that ATS would meet their needs; (2) the Air Force estimated that ATS would cost approximately $400 million if it exercised all contract options; (3) costs have exceeded budgeted amounts since March 1991 for the first two contract options, and if the overrun continues, cost overruns could research 30 percent, raising the cost of those options to $94 million; and (4) the Air Force did not require separate independent verification and validation for ATS software, since software failure would not cause death or personnel injury, primary mission failure, or catastrophic equipment loss or damage.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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