Desert Shield/Storm

During Operation Desert Shield, actual deliveries of troops and supplies lagged behind the requirements of the Central Command, which oversaw the planning and movement of needed troops, equipment, and supplies. However, the Transportation Command, which supported the Central Command, was able to substantially meet requirements before the armed conflict with Iraq began. Due to the absence of hostilities during deployment, the Transportation Command had more than five months to overcome initial problems and deliver the needed supplies and forces before offensive operations started. The Transportation Command's support of the deployment needs of the Central Command was not accomplished, however, as rapidly, efficiently, and effectively as intended. The Transportation Command's management of wartime theater transportation was hampered by the lack of (1) an operational plan for a Desert Shield-type contingency; (2) agreed-upon operating procedures and lines of responsibility for a wartime situation among the Command, its components, and the services; and (3) a fully implemented central deployment database with accurate and complete transportation information. Despite these problems, the airlift and sealift moved thousands of personnel and millions of tons of cargo. Overall, the component units of the Transportation Command performed responsively, at a high operating tempo, and with an overall high utilization and reliability of aircraft and ships. The Defense Department has prepared several proposals to address the problems it encountered during the deployment.

GAO found that: (1) during Operation Desert Shield deployment, actual deliveries of troops and supplies lagged behind Central Command requirements, but the Transportation Command was able to substantially meet the requirements due to the 5-month delay before fighting began; (2) the Transportation Command did not support the Central Command's deployment needs as rapidly and effectively as intended; (3) the Transportation Command's management of wartime theater transportation was hampered by lack of an operational plan, agreed-upon operating procedures and lines of responsibility for a wartime situation, and a fully implemented central deployment database with accurate and complete transportation information; (4) despite those problems, the Transportation Command performed responsively and at a high operating temp; and (5) the Department of Defense has prepared proposals to address the problems it encountered during the deployment.