POW/MIA Affairs

In the mid 1980s, critics alleged that the Army had inaccurately identified the remains of personnel found in Southeast Asia who had been listed as killed or missing in action during the Vietnam War. In particular, the Army's Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii was criticized for using identification techniques that were not accepted by the scientific community and for lacking adequate staff, facilities, equipment, and review procedures. Since then, the laboratory has revised its practices and procedures to ensure that only scientifically accepted techniques and methodologies are used to identify remains; appointed a world-renowned board-certified forensic anthropologist as the laboratory's first scientific director and hired qualified staff to do the identifications; and established an extensive review process to minimize the possibility of misidentifications. Despite these improvements, the laboratory still lacks internal controls needed to manage an efficient identification operation. GAO found instances when the laboratory (1) could not readily locate case files and remains and (2) did not properly document requests for antemortem records to outside agencies. These weaknesses could delay the identification process. GAO also found that the services' absence of physical control over the remains leaving the laboratory had led either to some remains disappearing or unacceptable risks of such loss.

GAO found that: (1) CILHI uses scientific identification techniques and methodologies that are consistent with or exceed those employed in other modern forensic science laboratories; (2) CILHI hired an internationally recognized forensic anthropologist as its director; (3) CILHI has added several qualified scientists and casualty data analysts to its staff; (4) CILHI has incorporated extensive review processes and procedures that make the misidentification of human remains extremely unlikely; (5) the role of the Army consultants who review CILHI-recommended identifications is unclear, in that the Army has not provided them standard guidelines that specify the types of information each consultant should review in analyzing individual cases; (6) Army consultants do not review cases involving identifications from the Korean War or from World War II; (7) CILHI has had difficulty in maintaining adequate administrative control over files; (8) CILHI does not have essential data in many of the antemortem records of personnel listed as missing; (9) there were instances in which the services' absence of physical control over remains had caused either a loss of some remains or unacceptable risks of loss; and (10) physical accountability of remains located at CILHI may be a problem.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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