Army Training

In this report on the active Army brigades that replaced the National Guard's combat roundout brigades for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, GAO compares the two groups in terms of officer and noncommissioned officer leadership training completed, military occupational specialty qualification rates, gunnery qualification rates, and collective training events completed. The replacement brigades showed a higher level of proficiency at the time of their deployment to the Persian Gulf for almost every objective measure of individual and unit proficiency than did the roundout brigades. GAO's analysis of the training done by the replacement and roundout brigades the year before Operation Desert Storm showed that replacement brigade soldiers had many more opportunities to develop proficiency in the key building blocks of Army training: leadership, individual, and crew skills. The new equipment received by the replacement brigades did not pose operating difficulties; rather in all cases, it enhanced their capability. Equipment shortages were similar for both groups and generally reflected Army-wide conditions.

GAO found that: (1) replacement brigades demonstrated a higher level of proficiency than roundout brigades; (2) replacement brigade soldiers had greater opportunities to develop leadership, individual, and crew skills; (3) replacement brigade soldiers had greater leadership training, individual skill qualification rates, and tank and vehicle gunnery skills; (4) only 50 percent of roundout brigade officers had completed required collective training courses at the company, battalion, and brigade levels, which resulted in difficulties in tactical and technical competence, training standards comprehension and application, and discipline enforcement; (5) 90 percent of replacement brigade officers completed the required training courses and possessed greater proficiency in critical skill areas; (6) roundout brigades post-deployment training focused on developing skills for the first time and roundout soldiers were twice as unlikely to deploy with their units; (7) National Guard roundout brigades had a higher percentage of senior grade personnel assigned and lower personnel turnover than replacement brigades; (8) new equipment received by the replacement brigades enhanced operational capabilities; (9) both replacement and roundout brigades experienced Army-wide equipment shortages; and (10) Army initiatives are underway to improve individual soldier skills and leadership proficiency, provide training to soldiers not qualified for assigned jobs, and utilize active Army officers in training reservists.