Military Afloat Prepositioning

A key part of U.S. mobility strategy, known as afloat prepositioning, is keeping ships continuously loaded with combat equipment and support items. These ships are anchored near potential trouble spots so that they can quickly respond to developments during wartime. This report discusses (1) how afloat prepositioning was used during the Persian Gulf war, (2) the Defense Department's (DOD) postwar initiatives to improve afloat prepositioning, and (3) issues related to DOD's expansion of afloat prepositioning.

GAO found that: (1) maritime prepositioning ships began arriving in Saudi Arabia 8 days after the beginning of Operation Desert Shield, compared to 20 days for fast sealift ships and 30 days for Ready Reserve and chartered ships departing from the United States; (2) two Marine brigades using equipment from prepositioning ships and an airborne division were the only combat units that were at full strength one month after the beginning of Operation Desert Shield; (3) after unloading, ships were used for additional sealift or storage duties, and one was reloaded and returned to the Pacific in case of a crisis there; (4) in addition to its ships, the Air Force had some equipment prepositioned in Saudi Arabia; and (5) after noting problems in the Gulf War deployment, the Marine Corps initiated improvements in its afloat prepositioning, such as better matching inventories to its needs, matching a ship's cargo to a specific combat unit type so all ships would not have to be deployed in every crisis, revising doctrine and personnel training for ship unloading, and fielding improved automated inventory systems at all fleet marine force locations. GAO also found that: (1) DOD is planning to expand its sealift capabilities, including designing new prepositioning ships, and increasing the Army contingent to 15 ships; (2) the DOD study considered less expensive land prepositioning near potential conflict sites, but DOD opted for the greater flexibility of afloat prepositioning; (3) DOD has not identified new sites for its expanded fleet; (4) the study did not consider the advantages of owning ships, such as greater fleet stability and specifically designed ships; and (5) the Army needs to identify and procure the additional equipment for prepositioning, develop a periodic maintenance program for equipment and ships, and determine how to fund its sealift operation and support costs.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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