National Aero-Space Plane

The National Aero-Space Plane Program, which during the past seven years has been developing an aircraft that can achieve a low earth orbit using a single stage, has been fraught with turmoil, changes in focus, and unmet expectations. The program is again at a crossroads, with costs increasing, technical progress behind schedule, and insufficient program funds. Although the program is supposed to be unconstrained by operational requirements, discussions about the utility or cost/benefit of the program have prematurely evolved into efforts to justify the program by citing the potential benefits from future operational aerospace vehicles and spin-off applications. GAO believes that, in responding to pressures to successfully compete for funding and to show results in the face of reduced budgets, unrealistic expectations have been raised about the time and cost required to achieve the program's goals and objectives. Program officials, aware of the need to again redirect the program, have proposed several alternative development strategies, but no decision has been made on which, if any, of the proposals will be approved. GAO recommends delaying any decision to build and test the X-30--a manned experimental flight vehicle--until critical technologies are developed and proven and decisions on program restructuring are made.

GAO found that: (1) NASP technological challenges and high risks have forced the program to be redirected toward research and technology development; (2) the NASP program has experienced technical problems, schedule delays, cost overruns, and a decreasing budget; (3) the decision to build the X-30 experimental flight test vehicle depends upon the resolution of technical problems concerning weight, complexity, and low speed engine thrust capacity requirements; (4) the Phase II NASP development is nearly 5 years behind schedule and 25 percent of the program's Phase II tests are incomplete due to budgetary constraints, schedule delays, and technical problems; (5) preliminary contractor estimates for building and testing two single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO) capable X-30 vehicles totalled about $17 billion and nearly five times the original $3.1-billion projected cost; (6) the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Department of Defense (DOD) were considering such fundamental NASP program options as extending the program schedule, refocusing NASP objectives toward propulsion system research and development, indefinitely deferring the program, or eliminating the X-30 vehicle and focusing on an unmanned subscale vehicle; (7) because of uncertain program objectives and time frames, NASA and DOD need to provide a cost/benefit justification to compete for limited budget funds; (8) NASP program justifications and benefits included more flexible and less costly access to space and a near-term potential for intra-agency technology transfer; and (9) DOD and NASA based future economic benefits and technological projections on overly optimistic assumptions.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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