Strategic Defense Initiative

Changing Design and Technological Uncertainties Create Significant Risk Gao ID: IMTEC-92-18 February 19, 1992

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) has consumed billions of dollars and undergone repeated changes in its objectives and design during nearly a decade of research and development, yet the tremendous technical challenges still facing "Star Wars" increase the risk that its promised protection against enemy missiles will not be realized. This report reviews the status, challenges, and risks associated with SDI's automated data processing and communications technologies. GAO notes that including or excluding integration capabilities for space-based interceptors in the missile defense system architecture has significant design and cost implications but to what degree is unknown. In proceeding with a system that uses both ground- and space-based interceptors, SDI will be pushing the cutting edge of technology and will have to rely on some unproven technologies.

GAO found that: (1) although the goal of the Missile Defense Act of 1991 is to deploy a missile defense system to protect the United States and its allies against limited missile attacks, the act does not address whether integration capabilities for space-based interceptors should be included in the missile defense system architecture; (2) the act authorizes $465 million for space-based interceptor research and development; (3) SDIO is continuing its efforts to design the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) system to address the change in program focus from deterrance to protection, but it has not solidified GPALS architecture; (4) until SDIO solidifies GPALS architecture, there is an increased risk that its subsystems will be incompatible; (5) if SDIO includes integration capabilities for space-based interceptors into the missile defense system but never deploys them, it will incur unnecessary costs, but if SDIO does not include space-based interceptor capabilities in the missile defense system and the inclusion is later deemed necessary, costly reengineering will be required; (6) resolving technical challenges in the GPALS subsystem, Battle Management/Command, Control, and Communications (BM/C3), is essential to GPALS development; and (7) BM/C3 software may have to operate on parallel processors and will require a highly sophisticated software engineering and development environment that is not currently available.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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