Infantry Antitank Weapons Tests

Assessment of the Army's Test and Evaluation of the Dragon II and BILL Gao ID: NSIAD-92-170 March 16, 1992

After conducting side-by-side testing and evaluation of two antitank weapons--the Dragon II and the Swedish Bofors Infantry Light and Lethal (BILL)--the Army must choose the superior system to fill in until the Army's new system called Javelin is fielded. The Army's selection must fully consider cost effectiveness and six performance measures, including tank killing capability, gunner survivability, portability by field troops, countermeasures vulnerability, system reliability, and safety. This report assesses the Army's evaluation, completed in January 1992. GAO discusses (1) whether additional tests are needed and (2) potential Dragon II improvements.

GAO found that: (1) the Army conducted some side-by-side tests, as required by the act, to assess Dragon II and BILL as interim medium antitank candidates and also established an evaluation team that considered the results of side-by-side tests, reviewed the results of earlier tests, and obtained the opinions of subject matter experts; (2) based on the team's findings, the Army selected Dragon II as the superior system; (3) the Army did not fully comply with the act's provisions, since it limited its testing primarily to tank-killing capability or lethality and did not adequately compare gunner survivability during either previous or current testing; (4) the Army's lethality tests and assessments appear to have been conducted in a reasonable manner and both systems were equally supportable and reliable; (5) the Army's tests did not provide sufficient information to select the superior system; (6) further testing of Dragon II and BILL may no longer be warranted, since the Army has already fielded Dragon II and even if BILL was selected as a supplemental interim system, the earliest its fielding could begin would be 17 months before the Javelin's scheduled fielding; (7) the dissolution of the Soviet Union has reduced the Soviet threat and the need for a supplemental interim system; (8) if changes should occur in the Soviet threat or the Javelin schedule, consideration could be given to Dragon II improvements as an alternative to BILL; and (9) the Army did not test the Milan because the contractor withdrew from the competition.



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