Army Force Structure

While the Army is successfully removing troops from Europe at a rapid pace, the drawdown is contributing to problems at U.S. military installations struggling to assimilate an influx of personnel from domestic base closures and realignments. The European drawdown will ultimately reduce troops, civilians, and installations to about half of their 1989 level. This briefing report (1) determines the status of military and civilian personnel cuts and whether the Army has been able to manage reductions at the pace imposed upon it; (2) identifies the Army's problems in repairing and relocating usable equipment and disposing of excess equipment; (3) determines how the Army is budgeting, accounting for, and covering its costs during the drawdown; and (4) ascertains the impact of force reductions in Europe on U.S. bases and on the quality of life of soldiers returning to the United States. In summarizing this report in testimony before Congress, GAO discussed the difficulties the Army faces in accomplishing this task and the steps it must take to overcome these problems; see: Army Force Structure: Issues Related to the Drawdown in Europe and Impacts on Soldiers and U.S. Bases, by Richard Davis, Director of Army Issues, before the Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation, House Committee on Armed Services. GAO/T-NSIAD-92-28, Apr. 9, 1992 (eight pages).

GAO found that: (1) the accelerated pace of the Army drawdown in Europe has greatly increased demands on USAREUR resources at a time when the USAREUR budget is being dramatically reduced; (2) although the Army is successfully removing troops from Europe at a rapid pace, the associated reductions in civilian personnel and equipment lag behind; (3) the European drawdown is contributing to the problems of U.S. military installations which are already burdened with assimilating an influx of personnel from domestic base closures and realignments; (4) returning soldiers are arriving at crowded posts, experiencing difficulty finding affordable housing, and bearing the cost of temporary lodging when housing can not be located within a few days; (5) although the Army is returning 57 formerly European-based support units originally scheduled for inactivation to bolster active-duty forces in its contingency force, much of those units' equipment was used in Operation Desert Storm and is in poor condition; (6) the Army believes that it can bring those units back to a high state of readiness by summer 1992, but the maintenance capacity of receiving bases is being fully taxed and it is uncertain how quickly this goal will be achieved; and (7) USAREUR has not yet disposed of the large amount of excess equipment resulting from force reductions or eliminated the entire stockpile of war reserve materiel in Central Europe.