Operation Desert Storm

Apache Helicopter Was Considered Effective in Combat, but Reliability Problems Persist Gao ID: NSIAD-92-146 April 20, 1992

The Apache--the Army's $14 million premier attack helicopter--received its first real test under combat conditions during the Persian Gulf war. In past reports, GAO highlighted reliability and logistical support problems with the Apache that could hinder the helicopter's effectiveness during actual combat. In the view of Apache pilots and commanders GAO interviewed, however, the Apache proved its effectiveness by destroying 278 tanks and about 900 other targets and by providing the Army with timely intelligence data. The Apache flew mostly armed reconnaissance missions during the air campaign, while during the 100-hour ground war, it flew mostly attack missions, its primary role. The Apache flew only a few missions during the war--a total of 83--mainly because of the perceived enemy threat to low-flying helicopters during the air campaign and because ground commanders opted against using the Apache more often. The Apache's key weapons and other vital subsystems did experience reliability problems, which were intensified by the harsh desert environment. Logistical problems, such as parts shortages, also arose, grounding some Apache aircraft. Nevertheless, Apache pilots and commanders said that the Apache completed all assigned missions.

GAO found that: (1) during Operation Desert Storm, Apaches proved their combat effectiveness by destroying 278 tanks and about 900 other targets; (2) during the air campaign, Apaches primarily flew armed night reconnaissance missions in enemy territory because of their night vision and videotape capabilities, which provided timely intelligence information to Army division commanders; (3) Apaches flew only a total of 83 missions during the war, primarily because of the perceived enemy threat to low-flying helicopters during the air campaign and because the use of Apaches could have divulged the location of allied forces; (4) Apache use was also limited during the ground campaign, because ground commanders, who controlled the Apache's use and roles, chose not to use it more and the Army was restricted in where it could use the Apache due to agreements with the Air Force; (5) the Apache was capable of performing its assigned missions during the war, but component problems, sometimes intensified by harsh desert conditions, adversely affected the performance of the Apache's essential weapons and other subsystems; (6) during the 100-hour ground campaign, little maintenance was performed on the Apaches because units advanced through enemy territory so rapidly that maintenance support could not keep up with the aircraft; and (7) Apache pilots and maintainers cited the lack of spare parts as the most frequent reason some aircraft were not available to carry out missions.



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