Operation Desert Storm

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm represent the largest U.S. military deployment since the Vietnam War. During the Gulf War, the Army moved more than 519,00 tons of supplies to Southwest Asia, much of which passed through two main depots: the New Cumberland Army Depot and the Red River Army Depot. Concerns have been raised that, despite hundreds of millions of dollars being spent to modernize Army depots, materiel and supplies backlogged during the war. This report looks at (1) how much the New Cumberland and Red River Depots' work loads increased as a result of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, (2) the size of depots' backlogs of received items and items to be shipped, (3) what caused the backlogs, and (4) what lessons have been learned that could be applied to improving logistics operations.

GAO found that, during Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield: (1) New Cumberland's receiving work load increased 44 percent, its requisition processing work load increased 59 percent, and its shipping work load increased 25 percent; (2) Red River's receiving and requisition work loads increased slightly, and its shipping work load increased 121 percent; (3) New Cumberland's materiel receiving backlog increased from 0 to 49 days, and its shipping backlog increased from 0 to 5 days; (3) Red River's receiving backlog increased from 26 days to 38 days by October 1990 and then decreased to 15 days by February 1991, and its shipping backlog increased from 9 to 27 days; and (4) the increased backlogs were primarily due to reductions in force that occurred at the same time as work-load increases, automated storage and retrieval systems that were not operational and exceeded optimal storage capacity. GAO also found the Army's logistics report about the lessons learned during the conflict suggests way to address problems involving: (1) inadequate oversight of cargo; (2) inefficiency of manual processing of requisitions; (3) reduction-in-force actions; and (4) a lack of accountability over deployed materiel and equipment. GAO believes that, although the Army has suggested corrective actions, the Department of Defense will have to make a long-term commitment to fulfill those actions in order for them to be effective.