ADP Procurement

Prompt Navy Action Can Reduce Risks to SNAP III Implementation Gao ID: IMTEC-92-69 September 29, 1992

This report presents GAO's assessment of the Navy's efforts to upgrade its Shipboard NonTactical ADP Program (SNAP). GAO selected this acquisition, known as SNAP III, because of its large life-cycle cost, estimated at about $600 million, and because it is in an early stage in the procurement cycle, where corrections are easier and cheaper to make. GAO found that the Navy is not providing enough managerial oversight to minimize SNAP III risks. This has resulted in incompatible systems, which require different hardware and software to perform similar functions, being installed aboard ships. Continued implementation of incompatible systems is contrary to the Navy's goal of an integrated environment for all shipboard nontactical systems. A single authority over developing and funding all shipboard nontactical programs is needed to ensure that all ongoing and planned efforts support this goal. Furthermore, the Navy lacks a strategic information resources management (IRM) plan for SNAP III implementation. Without a plan specifying standards for hardware, software, and system interfaces, all efforts to integrate the shipboard environment will be highly vulnerable to schedule delays, cost overruns, and poor performance. The lack of a strategic IRM plan also means that the Navy has no way of knowing whether continued installation of the old systems on new ships is justified.

GAO found that: (1) the Navy has inadequate managerial oversight of SNAP development because no single manager or organization has the authority to direct development or control deployment, which has led to redundant development efforts and incompatible systems; (2) 12 separate commands have autonomy over the development and funding of major SNAP systems; (3) the different systems do not meet SNAP III goals, and waste resources; (4) the Navy does not have a strategic information resources management (IRM) plan for SNAP III implementation, which has led to its failure to develop contingency plans, assess hardware and software needs, or address the transition from old to new systems; (5) the Navy is installing antiquated SNAP II systems on its newest vessels, which will increase costs if they have to be replaced with SNAP III equipment; and (6) the Navy has begun developing a strategic IRM plan for SNAP.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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