Javelin Antitank Weapon

The Army is developing the Javelin as a portable, hand-held missile launcher that troops can use on the battlefield to destroy enemy tanks. Since June 1989, cost estimates for producing and fielding the Javelin have soared by about 57 percent to $11.9 billion and development of the weapon is now substantially behind schedule. This report examines (1) the causes for cost increases and schedule delays and whether more cost and schedule slippages are likely, (2) whether the Army has reassessed the number of Javelins that are needed based on current threat assessments, and (3) whether there is a requirement for the Javelin to better distinguish between friend and foe when firing.

GAO found that: (1) the Army's total cost estimate for the Javelin increased from $7.6 billion in June 1989 to $11.9 billion in August 1991; (2) the $1.1-billion increase in acquisitions costs is primarily due to an expanded production period and contractor problems in developing a missile component; (3) the $3.2-billion increase in fielding and support costs is primarily due to higher costs for field and support services, higher charges for spare parts, and higher escalation rates in estimates; (4) the Army's cost estimate for producing the missile's focal plane array component is optimistic and understated; (5) the Army restructured the original 36-month Javelin development schedule to a 54-month schedule after the contractor encountered significant problems in developing the focal plane array component; (6) the Army and the Department of Defense (DOD) assess the restructured schedule as posing a moderate risk because of the limited time available for redesigning and retesting; (7) the Army plans to maintain its original plans to procure 58,000 Javelin missiles, in spite of the dramatic decline in assessed threats since June 1989; (8) the Marine Corps reduced its planned procurement of Javelin missiles by over 30 percent; (9) although the Javelin is not required to distinguish friend from foe, the Army has not scheduled its advanced sensor, which offers some inherent capability, for assessment; and (10) DOD stated that modern weapons needed such identification capability, and Desert Storm experience reinforced the need for such capability.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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