Operation Desert Storm

The U.S. armed forces relied heavily on the Patriot missile to intercept incoming Iraqi Scud missiles during the Persian Gulf war. Because the Army did not collect performance data, however, it is impossible to know with any precision how well the Patriot did in hitting battlefield targets during Operation Desert Storm. About nine percent of Patriot launches produced strong evidence, such as disabled Scuds embedded with Patriot fragments, that the target was destroyed. Another 16 percent of the engagements produced less convincing evidence of success, such as radar tracking data showing that the Patriots came close to the Scuds. This evidence does not prove, however, that the Patriots either destroyed or diverted the Scuds.

GAO found that: (1) the Patriot computers collected target information that can not irrefutably prove that the Patriot destroyed or failed to destroy Scud warheads; (2) since all ground damage assessments were not equally comprehensive, the absence of identified ground damage could be a misleading indicator of a warhead kill; (3) strong evidence exists for about 9 percent of the engagements that the Army believes resulted in warhead kills, including a ground damage report that a Scud had been recovered with Patriot fragments or fragment holes and radar tracking evidence that the Scud experienced a dramatic slowdown and that debris was present after a Patriot intercept; and (4) lesser evidence exists for 16 percent of engagements, includomg computer-generated data to support the Army's determination that a Scud was detected, engaged, and intercepted and ground damage reports that showed no ground damage relating to these engagements.