Chemical Weapons Destruction
Issues Affecting Program Cost, Schedule, and Performance Gao ID: NSIAD-93-50 January 21, 1993Congress told the Pentagon in 1985 to destroy the bulk of the U.S. stockpile of lethal chemical weapons. The Defense Department plans to spend nearly $8 billion to build and run specially designed, high-temperature incinerators on Johnston Island in the Pacific Ocean and at eight locations around the continental United States. GAO's review of test results from the Johnston Island facility shows lower than anticipated destruction rates stemming from unreliable equipment. This could mean that the destruction program will take longer than planned and exceed cost estimates. The overall average hourly rate of rocket destruction improved substantially from the first to the second test phase, but extensive maintenance downtime continued to slow operations. Public concerns about the safety of chemical weapons incineration have caused several states to consider legislation that could halt construction of the facilities. The Army began a study in October 1991 to identify and evaluate the possible use of alternative technologies to destroy chemical weapons and agents. The Army has also continued to encounter difficulties in obtaining the required environmental permits. Congress recently extended the mandatory completion date of the disposal program by more than five years and postponed funding decisions for future incineration facilities until the results of the alternative technology study are known.
GAO found that: (1) the Army's operation of the prototype disposal facility was generally safe and performance improved, but destruction rates were lower than expected due to unplanned and unscheduled maintenance downtime; (2) the Army and the contractor used different methodologies to compute the destruction rates, but neither fully incorporated downtime in their formulas; (3) the prototype facility operated on its planned 10-hours per day schedule less than 30 percent of the time; (4) the Army has not revised its life-cycle costs and schedules for future sites to reflect the probability that the disposal facility could not operate 24 hours a day as planned; (5) the Army needed to publish its assessment reports with less delay; (6) the Army determined that on-site destruction was the safest and most efficient way to dispose of chemical weapons, but state regulations and public opposition could delay or prohibit new disposal facility construction; (7) the Army initiated a review of alternative chemical weapons disposal technologies, in response to opposition to high temperature incinerators; (8) Congress mandated the use of an alternative technology at three sites if it was significantly safer, equally cost-effective, and would take less time, and prohibited incinerator construction at another site until the Army completed its assessment of alternative technologies; (9) the Army considerably underestimated the time environmental permit processes take, partly due to states not having a priority schedule for permit processing; and (10) some states are considering legislation that would delay or prevent construction of chemical weapon incinerators, which would significantly delay weapon disposal.
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