Desert Shield/Storm

The Air Force Air Mobility Command performed well under demanding circumstances during Operation Desert Shield/Storm, showing flexibility in its response to unforeseen difficulties associated with the airlift operation. The Air Force's ability to transport sustainment cargo--the material required to supply deployed troops--and units to the theater of operations efficiently was taxed by several factors, some of which were beyond the Air Force's control. These difficulties, however, were largely offset by the lengthy buildup period between August 1990 and January 1991. By the start of Desert Storm, the Defense Department and the Air Force had devised "work arounds" that, to a large degree, alleviated these problems. Yet even with the Air Force's flexibility in devising work arounds, the lack of available aircrews prompted the Air Force to extend allowable hours for flight times; regulations normally limit these hours because of the dangers associated with aircrew fatigue. Further, the long distances and lack of an in-theater recovery base forced the Air Force to rely extensively on Air Reserve Component volunteer aircrews before the official call-up of the Reserves was authorized. Finally, the Air Force's decision to activate partial, rather than complete Reserve units, caused confusion about command structure and administrative procedures.

GAO found that: (1) AMC maintained continuous airlift operations from the United States to Saudi Arabia from the first day of Desert Shield deployment; (2) AMC averaged 65 missions per day from August 7, 1990, to November 1990; (3) AMC averaged 125 missions per day when hostilities began with Desert Storm; (4) AMC access to off-load locations was more limited in the initial months of Desert Shield than expected; (5) large backlogs of sustainment cargo caused legitimate high-priority cargo to be delayed at AMC aerial ports of embarkation; (6) additional off-load locations were made available to AMC through political negotiations and physical improvements to facilities in Saudi Arabia; (7) the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Command sent representatives to major AMC ports of embarkation to reduce the large backlogs and speed the delivery of sustainment cargo; (8) the Central Command's allocation of airlift cargo capacity imposed a degree of discipline on the transportation and supply requisition systems and made field commanders and supply units aware of the limited availability of airlift cargo; (9) AMC required reserve augmentation earlier than envisioned and relied heavily on reserve volunteers for the 3 weeks prior to the presidential call-up due to the lack of an in-theater recovery base; and (10) the Air Force called up its reserves by subunits or skill categories rather than as whole units.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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