Operation Desert Storm

During Operation Desert Storm, a large coalition tanker fleet shipped more than 700 million pounds of fuel during roughly 50,000 refuelings to about 2,000 aircraft. Although these results suggest a notable success, it must also be acknowledged that an average of nearly 40 percent of the fuel carried by Air Force tankers went unused. This degree of inefficiency prevented more combat missions from being supported, a frustrating situation for operational planners. It also suggests that more tankers were supporting operations than were needed on the basis of fuel requirements alone. The policy of giving priority to refueling strategic bombers left a gap in both the capability and knowledge necessary to support a large conventional contingency. Accordingly, the tanker force faces several challenges as it switches from a predominately conventional role. The Pentagon will have to decide, in light of the smaller post-Cold War force, the proper size and capability of the tanker fleet. Although Desert Storm may not be a prototype for future tanker operations, it offers lessons that may be helpful in making that decision.

GAO found that: (1) during Operation Desert Storm, a large coalition tanker fleet transferred over 700 million pounds of fuel to about 2,000 aircraft over 43 days of combat; (2) although the results of the refueling operations were positive, nearly 40 percent of the fuel carried by Air Force tankers went unused; (3) refueling inefficiency prevented the support of additional combat missions; (4) the Desert Storm experience suggests that more tankers were supporting operations than needed; (5) in light of the information obtained from Operation Desert Storm and changes in overall global defense requirements, the Department of Defense (DOD) needs to review and adjust the size and capability of its air tanker fleet to support conventional rather than strategic contingencies; (6) additional actions to improve refueling operations include the need for better planning tools and communication equipment, research and analysis of air refueling support operations, integration of tankers, planning for conventional contingencies, sharing of tanker training hours among receiver communities, and greater standardization of refueling systems; and (7) the Air Force does not collect and analyze data on improving the efficiency of aerial refueling operations.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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