Small Arms Parts

During the past several years, many thefts of small arms parts from Army bases and National Guard armories have been discovered. The common thread in these thefts has been the involvement of military personnel. In all but one case, the thefts were discovered by accident. An indicator of the pervasiveness of these thefts is that military small arms parts are readily available at gun shows across the country, including the parts necessary to convert sporting rifles into fully automatic M16 assault weapons. During its most recent review, GAO discovered previously undetected thefts of small arms parts by National Guardsmen in Michigan. One of these Guardsmen had been selling small arms parts to a national gun dealer who turned out to be a supplier to the Branch Davidian religious sect in Waco, Texas. The thefts had gone unnoticed for years because of inattentive management and inadequate internal controls. Notable deficiencies included the following: (1) key supply and repair duties were often carried out by the same person, (2) inventory controls fell short, (3) physical security was weak, and (4) computer system control weaknesses hid thefts. GAO summarized this report in testimony before Congress; see: Military Small Arms Parts: Poor Controls Invite Widespread Theft, by Donna M. Heivilin, Director of Defense Management and NASA Issues, before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. GAO/T-NSIAD-94-79, Nov. 18, 1993 (14 pages).

GAO found that: (1) many thefts and attempted thefts of small arms parts have occurred over the past 5 years; (2) the common factor in these thefts has been the involvement of military personnel; (3) military small arms parts are readily available to the public at gun shows, and it is likely that these small parts are stolen property; (4) thefts are undetected because of inadequate management, physical security, and computer system controls that hide thefts; (5) at the six sites reviewed, key supply and repair duties are not separated, requisitions for repair parts are not reviewed on a regular basis, and inventory documentation is incomplete; (6) serious vulnerabilities in computer system controls have enabled military personnel to steal parts; and (7) adequate security and system controls are essential to ensure total system integrity from origination of source documents through final disposition of products.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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