Operation Desert Storm

The medical and evacuation units provided by the Air Force during Operation Desert Storm would have been unable to handle the projected number of casualties. Further, even though actual casualty rates fell short of the predictions, the units still had a hard time accomplishing their missions. Units did not have enough or the right mix of people; supplies were often incompatible with the equipment, missing, or outdated; many personnel were inadequately trained; and the system used to regulate the movement of patients did not work. According to Air Force personnel, the Air Force's system of forming teams to meet staffing requirements was biased and caused low troop morale.

GAO found that: (1) the Air Force could not have adequately cared for, evacuated, and regulated the predicted number of casualties because its medical and evacuation units were often inappropriately staffed for the assigned missions, logistics and equipment problems, and inadequate training for deployment conditions; (2) several factors caused patient flow problems and ineffective use of hospitalization including the lack of involvement of joint regulating officials in directing patient movement, internal and external theater communications problems, and inadequately integrated and time-consuming computer systems; (3) the Air Force believes that its ability to deploy its medical and evacuation units will improve significantly after prior recommendations have been approved and implemented; (4) the Air Force's system for staffing its medical and evacuation units was problematic, biased, and promoted short-term degradation of unit cohesion; and (5) the Air Force believes that troop morale and other problems associated with its medical and evacuation staffing system will be resolved through better unit education and training.