Strategic Bombers

The Air Force's "Bomber Roadmap" estimates that it will cost about $3 billion to modify and equip the B-1B and B-52 bombers with conventional capabilities, but this figure is understated by billions of dollars. At the end of the Cold War, the Air Force redefined the role of its bomber force from one focused on nuclear war to one equipped to do a variety of conventional missions--a scenario spelled out in the June 1992 "Bomber Roadmap." This report discusses operational and fiscal challenges that Congress and the Pentagon will need to address when deciding the level of funding needed to make the changeover to a conventional role. GAO identifies some operational problems that must be resolved if the B-1B aircraft is to become the backbone of the conventional bomber force, and GAO questions the Air Force's plans to equip each type of bomber with some mix of precision-guided munitions.

GAO found that: (1) the Air Force planned to make the B-1B strategic bomber the backbone of its bomber force and equip B-52, B-1B, and B-2 bombers with precision-guided munitions; (2) while the B-52 bomber delivers a wide variety of weapons and performs a variety of missions, the B-1B bomber currently can deliver only one kind of bomb and its mission is limited; (3) low altitude bomb-to-bomb collisions and excessive bomb-reloading times limit the effectiveness of the B-1B bomber; (4) corrections to remedy bomb collisions would not necessarily reduce current mission objectives; (5) the B-2 bomber was designed to have a nuclear and conventional role, however information was insufficient to project the aircraft's future conventional capability; (6) the Air Force's bomber roadmap was inadequate to make funding decisions and failed to address the contributions of carrier-based and long-range theater attack aircraft; (7) modifying B-1B and B-52 bombers for conventional capabilities would total over $3 billion; (8) bomber modification costs could be greatly understated due to operational, defensive avionics systems procurement, and war readiness spare parts problems; and (9) total modification costs could increase by $11 million due to the Air Force's failure to include the cost of procuring and developing exclusive nonprecision-guided munitions.