Operation Desert Storm

The limited role of strategic bombers in Operation Desert Storm, coupled with employment, equipment, and training problems, precludes a definitive assessment of the contribution they can make in a conventional war. The B-52 was intended to undermine the morale of Iraqi ground forces through periodic bombardment. The sheer number of other aircraft attacking the same targets and inadequate battle damage assessments, however, make it hard to isolate the B-52's contribution. GAO does note several issues that should be addressed in deciding the future of the bomber force. First, because the B-52 was often employed like a tactical fighter aircraft, Desert Storm did not make full use of its conventional capabilities. Second, the nuclear orientation of the B-52 force made the plane inadequately prepared for the demands of conventional missions in the Persian Gulf. Finally, B-52 support during Desert Storm was at the same time a notable success story and an object lesson in the magnitude of the effort required to sustain B-52 operations overseas. GAO believes that the need for theater commanders to play a major active peacetime role in identifying bomber equipment and training priorities was a major lesson learned during Desert Storm. But the bomber priorities embodied in the Air Force road map, such as fixed targets and long range, autonomous operations, do not reflect the theater commanders' use of B-52s in Desert Storm. Nor did the Air Force seek input from theater commanders in developing its road map.

GAO found that: (1) it could not assess the bombers' contribution to Operation Desert Storm, since they were a small part of the total air force, they flew few missions, their missions were not geared to their strengths, and battle damage assessments were inadequate; (2) the B-52 force was not adequately prepared to meet all wartime demands because factors considered in its nuclear orientation were not material to conventional operations; (3) the B-52 force focused on low-altitude training prior to the war, but during the war, the bombers usually flew at high altitudes and with fighter support, for which their crews had inadequate training; (4) the bombers had equipment limitations for high-altitude missions; (5) the Strategic Air Command (SAC) provided much of the B-52 logistical support required, and most of the planes were based far from the war theater; (6) with the dissolution of SAC, future theater commanders will need to devote large logistical efforts to B-52 bombers; and (7) appropriate munitions were not always available for certain types of missions.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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