Operation Desert Storm

Navy medical units that supported Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm were assigned wartime missions they were unprepared for. They were neither staffed nor equipped to care for the numbers of casualties they were told to expect, provide noncombat medical care, support the evacuation of casualties out of theater, or receive large numbers of chemically contaminated casualties. The personnel information systems used to assign individuals to Navy medical units contained incomplete and outdated information. Many doctors and nurses who were scheduled to deploy did not do so for a variety of reasons. In addition, medical personnel had not trained during peacetime for their wartime mission. Personnel also raised concerns about their ability to obtain equipment and supplies needed to treat mass casualties and to perform other missions. Fortunately, the six-month interval between deployment and the start of the ground war allowed individuals to prepare for their wartime roles. By most accounts, medical units supplied by the Navy provided adequate care for those in need. However, had the Navy incurred the predicted number of casualties, or had the ground war started earlier or lasted longer, the care provided by these units might have fallen short.

GAO found that: (1) the Navy medical units were not prepared to fulfill their assigned missions, although the Navy demonstrated its ability to rapidly provide significant medical capabilities during wartime; (2) the units' missions included handling more casualties than they were designed for, providing noncombat medical care, supporting the evacuation of casualties out of theater, and receiving large numbers of chemically contaminated casualties; (3) the Navy did not efficiently manage its deployment and assignment of medical personnel because full mobilization did not occur; (4) the Navy's personnel information system contained outdated and inaccurate data; (5) medical personnel were deployed without adequate training; (6) the lack of inventory controls allowed incomplete, unmaintained, and incompatible equipment to be sent to the theater; (7) inadequate inventory records hampered the deployment of medical supplies and equipment; (8) the incompatibility of the Navy's automated supply systems with the Army's supply system increased order and shipping times for medical supplies; and (9) although the Navy has initiated improvements in providing in-theater medical support, it has not established time frames to correct identified problems.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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