Operation Desert Storm

During Operation Desert Storm, at least 25 U.S. military personnel were killed by U.S. submunitions and many others were injured. The Army attributes 16 of these deaths to inappropriate handling of munitions. This report reviews aspects of the Army's Persian Gulf experience with its M42, M46, and M77 submunitions, which were responsible for some of the deaths and injuries. GAO discusses whether (1) the dud rate for these munitions as calculated during acceptance tests was higher than the Army's requirements or goals, (2) U.S. soldiers were adequately warned about the dangers of unexploded submunitions, (3) it was reasonable to use submunitions in areas that U.S. soldiers expected to occupy, and (4) the Army's planned improvements will reduce these casualties in the future.

GAO found that: (1) the submunitions' dud rate was higher than the Army's dud rate goal; (2) design and deployment deficiencies caused higher than expected dud rates; (3) although soldiers were repeatedly warned of the dangers of unexploded submunitions, they were not trained to recognize them; (4) the lack of discipline and inadequate leadership contributed to soldiers collecting unexploded submunitions as souvenirs; (5) the Army's use of submunitions in Operation Desert Storm was reasonable, but its failure to consider the effect of unexploded submunitions increased the potential for friendly casualties; and (6) the Army has initiated improvements to reduce the submunition dud rate, and increase soldiers' awareness of submunition dangers and use in combat, but submunitions already in inventory will not be modified.